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For Leo and Viola

Preface
This book is about Denis Diderot’s late work, the Éléments de physiologie. 
It argues, against the prevailing view, that this treatise made a substantial 
contribution to materialist thought, offering ways of explaining a 
human being without recourse to the divine and also without reducing 
human complexity or doing away with awe and wonder. These ways 
were physiological. The prevailing view accepts that Diderot planned 
to do something like this, but considers that unfortunately he did not 
complete his project. I argue that he did, and I explain not only why I 
think this, but also what led to the prevailing view that he did not, and 
why that particular story is illuminating in itself. Another aspect of the 
prevailing view is that it is accepted that even in its unfinished form, this 
work would have been of importance and interest to readers of the time, 
if only it had circulated and been read instead of being hidden away in 
two copies in the inaccessible private archives of Diderot’s daughter and 
Catherine II of Russia, his patron. I argue that it did circulate, was read, 
and did have a decisive influence as early as the 1790s, and also that 
it was published, in an admittedly slightly odd form, in 1823. To help 
this rather argumentative study make its case, I offer a connected digital 
edition of this first publication, Jacques-André Naigeon’s Mémoires 
historiques et philosophiques sur la vie et les ouvrages de Denis Diderot, which 
can be accessed here: https://naigeons-diderot.mml.ox.ac.uk/index.
htm.
A quick word on the translations: every quoted text is followed by 
an English translation, with both languages equal on the page. This is 
to make it as accessible as possible to any interested reader, whether 
francophone or anglophone or somewhere in between. The translations 
x The Atheist’s Bible
are drawn from published works where possible, but in the many cases 
where there is none, I keep the translated text as close to the original as 
possible (while hopefully still making sense), specifically to facilitate 








1. Introduction:  
The Curious Materialist 
L’amour est plus difficile à expliquer que la faim: car le fruit n’éprouve 
pas le désir d’être mangé.1 
Love is harder to explain than hunger, for a piece of fruit does not feel the 
desire to be eaten.
Love is more difficult to explain than hunger, or so says the eighteenth-
century philosophe and explainer of difficult things, Denis Diderot. 
How could we disagree? Hunger is probably a more fundamental 
physiological need than the complex set of feelings called love. Even if 
the comparison nudges us to see love in terms of another physiological 
need, lust and the drive to procreate, we would probably still agree 
that it is harder to explain than hunger. And that is where we suppose 
1  Throughout this book, I will give page references to the three current critical editions, 
in order of publication, in part to facilitate ease of reference for readers with access 
to only one of them, and in part because the most recent edition massively expands 
our understanding of the sources Diderot used when composing this work, and 
is therefore immediately a crucial referent. First, Jean Mayer’s 1987 edition: Denis 
Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Jean Mayer, vol. 17 (Paris: Hermann, 1987). 
This constitutes volume 17 of the ongoing Œuvres complètes of Diderot, known as 
DPV, after three of its founding editors, Herbert Dieckmann, Jacques Proust, and 
Jean Varloot. Second, Paolo Quintili’s stand-alone edition: Denis Diderot, Éléments 
de physiologie, ed. by Paolo Quintili (Paris: Champion, 2004). Third, Motoichi 
Terada’s edition: Denis Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Motoichi Terada 
(Paris: Éditions Matériologiques, 2019). This makes available Terada’s immense 
work on Diderot’s sources, which very helpfully appeared as I was revising this 
manuscript. I will always signal when his indication of a source should be taken 
into account in our understanding of any given passage. Thus: DPV 494/PQ 328/
MT 307. 
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Diderot is taking us, towards an analysis of hunger and love as appetites 
of different but recognisable sorts. But that is not where the sentence 
goes! The reason he gives for love being harder to explain than hunger 
is that a piece of fruit does not feel the desire to be eaten. What? We 
suddenly halt. 
The perspective has switched, from the person who feels appetites 
to the object of their appetite, be that a piece of fruit or, implicitly, the 
desired person. Does a piece of fruit feel anything at all? By stating that 
the fruit has no desire to be eaten, Diderot raises the possibility that 
it might indeed have feelings of some sort, even desires, even if this 
particular one, not to be eaten, is negative. Furthermore, in saying that 
the piece of fruit does not want to be eaten, the proposed self-protective 
position of the piece of fruit sounds perfectly reasonable. So here we are, 
in agreement with the imaginary point of view of a piece of fruit. Look 
what he has reduced us to! We are obliged to pause and take stock; and 
although we do not really think that a piece of fruit has sensation or 
feeling, we are wondering about the relationship between an eater and 
an eaten thing, and seeing that it raises questions about reciprocity that 
might need further thought. These same questions about reciprocity 
return us to the other factor in this equation: love, or rather, those feeling 
the love, the lovers. Does a lover pulsate with the desire to be eaten? 
We appear to be bordering on the sexually explicit. Certainly, Diderot 
is presenting us with a complex knot that brings together and literally 
equates not only bodily urges, emotions, and feelings, but also fruitly 
feelings. And this all feels rather challenging, to put it no more strongly 
than that. 
The Éléments de physiologie quite frequently exerts a sort of Alice in 
Wonderland pressure on the reader, inverting proportions, shaking 
assumptions, making bizarre comparisons, asserting relationships 
between phenomena we would never have thought of associating. For 
instance, we read that blood flows round the body faster than the fastest 
river.2 That is not just an analogy to make us understand the point more 
quickly, not just an image that evokes coursing water only to project 
an internal picture of our rivery arteries, it’s also an exact statement 
about the relative speeds of fluids in nature which requires us to think 
2  DPV 376/PQ 195/MT 196.
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about them comparatively. Or, as we find on another page, ‘un œil se 
fait comme une anémone’ [an eye grows like an anemone] and ‘un 
homme se fait comme un œil’ [a man grows like an eye].3 Here, rather 
than moving progressively from simple to complex and thus from an 
anemone to an eye and thence to a human being, Diderot criss-crosses 
the different organisms so that we never settle into some complacent 
supremacist hierarchy. In fact, he is more likely to do the exact opposite, 
as here:
Les animaux carnassiers sont plus sujets au vomissement que les 
frugivores. 
Les ruminants ne vomissent point.
L’huître n’a point de bouche.4
Carnivorous animals are more subject to vomiting than herbivores.
Ruminants don’t vomit at all.
The oyster has no mouth. 
There is a visible sequence to the order in which Diderot presents 
digestion here: he moves from the top of the food chain to the bottom; 
from complex meat-eater to simple oyster (oysters are the typical 
example of a crude life form in writing of the period).5 And yet the 
bodily function he chooses, the ability to vomit, might not be the normal 
way of establishing a top-down hierarchy. Furthermore, the mouthless 
oyster somehow seems seriously incapacitated in this series: it is not that 
the oyster does not vomit because it never needs to, but that it has no 
mouth so it cannot. 
Diderot’s human being is not a supreme life form, but a composite 
of life forms in all their stages: ‘l’homme a toutes les sortes d’existence: 
l’inertie, la sensibilité, la vie végétale, la vie polypeuse, la vie humaine’ 
[man has every kind of existence: inertia, feeling, vegetable life, polypous 
life, human life].6 Thus, analogies whereby the nervous system is like 
‘une écrevisse’ [a crayfish],7 or the blood vessels around the heart 
3  DPV 432/PQ 253/MT 250.
4  DPV 402/PQ 202/MT 220.
5  See Caroline Jacot-Grapa, ‘Des huîtres aux grands animaux’, Dix-huitième siècle, 42.1 
(2010), 99–117 (pp. 107–08), https://doi.org/10.3917/dhs.042.0099. 
6  DPV 337/PQ 154/MT 157.
7  DPV 355/PQ 175/MT 174.
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are like its ‘pattes’ [paws],8 are not just imaginative comparisons that 
draw the reader in by giving them a rapid and vivid visualisation, 
but also genuine investigations into the cohabitation of different life 
systems within one complex organism. The Éléments de physiologie is as 
much about the elements as it is about the physiology: it looks at the 
shifting forms and patterns of matter and it considers humans in their 
material embodiment, as an expression thereof. It asks how the being 
and behaviour of any given person express that material identity, in 
sickness and in health. Bodily sensation, emotion, and perception are 
thus directly connected, as Diderot shows, using himself as an example:
Je suis heureux, tout ce qui m’entoure s’embellit. Je souffre, tout ce qui 
m’entoure s’obscurcit.9
I am happy, and everything around me grows beautiful. I am in pain, and 
everything around me is plunged in gloom.
And he asks what, in a context whereby physiological embodiment is 
all-determining, selfhood might be? The answer is that self is memory: 
La mémoire constitue le soi. La conscience du soi et la conscience de 
son existence sont différentes. Des sensations continues sans mémoire 
donneraient la conscience ininterrompue de son existence: elles ne 
produiraient nulle conscience de soi.10
Memory constitutes the self. The consciousness of self and the 
consciousness of one’s existence are different. What continuous sensation 
without any memory would impart would be the uninterrupted sense of 
existence, not any consciousness of self.
Selfhood is not a given, and its lack or loss have to be envisaged. It may 
exist for only part of life, between childhood and old age. The processes 
of growth and decline cannot be controlled, but are impelled forward 
naturally, passively. Change and flux are constant: 
Nul état fixe dans le corps animal: il décroît quand il ne croît plus.11
8  DPV 373/PQ 192/MT 192.
9  DPV 461/PQ 287/MT 277.
10  DPV 471/PQ 298/MT 286.
11  DPV 312/PQ 127/MT 135.
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There is no fixed state in the animal body: it starts shrinking once it stops 
growing.
There is always movement and variation: this is a premise of materialist 
thought. In the context of human physiology, that means growth, age, 
illness, and also, inevitably, malformation. The curious materialist will 
be fascinated by all these variations in bodily condition, and will want to 
know what effect they have on perception, experience, and happiness. 
Diderot is this curious materialist, and while one could no doubt 
argue that all of his works explore aspects of human embodiment and 
experience in some way, it is in the Éléments de physiologie that he focuses 
on it most directly, thoroughly and systematically. Furthermore, written 
at the end of his life, it contains and distills aspects of everything he has 
hitherto engaged with; it has great range and depth of allusion, and great 
writerly control, such that images, phrases, stories, and subjects work 
their way into the reading mind and stick there. As Diderot comments 
with a witty and virtuoso command of rhythm and onomatopeia, ‘un 
plat ouvrage nous endort comme le murmure monotone d’un ruisseau’ 
[a flat piece of work sends us to sleep like the monotonous murmur of a 
stream].12 This work is one long series of jolts. The chapter opened with 
one such, and indeed it is woven through with bizarre one-liners that 
specialise in startling juxtapositions.
Diderot probably started working on the Éléments soon after he 
completed the first draft of his experimental poetico-materialist 
dialogue Le Rêve de d’Alembert [D’Alembert’s Dream] in 1769, with its 
quartet of truly existing but fictionalised speakers, philosophe Diderot, 
mathematician Jean le Rond d’Alembert, doctor Théophile de Bordeu, 
female Julie de Lespinasse. D’Alembert’s Dream in fact serves as an 
imaginative introduction to the substantial materialist treatise that is 
the Éléments de physiologie, which Diderot probably continued to work 
on until relatively close to his death in 1784.13 In terms of genre it is quite 
unlike his earlier writings in this area, be they the allusive Lettres (on 
12  DPV 506/PQ 345/MT 320.
13  We know this because there are references to it in his Réfutation d’Helvétius and 
Observations sur Hemsterhuis, from 1773–74, and within the Éléments itself he remarks 
that he was more than 66 years old when he working on a particular section, which 
would date that part to after October 1779 [DPV 313/PQ 129/MT 136], and finally, 
the most developed manuscript version we have, from his daughter’s archive the 
Fonds Vandeul, has additions that could not have been made before 1782. So, this 
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the blind or on the deaf and dumb), the aphoristic Pensées or indeed the 
audacious dialogues that form Le Rêve de d’Alembert.14 It advertises its 
claim to seriousness overtly. This is obvious from the title itself, whether 
that title is indeed the Éléments de physiologie or simply Physiologie 
(there is some dispute about this).15 And despite the many startling 
one-liners, cunningly designed to jolt the sleepy and passive reader 
into wakefulness, its attentive approach to the thorough but succinct 
description of the human body aligns it more with the knowledge-
disseminating Encyclopédie he edited for more than twenty years than 
with the rest of his generally elliptical writings, with the crucial difference 
that here he presents his highly contentious theories about matter, life, 
thought, and the human mind unmasked, and step by censorable step. 
As Diderot puts it, while nonetheless admitting that this method is 
not infallible, ‘il n’y a qu’un moyen de connaître la vérité, c’est de ne 
procéder que par partie et de ne conclure qu’après une énumération 
exacte et entière’ [there’s only one way of getting to the truth, to proceed 
from one part to the next and to conclude only after an exact and total 
enumeration].16 His earlier text, the Rêve de d’Alembert, for all its playful 
gives us periodic reference points that suggest that he was working on it across the 
final fifteen years of his life. 
14  Pensées philosophiques, published in 1746, Lettre sur les aveugles, published in 1749 and 
the Lettre sur les sourds et muets, published in 1751, the Principes sur l’interprétation 
de la nature published in 1753, and the Principes philosophiques sur la matière et le 
mouvement, written but not published, in 1770.
15  The (early draft) St Petersburg manuscript is entitled Élémen[t]s de physiologie; the 
(mature draft) Fonds Vandeul manuscript also has Élémens de physiologie on the title 
page; Hippolyte Walferdin, describing a lost manuscript copy in 1837, gives its title as 
Physiologie (see DPV 270–71, discussed below, in the chapter entitled ‘1823: Naigeon’s 
Mémoires historiques et philosophiques sur la vie et les ouvrages de Denis Diderot’); 
Gerhardt Stenger considers that ‘l’ouvrage fini devait s’intituler “Physiologie” tout 
court’ [the finished work was supposed simply to be called Physiology] (Diderot, le 
combattant de la liberté (Paris: Perrin, 2013), p. 740, n. 144); Naigeon confuses matters 
by alluding to it as Diderot’s ‘système particulier de physiologie’ [his particular 
system of physiology] and also as ‘une nouvelle théorie, ou plutôt une histoire 
naturelle et expérimentale de l’homme’ [a new theory, or rather, a natural and 
experimental history of man] (Mémoires historiques et philosophiques sur la vie et les 
ouvrages de Denis Diderot (Paris: J. L. L. Brière, ‘1821’ [1823]; repr. Geneva: Slatkine 
Reprints, 1970), p. 291); Terada, presumably on the basis of Naigeon’s description, 
also calls it by the name Histoire naturelle et expérimentale de l’homme (MT 54, 57). 
It seems most probable, given that both manuscript versions carry the full title of 
Éléments de physiologie and that the ‘Avertissement’ of the Vandeul version explicitly 
names the title ‘Éléments de physiologie’, that this was indeed the proposed title.
16  DPV 464/PQ 290/MT 280.
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profundity and exploratory discussion, was not ‘an exact and total 
enumeration’, and nor does it proceed systematically, but the Éléments 
de physiologie is and does. In the Rêve, Diderot has the fictionalised 
Bordeu offer the thought that ‘la fibre est un animal simple; l’homme 
est un animal composé. Mais gardons ce texte pour une autre fois’ [the 
fibre is a simple animal; man is a composite animal. But let’s keep that 
thought for another time], and in so doing, he plants an allusion to a 
more systematic treatment of this idea. That more systematic treatment 
is to be found in the Éléments de physiologie.17 We have already quoted the 
passage proposing that ‘l’homme a toutes les sortes d’existence’;18 this is 
a recurrent theme which is repeatedly revisited, and later we read that 
‘l’homme est un assemblage d’animaux où chacun garde sa fonction’ 
[man is an assemblage of animals, each one with its own function].19
The Éléments de physiologie is organised into three parts, each of which 
is subdivided into numerous chapters. It has a beginning, a middle, and 
an end, in the most traditional way possible, and let it be said, in a more 
traditional way than we normally find in Diderot’s works. The first part, 
simply entitled ‘Des Etres’ [On Beings], opens with a tableau of nature 
in general, looking at the links in a chain of being organised according 
to complexity of organism. It is divided into three chapters on, in order 
of increasing complexity, the ‘végéto-animal’, the ‘animal’ and ‘homme’. 
In these, he rapidly sketches the classification of living beings according 
to their differences and similarities, repeatedly enquiring about the 
ability to feel sensation across nature. What is original about this part 
is perhaps more than anything the way in which it fuses philosophy 
17  Denis Diderot, Le Rêve de d’Alembert, ed. by Colas Duflo (Paris: GF Flammarion, 
2002), p. 138; or DPV 17, p. 166. Duflo supplies a footnote reference to a slightly 
different passage of the Éléments, ‘Il y a certainement dans un même animal trois 
vies distinctes [etc]’ [there are certainly three distinct life forms in a single animal], 
although his reference is in fact to a very early draft of the Éléments de physiologie, 
called the Fragments dont on n’a pu trouver la véritable place, DPV 17, p. 226. In the 
Éléments de physiologie proper, this passage is DPV 310/PQ 126/MT 134. I discuss the 
relationship of these drafts to each other below, see the section in Chapter 2 titled 
‘From Elements to Fragments’.
18  DPV 337/PQ 154/MT 157.
19  DPV 501/PQ 338/MT 314. Terada points out that Diderot’s source here is Bordeu’s 
Recherches sur les maladies chroniques (1775), in which he variously writes that ‘le 
corps vivant’ [the living body] is an ‘assemblage de divers organes’ [assemblage of 
different organs] and an ‘assemblage de plusieurs organes’ [assemblage of many 
organs]. Éléments, ed. by Terada, p. 496, Source XI.
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and natural history so totally, that it does it so briefly, and that it is so 
explicit in its views. Others such as the famous and successful author 
of the Histoire naturelle générale et particulière (1749–89) in 36 volumes, 
Georges-Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon, or the Swiss naturalist Charles 
Bonnet might be diffusely, ever so cautiously, hovering on the point of 
suggesting similar sorts of points, but apart from needing to penetrate 
their actual meaning, first of all you’d have to find the passage, buried 
somewhere in volume 12. This is not even a joke: that is where Buffon 
first gets round to defining Nature, in volume 12 of 36.20 In the Éléments 
de physiologie, it’s line 1.
The second part, entitled the ‘Éléments et parties du corps humain’ 
[Elements and parts of the human body], focuses on human physiology. 
It displays a remarkable synthesis of disciplinary erudition, this time 
very specifically from the field of physiology and much bolstered by 
the work of the pre-eminent Swiss physiologist Albrecht von Haller, 
and made comprehensible and meaningful thanks to Diderot’s 
extraordinary style, consisting at once in concise lucidity of description 
and in the ability to know when to puncture the description, pause, and 
start asking questions or drawing strange and destabilising analogies 
which breathe new meaning into the text. This second part does not 
attempt a complete synthesis of existing accounts of the workings of the 
human body and of its elements. There is nothing about the skeleton, 
for example. Instead, it focuses its attention on the basic material of the 
human body (fibres, cellular tissues) and on how it functions (blood, 
muscles, reproduction, the separate organs). Diderot repeatedly returns 
to two groups of questions: firstly, what is the difference between 
organised beings and an animal or what we’d now call an organism (can 
an organ be considered an animal in itself, for example?), and secondly, 
how is sensation communicated from one part of the body to another, 
what happens when that communication is interrupted, and what is the 
significance of that interruption? 
The third and final part contains a detailed discussion of the senses 
and the mind, memory, imagination, thought, what it terms ‘les 
phénomènes du cerveau’ [the phenomena of the brain]. It proposes 
20  Buffon, ‘De la nature. Première vue’ [On Nature. First view], in Œuvres, ed. by 
Stéphane Schmitt and Cédric Crémière (Paris: Gallimard Pléiade, 2007), p. 985, 
https://doi.org/10.5962/bhl.title.53421.
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that human experience of self and other is first and last the product of 
relational material organisation in time and space, entirely determined 
by it, yet no less conscious and lived for all that it is determined. Thus 
there is no soul, no supernatural element, and also no place for the faculty 
supposedly exclusive to man, ‘reason’. Reason is replaced with ‘instinct’ 
on the one hand, and ‘understanding’ on the other. Diderot rounds off 
the Éléments de physiologie with an extraordinary meditation on death 
in the Stoic tradition—in Montaigne’s version, ‘que philosopher c’est 
apprendre à mourir’ [to philosophise is to learn to die] and in Diderot’s 
chiastic mirroring: ‘un autre apprentissage de la mort est la philosophie’ 
[another apprenticeship of death is what philosophy is].21 
In sum, the Éléments de physiologie is overtly atheist and materialist. 
Materialism refers to the view that the universe and everything in it 
is made entirely from matter in different shapes and forms; in this 
eighteenth-century context, it is also automatically understood to be 
an atheist position, and therefore dangerous, both for the person who 
holds it and might be imprisoned because of it (as Diderot was in 1749, 
for the suspect views about the existence of God expressed in his Letter 
on the Blind), and for the general population, who, the (ecclesiastical) 
authorities considered, would be at risk of contamination. 
It is a substantial materialist treatise and there is nothing else of its 
time like it (and nor would there be for at least another century), nothing 
else that places a detailed physiological account of humans and human 
consciousness within an overtly materialist presentation of nature. It 
draws on the work of physiologists like Haller and others, and on the 
work of naturalists like Buffon or Bonnet. It dialogues with philosophers 
like the polemical Julien Offray de La Mettrie and the more mainstream 
Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, and re-visits many of the same examples 
and topoi that we find across all these writers, and which Diderot had 
also treated in earlier works, examples such as the man plunged in 
thought and perfectly unaware of his surroundings who nonetheless 
unhesitatingly navigates obstacles as he paces along, or the abilities of 
the imbecile or the mad, or the surprising strength ill men discover in 
themselves when rescuing possessions from fire, and so on. It extends 
all this into an open investigation of conscious and unconscious states 
21  DPV 516/PQ 361/MT 328.
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in all their bizarre variety. In 1759, Théophile de Bordeu (the real one, 
and Diderot’s friend, not the loquacious fictionalised version we meet 
in the Rêve de d’Alembert) had implored some great philosopher to come 
forward and help make sense of what he called the ‘animal economy’, 
that is to say, the human being in both physical and moral aspects.22 
Il faudroit enfin un Descartes ou un Leibniz, pour débrouiller ce qui 
concerne les causes, l’ordre, le rapport, les variations, l’harmonie, et les 
lois des fonctions de l’économie animale.23 
Ultimately what is needed is a Descartes or a Leibniz to disentangle 
everything concerning the causes, the order, the relationship, the 
variations, the harmony, and the laws governing the functions of the 
animal economy. 
It seems that the Éléments de physiologie is Diderot’s answer to that 
challenge.
And yet, for all its manifest stature, both within Diderot’s own œuvre 
and beyond it, as a bravely explicit exploration of what it is to be human 
in the absence of the soul, and also as a response to the need expressed 
by vitalist doctors like Bordeu for some new ways of understanding 
how the body, in its physical and emotional aspects, connects up, the 
Éléments de physiologie is little known and little studied. It is really only 
the third part, with its discussions of thought and memory, its bravura 
set pieces about sensation and recall which prefigure the writings of 
Henri Bergson or Marcel Proust, that have interested Diderot scholars. 
Indeed two mainstream editions of Diderot’s philosophical works do 
not consider it worth including the first two parts, and only print the last 
one; they abridge no other work by so much as a paragraph, let alone 
22  For a discussion of the term ‘animal economy’, see Philippe Huneman, ‘Les 
théories de l’économie animale et l’émergence de la psychiatrie de l’Éncyclopédie 
à l’aliénisme’, Psychiatrie Sciences Humaines Neurosciences, 2.2 (2004), 47–60 (p. 47), 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03006001.
23  Théophile de Bordeu, ‘Recherches sur les glandes’ (1759), in Œuvres complètes de 
Bordeu: précédées d’une notice sur sa vie et sur ses ouvrages, ed. by Anthelme Richerand 
(Paris: Caille et Ravier, 1818), vol. 1, p. 208. We discuss this claim and its implications 
below, in the section titled ‘Major Debates in Physiology: Mechanism and Vitalism’, 
in Chapter 4.
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two thirds of the whole text.24 The current book is, for all its faults, the 
only monograph devoted to it thus far.25 How could this be? 
There seem to be a number of rather fascinating reasons for this 
bizarre neglect, as we will see. This book falls into two parts: the first 
looks at how Diderot’s Éléments de physiologie makes an intervention in 
the philosophy and physiology of his time (part of the intervention in 
the former, having been misunderstood, is part of the reason for the 
neglect), deepening our understanding of what is at stake beyond what 
has been sketched out thus far. The second part looks at what would 
normally be called its dissemination and reception, but cannot yet be, 
seeing as scholarship as it currently stands does not think that it was 
disseminated in the first place. Perhaps we can say instead that the second 
part presents its reasons for supposing that the Éléments de physiologie 
was being read at least to some extent in the 1790s, those turbulent and 
unstable years of frequent régime change, and furthermore, its reasons 
for thinking that it exerted influence almost immediately. The book 
ends with a study of what I will argue is the first publication of the 
Éléments de physiologie in 1823, in a form which is almost but not quite 
unrecognisable, thanks to a substantial reorganisation operation carried 
out on it by Diderot’s intellectual disciple and literary executor, the 
industrious Jacques-André Naigeon.26 
24  Laurent Versini’s five-volume edition of Diderot’s work only contains this last part: 
Denis Diderot, Œuvres, ed. by Laurent Versini, 5 vols (Paris: R. Laffont, 1994–97). 
More recently, Michel Delon and Barbara de Negroni’s edition of Diderot’s Œuvres 
philosophiques reproduces very short extracts from parts 1 and 2, and slightly longer 
extracts (although also cut) from part 3, and downgrades it to an Appendix to the 
Rêve. Denis Diderot, Œuvres philosophiques, ed. by Michel Delon and Barbara de 
Negroni (Paris: Gallimard, 2010), pp. 411–44. We discuss this further below, see 
Chapter 2.
25  Monographs on Diderot which do substantially engage with or quote from the 
Éléments de physiologie are: Kurt Ballstadt, Diderot: Natural Philosopher, SVEC 2008:09 
(Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2008); Andrew Clark, Diderot’s Part (Ashgate: 
Aldershot, 2008), https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315257853; Colas Duflo, Diderot 
Philosophe (Paris: Champion, 2003); Caroline Jacot-Grapa, Dans le vif du sujet: 
Diderot, corps et âme (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2009); Jean Mayer, Diderot, homme de 
science (Rennes: Imprimerie Bretonne, 1959).
26  Naigeon’s Mémoires came out as the twenty-second volume of the Brière edition 
of Diderot’s Œuvres; all are date-stamped as having been published in 1821, but in 
fact they came out gradually between 1821–23. See David Adams, Bibliographie des 
œuvres de Diderot, 1739–1900, 2 vols (Ferney-Voltaire: Centre international d’étude 
du XVIIIe siècle, 2000), vol. 2, p. 141. Naigeon’s Mémoires therefore came out in 
1823, and I will consistently refer to them in that way, despite the prevailing dating 
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Perhaps this is the moment therefore to mention that the Éléments 
de physiologie was not published during Diderot’s lifetime. Those who 
already frequent the works of Diderot know that this puts it in good 
company, and indeed in the same camp as most of his work. In order 
to secure his release from prison in 1749, he had had to promise never 
to publish anything that might disturb or undermine the authorities 
ever again, and nor did he. The Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des 
sciences, des arts et des métiers, on which he was already in 1749 hard at 
work (and which his imprisonment interrupted), which he co-edited 
with Jean le Rond d’Alembert until its publication was banned in 1759 
and d’Alembert gave up on it, and which Diderot carried on preparing 
in secret, bringing out the remaining volumes of text in 1765 (there 
were 17 in all), and 11 volumes of plates in 1772, bringing the grand 
total to 28 volumes, was too massive an enterprise to endanger, and in 
itself exposed him to a good deal of risk anyway. Instead, from then 
on, he only published a couple of philosophical works (Lettre sur 
les sourds et muets, 1751; Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature, 1753), 
a few plays (Le Fils naturel, 1757; Le Père de famille, 1758), and various 
other short texts, including the Additions aux pensées philosophiques 
(1770) and the Regrets sur ma vieille robe de chambre (1772).27 And of 
this, only the Lettre de M. Diderot à MM. Briasson et Le Breton, Diderot’s 
intervention in the case brought by Luneau de Boisjermain against the 
publishers of the Encyclopédie, actually carried his name in black and 
white.28 Indeed, the plays caused a scandal anyway, as he was accused 
of plagiarism, while he himself was mercilessly satirised in Palissot’s 
play Les philosophes of 1760 as part of a large-scale anti-Encyclopédie 
campaign; in sum, he was already a target, and already at risk. Thus, 
many of the works for which he is now most famous—his novels Jacques 
le fataliste or La Religieuse, or his dialogues, the scientifically exploratory 
Rêve de d’Alembert and the morally outrageous Neveu de Rameau, went 
to 1821. See below for further information about the precise circumstances of their 
publication.
27  For the complete list, see Adams, ‘Liste chronologique des éditions’, in his 
Bibliographie des œuvres de Diderot, 1739–1900 (Ferney-Voltaire: Centre international 
d’étude du XVIIIe siècle, 2000), vol. 1, pp. 53–76.
28  See Kate E. Tunstall, ‘La fabrique du Diderot-philosophe, 1765–1782’, Les Dossiers du 
Grihl, 2 (2017), https://doi.org/10.4000/dossiersgrihl.6793, especially paragraphs 
25–26; J. Lough, ‘Luneau de Boisjermain v. the Publishers of the Encyclopédie’, SVEC, 
23 (1963), 115–77; Adams, Bibliographie des œuvres, vol. 2, pp. 211–12.
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unpublished during his lifetime. However, all of these works, with the 
exception of the then completely unknown Neveu de Rameau and also the 
Éléments de physiologie, had been circulated in a manuscript periodical, 
the Correspondance littéraire, sent only to a very restricted number of 
very elevated personnages, including Catherine II, across Europe and 
in Russia. Manuscripts were not subject to the same censorship laws, 
and in any case this manuscript magazine’s royal readers extended 
their protection to it; Catherine indeed extended her protection directly 
to Diderot, buying his books and manuscripts and making him the 
salaried-librarian of his own books. Diderot died in 1784, and his books 
and a set of his manuscripts were sent off to Catherine; the books are 
now lost but the manuscripts are still in St Petersburg. 
His novels and various short stories started leaking into print from 
copies of the Correspondance littéraire in the 1790s, and at this point, his 
literary executor, Naigeon, as we will hear, was galvanized into action, 
bringing out his edition of Diderot’s Œuvres in fifteen volumes in 1798; 
he still omitted the Rêve de d’Alembert, the Éléments de physiologie, and 
the Neveu de Rameau, judging them too dangerous. In 1805, the Neveu de 
Rameau came out as Rameaus Neffe, in German, translated by none other 
than that titan of German letters, Goethe. So it was out of the bag. That 
left the Rêve de d’Alembert and the Éléments de physiologie, which Naigeon 
meshed into a new work, taking up one quarter of the Mémoires historiques 
et philosophiques sur la vie et les ouvrages de Denis Diderot, and which, as 
mentioned, would be published in 1823, thirteen years after Naigeon’s 
death, and which therefore constitutes the first sort-of publication of 
both of those works. The Rêve de d’Alembert itself would be published 
entire in 1830, and from that moment it has had its own separate 
life. I say ‘sort-of publication’: we will see exactly what I mean in the 
chapter devoted to it, and in the connected digital edition of Naigeon’s 
Mémoires that I offer as part of this study.29 Suffice it to say that in the 
published version of the Mémoires, the discussion of these two texts take 
up 100 pages, and that of those 100 pages, 80 are woven from verbatim 
but unacknowledged and massively reorganised passages from these 
two works, with about 30 pages from the Rêve and about 50 from the 
Éléments. So this means that there are 80 pages of Diderot’s writing in 
the Mémoires, and they are all about physiology. 
29 See https://naigeons-diderot.mml.ox.ac.uk/index.htm.
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So this is the extent to which we can and cannot say that the 
Mémoires constitute the first publication of both the Rêve de d’Alembert 
and the Éléments de physiologie. It is the first time that lines written 
by Diderot from both works appeared in print, but they did not 
appear as he wrote them, it wasn’t clear that they were quotation—it 
looks like a paraphrase of what Diderot thought—and they are in a 
book whose author is not Diderot but Naigeon. The sheer extent of 
his reworking, as well, perhaps, as the relative unpopularity of the 
Mémoires—they have been plundered for anecdotes about Diderot 
but not taken seriously otherwise, and not been the object of any 
research in themselves—along with the availability from 1830 of the 
engaging and quirky Rêve de d’Alembert, has meant that it has never 
been contemplated that the Mémoires might constitute their first 
publication.30 The Éléments de physiologie, unlike every other one of 
his works, did not come out separately and acquire its own identity 
in those crucial first fifty years after Diderot’s death when his œuvre 
was being pieced together. It would not come out until 1875, in the 
critical edition in 20 volumes by scholars Jules Assézat and Maurice 
Tourneux. However, this was another bad moment for the Éléments de 
physiologie: Assézat and Tourneux published the early draft they had 
found in the St Petersburg archive of Diderot manuscripts. And so the 
reputation of the Éléments de physiologie was fixed: insofar as it existed 
at all, it was as an unfinished project. Not even the publication of the 
complete draft in 1964, subsequent to the emergence in 1948 of the 
complete set of Diderot’s manuscripts which had gone to his daughter 
(a thrilling story),31 has shifted that view. This book, however, attempts 
to overturn it.
The next chapter maps current scholarship on the Éléments de 
physiologie, and explores why it has stuck with the view of the Éléments 
de physiologie as an incomplete text; there is a perfect storm of reasons.
30  I should add though that Motoichi Terada’s 2019 edition gives the relevant pages 
from Naigeon in an appendix, fully referenced to the Rêve de d’Alembert and to the 
Éléments de physiologie in its early draft form. This is a question we will return to in 
Chapter 12.
31  Herbert Dieckmann, ‘L’épopée du Fonds Vandeul’, Revue d’histoire littéraire de la 
France, 85.6 (1985), 963–77. 
2. ‘Toutes les imperfections de 
l’inachèvement’1:  
The Mystification about  
the Manuscript Fragments
The general view about the Éléments de physiologie, as those who have 
an overview of Denis Diderot’s production will know, is that they are 
a fragmentary series of reading notes and scattered thoughts scribbled 
by the ageing philosopher, and which have some form of undefined but 
underpinning relation to the Rêve de d’Alembert. This chapter will look 
closely at these views and try to understand where they come from, 
given that, as has been suggested and hopefully also demonstrated, at 
least to some extent, the Éléments de physiologie are not a fragmentary 
series of reading notes. However, many influential and important voices 
do maintain that this is the case. 
Jean Mayer, authority on Diderot and science, and twice editor 
(1964, 1987) of the mature version of the Éléments brought to light in the 
Vandeul archive by Herbert Dieckmann in 1948, states in his book Diderot, 
homme de science (1959) that the Éléments de physiologie display ‘toutes les 
imperfections de l’inachèvement’ [all the flaws of incompletion].2 His 
1  Jean Mayer, Diderot, homme de science (Rennes: Imprimerie Bretonne, 1959), p. 273. 
Translation: ‘All the flaws of incompletion’.
2  Mayer, Diderot, homme de science, p. 273. Later statements in the editions themselves 
show that Mayer would come to modify this early view, presumably after prolonged 
contact with the completed version of the Éléments de physiologie itself. In his DPV 
© Caroline Warman, CC BY 4.0 https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0199.02
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1987 edition would implicitly disagree with that earlier statement, stating 
that ‘Diderot avait poussé le travail jusqu’à l’achèvement’ [Diderot’s 
work on it had got to the point of completion], although he continued to 
maintain that the Éléments ‘souffrent visiblement d’une documentation 
scientifique encombrante et mal dominée’ [visibly suffer from a 
cumbersome and poorly mastered amount of scientific documentation]3 
and that we should not be unduly concerned if Diderot contradicts 
himself as these are only his reading notes.4 The preeminent historian 
of the eighteenth-century life sciences, Jacques Roger, did not consider 
this work a work at all, but rather, ‘[des] notes de travail rassemblées 
sous le titre d’Éléments de physiologie’ [working notes brought together 
under the title of Elements of physiology].5 Roger goes so far as to say 
that he prefers to use the earlier incomplete draft which we call the 
Saint-Petersburg version after the archive where it is held. The reason? 
Because the more mature version ‘tend à masquer, sinon les grandes 
influences subies, du moins les chapitres où chacune d’entre elles s’est 
plus précisément exercée’ [tends to mask, if not its major influences, at 
least the areas where they have been most specifically influential].6 His 
judgement—that the Éléments is a bundle of working notes and not a 
finished work—becomes the reason that he cannot use the final version, 
precisely because it is not just a bundle of working notes. He thereby 
reveals—consciously or not—that what he really values is what makes 
his job as a source-tracing historian of science easier, that is, early drafts 
in their magpie state. The issue is not that he should prefer the early 
draft but that he should define the completed work in relation to that 
preference, and thereby considerably deform it. And it would not matter 
edition he writes that ‘Diderot a poussé le travail jusqu’à l’achèvement [...]’ [Diderot 
worked on it to the point of completion], Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Jean Mayer, 
Œuvres complètes, DPV (Paris: Hermann, 1987), vol. 17, pp. 261–574 (p. 273). In his 
1964 edition he had already stated that the Éléments de physiologie was in many ways 
superior to other such physiological works of the time. Éléments de physiologie, ed. by 
Jean Mayer (Paris: Didier, 1964), p. lvi.
3  DPV 286.
4  ‘Mais ce sont là des notes de lecture: Diderot ne souscrit pas à toutes les opinions 
qu’il rapporte’ [But there are just reading notes : Diderot doesn’t subscribe to all the 
opinions he records]. DPV 349n.: note starts on p. 348. 
5  Jacques Roger, Les sciences de la vie dans la pensée Française du XVIIIe siècle: la génération 
des animaux de Descartes à l’Encyclopédie, 2nd edn (Paris: A. Colin, 1971), p. 699.
6  Roger, Les sciences de la vie, p. 672.
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that he was biased and wrong in his judgement if he and Mayer hadn’t 
had considerable and persisting influence. 
In the Pléiade volume of Diderot’s Œuvres philosophiques (2010), 
the Éléments de physiologie do not appear in their own right but are 
subordinated as an appendix of thirty pages of cherry-picked extracts 
connected to the Rêve de d’Alembert. Eminent Diderot scholars Michel 
Delon and Barbara de Negroni justify this decision by calling the Éléments 
de physiologie a ‘texte technique’ [technical text], and by explaining that 
it provides information about what medical sources Diderot was using 
when composing the Rêve de d’Alembert.7 And indeed, the thirty pages 
of extracts we find in the Pléiade volume of the Œuvres philosophiques 
hardly contribute to making the Éléments seem like a completed work 
in its own right; on the contrary, they sustain the myth of the Éléments’ 
fragmentary character by producing a newly fragmented version. The 
editors are not without precedent in only publishing extracts: Laurent 
Versini did the same thing in his 1994 volume of Diderot’s philosophical 
works. Versini’s fragments are explicitly chosen according to criteria 
of omission: he omits what he considers to be tiresome descriptions 
and lists of anatomy and physiology, which are, he says, out of place 
in ‘une collection d’œuvres philosophiques ou littéraires’ [a collection 
of philosophical or literary works].8 When Delon and Negroni call it a 
‘texte technique’, therefore, they are simply confirming Versini’s view 
that it just does not suit our taste (or come up to our standards) as 
scholars of literature and thought.
Between, on the one hand, the historians of science who declare 
that the Éléments are incomplete and/or nothing more than a bundle of 
working notes, dismissing the completed version because it gets in the 
way of source-hunting, and, on the other, literary scholars who accept 
and relay these opinions while also adding to the general rejection 
of this work with further damning judgements about its tiresome 
technical descriptions and implied lack of literary quality, the Éléments 
7  Denis Diderot, Œuvres philosophiques, ed. by Michel Delon and Barbara de Negroni 
(Paris: Gallimard, 2010), p. 1253. Chronologically, this is a little misleading, given 
that Diderot wrote the Éléments de physiologie after the Rêve, see Chapter 1, but 
presumably what is meant is that the Éléments de physiologie tells us about Diderot’s 
medical knowledge more generally, which is fair enough.
8  Laurent Versini, ‘Introduction [to Éléments de physiologie]’, in Denis Diderot, Œuvres, 
ed. by Laurent Versini (Paris: R. Laffont, 1994), vol. 1: Philosophie, p. 1259.
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de physiologie has not recently stood much chance of establishing a 
reputation on its own terms. In the case of this text more than any of 
Diderot’s others, the disciplinary specialisations and identities of the 
modern university system have meant that it falls between stools, failing 
to conform to our various expectations of style or content. The story 
about its fragmentary nature, however, has nothing to do with modern 
institutional specificities: it is a much older one.
The story about the fragments is generally traced to and substantiated 
by the account given by Diderot’s literary executor, Jacques-André 
Naigeon. In his Mémoires historiques et philosophiques sur la vie et les 
ouvrages de Denis Diderot, published posthumously in 1823 (although 
dated to 1821, like the rest of the Brière edition, of which this was the 
last volume), Naigeon wrote that Diderot never completed his work 
on physiology and only left ‘quelques matériaux épars et sans aucun 
ordre entre eux’ [a few scattered materials with no internal order], 
further alleging that these scattered materials would only make sense 
‘aux yeux du philosophe assez instruit pour couver les idées neuves et 
fécondes dont Diderot a semé ses recherches’ [to the philosopher who is 
sufficiently knowledgeable to appreciate the new and fertile ideas that 
Diderot planted in his work].9 He also emphasised Diderot’s debt to the 
great physiologist Albrecht von Haller, saying he had read Haller’s work 
on Physiologie twice through ‘la plume à la main’ [pen in hand]: this 
has always been understood to tell us that Diderot’s pen was ready to 
note down whatever he found useful in the ‘source’ text, and therefore 
that he is in someway subservient to it.10 This is despite the fact that it 
could just as easily be read as meaning that he considerably corrected 
or responded to or amplified the source text, as he famously did in the 
case of the Observations sur Hemsterhuis, the Réfutation d’Helvétius or just 
generally. 
The ninth volume of the great and first Œuvres complètes edition 
of the 1870s, undertaken by Jules Assézat and Maurice Tourneux and 
based on the archive of Diderot manuscripts which had been sent to 
9  Jacques-André Naigeon, Mémoires historiques et philosophiques sur la vie et les ouvrages 
de Denis Diderot (Paris: J. L. L. Brière, ‘1821’ [1823]; repr. Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 
1970), p. 291.
10  Naigeon writes that Diderot ‘avait lu deux fois, et la plume à la main, sa grande 
physiologie’ [read his great physiology twice, pen in hand] (Mémoires historiques et 
philosophiques, p. 222n).
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Catherine the Great in St Petersburg after his death in 1784, contains the 
first print-published version of the Éléments de physiologie in its entirety, 
although as scholars would later discover, the so-called St Petersburg 
manuscript was a copy of a relatively early draft which Diderot would 
subsequently substantially reorganise and add to. In his introduction to 
the St Petersburg version, Jules Assézat closely paraphrases Naigeon’s 
description of the Éléments, although he does not say so. Diderot, he 
wrote, ‘lisait la plume à la main tous les livres qui lui parvenaient, et 
il en tirait ce qui pouvait l’éclairer dans ses recherches. Ce sont ces 
notes, intitulées Éléments de physiologie, qui forment un volume in-4° 
de la collection des manuscrits de la bibliothèque de l’Ermitage, que 
nous publions [...]’ [read all the books that he could get hold of, pen 
in hand, and took from them anything that helped advance his work. It 
is these notes, entitled Elements of physiology, forming a quarto volume 
in the manuscript collection of the Hermitage library, which we are 
publishing here].11 The fact that Assézat, without knowing it, only had 
access to an inferior version, adds a further complicating layer to the 
story, in that Naigeon’s account would have seemed more accurately to 
describe the manuscript he worked from, although even that is hardly 
fragmentary, producing a substantial 190 printed pages. The most 
complete version we now know of, and the one which current editions 
use, was rediscovered by the great Diderot scholar Herbert Dieckmann 
in 1948 in the collection of manuscripts which passed to Diderot’s 
daughter, Angélique Vandeul, at his death in 1784, and thereafter down 
through her family. Dieckmann himself had written an important article 
in 1938 examining Naigeon’s treatment of the Rêve de d’Alembert and the 
Physiologie in his Mémoires historiques et philosophiques: he was the first 
scholar to bring to light that those Mémoires in fact quote verbatim from 
both these works.12 His preference was clearly for the Rêve, which, given 
that he, like Assézat, was at that point working with the earlier version, 
11  Denis Diderot, Œuvres complètes, ed. by Jules Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: 
Garnier Frères, 1875), vol. 9, p. 237. He elaborates further: ‘ce caractère de notes, 
prises au jour le jour et rassemblées à la hâte, fait de cet ouvrage tout autre chose 
qu’un traité didactique’ [this note-like character it has, of having been jotted down 
from one day to the next, makes this work completely different from a didactic 
treatise], p. 238.
12  Herbert Dieckmann, ‘J.-A. Naigeon’s Analysis of Diderot’s Rêve de d’Alembert’, 
Modern Language Notes, 53.7 (1938), 479–86, https://doi.org/10.2307/2912683.
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is perhaps not surprising.13 Dieckmann’s consistent assumption is that 
the Éléments de Physiologie was, or was planned to be, part of a longer 
version of the Rêve. Naigeon’s story of, on the one hand, the disordered 
manuscript fragments, and, on the other, the reading notes, persist in 
assessments of the Éléments today, as we have seen in the influential 
accounts of Jean Mayer and Jacques Roger quoted at the beginning of 
this chapter. Naigeon’s assertions about fragments and reading notes 
therefore come full circle, not only being repeated as authoritative 
evidence in every introductory presentation of the Physiologie that exists, 
and by every one of the critics mentioned thus far, but to some extent 
also used to define what the Physiologie is, and therefore what it is not, 
thereby dismissing the actual evidence of the text itself. 
It’s an odd situation, and one in which Naigeon’s account has been 
decisive. Even Paolo Quintili’s and Motoichi Terada’s editions of the 
Éléments de physiologie (2004 and 2019 respectively), both of which 
forcefully argue for the importance of this late text, continue to plough 
the same furrow, quoting Naigeon, adding further information about 
Diderot’s medical sources.14 There are very few scholarly pages which 
look at this text on its own terms, as opposed to as some sort of basket 
containing a mish-mash of Diderot’s medical interests. This is because 
of what Naigeon said in his Mémoires historiques et philosophiques in 1823, 
and which every critic since has quoted as the gospel truth, compounded 
with this issue of the two very different stages of manuscript 
completion, their staggered publication dates, and the fact that Assézat’s 
confirmation of Naigeon’s story, although based on an incomplete 
draft, has nonetheless influenced later scholars from Dieckmann to the 
present, all of whom continue to relay this same account. The result is 
a sort of received wisdom about the Physiologie which means that when 
it is mentioned—if it is mentioned in non-Diderot-specific literature at 
all—it is as an incomplete text, a pipe dream of Diderot’s. That’s what 
13  Dieckmann remarks with surprise that ‘Sometimes Naigeon seems to prefer even 
the Éléments: once he chooses the formulation of the Éléments, though the same 
passage is found in the Rêve with only minor variants’. Dieckmann, ‘J.-A. Naigeon’s 
Analysis’, 484. He is referring to Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, p. 260.
14  Motoichi Terada describes it as situated ‘à mi-chemin entre un composé mosaïque 
de notes de lecture et un discours scientifique’ [half-way between a mosaic made 
out of reading notes and a scientific discourse], Éléments de physiologie, ed. by 
Motoichi Terada (Paris: Éditions Matériologiques, 2019), p. 9 [hereafter MT].
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Jean Starobinski called it in passing in his otherwise inspiring study of 
the intellectual history of the twinned concept of Action et Réaction.15
So if this story started with Naigeon, did he simply get it wrong? If 
he is the source for this story, and if the story appears to be starkly out of 
tune with the textual evidence, then we need to look again at his Mémoires 
historiques et philosophiques to see exactly what he says. He devotes 100 
pages out of 416—that is, just about a quarter of the whole—to discussing 
Diderot’s views on physiology. Of these 100 pages, 83—presented as a 
description or paraphrase—are almost entirely verbatim quotation from 
the Rêve and the Physiologie, extremely carefully assembled and sewn 
together. It’s about a third Rêve, and two thirds Physiologie.16 The more 
substantial borrowing is from the Physiologie not the Rêve, and there are 
fifty pages of quotation from it, which is obviously only a small part of 
the whole, but nonetheless, not merely a few scattered fragments. Just 
to be clear, in his Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, Naigeon describes 
Diderot’s entire production, from the texts that were print-published 
and known during Diderot’s lifetime such as the Lettre sur les aveugles, 
the Encyclopédie articles or the plays, to those with a limited manuscript 
circulation through the journal Correspondance littéraire such as the art 
criticism of the Salons, the fictional travelogue the Supplément au voyage 
de Bougainville or the novels La Religieuse and Jacques le fataliste, or only in 
15  Jean Starobinski writes: ‘Diderot rêva d’une anthropologie d’inspiration médicale 
quand il entreprit ses Éléments de physiologie, restés inachevés’ [Diderot dreamed of 
writing a medically-inspired anthropological work when he undertook the Éléments 
de physiologie, which remained unfinished], in Action et réaction: vie et aventures d’un 
couple (Paris: Seuil, 1999), p. 146. See also the important intellectual historian Ann 
Thomson who mentions in passing Diderot’s ‘medical notes entitled Éléments de 
physiologie, the result of his medical reading [which] includ[e] vague formulations 
resembling La Mettrie’s’, in Bodies of Thought: Science, Religion, and the Soul in the 
Early Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 221. The ‘vague 
formulations’ to which she refers relate to the paragraph about the flesh pincers 
which we will quote in full in Chapter 4.
16  We shall be analysing this in Chapter 12; see also the connected digital edition of 
Naigeon’s Mémoires at https://naigeons-diderot.mml.ox.ac.uk/index.htm. Motoichi 
Terada agrees with this analysis, referencing my article: Caroline Warman, 
‘Naigeon, éditeur de Diderot physiologiste’, Diderot Studies, 34 (2014), 283–302, MT 
56, 63. It was my great good luck that while finalising this digital edition of the 
Mémoires, Motoichi Terada brought out his edition of the Éléments de physiologie, 
which also reproduces Naigeon’s Mémoires, see his ‘Annexe: le précis du Rêve 
(Naigeon, Mémoires, pp. 207–91), avec des notes sur les emprunts au Rêve et aux EP’, 
pp. 513–93. This enabled me to check my results against his; my work as a whole has 
much benefitted from his.
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uncirculated manuscript, such as the searing social satire of the Neveu de 
Rameau. Yet there are only two texts from which he quotes substantially, 
the Rêve and the Physiologie, and of those two, the Physiologie takes up 
twice as much space as the Rêve. Of all Diderot’s production, therefore, 
it is the one to which Naigeon gives most visibility, and which he must 
consider to be the most important. There is a stark difference therefore 
between the story he tells about the scattered fragments and reading 
notes and the way in which he prioritises this text for quotation above all 
others. It looks as if he’s being deliberately misleading. Why? 
We only begin to get an answer to this question when we look at 
some of the paratexts and also at the different versions of the Physiologie. 
From Elements to Fragments 
Before returning to Paris from St Petersburg in 1774, Diderot had a new 
version of the Rêve de d’Alembert copied for Catherine II. It gave new 
names to the interlocutors—instead of Diderot, Jean le Rond d’Alembert, 
Julie de Lespinasse and Théophile de Bordeu, we have the playwright 
Nicolas Boindin, the grammarian César Chesneau Dumarsais, Mlle 
Boucher (daughter of painter François Boucher), and the philosophe 
Julien Offray de La Mettrie. The manuscript, entitled Les deux Dialogues, 
is fairly substantial (113 folios) and presents an intermediary version 
of the text we now know—more developed than the first drafts of the 
Rêve de d’Alembert but not yet in its final form.17 It was preceded by an 
‘Avertissement’ [Foreword] in the form of a letter directly addressing 
Her Imperial Majesty which explained that the original Dialogues had 
had to be destroyed because the original players insisted on having 
their fictional counterparts eradicated. This is the first instantiation of 
the myth of the destruction of the Rêve in response to d’Alembert and 
Lespinasse’s supposed deep displeasure at featuring in the text.18 The 
17  Georges Dulac describes this manuscript in detail in Le Rêve de d’Alembert, DPV, vol. 
17, p. 76.
18  Colas Duflo discusses the supposed destruction of the Rêve de d’Alembert on the 
orders of the supposedly embarrassed d’Alembert in the introduction to his edition: 
‘Il est difficile de croire que D, qui s’est souvent vanté d’être un champion de la 
mystification, n’ait pas encore une fois utilisé cet art utile. Jacques Roger maintient 
cependant qu’on “ne peut suspecter D de mauvaise foi en la circonstance” et que 
Grimm a dû garder une  copie, sans en avertir D, qui serait “miraculeusement” 
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‘avertissement’ explains that the reassembled version ‘n’est qu’une statue 
brisée, mais si brisée, qu’il fut presque impossible, même à l’artiste de la 
réparer’ [nothing but a shattered statue, so very shattered that not even 
the artist could put it back together] and further that there remained ‘un 
grand nombre de pièces dont il [l’artiste] ne put reconnaître la véritable 
place’ [a large number of pieces whose proper place not even [the artist] 
could find again]. These pieces were all gathered at the end of the Deux 
dialogues and presented as ready for reintegration, despite not being 
from the original Rêve at all.19 There are thirty pages of them, in the form 
of aphoristic remarks about physiology and sensation, gathered under 
thematic headings and entitled, in explicit echo of the ‘avertissement’, 
‘Fragments dont on ne put reconnaître la véritable place’ [Fragments 
whose proper place could not be recognised].20 This is a recognisable 
early draft of the Éléments de physiologie.21
So the first instance of the Éléments de physiologie being claimed to 
be fragmentary comes from Diderot himself, here, in 1774. Insofar as 
it introduces a masked version of the Rêve, masked not least because of 
the fears he expresses in the ‘Avertissement’ for his peace, fortune, life, 
honour, and reputation should it ever be leaked or published, we can 
see why Diderot might want to call them ‘fragments’: it’s part of the 
disguise. Insofar also as these supposed Fragments are indeed a very 
early draft, we can see that it makes sense: they are incomplete, although 
the time sequence is back to front: they are not relics of what has been 
but seeds of what will be. But there is another game going on here 
réapparue après la mort de Julie de Lespinasse (Intro de l’éd GF-Flam 1965, p. 21). 
Jean Varloot, pour sa part, pense que Diderot “simula un autodafé du manuscrit” 
(Introduction de l’édition DPV, p. 27). Il n’est peut-être ni possible ni très utile de 
trancher la question’ [it is hard to believe that D, who had often boasted of being a 
champion of mystification, didn’t once again deploy this useful skill here. Jacques 
Roger however maintains that “on this occasion we cannot suspect Diderot of being 
in bad faith” and that Grimm must have kept a copy without telling D, which 
“miraculously” reappeared after Julie de Lespinasse died. Jean Varloot thinks that 
Diderot “pretended to burn the manuscript”. It is perhaps neither possible nor 
particularly useful to determine the truth of the matter]. Denis Diderot, Le Rêve de 
d’Alembert, ed. by Colas Duflo (Paris: GF Flammarion, 2002), p. 29, n. 3.
19  ‘Avertissement’ DPV 17 221–23; Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Paolo Quintili (Paris: 
Champion, 2004), pp. 415–18 [hereafter PQ].
20  DPV 225–60 (title page: p. 225)/PQ 418–50 (title page: p. 418).
21  This early draft can be consulted in Le manuscrit de Pétersbourg/1774/Avertissement 
des deux dialogues/Fragments dont on n’a pu trouver la véritable place, ed. by George 
Dulac in DPV, vol. 17, pp. 213–60.
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too, of which we begin to catch a glimpse when we discover that this 
specific ‘Avertissement’ exists in two further manuscript versions and 
is clearly therefore not an incidental but a crucial part of the text. The 
second version of the ‘Avertissement’, now in the Fonds Vandeul, again 
introduces the Rêve de d’Alembert, again alleging that ‘Ce n’est qu’une 
statue brisée, mais si brisée qu’il fut presque impossible à l’artiste de 
la réparer. Il est resté autour de lui nombre de fragments dont il n’a pu 
retrouver la véritable place’ [this is nothing but a shattered statue, so 
very shattered that not even the artist could put it back together. Around 
it there remain a number of fragments whose proper place not even (the 
artist) could find again].22 A subsequent, and third, version was, like 
the first, sent to Catherine, this time after Diderot’s death, along with a 
complete set of his manuscripts, but this one did not introduce the Rêve. 
Instead, it directly preceded the first complete draft of the Éléments de 
physiologie, now known as the St Petersburg version, and first printed in 
the Assézat-Tourneux edition of Diderot’s complete works, as we have 
mentioned.23 By this point, these supposed fragments were 190 pages 
long. So there is a conscious repeated connection on the part of Diderot 
between this introduction with its invocation of the shattered sculpture 
and the ‘fragments dont [l’artiste] n’a pu reconnaître la véritable place’.24 
We see this conscious connection underlined even more explicitly when 
we set the ‘Avertissement’ alongside the opening pages of the Éléments 
de physiologie (in both the St Petersburg and Vandeul versions).25 
La chaîne des êtres n’est pas interrompue par la diversité des formes. 
La forme n’est souvent qu’un masque qui trompe, et le chaînon qui 
22  Spelling sic. Bibliothèque nationale de France, NAF 13.731, ff3rv–4r: the quote is 
ff3rv. This is the manuscript known as V2, see DPV 17, pp. 213 and 83. Dulac says 
this ‘Préface’ is ‘écrite d’une autre main’ [written in a different hand] from the rest 
of the copy: in fact the handwriting is very recognisably that of copiste E (according 
to Paul Vernière’s system, Diderot, ses manuscrits et ses copistes (Paris: Klincksieck, 
1967), the same who was responsible for the ms. of the Éléments de physiologie in 
the Fonds Vandeul. The wording has changed slightly: ‘fragments dont [l’auteur] 
n’a pu reconnaître’ [1774 version, and heading of the 1774 fragments] or ‘retrouver la 
véritable place’ [NAF 13.731 and AT IX 251]’.
23  AT IX 251.
24  See above, note 21, in Chapter 2.
25  In the St Petersburg version, it is in the second paragraph; in the Vandeul version, it 
is in the fifth.
 27‘Toutes les imperfections de l’inachèvement’
paraît manquer réside peut-être dans un être connu, à qui les progrès de 
l’anatomie comparée n’ont encore pu assigner sa véritable place.26
The chain of being is not interrupted by the diversity of its forms. Form is 
often nothing other than a deceptive mask, and the link which seems to 
be missing may perhaps be found in a known being, which the advances 
in comparative anatomy have not yet managed to assign to its proper 
place.
The textual echo between the ‘Avertissement’’s ‘fragments dont on 
n’a pu reconnaître la véritable place’ and the ‘chaînons’ whose place 
in the ‘chaîne des êtres’ the progress of research in comparative 
anatomy ‘n’[a] pas encore pu assigner sa véritable place’ is glaring, the 
repetition drawing attention to the phrasing. What is Diderot’s point?27 
Might he be suggesting an implicit parallel between text and content, 
and emphasising replicating structures of seeming fragmentation in a 
context of incomplete knowledge?
In the Vandeul manuscript, the ‘Avertissement’ we have been 
considering in its three iterations is removed and replaced with a new 
one which retains the claim about the fragments but sets it within a 
completely different framing narrative:
Éléments de Physiologie 1778
AVERTISSEMENT
En lisant les ouvrages du Baron de Haller Mr *** conçut le projet de 
rédiger des Éléments de physiologie. Pendant plusieurs mois il recueillit 
ce qui lui parut propre ou essentiel à entrer dans ces Éléments. Les notes 
et extraits étaient sur des feuillets épars et isolés. La mort ayant empêché 
Mr *** d’exécuter le projet, dont il n’avait fait que préparer les matériaux, 
on a cru devoir les réunir en une seule copie. Quelque incomplets qu’ils 
soient, et malgré le défaut d’ordre qu’on n’a pu y mettre, on pense que le 
public recevra avec plaisir ces fragments, et qu’un jour quelque personne 
26  DPV 295–96/PQ 108/MT 118, my bolding. SP AT IX 253 is the second paragraph; 
the syntax is very slightly different from the quoted text above: ‘Il ne faut pas croire 
que la chaîne des êtres…’—the rest is the same, apart from a slight difference in 
punctuation.
27  The model of the chain and its links is of course part of what Diderot is drawing 
attention to, and I address this topic below, see Chapter 3. See also: Yves Citton, 
L’Envers de la liberté: l’invention d’un imaginaire Spinoziste dans la France des lumières 
(Paris: Éditions Amsterdam, 2006), pp. 85–89; and Arthur O. Lovejoy’s famous 
study, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936; 
repr. 2001), esp. pp. 227–41.
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entreprendra d’après le plan et les idées de Mr *** l’ouvrage qu’il n’a fait 
qu’ébaucher.28
Fig. 2.1 The new ‘Avertissement’, BnF, Manuscrits, NAF 13762, f. 1v, 
Denis Diderot (copyist ‘E’), c. 1780, Pen and paper, Denis Diderot  
Éléments de physiologie, Fonds Vandeul, Bibliothèque nationale de 
France, CC-BY
FOREWORD
It was on reading the works of Baron Haller that Mr *** came up with 
the project of writing a book on the Elements of physiology. He spent 
many months gathering whatever he thought was relevant or essential to 
28  DPV 293/PQ 105/MT 115. See also Herbert Dieckmann, Inventaire du fonds vandeul 
et inédits de Diderot (Genève: TLF Droz, 1951), pp. 76–78. NAF 17.362, Copiste E. 
There are two emendations on the ms. copy, neither in E’s hand: ‘mois’[months] 
replaces the original ‘années’ [years], and the original ‘le public les recevra’ [the 
public will welcome them] has become the syntactically clearer ‘le public recevra 
[…] ces fragments’ [the public will welcome these fragments]: the correcting hand 
may be Vandeul’s.
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include in these Elements. His notes and extracts were on scattered and 
separate scraps of paper. Death having prevented Mr *** from completing 
the project, for which he had only got as far as preparing the materials, it 
was felt they should be assembled into a single copy. However incomplete 
they may be, and despite the flaws in the order that has been chosen, it is 
hoped that the public will welcome these fragments with pleasure, and 
that one day somebody will undertake the work according to the plans 
and ideas that Mr *** was merely able to sketch out.
This is a new version of the story about the fragments, at once more 
elaborate, more specific with respect to the details, and even more 
strikingly at odds with the text itself, in this its most complete version, 
filling 152 manuscript recto-verso pages of continuous text, and between 
210 and 250 printed pages in Mayer’s, Quintili’s and Terada’s annotated 
editions. Terada comments with surprise at the notion that this could 
be described as merely ‘une ébauche d’ouvrage’ [a sketch for a book] 
and adds that ‘il y a certainement quelque mystification dans cette 
notice’ [there is certainly some mystification going on in this preface].29 
Dieckmann and Quintili think it is so at odds with the text it purportedly 
introduces that it must in fact be part of the earlier St Petersburg version 
which, in their view, it more accurately describes.30 There is no evidence 
that this is the case: the copyist is the same, it appears on the first page 
of the bound manuscript notebook and is not a later insertion, and the St 
Petersburg version had its own ‘avertissement’, as we have seen. On the 
contrary, Dieckmann and Quintili’s bewilderment is further evidence 
of the extent to which this particular story about incompletion has been 
taken as the literal truth, without it ever occurring to anyone apart from 
Terada that the Éléments, in common with Diderot’s other works, might 
contain playful and mystificatory features that themselves enclose a 
29  MT 115n and MT 34 respectively.
30  Dieckmann observes ‘on est surpris de trouver l’Avertissement en tête de ce 
volume; il appartient plutôt au manuscrit de Leningrad’ [it is surprising to find 
the Notice at the beginning of this volume; it really belongs to the Leningrad 
manuscript], in his Inventaire, p. 77. Paolo Quintili takes this further, considering 
that this ‘Avertissement’ may well be posthumous precisely because it reflects the 
nature of the SP ms. rather than the Vandeul one (PQ 105, n. 2; see also DPV 293). 
Jean Mayer, in his 1987 DPV edition, appears to think that certain ‘réviseurs’ wrote 
this ‘Avertissement’ (DPV 17, p. 272); this seems unlikely for the reasons discussed 
above, and also because the same copyist, ‘E’ in Vernière’s denomination, who 
copied out the entire manuscript, also did the ‘Avertissement’; the hand is the 
same.
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message in some way intimately connected with the questions the text 
was trying to raise. 
This particular ‘avertissement’ asserts the incompleteness of the text 
it introduces even more insistently than the previous one, while doing 
so on the basis of an entirely different scenario. It retains the notion 
of the fragment, but integrates it into a story about long preparation 
interrupted by death, implicitly invoking loyal friends left behind to 
look after the ‘feuillets épars et isolés’ [scattered and separate scraps of 
paper], who have made a great effort to bring the ‘fragments’ together, 
who hope the public will take pleasure in them, and that one day some 
person will undertake to flesh out the plan and ideas Mr*** has only 
sketched out. Incomplete, disordered, written on scraps of paper? The 
Éléments de physiologie is none of these things, and nor is the manuscript 
notebook which contains it.31 Interrupted by death and advertising the 
date 1778, when Diderot did not die until 1784? Just a plan and some 
ideas, brought together in a single copy, while awaiting completion? 
None of this describes the Éléments de physiologie even remotely, but it 
does by contrast very precisely recall the fate and story of a landmark 
work, the posthumous so-called Pensées of the mathematician and 
Jansenist thinker Blaise Pascal.32 Is this just a coincidence?
Pascal’s project, one on which he was working during the last 
years of his life and despite his paralysing ill health, was to have been 
an apology of the Christian faith, an ‘apologie’ being in English an 
‘apology’ or ‘apologia’ and meaning ‘a written defence or justification’ 
(OED); Pascal’s particular aim seems to have been to convince atheists 
to believe in God, hence the famous ‘pari de Pascal’ [Pascal’s wager], 
which argues that atheists might as well believe in God as they have 
nothing to lose.
It was famously not written out in continuous prose but made from 
many separate fragments written on scraps of paper. The Pascal family 
and their Jansenist circle at Port-Royal worked for years to produce what 
they saw as the best version, now known as the Port-Royal edition, and 
31  NAF 17.362; see also Jean Mayer’s careful description of the ‘tome cartonné’ DPV 
17, pp. 287–88.
32  For a luminously clear introduction to Pascal and Pascal studies, see Richard Parish, 
‘Blaise Pascal’, French Studies, 71.4 (2017), 539–50, https://doi.org/10.1093/fs/
knx215.
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in fact it was not what we would call a comprehensive or even a faithful 
edition, as it often ignored Pascal’s own organisation (he had many of 
the separate fragments carefully ordered in specific thematic folders 
or ‘liasses’) and set aside a vast number of fragments which were not 
thought to be appropriate. Their title in the first editions of 1669, 1670, 
and 1688 was given as Pensées de M. Pascal sur la religion et sur quelques 
autres sujets, qui ont esté trouvées après sa mort parmy ses papiers [Thoughts 
of Mr Pascal on religion and on various other subjects which were found 
after his death amongst his papers]: the notion of these ‘thoughts’ having 
been found after his death amongst his papers is therefore a central 
part of the identity of the published work. The title page of the 1688 
edition advertises itself as being ‘augmentée de beaucoup de Pensées’ 
[augmented with many Thoughts] so the difficulty and incompleteness 
of the editions was a feature of the Pensées from the very beginning. 
Jean Filleau de la Chaise had even written a book entitled Discours sur 
les pensées de M. Pascal où l’on essaye de faire voire quel estoit son dessein 
[Discourse on the thoughts of Mr. Pascal where an attempt is made to 
see what his design was]. It came out in 1672, two years after the original 
Port-Royal edition, and in it he expressed the fear that ‘quantité de gens 
seront sans doute choqués d’y trouver si peu d’ordre’ [many people will 
no doubt be shocked at the lack of order they find in it].33
Étienne Périer, Pascal’s nephew, had alluded explicitly to this lack 
of organisation or connective logic in his introduction to the Port-Royal 
edition:
on les trouva [les papiers] tous ensemble enfilés en diverses liasses, mais 
sans aucun ordre et sans aucune suite.34 
they [the papers] were found all kept together in different folders but 
they weren’t in any order or sequence.
This description is very close to what Diderot would write in the revised 
‘Avertissement’ at the beginning of his Éléments, down to his ‘feuillets 
épars et isolés’ and ‘défaut d’ordre’. The version Naigeon gave in his 
33  Jean Filleau de La Chaise, Discours sur les pensées de M. Pascal où l’on essaye de faire 
voire quel estoit son dessein (Paris: Guillaume Desprez, 1672), p. 3.
34  Blaise Pascal, Les Provinciales, Pensées, et Opuscules divers, ed. by Gérard Ferreyrolles 
and Philippe Sellier (Paris: Livre de Poche ‘La Pochothèque’, 2004), p. 831.
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Mémoires sur la vie et les ouvrages de Denis Diderot closely echoes both 
Diderot’s ‘Avertissement’ and Périer’s own words: 
il n’a laissé de l’important ouvrage qu’il projetait […] que quelques 
matériaux épars et sans aucun ordre entre eux.35
of the substantial work he was planning he left nothing […] apart from a 
few scattered materials that didn’t follow any order
It is difficult to deny the similarities between Diderot’s revised 
‘Avertissement’ with its story about posthumous publication and 
disordered fragments and the story of Pascal’s Pensées, even down to 
the actual wording. They are very similar. This suggests two initial 
conclusions: firstly, that Diderot was quite specifically evoking Pascal, 
and secondly, that it is not with Naigeon that this story about fragments 
and disorder commences, but with Diderot; Naigeon merely relayed it. 
It is clear enough that the notion of fragments had been a crucial part of 
his presentation of the Éléments from the very first drafts, but it is only 
with the final version that it develops into a story implicitly referencing 
Pascal. 
Do we now have enough evidence to stop calling the Éléments 
de physiologie fragmentary, and to say instead that it seems as if this 
particular story about fragments is a disguise devised by the notoriously 
tricksy author? If so, the question then becomes why he did it, with 
a subsidiary enquiry into why no one has ever noticed. Perhaps the 
confusion over the two drafts, along with the view that Naigeon was 
faithfully transcribing what really happened as opposed to just as 
faithfully transcribing Diderot’s mystification, explains why this has 
become the official account of the Éléments. In later chapters we will 
add more detail to the general picture of confusion surrounding this 
text when we look at the complex relationship between its publication 
history and Diderot’s reputation during the French Revolution. In the 
rest of this chapter, however, we will attempt to address what this Pascal 
parallel that Diderot sets up at the very beginning of the Éléments is 
supposed to do.
35  Naigeon, Mémoires historiques et philosophiques sur la vie et les ouvrages de Denis 
Diderot, p. 291.
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Significantly for the argument being made here, two new editions of 
Pascal’s Pensées, the first to significantly reorder the Port-Royal version, 
came out while Diderot was composing his Éléments de physiologie, one 
in 1776 (with a revised version in 1778), and the other in 1779. The first 
was a polemical ‘more methodical’ reordering, by the philosophe and 
mathematician Condorcet, and the other was a serious contribution to 
Pascal scholarship, retrieving and making available material which had 
not until then been known.36 This latter edition, by Charles Bossut, which 
came out in 1779, thereafter dominated until well into the nineteenth 
century.
Condorcet was a mathematician, thinker, and protégé of D’Alembert, 
Diderot’s Encyclopédie co-editor, and he brought out his revised edition of 
the Pensées, advertising itself as being more methodical, in 1776. In 1778, 
this edition was republished, this time with annotations by Voltaire, who 
calls himself the ‘second éditeur’. Voltaire’s first annotation, relating to 
the title, is feistily judgmental and reductive in the normal Voltairean 
way, and immediately seizes on the issue of fragments, disorder, and the 
posthumous edition by a group of friends. 
(*) Ce n’est point ainsi que Pascal avait arrangé ses pensées; car il ne les 
avait point arrangés du tout, il les jeta au hasard. Ses amis après sa mort 
les mirent dans un ordre; l’auteur de l’Éloge  les a mises dans un autre, et 
ce nouvel ordre est plus méthodique. Second éditeur. 37
(*) This is not at all how Pascal had arranged his thoughts, as he hadn’t 
arranged them in the slightest, he just set them down at random. After 
his death, his friends put them in one order; the author of the Éloge  [In 
Praise of Pascal] put them in another one, and this new order is more 
methodical. Second editor.
Voltaire had of course previously engaged with Pascal’s Pensées in the 
last of his Lettres philosophiques, published in 1734, and the annotation 
above is a paraphrase from that earlier text, in whose opening paragraph 
he had written of the Pensées which Pascal ‘avait jetées au hasard sur le 
papier’ [had randomly set down on paper], talking of his respect for 
36  Éloge et Pensées de Pascal, édition établie par Condorcet et annotée par Voltaire, ed. by 
Richard Parish, in Œuvres complètes de Voltaire (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1968–), 
80A (2008); Œuvres, ed. by Abbé Charles Bossut, 5 vols (The Hague [Paris]: Detune, 
1779). 
37  Éloge et Pensées de Pascal [Condorcet/Voltaire], p. 129.
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‘le génie et l’éloquence de Pascal’ [the genius and eloquence of Pascal] 
declaring that ‘c’est en admirant son génie que je combats quelques-unes 
de ses idées’ [it is while admiring his genius that I contest some of his 
ideas].38 Voltaire’s Letter 25 does indeed go on to combat Pascal’s ideas, 
quoting gobbets of the Pensées whose logic and view of Christianity 
and mankind he contests at every turn. For Voltaire, Pascal’s genius 
and eloquence—and, we should add, his engagement with reason in 
discussing matters of faith—make him an important reference point, 
while his Jansenist world view makes him an important adversary for 
the optimistic pro-tolerance pro-mercantilist thinker that is the Voltaire 
of the 1730s. What he is in 1778 when the Condorcet edition with its 
Voltaire amendments came out is on his deathbed, at the end of about 
twenty years of ceaseless campaigning against religious intolerance.39 
The tone of his comments has therefore sharpened, as we will see.
Bossut’s multi-volume edition of Pascal’s complete works 
(including, of course, the Pensées) came out in 1779 and would have 
been known to Diderot, if for no other reason than that the careful 
description of Pascal’s calculating machine that Diderot had written for 
the Encyclopédie article MACHINE ARITHMÉTIQUE was reprinted in 
its fourth volume: the Pascal scholar Arnoux Straudo believes that this 
article and its reappearance in Pascal’s Œuvres complètes were responsible 
for the revival of Pascal’s reputation as a scientist, forming the basis of 
subsequent descriptions.40
38  Voltaire, Lettres philosophiques, ed. by Frédéric Deloffre (Paris: Gallimard Folio, 
1986), p. 156.
39  It was, apparently, the last work he published, and he was beadily following up 
on its progress only two weeks before he died: ‘Je voudrais bien savoir si le Pascal 
Condorcet est fini. Je vous prie de vous en informer à Grasset de Genêve’ [I would 
be very keen to know if the Pascal Condorcet is finished. Please be so kind as to 
check with Grasset in Geneva]. ‘Voltaire [François Marie Arouet] to Jean Louis 
Wagnière: Thursday, 14 May 1778’, in  Electronic Enlightenment Scholarly Edition of 
Correspondence, ed. by Robert McNamee et al., 2018, https://doi.org/10.13051/
ee:doc/voltfrVF1290322a1c. With thanks to Richard Parish for this information.
40  Straudo writes that: ‘Le travail de Diderot sera d’une grande utilité pour la fortune 
scientifique de Pascal: reproduit en effet dans l’édition des oeuvres de Blaise Pascal de 
Bossut [IV.34-50] et dans l’Encyclopédie méthodique [Mathématiques, t.1 (Paris 1784), 
p. 136-42], il servira de base à des descriptions ultérieures’ [Diderot’s work would 
be extremely useful for Pascal’s academic fate : reproduced in Bossut’s edition of the 
Works of Blaise Pascal and in the Encyclopédie méthodique, it would serve as a basis for 
later descriptions] (La fortune de Pascal en France au XVIIIe siècle, SVEC 351 (Oxford: 
Voltaire Foundation, 1997), p. 206).
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Might it be the case therefore that these two new editions, with their 
prominent discussions of fragments and ordering and their claims 
to improve on previous editions, could have suggested to Diderot a 
new approach to his existing line about the Éléments de physiologie’s 
fragmentary nature?
One wonders therefore whether the date of 1778 on the title page 
of the Vandeul manuscript which we know to be erroneous and which 
the two editors Mayer and Quintili have found bizarre might be some 
form of signal to indicate proximity to the Condorcet/Voltaire edition 
of Pascal’s Pensées, or even to Voltaire’s death? Death, after all, features 
in the ‘avertissement’ as the obstacle to the completion of the project. In 
1778, not only Voltaire but also Diderot’s erstwhile friend Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau died, within six weeks of each other. 1778 is a death year for 
the philosophes, a moment with which Diderot may well have chosen 
to associate his not-yet-happened death. However, it is no more than 
speculation that Diderot chose this date as a significant one, and if so, 
that it might have been for these reasons.
Whether or not the date given on the first page of the manuscript 
is a later addition, there is a temporal proximity between the ongoing 
composition of Diderot’s Physiologie and the publication of two new 
editions of Pascal’s Pensées, both of which very publicly reopen the issue 
of their order and incompletion. It adds further circumstantial evidence 
about where this repeatedly relayed and manifestly false myth about 
the fragmentary nature of Diderot’s last work came from. But we may 
not need this very localised literary history to make the case; it just 
helps us to see that the case is there. After all, the ‘avertissement’ letter 
which Diderot wrote to Catherine II in 1774, and which was re-sent to 
her as the introduction to the Éléments de physiologie in 1785, predates 
these Pascal editions, and draws attention repeatedly to the notion of 
fragments, dispersal, and rearrangement, as we have seen.
So the notion of fragmentation and the implicit reference to Pascal 
are planted at the opening of Diderot’s Physiologie. Why is this? Why 
is it fundamental to the project of the Éléments de physiologie to first 
establish the Pascalian parallel? Pascal’s Pensées were of course, and as 
already mentioned, the mosaic fragments of his long-mulled-over and 
never-completed apology of the Christian faith, in parts conceived of as 
a dialogue with an atheist whom Pascal is seeking to convert. 
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His ‘written defence or justification’ of the Christian faith had a huge 
impact from the moment of its publication. His arguments constituted 
a crucial reference for anyone interested in debating religion and its 
relation to knowledge in the century after his death, which was more or 
less everyone engaged in any aspect of knowledge at all, Voltaire being 
a case in point. But the Pensées and their arguments were nonetheless 
fragmentary and their relation to the never-achieved whole a matter for 
public discussion, dispute, and rearrangement. Might Diderot be using 
this opening allusion to the incompletion of Pascal’s Pensées as a way 
of throwing down the gauntlet, the literal notification or ‘avertissement’ 
of a challenge to religious accounts of nature and man? The carefully 
crafted wholeness of the Éléments, starting with the big picture of nature 
and its infinitely varied beings, moving through the properties of 
matter and the different life forms, subsequently focusing in on human 
anatomy, and then presenting an extended assessment of sensation, the 
brain and human consciousness and self-consciousness, ending with a 
reverie about death, stands in interconnected and thorough contrast to 
the fractured Pensées. The Éléments de physiologie looks like the atheist’s 
response to—and rebuttal of—the arguments of the Christian who had 
been trying to convert him to faith. 
We know, after all, that Diderot likes to dialogue, rewrite, contest, 
refute: we have examples of this throughout his œuvre. We also, of 
course, know that he likes the aphoristic form of the ‘pensée’ which 
both recalls Pascal and is a sort of tribute to him: Diderot’s Pensées 
philosophiques (1746) is one of the earliest publications of the emerging 
writer, and, as the prominent co-editor of the Encyclopédie, he returns 
publicly to the form with the Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature 
(1753) continuing with it in the Additions aux pensées philosophiques 
(1763).41 Indeed, he inserts a transformed version of at least one of his 
own Pensées philosophiques into the Éléments. In its first version it reads 
as follows: 
41  The ‘Additions’ were written in 1762, manuscript-published in the Correspondance 
littéraire in 1763, print-published in 1770 in Naigeon’s Recueil philosophique, and 
there (falsely) attributed to Vauvenargues. See David Adams, Bibliographie des 
œuvres de Diderot, 1739–1900, 2 vols (Ferney-Voltaire: Centre international d’étude 
du XVIIIe siècle, 2000). With thanks to Kate E. Tunstall for this detail.
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Le vrai martyr attend la mort; l’enthousiaste y court.42
The true martyr waits for death; the enthusiast runs towards it.
In the Éléments, it has become this:
L’enfant court à la mort les yeux fermés  : l’homme est stationnaire  ; le 
vieillard y arrive le dos tourné.43
The child runs towards death with their eyes shut; the man is stationary; 
the old man approaches it with his back turned.
The shared scenario involves the more or less rapid movement of different 
sorts of people (different in terms of religious fervour or in age) towards 
death. Yet what was in the 1746 version an implicit criticism of the zealot 
who courts death has turned in the mature version into an aphorism 
about the growth and decline of the individual over time, and about 
their attitude to death according to their age. The idea and its expression 
are doubly materialist, being embodied (eyes closed, back turned), and 
also because the position of the body in space and time determines the 
experience and happiness of the individual. The criticism of religious 
enthusiasm in the first formulation gains a new edge in the context of 
the revision, in that being carried away by religious feelings is implicitly 
now presented as a youthful impulse which the older, wiser man moves 
beyond. 
There are other such instances of Diderot incorporating his youthful 
Pensées into the older text: it is not my aim here, however, to focus on this 
particular aspect of Diderot’s auto-intertextuality but rather to show that 
the ‘pensée’ is a form that Diderot continuously works with and indeed 
(as in this case) reworks. Pascal himself is explicitly named twice in the 
Éléments, once as an example of someone who was supposed never to 
have forgotten anything he had done, read, or thought ‘depuis l’âge de 
raison’ [since reaching the age of reason] and once, in the conclusion, 
where he is cited as having said about God that ‘on ne sait ni ce qu’il est, 
ni s’il est’ [we are incapable of knowing either what he is or whether he 
42  Denis Diderot, Pensées philosophiques, Additions aux pensées, ed. by Jean-Claude 
Bourdin (Paris: GF Flammarion, 2007), p. 76 (‘Pensée’ 39).
43  DPV 313/PQ 129/MT 136.
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is].44 So, in sum, Pascal is both an implicit and an explicit reference point 
in the Éléments de physiologie, and the ‘pensée’ form so strongly associated 
with him is also present throughout Diderot’s œuvre, including in this 
particular work. But this isn’t all. There is reason to think that Diderot is 
engaging with specific arguments and pensées, and that the two writers 
surprisingly share common anchoring points or questions, even if their 
answers radically diverge. As Diderot observes, appositely enough in 
his own Pensées philosophiques, there are ‘arsenaux communs’ for the 
believer and the unbeliever alike:
C’est en cherchant des preuves que j’ai trouvé des difficultés. Les livres 
qui contiennent les motifs de ma croyance m’offrent en même temps les 
raisons de l’incrédulité. Ce sont des arsenaux communs.45
It is when I was looking for proofs that I found difficulties. The books 
which contain the motives for my belief also and at the same time give 
me the reasons for unbelief. They contain ammunition for both sides. 
We will therefore now turn to what I have suggested might be common 
points of reference, or even an arsenal of tools or weapons that Diderot 
could use, redeploy, or even turn against their creator. The three editions 
of Pascal’s Pensées that Diderot would have had access to, that is, the 
Port-Royal, the Condorcet/Voltaire, and the Bossut, form the corpus 
of pensées which has been considered here. Suggestive parallels with 
pensées that were not yet available in print have been left aside, except in 
one case which we will come to in due course. 
44  Pascal’s prodigious memory: DPV 473/PQ 301/MT 289; Pascal on God: DPV 515/
PQ 358/MT 327; Pascal in English Pensées, trans. by Roger Ariew (Indianapolis, 
IN: Hackett, 2005), p. 212. Pascal had written, ‘Nous sommes donc incapables de 
connaître ni ce qu’il est ni s’il est.’ In the Le Guern edition (used by DPV), this is 
part of composite fragment 397; in the widely-used Sellier, this is part of composite 
fragment 680 (p. 1210); the concordance tables in the Brunschvicg edition record 
this composite fragment in many different parts of the Port-Royal and Bossut 
editions. For Port-Royal edition, see VII 1 and 2, XXVIII.69; for Bossut, see II iii.1; II 
iii.4 and 5; II xvii.63. It appears in abridged form in Condorcet/Voltaire, ed. Parish, 
pp. 161-62, Article III §1 (with grateful thanks to Richard Parish for locating it). 
45  Diderot, Pensées philosophiques, pp. 89–90 (‘Pensée’ 61).
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Pascal and Diderot: Common Reference Points 
Instinct
Both Pascal and Diderot consider instinct to be central to understanding 
the nature of man, both repeatedly ask about the relation of part to whole 
and the extent to which part is independent of or dependent on whole, 
and both consider that one’s outlook on the world and experience of it 
are determined by varying levels and emphases of perception as well as 
by illness.
‘Deux choses instruisent l’homme de toute sa nature: l’instinct et 
l’expérience’ [Two things teach man about his whole nature: instinct and 
experience] writes Pascal, in a fragment which appears to have been first 
published in Bossut’s edition and would not have been out of place in 
Diderot’s work.46 And where of course, for Pascal, nature is not an entity 
which excludes God, while for Diderot it is, instinct is of vital importance 
for both thinkers as they try to access what nature is, divested of custom. 
Thus, Diderot writes: ‘L’instinct guide mieux l’animal que l’homme. Dans 
l’animal il est pur, dans l’homme il est égaré par sa raison et ses lumières’ 
[Instinct guides animals better than humans. In animals it is unalloyed 
whereas in humans it is misled by their reason and knowledge].47 When 
Pascal, echoing Montaigne, writes suspiciously of custom as ‘une seconde 
nature, qui détruit la première’ [a second nature that destroys the first], 
fearing that even nature may possibly be a form of custom, and therefore 
unnatural, he is also showing ‘l’homme égaré’—man misled, unable to 
46  Op. cit., p.897, § 161 (Sellier, section VIII, ‘Contrariétés’); Bossut I.iv.10 (Brunchsvicg 
§396); Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans. by Roger Ariew (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 
2005), p. 34. Ariew follows Sellier’s ordering. I have used Sellier’s concordance to 
produce the Brunschvicg numbering, and used the Brunchsvicg concordance to 
get to the Port-Royal and Bossut editions (it doesn’t give the Condorcet/Voltaire 
edition). 
47  DPV 315/PQ 131/MT 138. In this section Diderot is also invisibly referencing 
La Mettrie’s Traité de l’âme: ‘L’instinct consiste dans des dispositions corporelles 
purement mécaniques, qui font agir les animaux sans nulle délibération, 
indépendamment de toute expérience’ [instinct consists in purely mechanical bodily 
dispositions which make animals act without any deliberation and independently of 
any experience] (Traité de l’âme, in La Mettrie, Œuvres philosophiques, ed. by Francine 
Markovits, 2 vols (Paris: Fayard, 1987), vol. 1, p.185, added emphasis indicating the 
verbatim borrowing).
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access ‘real’ nature.48 In a fragment from the St Petersburg draft of the 
Éléments de physiologie which never made it into the Vandeul version, 
Diderot had written: ‘Nous ne pouvons connaître l’instinct parce qu’il est 
détruit par notre éducation. Il est plus éveillé dans le sauvage’ [We cannot 
understand instinct because it is destroyed by our education. It is keener 
in savages].49 So while they are agreed on the importance of instinct as 
well as its compromised nature in man, Diderot will elevate the ‘savage’ 
man or animal over ‘civilised’ man as the former is closer to nature, less 
compromised in his reactions, as we see in this comic if compressed little 
scenario about a worm who unites instinct and experience: ‘Expérience 
sur le ver: attendez qu’il sorte, piquez-le, il se détournera, il rentrera dans 
la terre, craindra de sortir etc’ [Experiment on a worm: wait for it to come 
out, prick it, it will turn away, go back into the ground, fear to come out 
etc].50 Out comes the worm, gets poked by the experimental human, dives 
back down into the earth and won’t come out again. Its instinct makes it 
escape, and its experience of being poked gives it fear and thereby teaches 
it not to come out again. The worm has learnt the lesson which natural 
instinct has taught it, and it has turned, wisely.51
Pleasure, Thought, and the Definition of the Human
Pascal sarcastically asks what it is within us that feels pleasure.52 
Qu’est-ce qui sent du plaisir en nous ? Est-ce la main, est-ce le bras, est-ce 
la chair, est-ce le sang? On verra qu’il faut que ce soit quelque chose 
d’immatériel.53
48  Op. cit., p.897, § 159 (Sellier, section VIII, ‘Contrariétés’); Port-Royal: XXV.15; 
Bossut I.vi.19 (Brunchsvicg §93). Pensées, trans. by Ariew, p. 34. Sellier refers us to 
Montaigne, Essais, III, 10, p. 1010: ‘L’accoutumance est une seconde nature, et non 
moins puissante’ [custom is a second nature, and no less powerful].
49  PQ 140, ‘FNR’ (Fragment non repris). DPV 325 doesn’t reference this FNR. 
50  DPV 314/PQ 131/MT 138.
51  Sellier § 176 also considers the question of instinct. With thanks to Richard Parish 
for this addition.
52  In Sellier’s edition, this ‘pensée’ precedes the fragment entitled ‘Contre le 
pyrrhonisme’ (§141). ‘Pyrrhonism’ is a synonym of scepticism, the position 
of rational doubt which Pascal works so hard to present as untenable and even 
incompletely rational in itself (see Pascal’s wager, which as Parish points out is 
‘more correctly the fragment Infini: Rien [B 233; L 418; S 680]’. Parish, ‘Blaise Pascal’, 
p. 543.
53  Op. cit., p. 889, §140 (Sellier, section VII, Grandeur); Port-Royal XXXIII.8; Bossut 
I.iv.8 (Brunchsvicg §339bis). Pensées, trans. by Ariew, p. 30.
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What feels pleasure in us? Is it our hand, our arm, flesh, blood? We will 
see that it must be something immaterial.
His triumphant ‘we will see that it must be something immaterial’ is 
blocked by Diderot, who takes this question extremely seriously and 
will musingly say that ‘je pense que le plaisir n’est point dans l’oeil’ [I 
think that the feeling of pleasure is by no means in the eye]54 without 
implying either that this is a statement of the obvious, absurd in any 
way, or that if pleasure isn’t located in the eye, it cannot be material. 
Indeed, he will flatly contradict Pascal’s position when he states that 
‘chaque organe a son plaisir et sa douleur particulière’ [each organ has 
its own particular pleasure and pain].55 When Pascal declares, this time 
in dialogue with René Descartes, that thought is what defines human 
difference from the rest of nature, Diderot again contradicts him. Pascal 
had written:
Je puis bien concevoir un homme sans main, pieds, tête, car ce n’est 
que l’expérience qui nous apprend que la tête est plus nécessaire que 
les pieds. Mais je ne puis concevoir l’homme sans pensée. Ce serait une 
pierre ou une brute.56
I can certainly conceive of a man without hands, feet, head, for it is only 
experience that teaches us the head is more necessary than the feet. But I 
cannot conceive of man without thought. He would be a stone or a beast.
Diderot writes in sharp contradistinction as follows: 
Dans l’état parfait de santé, où il n’y a aucune sensation prédominante 
qui fasse discerner une partie du corps, état que tout homme a quelque 
fois éprouvé, l’homme n’existe qu’en un point du cerveau: il est tout au 
lieu de la pensée; peut-être en examinant de fort près trouverait-on que 
54  DPV 456/PQ 281/MT 272.
55  DPV 499/PQ 336/MT 313. See Chapter 4, particularly Bordeu-inspired vitalism.
56  Pascal, Pensées, p. 891, §143 (Sellier, section VII, Grandeur); Port-Royal XXIII.1; 
Bossut I.iv.2 (Brunchsvicg §339). Pensées, trans. by Ariew, p. 31. Sellier gives an 
intertext from Descartes: ‘Nous connaissons manifestement que, pour être, nous 
n’avons pas besoin d’extension, de figure, d’être en aucun lieu, ni d’aucune autre 
telle chose qu’on peut attribuer au corps, et que nous sommes par cela seul que 
nous pensons’ [We manifestly know that, in order to be, we have no need of 
extension, shape, location or of any other such thing that might be attributed to 
a body, and that we exist solely because we think] (Descartes, Principes I, 8, in 
Œuvres, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris : Vrin, 1964), vol. 9 : II, édition 
révisée, p. 28).
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triste ou gai, dans la peine ou le plaisir, il est toujours tout au lieu de la 
sensation.57
In a perfect state of health, when no single dominant sensation draws 
attention to any particular part of the body, a state which everyone has 
experienced sometimes, then a person exists only in one point in their 
brain and is completely absorbed in the thought; perhaps if we looked 
very closely we would discover that when someone is sad or happy, in 
pain, or feeling pleasure, they are always completely absorbed by their 
sensation.
Diderot’s response to the definition of man as inevitably connected 
to thought is to reframe the question in bodily terms: what is the 
predominant sensation? If there is none, and if the person is in perfect 
health, then they will be entirely focused on their thought, or in Diderot’s 
expression, entirely ‘in the place of the thought’. He then transposes 
this idea onto the notion of feeling, pain and pleasure (notably absent 
in the previous hypothesis of the thought place), to suggest that the 
person when feeling would be entirely focused on the sensation, located 
inside it. This reframing completely displaces thought from its elevated 
position as ultimate, different, and essentially defining. Thought is only 
part of what is going on, only part of our consciousness, unless we enjoy 
such perfect health that we have no predominant sensation, in which 
case we can exist totally in our thought. He goes on to deny that humans 
are always thinking anyway:
Est-ce qu’on pense quand on est vivement chatouillé? est-ce qu’on pense 
dans la jouissance des sexes? est-ce qu’on pense quand on est vivement 
affecté par la poésie, par la musique ou la peinture? Est-ce qu’on pense 
quand on voit son enfant en péril? Est-ce qu’on pense au milieu d’un 
combat?58
Are we thinking when we are being intensely tickled? are we thinking 
when we are enjoying sexual ecstasy? are we thinking when we are 
intensely affected by poetry, music, or painting? Are we thinking we see 
our child in danger? Are we thinking in the midst of a fight?
What an array of differently intense situations! From close bodily 
contact whether pleasurable or painful (being tickled, having sex, 
fighting), to heightened emotion in response to the arts, or fear for 
57  DPV 330/PQ 146/MT 151. Part 1, chapter 3 (‘Homme’), §2 (‘Pensée’).
58  DPV 330/PQ 146-47/MT 151.
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a child’s safety, in none of these moments do we think, says Diderot. 
His definition of what is human includes these moments of strong, 
even violent sensation, and these moments preclude thought: logically 
therefore, Diderot’s definition of what is human contests Pascal’s (and 
Descartes’s), reasserting the dominance of sensation over thought, and 
here in fact limiting the primacy of thought to neutral balance, which is 
tantamount to the total absence of sensation. 
In terms of the process of thinking, however, Diderot seems to accept 
Pascal’s view so totally as to quote him, albeit invisibly and possibly 
also unknowingly. This is Pascal’s pensée about only being able to think 
about one thing at a time, and we also find it in La Mettrie’s Traité de 
l’âme [Treatise on the soul].59 It suggests that unpublished versions of 
Pascal’s Pensées were circulating, in this case attaining print publication 
via the intermediary of La Mettrie. This is the sole example in this 
chapter where we use a passage from Pascal which was not, so far as I 
can tell, available in any of the published editions, and yet it is also the 
only occasion on which the phrasing is so close that it seems like direct 
quotation. This is what Pascal had written:
Une seule pensée nous occupe. Nous ne pouvons penser à deux choses 
à la fois.60 
A single thought occupies us. We cannot think of two things at the same 
time.
In La Mettrie we read this:
Nous ne pensons qu’à une seule chose à la fois.61
We can only think of one thing at a time.
In Diderot’s version, this becomes:
Nous ne pouvons être qu’à une seule chose à la fois.62
We can only be focused on one thing at a time.
59  We look at this trio of elsewhere, see Chapter 3.
60  Pascal, Pensées, p. 1081. S§453. Pensées, trans. by Ariew, p. 142.
61 La Mettrie, Traité de l’âme, pp. 212–13 and elsewhere: ‘l’Ame ne peut avoir qu’une 
seule idée distincte à la fois’ [the soul can only have one distinct idea at a time] (p. 
186).
62  DPV 468/PQ 294/MT 283.
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Diderot—we must assume—is using La Mettrie, without necessarily 
knowing that Pascal is the hidden source. It remains nonetheless within 
the realms of possibility that whatever La Mettrie had access to in terms 
of circulating Pascalian manuscripts, Diderot also had access to. The 
filiation in any case is clear, and Diderot’s shift from a focus on thought 
to one which emphasises instead a more diffuse (and sensory) being is 
consistent with the displacement of thought from its central position 
that we have already been looking at.
Limbs and Body: Subordination and Independence 
Pascal uses the reference point or example of the body again and again 
to make his Christian arguments about the primacy of spirit or mind 
over its subordinate parts; this works just as well when he is talking 
about the church and its members as when he is talking about thought 
or pleasure and whether it’s located in the body or not. In the Pensées 
(Liasse XXVII) entitled ‘Morale chrétienne’, he makes a point about how 
a Christian is part of a greater body, recalling the words and terms of 
St Paul, who had written ‘Si l’un des membres souffre, tous les autres 
souffrent avec lui’ [If one member suffers, all members suffer with it] 
(1 Corinthians 12: 26).63 Pascal creates an extended analogy with body 
parts which quite quickly acquires a fictional life of its own that is not 
strictly plausible:
Etre membre est n’avoir de vie, d’être et de mouvement que par l’esprit 
du corps et pour le corps. Le membre séparé ne voyant plus le corps 
auquel il appartient n’a plus qu’un être périssant et mourant. Cependant 
il croit être un tout et, ne se voyant point de corps dont il dépende, il croit 
ne dépendre que de soi et veut se faire centre et corps lui-même.64
To be a member is to have life, existence, and motion only for the body 
and through the spirit of the body. The separated member, no longer 
seeing the body to which it belongs, has only a perishing and moribund 
existence. Yet it believes itself a whole, and, not seeing the body on which 
63  The Bible is quoted in the Jansenist theologian Louis-Isaac Lemaistre de Sacy’s 
French translation of 1667; the English is from Thomas Nelson’s New King James 
Version of 1982. 
64  1022 §404 (Sellier XXVII ‘Morale chrétienne’); Port-Royal XXIX.3; Ult XXIX. 5 and 8; 
Bossut II.xvii.70 (Brunchsvicg §483). Pensées, trans. by Ariew, p. 105.
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it depends, it believes it depends only on itself and wants to make itself 
its only center and body.
The separated limb has a being which is perishing and dying, as 
Pascal vividly puts it; thus far the analogy works in parallel. But this 
separated limb believes it has its own being, that it is complete in itself, 
that it relies on itself and is its own centre and body. This immediately 
departs from anatomical plausibility. Presumably the fact that this 
analogy develops in an absurd direction is part of Pascal’s point, viz, 
that it is absurd to contemplate such a division. Diderot, however, 
will produce an interestingly equivalent yet literalised version of the 
relationship between body and selfish member. In his version, the body 
and its different parts are not an analogy for anything; they are a direct 
description of the physiological processes of ageing. Meet the selfish old 
tendon:
Peu à peu le tendon s’affaisse, il se sèche, il se durcit, il cesse de vivre, 
du moins d’une vie commune à tout le système; peut-être ne fait-il que 
s’isoler, se séparer de la société dont il ne partage ni les peines, ni les 
plaisirs et à laquelle il ne rend plus rien.65
Bit by bit the tendon declines, dries up, hardens, and stops living, at 
least stops living the life common to the whole system; perhaps all it’s 
doing is isolating itself, separating itself from the society whose pains 
and pleasures it no longer shares, and to which it no longer contributes 
anything. 
And although this depiction is not ironically absurd as Pascal’s had 
been, it has a certain satirical humour or detachment, and in fact Diderot 
maintains the notion of the importance of contributing to something 
beyond one’s own immediate identity. The society here is the body as 
a whole. Elsewhere, as we have already indicated above but will also 
develop further in Chapter 4, Diderot considers at length the extent 
to which a body part has its own identity within the larger body, and 
whether it can exist alone. He will say, about organs, that ‘tous ont leur 
vie particulière’ [they all have their own particular life], and that ‘si 
l’organe vit, il a donc une vie propre et séparée du reste du système’ 
65  DPV 311/PQ 127/MT 135 (part 1, chapter 2 ‘Animal’; subsection ‘Vie’). There’s 
something about this selfish old tendon that is strongly reminiscent of the sorts of 
hyper-realised descriptions of wicked old people that we meet in Dickens. 
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[if the organ is living, it follows that it has its own life separate from 
the rest of the system].66 An extended comparison of wooden versus 
flesh pincers (that is, fingers) is part of this same discussion:67 it asks 
us to ask what the ability to feel pain means for flesh, however small or 
insignificant the piece of flesh, or sentient life, is. If it is sentient, it can 
feel pain; if it can feel pain, then probably, we assume, care should be 
taken not to inflict it, and probably also it should be respected as having 
its own identity. This question of whether the smaller parts have their 
own identity or not and whether they are subservient or not deeply 
divides Pascal and Diderot.68 Pascal will consider the independence of 
body parts almost with derision in order to reassert their subordination, 
as here:
Si les pieds et les mains avaient une volonté particulière, jamais ils ne 
seraient dans leur ordre qu’en soumettant cette volonté particulière à la 
volonté première qui gouverne le corps entier. Hors de là, ils sont dans le 
désordre et dans le malheur. Mais en ne voulant que le bien du corps ils 
font leur propre bien.69
If the feet and hands had a will of their own, they would never be in 
their order except by submitting this particular will to the primary will 
governing the whole body. Outside of this, they are in disorder and 
misfortune. But in wanting only the good of the body, they accomplish 
their own good.
Against which Diderot will assert (and as we quoted a few pages ago): 
‘Chaque organe a son plaisir et sa douleur [...] sa volonté [...]’ [Each 
organ has its pleasure, its pain […], its will].70 Although I have just 
extracted the key terms in order to make the parallel with Pascal clearer, 
the ellipses should not be taken as indicating that this is a passing 
remark. On the contrary, the whole paragraph runs as follows:
Chaque organe a son plaisir et sa douleur particulière, sa position, 
sa construction, sa chaîne, sa fonction, ses maladies accidentelles, 
héréditaires, ses dégoûts, ses appétits, ses remèdes, ses sensations, sa 
66  Both quotations from DPV 498–99/PQ 335/MT 312.
67  DPV 449/PQ 274/MT 265–66, quoted in full below. 
68  We will examine how this aspect of Diderot’s thought is influenced by Montpellier 
vitalism in Chapter 4, ‘Major Debates in Physiology: Mechanism and Vitalism’.
69  1023–24 §406. Pensées, trans. by Ariew, p. 106.
70  DPV 499/PQ 336/MT 312, quoted above.
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volonté, ses mouvements, sa nutrition, ses stimulants, son traitement 
approprié, sa naissance, son développement. Qu’a de plus un animal? 71
Each organ has its particular pleasure and pain, its position, its 
construction, its chain, its function, its accidental or hereditary 
illnesses, its dislikes, its appetites, its remedies, its sensations, its will, 
its movements, its nutrition, its stimulants, its appropriate treatment, its 
birth, its growth. What more does an animal have?
For Diderot therefore, the idea of integrity of existence of the different 
body parts is an important one, and not an object of derision. The 
question both Pascal and Diderot pose, however, is the same: does the 
member, limb, organ or just simply part of a body have its own separate 
existence, or does it not?
Illness
Where they both meet in an important way is on the distorting (Pascal) 
or determining (Diderot) effect of illness. Both return to it repeatedly. 
Pascal writes:
Nous avons un autre principe d’erreur, les maladies. Elles nous gâtent le 
jugement et le sens. Et si les grandes l’altèrent sensiblement, je ne doute 
pas que les petites n’y fassent impression à leur proportion.72
We have another principle of error, illnesses. They impair our judgement 
and our senses. And if major illnesses disturb them noticeably, I do not 
doubt that lesser ones make a proportionate impression.
Diderot puts it differently, removing the moralising notion of ‘error’, 
although retaining the idea that the way illness or a bodily disorder 
make us behave is literally a disorder, and therefore that bodily order is 
preferable and can be returned to:
Effet réciproque de la sensation sur les objets et des objets sur la sensation. 
Je suis heureux, tout ce qui m’entoure s’embellit. Je souffre, tout ce qui 
m’entoure s’obscurcit. [...]
71  DPV 499/PQ 336/MT 313. 
72  Pascal, Pensées, p. 860, §78 (following Sellier spelling and punctuation); PR XXV.11; 
Cond/Volt, p. 190, §XII (cf fn87); Bossut I.VI., §XIV. Pensées, trans. by Ariew, p. 15. 
Sellier points out that this is close to Montaigne Essais II.12, pp. 564–65: Montaigne 
is a common source and reference point for both Pascal and Diderot.
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Un peu de bile dont la circulation dans le foie est embarrassée change 
toute la couleur des idées: elles deviennent noires, mélancoliques, on se 
déplaît partout où on est. [...]
Et c’est à de pareilles causes que tient notre raison, nos goûts, nos 
aversions, nos désirs, notre caractère, nos actions, notre morale, nos vices, 
nos vertus, notre bonheur et notre malheur, le bonheur et le malheur de 
ceux qui nous entourent!73
Reciprocal effect of sensation on objects and of objects on sensation. I am 
happy, and everything around me becomes beautiful. I am in pain, and 
everything around me is plunged in gloom. […]
A little bile not circulating properly in the liver changes the colour of our 
ideas completely: they become dark, melancholy, and we are displeased 
wherever we are. […]
And it’s causes like this that determine our reason, our tastes, our 
aversions, our desires, our character, our actions, our morals, our vices, 
our virtues, our happiness and our unhappiness, the happiness and 
unhappiness of those who are close to us!
This extended passage from Diderot provides an interesting commentary 
on Pascal’s reflection about how nature makes us miserable in all states 
and that this misery is worsened by contrast with what our desires show 
us of a happier state; Pascal says that this contrast can never be resolved:
(§) La nature nous rendant toujours malheureux, en tous états, nos 
désirs nous figurent un état heureux, parce qu’ils joignent à l’état où 
nous sommes, les plaisirs de l’état où nous ne sommes pas; et quand 
nous arriverions à ces plaisirs nous ne serions pas heureux pour cela, 
parce que nous aurions d’autres désirs conformes à un nouvel état.74
(§) Since nature makes us constantly unhappy in every condition, our 
desires depict for us a happy condition, because they join to the condition 
in which we are, the pleasures of the condition in which we are not. And 
if we attained these pleasures, we would not be happy even then, because 
we would have other desires relating to this new condition.
The section sign (§) appears at the beginning of this paragraph in the 
Condorcet/Voltaire edition, and tells us that the ‘second éditeur’, that is, 
73  DPV 461/PQ 287/MT 277. These are the closing paragraphs of Part 3, chapter 1, on 
‘Sensation’.
74  Cond/Volt ed. Parish, p. 230 §XXIII; Parish gives the PR reference to the 1728 
edition, as being p. 13 (1728); S§529; PR XXIX.15; Bossut I.vii.5; Brunchsvicg §109. 
Pensées, trans. by Ariew, p. 165 (slightly modified).
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Voltaire himself, has something to say. His interventions are normally 
acerbic or derisive in some way, and nor does he disappoint here: 
(§) La nature ne nous rend pas toujours malheureux. Pascal parle 
toujours en malade qui veut que le monde entier souffre. Second éditeur.75
(§) Nature does not make us constantly unhappy. Pascal always speaks 
like a sick man who wants the whole world to suffer. Second editor.
What provokes Voltaire’s ire and insult here is Pascal’s a priori (and 
Christian Jansenist) position about nature always making us miserable. 
No, says Voltaire: Pascal was speaking as a sick man, and he wants 
everyone to suffer like him. Diderot’s position—not directed specifically 
at Pascal—is not about jealousy or mean-spiritedness; it is about the effect 
of illness on one’s outlook. As we quoted earlier, ‘Je suis heureux, tout 
ce qui m’entoure s’embellit. Je souffre, tout ce qui m’entoure s’obscurcit’ 
[I am happy, and everything around me grows beautiful. I am in pain, 
and everything around me is plunged in gloom]. This is something 
Pascal talks about, adding a subtle relativisation on thinking about 
being ill when well (he subsequently develops the theme of contrasting 
states, and wishing for something we do not have: in Sellier these two 
passages are brought together in §529, but in the Condorcet/Voltaire 
edition they’re far apart): ‘Quand on se porte bien, on ne comprend pas 
comment on pourrait faire si on était malade’ [When we are well, we 
wonder how we could manage if we were ill].76 
Change, Variation, and Monstrosity
Yet where Pascal uses these points to lambast human fallibility and 
weakness (even man’s grandeur lies in the recognition that he is 
wretched), and further, to draw attention to the instability of nature, 
Diderot, agreeing with the determining function of illness, fully 
embraces Pascal’s depiction of natural change, clearly taking on and 
75  Ibid.
76  S§529; Cond/Volt ed. Parish, p.289 §XIII; PRXXIX.23. Pensées, trans. by Ariew, p. 
165.
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arguing on behalf of the atheist. Pascal expresses the atheist point of 
view in order immediately afterwards to contest it. The first line is the 
atheist, the second the contestation: 
Toutes choses changent et se succèdent. 
Vous vous trompez, il y a... 77
All things change and succeed one another.
You are wrong; there is…
All things change, pass, and are replaced, says Pascal’s atheist: No, the 
man of faith replies, you are wrong, there is.... and the gap remains; 
there is no completed contestation. On the other hand, in the Éléments 
de physiologie, the statement about continous change is continuously 
repeated, sometimes unchanged, ironically enough:
Nul état fixe dans le corps animal: il décroît quand il ne croît plus.78 
There is no fixed state in the animal body: it starts shrinking once it stops 
growing.
L’ordre général change sans cesse: au milieu de cette vicissitude la durée 
de l’espèce peut-elle rester la même?79
The general order is constantly changing: in the midst of this vicissitude 
how can the continuation of the species stay the same?
Mais l’ordre général change sans cesse.80
But the general order constantly changes.
Thus, for Diderot, the state of nature, whether on the level of the human 
or the species or at any other level, is indeed one of flux, and no one 
individual or species or the particular form it takes is therefore unnatural 
or to be rejected. Nothing can be monstrous: the term itself is without 
meaning. This is in stark contrast with Pascal’s dialectical moralising 
approach:
S’il se vante, je l’abaisse
77  Pascal, Pensées, p. 843, §38; PR VI.4; Bossut: II.vi.8. Pensées, trans. by Ariew, p. 7. 
78  DPV 312/PQ 127/MT 135.
79  DPV 322/PQ 137/MT 144.
80  DPV 444/PQ 265/MT 261.
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S’il s’abaisse, je le vante
Et le contredis toujours
Jusques à ce qu’il comprenne
Qu’il est un monstre incompréhensible.81
If he exalts himself, I humble him.
If he humbles himself, I exalt him.
And I continue to contradict him
Until he comprehends
That he is an incomprehensible monster.
This fragment provokes another explosion of wrath from Voltaire, as 
follows:
Vrai discours de malade. Second éditeur.82
Truly the speech of a sick man. Second editor. 
Diderot addresses the question of monstrosity, without the vicious edge 
that characterises Voltaire’s intervention, although also without naming 
or invoking Pascal. What Diderot is dealing with is the notion, not the 
person:
Qu’est-ce qu’un monstre ? Un être, dont la durée est incompatible avec 
l’ordre subsistant.
Mais l’ordre général change sans cesse. [….] S’amender, se détériorer 
sont des termes relatifs aux individus d’une espèce entre eux, et aux 
différentes espèces entre elles.83
What is a monster? A being, whose continuing existence is incompatible 
with the existing order.
But the general order changes constantly. [….] To grow better or 
deteriorate are terms relative to the individuals within any species, and 
also to the different species amongst themselves.
81  Pascal, Pensées, p. 898, §163; PR XXI.4; Bossut II.i.4; Cond/Volt, p. 219, §3. Pensées, 
trans. by Ariew, p. 34.
82  Cond/Volt, p. 219 §3.
83  DPV 444/PQ 265/MT 261.
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For Diderot, monstrosity is simply relative difference, and relative 
difference is in fact the norm.84 So the notion of rejection of one sort, 
type, or species, or of pronouncing one sort to be the proper version 
and others deformed ones, or even (or in particular) the idea that 
nature is monstrous at all, is directly addressed and dismissed. 
Monstrosity becomes instead a form of weak synonym for change, 
indicating the continuous variation between forms. In sum, Diderot 
directly and without shame employs and redirects the terms of Pascal’s 
condemnation, whether they refer to nature or to the position of the 
atheist. 
Perfection/Perfectionnement
The important motif of perfection is a case in point. For Pascal, following 
the Biblical Book of Genesis and its account of the expulsion of Adam 
and Eve from the Garden of Eden, perfection is the thing we had but 
lost through giving in to an impulse of our own nature, specifically the 
desire for knowledge and the lure of power. 
Mais, malheureux que nous sommes, et plus que s’il n’y avait point de 
grandeur dans notre condition, nous avons une idée du bonheur et ne 
pouvons y arriver, nous sentons une image de la vérité et ne possédons 
que le mensonge, incapables d’ignorer absolument et de savoir 
certainement, tant il est manifeste que nous avons été dans un degré de 
perfection dont nous sommes malheureusement déchus.85
But, wretched as we are—and more so than if there had been no greatness 
in our condition—we have an idea of happiness and cannot reach it. We 
perceive an image of truth and possess only a lie. Being incapable of 
absolute ignorance and certain knowledge, it is obvious that we once had 
a degree of perfection from which we have unhappily fallen.
84  Work on Diderot’s interest in the area of monstrosity includes Andrew Curran, 
Sublime Disorder: Physical Monstrosity in Diderot’s Universe (Oxford: Voltaire 
Foundation, 2001); Emita Hill, The Role of ‘le monstre’ in Diderot’s Thought (Banbury: 
Voltaire Foundation, 1972); Charles Wolfe, Monsters and Philosophy (London: 
College Publications, 2005). We return to this question in Chapter 3.
85  Pascal, Pensées, pp. 901–02, §164; PR XXI.1, 4; III.5, 6, 8; XXVIII.30; Bossut II.i.1, 4; 
II.V.3, 4; II.xvii.23 (Brunscvicg §434). Pensées, trans. by Ariew, pp. 36–37. Sellier and 
Brunschvicg both have this as one pensée, Port-Royal and Bossut as many different 
fragments.
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This passage is densely packed with overlaid binaries about greatness, 
abjection, misery, happiness, truth, lies, knowledge, ignorance, what is 
obvious or obscure, the manifest past and the unattainable future, what 
we feel and desire as opposed to what we actually possess and cannot 
avoid being aware of, what we did once have but have since lost. It is a 
desperate picture and a tragic situation: misery with the consciousness 
of its own condition and a sense not just of entrapment but that it could 
have been otherwise, that we could have retained perfection. 
For Diderot, perfection is not a noun but a verb, a dynamic process.86 
In this first extract, he also presents it in tension with its polar opposite, 
vice, although increased perfection and increased vice are paradoxically 
and ironically coupled together:
Je ne sais s’il n’en est pas de la morale ainsi que de la médecine qui n’a 
commencé à se perfectionner qu’à mesure que les vices de l’homme 
ont rendu les maladies plus communes, plus compliquées, et plus 
dangereuses.87
I do not know that morals are any different from medicine which only 
started improving as human vices made disease more common, more 
complex, and more dangerous.
To paraphrase, morality and medicine, that is to say knowledge of 
morality and medicine, develop, advance, improve, become more 
perfect, as human vices produce an increase in the incidence and variety 
of diseases, which are now more common, complex, and dangerous 
than they once were. The parallel here with Pascal’s story of our lost 
perfection is obvious, even if the origin is located elsewhere (not in the 
Garden of Eden but in Nature), and even if the term ‘perfectionner’ is 
now an ironic process (and a verb) rather than a lost state (and a noun).
Diderot is expressing a view we also find in Rousseau’s Discours sur 
l’origine de l’inégalité (1754), written of course when he and Rousseau 
were still close, and where Rousseau states that:
86  This point is influenced by Wilda Anderson’s pithily expressed insight that 
‘philosophy in eighteenth-century France... was not a noun, but a verb’. 
‘Eighteenth-Century Philosophy’, in The Cambridge History of French Literature, ed. 
by William Burgwinkle, Nicholas Hammond, and Emma Wilson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 404–11 (p. 404), https://doi.org/10.1017/
chol9780521897860.047.
87  DPV 512/PQ 354/MT 325.
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la pluspart de nos maux sont notre propre ouvrage, et [...] nous les 
aurions presque tous évités, en conservant la maniére de vivre simple, 
uniforme, et solitaire qui nous étoit prescrite par la Nature. Si elle nous a 
destinés à être sains, j’ose presque assurer, que l’état de réflexion est un 
état contre Nature, et que l’homme qui médite est un animal dépravé. 88
Most of our ills are of our own making, nearly all of which we might 
have avoided by preserving the simple, unchanging, and solitary way of 
life prescribed for us by nature. If nature has destined us to be healthy, I 
would almost venture to assert that the state of reflection is contrary to 
nature and that the man who meditates is a perverse animal. 
The Éléments repeats this view: ‘Rien n’est plus contraire à la nature que 
la méditation habituelle ou l’état du savant’ [nothing is more contrary 
to nature than habitual medition or the profession of the scholar] which 
had also been forthrightly expressed by La Mettrie in L’Homme-machine 
[Man a machine] (1747) and constituted the subject of a book by the 
influential Swiss physician Samuel-Auguste Tissot, De la santé des gens de 
lettres [On the health of men of letters] (1775).89 La Mettrie had written 
that ‘La Nature nous a tous créés uniquement pour être heureux’ [Nature 
created us all solely to be happy] and that it is ‘par une espèce d’abus de 
nos facultés organiques que nous [...] sommes devenus [savants]’ [we 
have perhaps become men of learning by a sort of misuse of our organic 
faculties].90 We see Diderot, Rousseau, and La Mettrie reversing the 
causal links in Pascal’s presentation of happiness, misery, nature and 
knowledge, while retaining a parallel account of the descent from a prior 
and better state. In a form of ironic twist, Rousseau’s ‘animal dépravé’ 
[perverse animal] is the ‘homme qui médite’ [meditative man] which 
should be understood here not (just) as a form of savage self-satire but 
88  Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Œuvres complètes, ed. by Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel 
Raymond (Paris: Gallimard Pléiade, 1964), vol. 3, p. 138. For further references, see 
also the related note, p. 1310; and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, 
trans. by Franklin Philip (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 30.
89  DPV 511/PQ 352/MT 324, and related note. La Mettrie, ‘L’homme-Machine’, in 
Œuvres philosophiques, vol. 1, p. 92. Anne C. Vila examines the pathology of the 
scholar in her illuminating study, Suffering Scholars: Pathologies of the Intellectual in 
Enlightenment France (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 
https://doi.org/10.9783/9780812294804. 
90  La Mettrie, ‘L’homme-Machine’, in Œuvres philosophiques, vol. 1, p. 92; trans. Ann 
Thomson in La Mettrie, Machine Man and Other Writings, ed. and trans. by Ann 
Thomson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 22 (slightly amended 
for the context).
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as the complete rejection of Pascal’s position with respect to man and 
nature. It is in this context that Pascal, as a man of great learning who 
made discoveries about natural philosophy (‘science’), who was the 
inventor of the first calculator, a profound reasoner, and ultimately a very 
influential Jansenist theologian, someone whose health, some thought, 
suffered as a result of his intense scholarly application and self-denial, 
becomes the target of ad hominem attack such as we found in Voltaire’s 
repeated comments, quoted earlier, saying Pascal ‘parle toujours en 
malade’, that he has a ‘vrai discours de malade’.91 It is difficult not to 
see in Diderot’s laconic remark ‘Le génie suppose toujours quelque 
désordre dans la machine’ [genius always carries with it the idea of 
some disorder in the machine] some form of (non-exclusive) allusion 
to Pascal, not least because of his association with the calculator or 
‘Machine arithmétique’ about which Diderot had written an important 
article for the Encyclopédie.92
Diderot does not only use perfectionner, ‘to perfect’, in an ironic 
coupling with the notion of decline, he also uses it more positively, as 
an activity we can work at. Here he really recasts the term of ‘perfection’ 
with its religious association of loss and sin, propelling it instead into a 
process of education and improvement, particularly focusing on those 
erstwhile drivers of temptation and misapprehension, the senses:
Nous exerçons nos sens comme la nature nous les a donnés et que les 
besoins et les circonstances l’exigent: mais nous ne les perfectionnons 
91  See above. 
92  DPV 508/PQ 348/MT 322. III.ix ‘Maladies.’ See also Straudo, La fortune de Pascal, 
as cited above, note 40, in Chapter 2. The question of the flaws of the genius 
was a subject which much preoccupied Diderot, as is well known. See Le Neveu 
de Rameau, ed. Marian Hobson (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2016), pp. 
103, 105, https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0098; Le Rêve de d’Alembert, ed. by Colas 
Duflo (Paris: GF Flammarion, 2002), p. 153. On Diderot and genius, see Herbert 
Dieckmann, ‘Diderot’s Conception of Genius’,  Journal of the History of Ideas, 2.2 
(1941), 151–82, https://doi.org/10.2307/2707111; Otis E. Fellows, ‘The Theme of 
Genius in Diderot’s Neveu de Rameau’, Diderot Studies, 2 (1952), 168–99; Angelika 
Schober, ‘Aspects du génie chez Diderot et D’Alembert’, Diderot Studies, 23 (1988), 
143–49; Laurence Mall, ‘L’Ego-philosophie à la manière de Diderot (Réfutation 
d’Helvétius)’,  Littérature, 165 (2012), 16–30, https://doi.org/10.3917/litt.165.0016; 
Jean-Alexandre Perras, L’exception exemplaire: inventions et usages du génie (XVIe-
XVIIIe siècle) (Paris: Garnier, 2015); Konstanze Baron and Robert Fajen, eds, Diderot, 
le génie des lumières: Nature, normes, transgressions (Paris: Garnier, 2019).
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pas; nous ne nous apprenons pas à voir, à flairer, à sentir, à écouter, à 
moins que notre profession nous y force.93
We use our senses as nature gave them to us and as our needs and 
circumstances require: but we do not perfect them; we do not teach 
ourselves to see, to smell, to feel, to listen, unless our profession forces 
us to.
Diderot here expresses real faith in the senses, if that is not too confusing 
a way of putting it, given that the rejection of religious faith underpins 
everything the Éléments de physiologie is about. The point of using the 
expression is to indicate that the senses are not presented as false portals 
of knowledge, as misleading or deluding, but rather in their functional 
and practical capacity, as the gifts of nature, and as being subject to 
improvement. There is real hope here, in learning to use our senses better, 
in perfecting them, even if this is presented as something which we do 
not do unless our profession forces us to. Diderot’s negative formulation 
(we do not improve our senses unless we have to) automatically suggests 
that we could and that we ought to. So the noun ‘perfection’, a place we 
have long left behind, is replaced with a process of learning to improve 
or perfect our natural senses. It’s a big shift.94 
This is the shift which the Éléments de physiologie is trying to effect. 
It involves rejecting notions of the soul, explaining the phenomena of 
nature in terms of matter, seeing a human as an individual member of a 
species and as determined by its body, its needs, and its capacities, and 
using its brain to ‘conceive clearly’ the truth and produce ‘clear ideas’.95 
This is the point Diderot returns to in the conclusion of the Éléments de 
physiologie, asking how it has come to be that there is no madness that has 
not been said by some philosophe or other, why all these ‘auteurs, dont les 
ouvrages sont remplis de visions’ [authors whose works are packed with 
visions] despise those whose ‘accurate and firm minds only allow to be 
true that which can be clearly conceived‘.96 Pascal is explicitly brought 
into this discussion as the genius who ‘dit expressément de Dieu: on ne 
sait ni ce qu’il est, ni s’il est’ [specifically said about God that we do not 
93  DPV 456–57/PQ 282/MT 272.
94  The topic of ‘perfectionnement’ will be important for Garat, Cabanis, and Destutt de 
Tracy, as will be discussed in some detail in Chapters 8 and 9.
95  DPV 514/PQ 356–57/MT 326.
96  DPV 514/PQ 356/MT 326.
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know what he is or whether he is]: here Pascal is at once a representative 
of those who have visions and despise those who wish to be able to 
conceive of things clearly, and also a thinker who is way beyond them. 
This is the whole sentence:
Ils assurent que l’existence de Dieu est évidente et Pascal dit expressément 
de Dieu : on ne sait ni ce qu’il est, ni s’il est.97
They assert that the existence of God is obvious yet Pascal specifically 
says about God that we do not know what he is or whether he is.
‘Ils’, that is, these ‘auteurs’, are therefore lesser than Pascal: they assert 
that God’s existence is obvious where Pascal had specifically argued 
that such assertion is not possible because we do not know what he 
is nor whether he is. The ‘et Pascal’ carries a sense of amazement and 
rhetorical flourish: it’s a ‘yet Pascal says the opposite’; it’s an ‘if Pascal 
says this they should pay attention’, it’s also an ‘even Pascal admits we 
know nothing about God’, he being a visionary and a genius.98 So Pascal 
represents for Diderot the man of genius who is beyond the common 
run of stupid complacent authors and also an example of those who get 
caught up in their own visions and can no longer see clearly. Pascal is his 
ultimate interlocutor, the man whose arguments he respects, and whom 
he therefore has to disprove. It is interesting therefore to consider that 
the snippet we have just shown Diderot quoting comes from the section 
now known as ‘le pari de Pascal’, Pascal’s wager, in which he argues 
that the non-believer might as well believe in God as he has much to 
gain and nothing to lose. In this particular section, Pascal is looking at 
the idea of trying to understand God, equipped only by our ‘lumières 
naturelles’, that is to say, our natural intelligence, as opposed to faith. 
Needless to say, for Pascal, our natural illumination gets us precisely 
nowhere. This is the passage:
97  DPV 515/PQ 358/MT 327.
98  Diderot continues as follows: ‘L’existence de Dieu évidente ! Et l’homme de génie 
est arrêté par la difficulté d’un enfant; et Leibniz est obligé, pour la résoudre, 
de produire avec des efforts de tête incroyables, un système qui ne résout pas la 
difficulté et qui en fait naître milles autres !’ [The existence of God obvious ! And so 
the man of genius is blocked by a child’s problem; and Leibniz is obliged, in order to 
solve it, and with unbelievable efforts of mind, to come up with a system that does 
not solve the problem and gives rise to a thousand others] (DPV 515/PQ 359/MT 
327). When Diderot evokes the ‘homme de génie’, therefore, he is alluding to Pascal 
and also transitioning to Leibniz, so he’s not only referring to Pascal.
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Parlons maintenant selon les lumières naturelles.
S’il y a un Dieu, il est infiniment incompréhensible, puisque, n’ayant ni 
parties ni bornes, il n’a nul rapport à nous. Nous sommes donc incapables 
de connaître ni ce qu’il est, ni s’il est.99
Let us now speak according to our natural lights.
If there is a God, he is infinitely incomprehensible, since, having neither 
parts nor limits, he bears no relation to us. We are therefore incapable of 
knowing either what he is or whether he is.
So what Pascal really said was that if we try to understand God we 
will fail because we cannot apprehend him, and the argument he 
subsequently develops is that we must therefore go via faith. Although 
he does say that God cannot be understood by our natural intelligence, 
he is not saying that God might not therefore exist, and indeed the whole 
point of Pascal’s wager is that it’s a rational argument directed at those 
who insist on having things presented rationally, that even if we cannot 
understand what God is or prove his existence we might as well still 
believe in him, because the benefits would be worth it.
It is by no means obvious therefore that Diderot clearly scores a point 
over Pascal when he writes that (even) Pascal says about God that we 
do not know what he is nor if he is, given that Diderot selectively uses 
the snippet fragment he fragments from the bigger fragment. Whether 
he scores a point or not is irrelevant: the issue is that Pascal is a crucial 
interlocutor for Diderot, both explicitly and implicitly: if convincing the 
atheist or Pyrrhonian sceptic is Pascal’s explicit and implicit aim, then 
convincing the Christian is Diderot’s explicit and implicit aim. They 
each represent what the other is seeking to refute, and the Éléments de 
physiologie bears witness to the importance Diderot gave to this task. The 
Éléments de physiologie tries to describe nature from component parts to 
complete system, it tries to show how all the mechanisms fit together and 
relate to one another, whether in the first part which looks at nature’s 
building blocks and processes, in the second with the fullness of its 
physiological description of the human body, in the final part which 
tackles the thorny questions of thought, emotion, behaviour, and illness, 
or in the general scrupulousness with which Diderot indicates what 
99  Pascal, Pensées, p. 1210, §680; PR VII.1, 2; XXVIII.69; Bossut II.iii.1; II iii.4 and 5; 
II.xvii.63 (Brunschvicg §233); Pensées, trans. by Ariew, p. 212. 
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is or isn’t known. It is as complete and thorough an atheist materialist 
challenge to the Christian apologist as it was possible to write at that 
time.
Fragmented Disorder
Whether this challenge was more or less ordered than what it was trying 
to refute was a crucial element of Diderot’s reply, and not just because 
Pascal’s Pensées were famously fragmented. Pascal himself had insulted 
his subject, ‘man’, in one fragment, asserting that he would not dignify 
it by presenting in an ordered fashion, as he wanted to show that human 
nature was incapable of being ordered in the first place. This is what he 
wrote:
Pyrrhonisme.
J’écrirai ici mes pensées sans ordre, et non pas peut-être dans une 
confusion sans dessein. C’est le véritable ordre, et qui marquera toujours 
mon objet par le désordre même.
Je ferais trop d’honneur à mon sujet, si je le traitais avec ordre, puisque je 
veux montrer qu’il en est incapable.100
Skepticism.
I will write my thoughts here without order, but not perhaps in 
unplanned confusion. This is true order, and it will always indicate my 
aim by its very disorder.
I would be honouring my subject too much if I treated it with order, since 
I want to show that it is incapable of it.
This fragment does not feature in the Port-Royal edition. It does 
appear in the Bossut and Condorcet/Voltaire editions, although in the 
latter shorn of its elucidating title, such that it seems as if ‘mon sujet’ 
might be his own attempt to talk about the Christian faith or, as some 
commentators have suggested, the human condition.101 Nevertheless, his 
intention to demonstrate that something is incapable of order is clear, and 
in the Condorcet/Voltaire edition, the general title of this section, and of 
which this is the first fragment, is ‘De l’incertitude de nos connaissances 
100  Pascal, Pensées, p. 1084, §457. Not in Port-Royal edition; Bossut I.ix.55 (Brunschvicg 
§434); Cond/Volt, p. 185. Pensées, trans. by Ariew, p. 144.
101  See Richard Parish’s elucidory note, Cond/Volt, p. 185.
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naturelles’. Pascal himself is throwing down the gauntlet, and making 
the whole issue turn on whether something (man, natural knowledge) 
is capable of order. The insult is that he is not going to bother ordering 
his own thoughts: it will be a symbolic confusion. 
It is a cruel twist of fate, therefore, that Pascal was unable to finish 
his manuscript, and left only disordered fragments, or in any case, 
fragments the order of which has been disputed for centuries and 
probably never will be finally resolved. It’s a cruel twist of fate or an 
ironic moral for his tale, depending on your point of view, but it makes 
it even clearer why Diderot included an ‘Avertissement’ presenting 
his own Éléments de physiologie as a heap of fragments: Pascal hung his 
attempt to write an Apology for the Christian faith on his ability to prove 
that unbelief was a disorderly mess of degraded and deluded mind, yet 
he failed; his Apology was a shocking mess, shocking to some in any 
case.102 Voltaire would go so far as to call the Pensées the product of an 
ill mind, but Diderot never did. Instead, he evoked the famous Pensées 
at the very beginning of his own Apology of Atheist materialism so as 
to resoundingly demonstrate and prove the deep coherence and order 
of nature, yet he also was hoist with his own petard, and everyone ever 
since has blithely talked about these fragments of the great philosopher’s 
late, last, uncompleted magnum opus. How unfortunate! How funny! 
102  As Jean Filleau de la Chaise said, quoted above in note 33. Jean Filleau de la Chaise, 
Discours sur les pensées, p. 3.
3. Material World and  
Embodied Mind
Denis Diderot’s subjects of material world and embodied mind were 
not new when he came to write about them in the Eléménts de physiologie 
in the 1770s, nor had they been new when he had written about them 
before, in his Pensées philosophiques (published 1746), Lettre sur les aveugles 
(published 1749), Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature (published 
1753), Rêve de d’Alembert (drafted 1769), Principes philosophiques sur 
la matière et le mouvement (written 1770), Observations sur Hemsterhuis 
and Réfutation d’Helvétius (both written 1773), or of course in the many 
articles he contributed to the Encyclopédie (published 1751–65). The 
sorts of concepts and frameworks he was using were already present in 
Aristotle’s Physics, which discusses nature, change, time, continuity, and 
finalism, and also in the Metaphysics, which thinks about man, desire, 
knowledge, the senses (in particular, sight), animals, and memory, 
asserting that knowledge is based on perception, or, as Diderot put it in 
the Réfutation d’Helvétius, crediting Aristotle for being the first ever to say 
it: ‘il n’y a […] rien dans l’entendement qui n’[ait] été antérieurement 
dans la sensation’ [there is nothing in our understanding which has not 
first passed through sensation], although Diderot’s formulation is a 
direct French translation of the medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas’s 
version, ‘nihil est in intellectu quod non sit prius in sensu’ [there is 
nothing in the mind which was not first in the senses].1 As this double 
1  Aquinas, Thomas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, 3 vols (Rome: Editori di San 
Tommaso, 1970–76) II, 3, 19, as Roland Desné and Gerhardt Stenger, point out, 
Réfutation d’Helvétius, ed. by Roland Desné, Didier Kahn, Annette Lorenceau and 
© Caroline Warman, CC BY 4.0 https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0199.03
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quotation which is also a refutation amply demonstrates, Diderot is 
writing in a thriving and self-aware tradition, one which goes back to 
Ancient Greece, and in so doing, he is also taking sides in similarly 
long-lived arguments—about the operation of nature, about infinity, 
about the existence or otherwise of immaterial beings: his particular 
tradition is that of Epicureanism. Epicurus, forty years younger than 
Aristotle, taught that everything in nature is made from atoms and from 
the fortuitous ways in which they combine to create different beings: 
whether there is any role for divine powers in this is a moot point, but 
ethics are important (virtue and happiness being interchangeable). His 
writings are mostly lost but his teaching survives in the Roman poet 
Lucretius’s masterpiece, De rerum natura, a poem which Diderot often 
quotes or alludes to, most prominently perhaps in his epigraph to the 
Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature: ‘Quae sunt in luce tuemur/ E 
tenebris’ [From the darkness, we can see what is in the light].2
Diderot’s moment in this tradition comes at a pivotal point after 
more than a hundred years of increasingly clamorous consensus that a 
true understanding of the world derives alone from the information or 
‘ideas’ our senses give us.3 Perhaps I will want to argue that the Éléments 
de physiologie is the culmination or final statement in the particular 
(materialist) offshoot of the empiricism debate (René Descartes asserted 
that we are born with innate ideas; John Locke denied it) that focuses on 
what sensation and sensibility are, and who or what has it, whether it is 
in fact innate or latent in all matter, and whether, if so, that means that 
matter can think. The stakes were high: theological accounts of the soul 
and of the order of the universe, of divine reasons and aims, accounts 
which underpinned social structures and laws, both for this life and the 
hereafter, were at risk of being dislodged from their position as truth. As 
indeed they were dislodged, to be replaced by accounts of nature and its 
laws and behaviour. A quick way of explaining this in English is to say 
Gerhardt Stenger, in Œuvres complètes, DPV (Paris: Hermann, 2004), vol. 24, pp. 
215-478: 515, n. 90.
2  Denis Diderot, Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature, ed. by Jean Varloot and Herbert 
Dieckmann, in Œuvres complètes, DPV (Paris: Hermann), vol. 9, pp. 1-111 : p. 337.
3  On Diderot’s closely-argued position in relation to empiricism, see Kate E. Tunstall, 
Blindness and Enlightenment: An Essay (London: Bloomsbury, 2011). On empiricism 
more generally, see Marion Chottin, Le Partage de l’empirisme: une histoire du problème 
de Molyneux aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris: Champion, 2014).
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that increasingly from the end of the eighteenth century onwards, the 
word ‘knowledge’ is replaced by ‘science’, its Latinate synonym. And 
‘science’, in English, means empirical descriptions of nature. (In French, 
this shift is not so niftily condensable: broadly, though, the branches of 
knowledge covered by eighteenth-century ‘natural philosophy’ become 
the modern-day sciences.) Of course, religion as practice and law did 
not disappear, and it remains an important presence in contemporary 
society. However, the ability of the church authorities to use the articles 
of belief to influence the way natural philosophy was conducted 
or to condemn its findings as being against religion or morality, was 
curtailed, not immediately, not irrevocably, but as it became more and 
more accepted that the accounts of the world and universe given by 
natural philosophy were, if incomplete, nonetheless verifiable, whereas 
religious accounts of nature and creation were not subject to verification. 
What we are cosily calling ‘Diderot’s moment in the tradition’ takes 
place, of course, within specific social technologies, networks and 
structures. These make his intervention possible and also determine 
its form and content.4 One of those, already implicitly evoked, is the 
transmission of the written word, in letter, manuscript or print, to smaller 
or greater audiences, at a given moment or across the generations. 
Another, more immediate, is the discussion that took place in the 
female-led salons, which was no less impactful for lacking a written, 
posterity-providing form.5 More official (and of course, exclusively 
male) are the learned societies which were being set up from the end of 
the seventeenth century to facilitate the exchange of research amongst 
their learned members, and whose meetings were carefully recorded 
in the archives that researchers now mine. The size of all these groups, 
even including print readers, was limited: connections, qualifications, 
language, and literacy were all needed for doors to be opened. And, of 
course, official censorship existed to make sure that those doors stayed 
shut when the authorities deemed that what might come in or go out of 
them posed a threat to ecclesiastical or monarchical orthodoxy. This was 
4  On the connection between Diderot’s materialism and his style of thinking in 
writing, see Caroline Jacot-Grapa, Dans le vif du sujet: Diderot, corps et âme (Paris: 
Classiques Garnier, 2009).
5  Dena Goodman, The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Carla Hesse, The Other Enlightenment: How 
French Women Became Modern (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
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the context of Diderot’s entire working life, but the pressure building for 
change, or perhaps we should say the consensus that these ‘new’ forms 
of knowledge needed wider dissemination, grew throughout it. So 
when I talk about his ‘intervention’, perhaps I ought to say increasingly 
busy iterations of the same points. Diderot was busy repeating himself 
and kindred writers as often and as well as he could (although not as 
often as Voltaire). This chapter will look at what those iterations were, 
and at whom he was iterating. 
It will be for later chapters to look at what happened next, a lurchingly 
complicated story that could not have been foreseen at the moment of 
Diderot’s death in 1784. Within the broad-brush context of the rise of 
science, the stage was set for the (by then) widely supported establishment 
or expansion of institutions to disseminate the new perspectives of 
natural philosophy. This narrative is broadly familiar to us from Michel 
Foucault’s influential account of the institutionalisation of the different 
academic disciplines around the turn of the nineteenth century, along 
with their ensuing professionalisation within the universities. Of course, 
in France, this process is part of the Revolution, whose new political 
structures undid and remade the previous institutions of learning more 
than once. The École normale, emerging briefly in 1795, aimed to make 
contemporaneous learning available to those who would go and teach 
it across the new Republic, while the research institution replacing the 
various academies of the ex-‘kingdom’, the Institut national des sciences 
et des arts, also set up in 1795 and also subject to regime upheavals, 
redefined the various branches of knowledge, and established specific 
groups to provide a platform for France’s world-leading research. In 
both these institutions, those who had known Diderot and whose ideas 
were aligned with his had important roles, and I will turn to them in 
due course. 
Many writers had been writing about nature, matter, man, and mind, 
in the previous 100 years, and they had been broadly in agreement 
in approach (empiricism) and in the way they presented man as 
completely determined by his material embodiment (as dependent on 
and moulded by his senses).6 They had even often been in agreement 
6  It is perhaps a bit tendentious to talk about general agreement in this context. 
Specialists tend to state instead that materialism ‘ne constitue en rien une doctrine 
unifiée’ [in no way constitutes a unified doctrine]: Adrien Paschoud and Barbara 
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about the ways in which they tried to prove their points, drawing on 
similar or even the same research, and on similar or even the same 
fictional hypotheses. Diderot is at the end of this tradition, to which he 
responds in detail, point by point, and which he closes off by presenting 
an unanswerable fusion of natural philosophy (drawing on physics, 
chemistry, what would come to be called ‘biology’, and medicine) and 
philosophy (theories of consciousness and identity related to memory), 
such that whether there is a soul can no longer be a serious question in 
the investigation of man’s nature, and the medical sciences no longer 
have to deal with it. 
So who and what was Diderot iterating, refining, or responding 
to in the Éléments de physiologie? In brief, Baruch Spinoza, Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz, Jean Meslier, Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle, Julien 
Offray de La Mettrie, Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, Georges-Louis 
Lerclerc de Buffon, Charles Bonnet, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Claude 
Adrien Helvétius and François Hemsterhuis. Current editions of the 
Éléments de physiologie provide important scholarly apparatus about 
Diderot’s medical sources, but give relatively little information about 
his philosophical ones, although Motoichi Terada has begun to add to 
our knowledge in this area.7 This is no doubt because the Eléménts de 
Selmeci Castioni, ‘Le matérialisme au XVIIIe siècle en France: enjeux et perspectives’, 
in Matérialisme(s) en France au XVIIIe siècle. Entre littérature et philosophie, ed. by 
Adrien Paschoud and Barbara Selmeci Castioni (Berlin: Frank and Timme, 2019), 
pp. 7–11 (p. 7). This is of course true, but whatever this non-unified non-doctrine 
is, it is nonetheless recognisable enough in its general positions for the same authors 
to say that ‘it swarms through writings of remarkable diversity’ (ibid., p. 8). My 
emphasis is on the common ground these swarming texts share rather than their 
differences. Yves Citton follows a somewhat similar approach in his L’Envers de la 
liberté: l’invention d’un imaginaire Spinoziste dans la France des lumières (Paris: Éditions 
Amsterdam, 2006), esp. pp. 28–33. See also Sophie Audidière, Jean-Claude Bourdin, 
and Francine Markovits, eds, Matérialistes Français du XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 2006); Ann Thomson, Bodies of Thought: Science, Religion, 
and the Soul in the Early Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); 
Franck Salaün, L’Ordre des mœurs: essai sur la place du matérialisme dans la société 
française du XVIIIe siècle (1734-1784) (Paris: Éditions Kimé, 1996), esp. pp. 41–78; 
and Colas Duflo, Diderot philosophe (Paris: Champion, 2003), pp. 65–267.
7  Terada’s edition gives some source material and resonances from ancient authors 
Aristotle, Cicero, Epictetus, and Seneca, and early modern philosophers (and while 
the distinction between medical writers and philosophers is often a false one, La 
Mettrie being a case in point, this list follows the received view about who is a 
medical professional and who is a more generally philosophical writer): Francis 
Bacon, Pierre Bayle, Condillac, Marin Cureau de la Chambre, Daniel Heinsius, 
d’Holbach, La Mettrie, Leibniz, Montaigne, Pascal, and Spinoza. See also the 
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physiologie has not received much recognition as a serious philosophical 
text. This chapter cannot single-handedly change such a state of affairs, 
and indeed it has a relatively limited aim, which is simply to look at 
how the Eléménts de physiologie picks up and responds to philosophical 
arguments about material man, to see which voices are present in the 
Éléments, to see how many voices there are, and to see how this text 
brings them together and makes it seem as if they are a sort of call and 
echo chorus. 
It is of course true that a good number or perhaps all of these 
(natural) philosophers and writers, taken separately, would, if charged, 
have strenuously rejected any association with materialism, and one of 
the necessary limitations of this chapter is that it never does take any 
of them separately. Their works are not looked at on their own terms, 
as a whole, or in the specific context of their production, and the way 
in which various sentences are lifted from them and woven together 
distorts their work, examining it from the retrospective point of view, or 
rather through the lens, of the Éléments de physiologie.8 
Another layer of severe restriction is applied to the number of voices 
we argue Diderot is engaging with here. Although a list that includes 
Spinoza, Leibniz, Meslier, Fontenelle, La Mettrie, Condillac, Buffon, 
Bonnet, Rousseau, Helvétius and Hemsterhuis, not to mention Pascal, is 
hardly short or unambitious, other voices whom we might expect to see 
here are absent: no Descartes, no Pierre Gassendi, no Locke or Thomas 
Hobbes, no David Hume, and no ancient philosophers at all. Montaigne 
peeps in with Lucretius via Meslier, but that’s all. If the space limitations 
already invoked also apply here—what can one really cover in a single 
chapter?—the question of the lens also does; these are the writers whose 
relevant pages of his introduction: ‘Les Éléments de physiologie dans la philosophie 
du dernier Diderot’, in Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Motoichi Terada (Paris: 
Éditions Matériologiques, 2019), pp. 14–26 [hereafter MT].
8  Readers wishing for a greater overview or more detail are encouraged to consult 
on materialism: as already cited in note 6 above, Audidière et al., Matérialistes 
français; Citton, L’Envers de la liberté; Salaün, L’Ordre des mœurs; Thomson, Bodies of 
Thought; and also Olivier Bloch, Le Matérialisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1985); Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of 
Modernity 1650-1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). For a specific focus 
on Diderot’s place within all this, see: Duflo, Diderot philosophe; Jacot-Grapa, Dans 
le vif du sujet; Tunstall, Blindness and Enlightenment; and also Timo Kaitaro, Diderot’s 
Holism (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 1997).
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presence I perceive most strongly in the Éléments de physiologie. That 
does not mean there are not other ones, while—very obviously—my 
own limitations are also operating to shape, frame, and constrain what 
and whom this chapter considers. It will be exciting when more work is 
done on philosophy in the Éléments de physiologie, more voices traced, its 
own contribution better understood.9 My hope is that what I argue here 
about how particular philosophical positions relating to the material 
universe on the one hand and empiricism on the other appear to be 
being consistently enounced, asserted, and repeated over the course of a 
hundred years, and about how the Éléments de physiologie, bringing these 
numerous strands together in an unprecedentedly open way, helps 
us see that this is the case, will be accepted as offering a productive 
approach. 
How to Use This Chapter
The system of materialist and empiricist philosophy we are looking 
at here has been broken down into relatively small parts for ease of 
treatment, and is summarised in italics at the beginning of each section, 
followed by supporting passages presented chronologically in order to 
bring out the dialogic aspect of this repeating-relaying conversation. The 
headings below list the subsections in order, and together they provide 
a summary of the topics addressed by the Éléments de physiologie, in 
particular its first and third parts. Readers who would prefer a shorter 
version and who would rather be directed straight to the Éléments 
without preamble can simply hop from one subsection to the next, 
reading the italicised paragraph at the beginning, and seeing how the 
Éléments de physiologie intervenes at the end. 
a. Nature, Order, and Natural Patterns
b. The Necessary Order of Nature  
The Order of Nature: Unchanging or in Flux
i. The Gouty Man and the Fire
ii. From Recycled Cases to the Specific
9  As Motoichi Terada does, for example, when he examines the connections between, 
on the one hand, sensibility and vanity, and on the other, Diderot’s political 
philosophy, in his ‘Les Éléments de physiologie dans la philosophie du dernier 
Diderot’, Éléments de physiologie, ed. Motoichi Terada, pp. 19–26. 
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c. Matter in Flux
d. The Natural Processes of Material Transformation
i. Reproduction
ii. The Beginning and End of Death
iii. The Beginning and End of Sensation
e. Knowledge Derived from the Senses
i. Knowledge from the Senses: Anti-Abstraction
ii. Sensory-Deprivation Fictions
f. Multi-Tasking and Levels of Awareness: Thinking and Walking
g. Selfhood and Memory
h. The Pursuit of Happiness
a. Nature, Order, and Natural Patterns
There is an order to nature and this order has no gaps, write Leibniz, Bonnet, 
and Diderot. This is expressed in Leibniz’s formulation that there is no jump 
in nature (Leibniz, Bonnet). This natural order replicates itself in the body, 
and in mental processes of perception and idea, writes Spinoza (and Condillac 
and Diderot), and should be followed in productions of the mind such as books, 
writes Buffon. 
We start with Leibniz’s concept of there being no gaps or jumps in nature:
Rien ne se fait tout d’un coup, & c’est une de mes grandes maximes & 
des plus vérifiées, que la nature ne fait jamais de sauts. J’appellois cela la 
loi de la continuité, lorsque j’en parlois autre fois dans les nouvelles de la 
république des lettres; & l’usage de cette loi est très-considerable dans la 
Physique.10 
Nothing is done in a single leap, and it is one of my great maxims and 
is amongst the most verified, that nature never makes a leap. I called that 
the law of continuity when I was talking about it before in the Nouvelles de 
la République des Lettres; & and the use of this law is very widespread in 
Physics. 
He advertises his ownership of what he calls his ‘maxims’, calls it 
the ‘law of continuity’, and explains its history in his own work. This 
particular extract is from the Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain 
10  Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (avant-propos et 
livre premier), ed. by Émile Boutroux (Paris: Librairie Delagrave, 1927), p. 11. 
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written in 1707 or 1711 in response to Locke’s Essay concerning Human 
Understanding, but not print-published until 1764 or 1765, although it is 
thought that parts of it were probably circulating in manuscript form, 
and were more or less well-known to the philosophical community.11 
We meet the formulation in almost identical form in Bonnet’s Corps 
organisés of 1762:
La nature ne va point par sauts. Tout a sa raison suffisante, ou sa cause 
prochaine & immédiate. L’état actuel d’un Corps est la suite ou le produit 
de son état antécédent; ou pour parler plus juste, l’état actuel d’un Corps 
est détérminé par son état antécédent.12 
Nature does not proceed in leaps. Everything has its sufficient reason 
or its near and immediate cause. The current state of a body is the 
consequence or product of its previous state, or to put it more accurately, 
the current state of a body is determined by its previous state.
In Bonnet, as with Leibniz, the formula refers directly to the continuous 
linked chain of cause and effect (‘raison suffisante’ is of course also 
a Leibnizian formula, known in parodic form through the absurd 
sayings of Pangloss, the idiot tutor in Voltaire’s Candide); this chain 
maps the patterns of logic onto the behaviour of nature, working on the 
assumption that logic itself is part of nature.
Diderot picks it up at least three times, once in the text that we know 
of as his Observations sur Hemsterhuis (1773), once in the Réfutation 
d’Helvétius (composed the same year) and once more in the Éléments de 
physiologie. Hemsterhuis is reflecting on the fact that he is not in control 
of his own thoughts, stating (rather obviously perhaps) that given 
that this is the case, there must be a cause prompting his (otherwise 
uncontrollable) thoughts. He writes:
Puisque je ne suis pas maître de penser à ce que je veux, et qu’une longue 
expérience me l’a appris, il faut bien que j’y sois porté par une cause.13
11  Adrien Paschoud, ‘Matérialisme, ordre naturel et imaginaire cosmologique dans 
L’Homme-plante (1748) de La Mettrie’, in Penser l’ordre naturel, 1680–1810, ed. by 
Adrien Paschoud and Nathalie Vuillemin (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2012), pp. 
51-66 (p. 52n).
12  Charles Bonnet, Considérations sur les corps organisés [1762], in Œuvres d’histoire 
naturelle et de philosophie, 18 tomes in 10 vols (Neuchâtel: chez S. Fauche, 1779–83), 
vol. 3, t. 5, p. 87.
13  François Hemsterhuis in Observations sur La ‘Lettre sur l’homme et ses rapports’ de 
Hemsterhuis, ed. by Gerhardt Stenger, in Œuvres complètes, DPV (Paris: Hermann, 
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Given that, as long experience has taught me, I am not in charge of what 
I think about, it must be that I am impelled to think about it by a cause.
Diderot writes in response to this passage that:
Toute cause est un effet me paraît un axiome.
Sans quoi la nature agirait à tout moment per saltum; ce qui n’est jamais 
vrai.14
That every cause is an effect seems to me to be an axiom.
Without it nature would be continuously acting per saltum [by leaps], 
which is never the case.
In this version the formula has taken on a Latin tinge: ‘par saut’ has 
moved into ‘per saltum’. In the Réfutation d’Helvétius, written in the 
same year and manuscript-published in the Correspondance littéraire 
(1783–86),15 we are back in French, also in the context of natural cause 
and effect thought:
Rien ne se fait par saut dans la nature; et l’éclair subit et rapide qui 
passe dans l’esprit, tient à un phénomène antérieur avec lequel on en 
reconnaîtrait la liaison, si l’on n’était pas infiniment plus pressé de jouir 
de sa lueur que d’en rechercher la cause.16
Nothing is done in a single leap in nature; and the sudden flash 
of lightning that passes through the mind derives from a previous 
phenomenon, and we would recognise the link if we were not in much 
more of a hurry to enjoy the illumination it brings than to seek its cause.
In the Éléments de physiologie we hear it again, but it is explicitly rather 
than just implicitly applied to the patterns and organisation of nature in 
general: 
2004), vol. 24, pp. 479-767; 309.
14  Ibid.
15  Réfutation d’Helvétius, ed. by Roland Desné, Didier Kahn, Antoinette Lorenceau, and 
Gerhardt Stenger, in Œuvres complètes, DPV (Paris: Hermann, 2004), vol. 24, p. 440.
16  Réfutation d’Helvétius, p. 626. The editors note the recapitulation and the Leibnizian 
origin, but omit the later reference in Éléments de physiologie Denis Diderot, Éléments 
de physiologie, ed. by Jean Mayer, Œuvres complètes, DPV (Paris: Hermann, 1987), vol. 
17, pp. 261–574 (p.483); Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Paolo Quintili (Paris: 
Champion, 2004), p. 314; Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Motoichi Terada 
(Paris: Éditions Matériologiques, 2019), p. 298 [hereafter notated as DPV 483/PQ 
314/MT 298].
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Rien ne se fait par saut dans la nature; tout y est lié. L’animal, l’homme, 
tout être est soumis à cette loi générale.17
Nothing is done in a single leap in nature, everything is connected up. 
Animals, humans, everything is subject to this general law.
‘Tout y est lié’ is the explanation and commentary for ‘rien ne se fait par 
saut dans la nature’: sequential links of cause and effect bind the whole; 
there are no gaps.
***
For Spinoza, things, ideas, and body, are all connected in the same way, 
replicating and following the same natural patterns.18
The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection 
of things (by IIP7), and vice versa, the order and connection of things is 
the same as the order and connection of ideas (by IIP6C and P7). So just 
as the order and connection of ideas happens in the mind according to 
the order and connection of affections of the body (by IIP18), so vice 
versa (by IIIP2), the order and connection of affections of the body 
happens as thoughts and ideas of things are ordered and connected in 
the mind, q.e.d.19
If there is a natural order to things and ideas and affections in the body, 
sometimes that natural order is lost, and needs to be found again, as he 
argues in his Traité de la réforme de l’entendement:
Le but est d’avoir des idées claires et distinctes, […] Ensuite, pour 
ramener toutes ces idées à l’unité, nous nous efforcerons de les enchaîner 
et de les ordonner de telle façon que notre esprit, autant qu’il se peut 
faire, reproduise objectivement ce qui est formellement dans la nature, 
prise dans sa totalité aussi bien que dans ses parties.20
The aim is to have clear and distinct ideas […]. Thereafter, to unify all 
these ideas, we will attempt to link them up and order them in such a 
17  DPV 483/PQ 314/MT 298.
18  This feature of ‘concaténation’ is neatly analysed by Citton in his L’Envers de la 
liberté, pp. 85–89. See also Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1936; repr. 2001), esp. pp. 227–41.
19  Spinoza, Ethics, trans. by Edwin Curley with an introduction by Stuart Hampshire 
(London: Penguin, 1996), p. 163.
20  Spinoza, Traité de la réforme de l’entendement et de la meilleure voie à suivre pour parvenir 
à la vraie connaissance des choses, ed. and trans. by A. Koyré (Paris: Vrin, 1951), §91.
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way that our mind, insofar as it is able to, reproduces objectively that 
which is formally in nature, nature being taken in its totality as well as 
in its parts.
Spinoza’s aim is to have clear and distinct ideas which reproduce 
objectively what is in nature, that is to say, its forms, and also to show 
others how to do the same. 
Condillac presents a similar notion that nature, ideas, and the 
exposition of truth are all, or should all, be linked in similar ways. His 
insistence on knowledge as purveyed by the senses has an obvious 
Lockean genealogy (but Spinoza said it first, as did many others, back to 
the acceptable Aristotle and the more worrying Epicurus).21 In his Essai 
sur l’origine des connaissances humaines of 1746, Condillac mentions this 
perfect match between nature, our knowledge of it, and our presentation 
of it:
La nature indique elle-même l’ordre qu’on doit tenir dans l’exposition 
de la vérité ; car si toutes nos connaissances viennent des sens, il est 
évident que c’est aux idées sensibles à préparer l’intelligence des notions 
abstraites.22
Nature herself indicates the order we need to follow when setting out 
the truth, for if all our knowledge comes from the senses, it is obvious 
that it is the sensory ideas which pave the way for the understanding of 
abstract notions.
Buffon again references this idea of a perfect match between the works 
of nature and the works of the natural philosopher. The aim of the 
author, he explains in his Discours sur le style, given on his admission to 
the Académie française in 1753, is to imitate Nature as closely as he can: 
if he succeeds he will create ‘immortal monuments’:
si [l’esprit humain] imite la Nature dans sa marche et dans son travail, s’il 
s’élève par la contemplation aux vérités les plus sublimes, s’il les réunit, 
21  Locke of course was less polemical to acknowledge as a source, see John Yolton, 
Locke and French Materialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), https://doi.
org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198242741.001.0001. 
22  Condillac, Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines [1746], ed. by Jean-Claude 
Pariente and Martine Pécharman (Paris: Vrin, 2014), p. 326 (II.II §. 52).
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s’il les enchaîne, s’il en forme un systeme par la réflexion, il établira sur 
des fondements inébranlables des monuments immortels.23
If [the human mind] imitates nature in its approach and in its work, if 
by dint of contemplation it is able to raise itself up to the most sublime 
truths, if it can bring them together and link them, if by dint of reflection 
it can shape it into one system, it will establish immortal monuments on 
unshakeable foundations.
The key idea is for the author to imitate Nature in his approach, literally 
his walk or in his steps, his proceeding would be the closest translation 
perhaps, and in his work: the book must replicate nature in order and 
organisation: what this means is that the author must raise himself to 
the contemplation of the most sublime truths, bring them together, link 
them up, and form a complete system. In fact Buffon uses the notion 
of authorship of books to establish nature as the best and most perfect 
author, or even, in the second extract below, not just the author but the 
book itself, a perpetually living book. Buffon is conceptualising this sort 
of difficult-to-imagine collapsing reversing relationship between the 
thing doing the doing and the thing which is made that we also see 
in Spinoza’s double definition of Nature as natura naturans (the power 
nature has to determine its own laws) and natura naturata (the concept 
of nature as completely determined), and will meet again when looking 
at Diderot’s model of memory as the self-reading, self-writing book. 
Here, however, is Buffon on the perfect form of natural creation; he is 
playing with the term ‘ouvrage’ [work] as book:
Pourquoi les ouvrages de la Nature sont-ils si parfaits? C’est que chaque 
ouvrage est un tout […]24
Why are the works of Nature always so perfect? Because every work is 
a whole.
la Nature est elle-même un ouvrage perpétuellement vivant.25 
Nature itself is a work, a perpetually living one.
23  Buffon, ‘Discours sur le style’, in Œuvres, ed. by Stéphane Schmitt and Cédric 
Crémière (Paris: Gallimard Pléiade, 2007), p. 424, https://doi.org/10.5962/bhl.
title.53421. 
24  Buffon, ‘Discours sur le style’, pp. 423–24.
25  Buffon, Histoire naturelle, vol. XII [1764], in Œuvres, ed. by Stéphane Schmitt and 
Cédric Crémière (Paris: Gallimard Pléiade, 2007), pp. 424, 985.
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For Buffon, nature and the book (should) match up perfectly in a 
mutally illuminating manner.
Diderot also sees nature and thought matching up: everything in 
nature is ordered and linked, and everything we write about nature 
necessarily follows the same pattern: 
Le type de nos raisonnements les plus étendus, leur liaison, leur 
conséquence est nécessaire dans notre entendement, comme 
l’enchaînement, la liaison des effets, des causes [,] des objets, des qualités 
des objets l’est dans la nature.26
The pattern of our most extensive chains of reasoning, their connections 
and sequencing, is a necessary one within our understanding, as the 
connection, linking of effects, causes, objects, and the qualities of the 
objects within nature also is.
We see how faithfully these philosophers can choose to relay each 
other when they are not disputing other differences when we see how 
they quote each other, or pick up each other’s specific phrasings, and 
therefore that it is reasonable to present them as more together than 
apart, more similar than different, more deeply united in their concerted 
efforts to understand nature and human understanding than divided on 
particular points—although of course some of the time we are looking 
at continuities, and other times at refinements and new versions.
As this last extract from the Éléments indicates, this natural order or 
pattern is ‘necessary’, determined by a fundamental model of cause and 
effect.
b. The Necessary Order of Nature
The order of nature is itself determined, writes Spinoza. Humans themselves 
are determined, and free will does not exist, writes Meslier. But there is reason, 
writes Condillac. Fontenelle wonders what the role of the instinct is. Diderot 
suggests that if there is any difference between the rest of living nature and the 
human, it is merely a question of extent.
Spinoza had said this in his Ethics: ‘the order of nature’ is determined, 
and therefore ‘things could have been produced in no other way and no 
26  DPV 463/PQ 289/MT 279.
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other order’.27 Humans are also determined by the laws of nature, and 
therefore free will does not exist.
Despite being determined by these same laws of nature, humans do 
not recognise that this is the case, says Spinoza:
It will be sufficient here if I take as a foundation what everyone must 
acknowledge: that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, and 
that they all want to seek their own advantage, and are conscious of 
this appetite. From these (assumptions) it follows, first, that men think 
themselves free, because they are conscious of their volitions and their 
appetite, and do not think, even in their dreams, of the causes by which 
they are disposed to wanting and willing, because they are ignorant of 
(those causes).28
Meslier, in his Anti-Fénelon, quotes and responds to Fénelon’s trumpeted 
declaration ‘Je suis libre*, et je n’en puis douter […]’ with the following 
abrupt refutation: 
* Nous sommes libres dès que nous faisons ce que nous voulons sans 
contrainte; nous ne sommes point autrement libres.29
* We are free from the moment we do what we want free of constraint, 
and we are not otherwise free in the slightest.
The stage is set here for a stand-off between reason and free will on the 
one hand (in this context, part of the demonstration of the existence 
of God), and Nature and instinct on the other, inevitably part of a 
demonstration that God is not part of the workings of Nature (unless 
God is defined as Nature).
It was generally agreed that instinct was common to all animals, 
but was not part of thought, a faculty which set humans apart from 
other animals, and was God-given. It was on this basis that Descartes 
could build his argument stating that animals had no soul. Fontenelle’s 
fragment ‘Sur l’instinct’, published in 1757–58, thought to be a 
response to Nicolas Malebranche, asked whether instinct is voluntary 
27  Spinoza, Ethics, p. 22 (§II.73). 
28  Spinoza, Ethics, p. 26 (§II.78).
29  Jean Meslier, Anti-Fenelon, in Œuvres complètes, ed. by Roland Desné, Preface and 
Notes by Jean Deprun, Roland Desné et Albert Soboul, 3 vols (Paris: Éditions 
anthropos, 1970–72), vol. 3, pp. 262–63.
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or involuntary.30 Condillac, in his 1746 Essai, agrees with the view that 
instinct is beyond our control, and maintains the barriers between it and 
what he calls here the ‘operations of the soul’. 
L’instinct n’est qu’une imagination dont l’exercice n’est point du tout 
à nos ordres, mais qui, par sa vivacité, concourt parfaitement à la 
conservation de notre être. Il exclut la mémoire, la réflexion et les autres 
opérations de l’âme. […] Enfin la raison résulte de toutes les opérations 
de l’âme bien conduite.31
Instinct is nothing other than a sort of imagination whose exercise can 
in no way be controlled by us, but which, with its lively responsiveness, 
perfectly contributes to the preservation of our being. It excludes 
memory, reflection, and the other operations of the soul. […] In short, 
reason is the result of all operations of the well-regulated soul.
But if, in his Essai, Condillac will write that ‘la raison’ ‘couronne 
l’entendement’ [reason crowns the understanding], by the time he 
writes his Traité sur la sensation, he no longer separates instinct and 
reason quite so firmly.32 
Diderot, writing the Éléments de physiologie, will be prepared to 
tersely assert that ‘Je veux, n’est qu’un mot’ [I want, is nothing more 
than a phrase].33 The will (‘la volonté’) is discussed purely as a 
function of nature’s needs and appetites. Our nature determines us. 
And it determines what we think and what we do. As we saw with 
Hemsterhuis, one is not always the master of one’s thoughts, and there 
is always a cause for this: Diderot agreed, and took the opportunity to 
reaffirm the law of sequential cause and effect. From Spinoza’s point 
of view, there will be a reason for our ‘volitions and appetites’ but we 
30  Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle, Fragments d’un traité de la raison humaine, in Œuvres 
complètes, ed. by Alain Niderst, 10 vols (Paris: Fayard, 1996), vol. 7, p. 6.
31  Condillac, Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines [1746], ed. by Jean-Claude 
Pariente and Martine Pécharman (Paris: Vrin, 2014), p. 133 (I.II § 95).
32  Condillac, Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines, ed. by Pariente et Pécharman, 
p. 132 (I.II §92). In the Traité des sensations, ‘raison’ never features in a chapter title; 
the process of thought moves sequentially from sensation to impression, idea, 
memory thereof, comparison to another memory of a different sensation, which 
leads to abstraction, and so on. The whole process is one long chain. See for example 
Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, Traité des sensations, ed. by Christiane Frémont (Paris: 
Fayard, 1984), pp. 125–27 (part 1, ch. 8, § ‘La statue devient capable de réflexion’, 
etc.).
33  DPV 483/PQ 314/MT 298.
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ourselves may not know what it is. Free will and reason occupy an ever 
smaller space in accounts of the mind. Instinct begins to take the place 
of reason. And indeed, in the third part of the Éléments de physiologie, 
with all its extended discussion of the brain and thought, there is no 
chapter on reason at all.34 There is more to say on the topic of instinct 
and also modes of perception which are paradoxically not perceived by 
the perceiving subject, but its place is in a later section of this chapter, 
once nature and its laws have been discussed (and instinct has been 
discussed as part of human nature being determined just like the rest 
of nature), and we have moved on to look in more detail at the human 
understanding.
For the moment, we return to the discussion of the order of nature, 
and whether this order is eternal or subject to change.
c. The Order of Nature: Unchanging or in Flux?
That order, however, is not an unchanging one: the universe and species 
themselves are in flux, write Leibniz, Meslier and Bonnet. (Buffon disagrees: 
he thinks nature is fixed.) Human individuals are also more or less in flux, 
writes Meslier: they vary according to their constitution, age, and health, 
from one person to the next, and over the course of their own lifetime (Buffon 
agrees). Madmen and fools embody these differences, as do sudden bursts of 
strength overcoming debility in the face of fear or overwhelming need. The man 
immobilised by gout will suddenly run away from fire, Condillac and Buffon 
tell us, or lift burning wooden panels from a building (Diderot bizarrely claims 
that Buffon himself did this).
As we have already quoted, Spinoza had stated that ‘the order of nature’ 
is determined, and therefore ‘things could have been produced in no 
other way and no other order’.35 Hemsterhuis echoes this view very 
closely:
34  Although in part one, ‘Des êtres’, in the third chapter, entitled ‘Homme’ the first 
sub-heading is ‘Raison’. However, from the first sentence, it is displaced in favour 
of ‘instinct’: ‘La raison ou l’instinct de l’homme est déterminé par son organisation 
[…]’ [The reason or instinct of a man is determined by his organisation] (DPV 328/
PQ 144/MT 149).
35  Spinoza, Ethics, p. 33 (22 II/73).
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Ce qui existe par soi-même, et dont l’essence est d’exister, existe 
nécessairement, et nécessairement d’une façon déterminée. Existant 
nécessairement, il serait contradictoire qu’il n’existât pas, ou qu’il existât 
d’une façon autrement déterminée.36
That which exists by itself, and whose essence is to exist, exists 
necessarily, and necessarily in a determined way. Existing necessarily, it 
would be contradictory for it not to exist, or for it to exist in a way that 
was determined differently.
Diderot agrees and then diverges. The divergence rides on the nature, 
or essence, of matter: is it homogenous or heterogeneous, that is, are the 
basic building blocks of matter all identical (‘homogenous’) or are they 
different (‘heterogeneous’)? The answer to this question, as we now 
know, is that they are different: this is what the periodic table tells us: 
the elements are essentially different, and from their combinations all 
things in nature are made. But natural philosophy was not ready to 
pronounce on the question at this stage. (Antoine Lavoisier’s ground-
breaking Traité élémentaire de chimie, with its first list of elements, would 
be published in 1789).37 Diderot was already convinced that nature was 
heterogeneous, and as he explains, what is at stake is whether nature 
in its current form is unchanging or, to give it its divine resonance, 
‘eternal’, or not: in his view its essential reactivity, or continuing change 
in reaction to everything around it, its ‘vicissitude’, means that while it 
is determined by natural laws (including the laws of cause and effect), 
and while it will eternally be so, it will also be subject to perpetual 
change. So, when Spinoza and Hemsterhuis state that nature’s current 
forms are determined and will be unchanging, Diderot, responding 
directly to Hemsterhuis, disagrees:
* Je ne crois pas cela. 
Je crois que la forme actuelle sous laquelle la matière existe est nécessaire 
et déterminée; ainsi que toutes les formes diverses qu’elle prendra 
successivement à toute éternité.
36  Hemsterhuis in Diderot, Observations sur La ‘Lettre sur l’homme et ses rapports’ de 
Hemsterhuis, ed. by Gerhardt Stenger, in Œuvres complètes, DPV (Paris: Hermann, 
2004), vol. 24, p. 284. 
37  Even the term ‘element’ is not a given here: what Lavoisier meant by ‘element’ is not 
the same as an element in the periodic table as understood by Dmitri Mendeleev or 
as redefined in the twentieth century according to atomic number. With thanks to 
François Pépin for this point. 
 79Material World and Embodied Mind
Mais cette vicissitude, ce développement qui est en flux perpétuel est 
nécessaire. C’est une suite de son essence et de son hétérogénéité.
Et je ne vois nulle contradiction à cette supposition.
Si elle est essentiellement hétérogène; elle est essentiellement en 
vicissitude.38
* I do not believe that.
I believe that the current form in which matter exists is necessary and 
determined as are all the different forms it will take successively and for 
all eternity.
But this vicissitude, this development which is in perpetual flux is 
necessary. It is the consequence of its essence and its heterogeneity.
And I see no contradiction in this supposition.
If it is essentially heterogeneous then it is essentially subject to vicissitude. 
Not all authors are willing to say this, and of course the extent to which 
Diderot writing these notes in Hemsterhuis’s book and then handing 
them back to him with the strict injunction to keep them completely 
secret actually counts as saying it at all is debatable. But Diderot did plant 
his views in a number of different textual flowerbeds, including this 
one: in his 1753 print-published Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature he 
suggested that Nature’s productions are infinitely varied;39 in the Rêve de 
d’Alembert, his character d’Alembert muses on the ‘flux perpétuel’, and 
this theme is further developed in the Eléménts de physiologie.40 
Meslier had depicted a broad-brush canvas of perpetual motion 
and perpetual variation in his Mémoire des pensées et sentiments (written 
probably in the 1720s just prior to his death in 1729 and better known 
as his Testament after Voltaire’s famous abridgement which appeared in 
1761). In its structure and iterative style, Meslier’s Mémoire is a written 
instantiation of infinite variation. One such evocation runs as follows:
En un mot toute action suit naturellement et necessairement la nature du 
mouvement de l’être qui se meut. Tout cela est clair et certain, et comme 
d’ailleurs tous les divers mouvemens dont je viens de parler, se peuvent 
encore modifier en infinies sortes et manieres, et que tous les êtres qui 
sont en mouvement et qui sont les plus petites parties de la matière se 
38  Diderot, Observations sur La ‘Lettre sur l’homme et ses rapports’ de Hemsterhuis, p. 284.
39  Diderot, Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature, DPV, vol. 9, p. 291 (‘pensée’ 12).
40  Diderot, Le Rêve de d’Alembert, DPV, p. 138; Éléments de physiologie, DPV 312/PQ 127/
MT 135; DPV 322/PQ 137/MT 144; DPV 444/PQ 265/MT 261, as quoted above.
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peuvent mesler, se combiner, se joindre, se lier, s’accrocher, et s’unir 
ensemble, ou se heurter les unes contre les autres, se repousser les unes 
les autres, se separer, s’écarter, et se disperser les unes des autres, en 
infinies sortes et manieres.41
In a word all action naturally and necessarily follows the nature of 
the movement of the moving being. All this is clear and certain, and 
moreover all these diverse movements that I have just been speaking 
about can further modify themselves in infinite ways and manners, 
and all the beings which are moving and which are the smallest parts 
of matter can mix, combine, join, link, hold on, and unite together, or 
alternatively crash into one another, repel, separate, diverge and disperse 
in infinite ways and manners.
The naturalist Charles Bonnet bravely evokes species change in the 
natural world and in living beings in his Palingénésie philosophique (1769), 
published the same year that the Rêve de d’Alembert was first drafted. 
Bonnet had already invoked ‘l’evolution, loi de la nature’ in his Corps 
organisés.42 In the Palingénésie philosophique, he evokes ‘[des] idées sur 
l’état passé & sur l’état futur des Etres vivans’ [ideas on the past state and 
on the future state of living beings], and seeks to disarm disapproval, 
official or otherwise, by insisting (in Pluchian mode)43 on the beauty of 
the spectacle, ‘cette ravissante Scene de métamorphoses’ [this ravishing 
scene of metamorphoses].44 The result of all this change would be that 
‘Nous contemplerions un monde tout nouveau, un Ensemble de Choses 
dont nous ne saurions nous faire actuellement aucune idée’ [we would 
41  Meslier, Mémoire des pensées et sentiments de Jean Meslier, in Œuvres complètes, ed. by 
Roland Desné, préface et notes par Jean Deprun, Roland Desné et Albert Soboul, 
vol. 2, p. 443.
42  Charles Bonnet, Considérations sur les corps organisés [1762], in Œuvres d’histoire 
naturelle et de philosophie, vol. 3, t. 5, p. 303.
43   Noël-Antoine Pluche (1688–1761) was the author of the Spectacle de la nature (1732–
42), famous for its argument that God’s existence could be proved by reference 
to the beauty of nature, an argument which Diderot contested in Saunderson’s 
(invented) death-bed speech (Lettre sur les aveugles [1749], in Denis Diderot, Lettre 
sur les aveugles: à l’usage de ceux qui voient; Lettre sur les sourds et muets: à l’usage de 
ceux qui entendent et qui parlent, ed. by Marian Hobson and Simon Harvey (Paris: GF 
Flammarion, 2000)). 
44  In the Palingénésie philosophique [1769], Bonnet evokes (in the title) ‘idées sur l’état 
passé & sur l’état futur des Etres vivans’ (Bonnet, Œuvres d’histoire naturelle et de 
philosophie, vol. 7, t. 15, p. 171).
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be contemplating a completely new world, an ensemble of things about 
which we currently have absolutely no idea at all].45
There are, as already suggested, material variations which are 
more familiar and less obviously paradigmatically challenging. There 
are malformed bodies: in eighteenth-century terms, ‘monsters’. Emita 
Hill, Andrew Curran and Charles Wolfe have all written fine and 
complementary studies of the monster as concept, as thought experiment 
and as fiction in Diderot.46 As we know, Diderot was interested in 
understanding the range and also random nature of ‘monstrous’ forms, 
and in using them to show the material variability of nature and its 
laws.47 Bonnet had said in his Corps organisés (1762) that
On nomme Monstre toute production organisée, dans laquelle la 
conformation, l’arrangement, ou le nombre de quelques-unes des parties 
ne suivent pas les règles ordinaires.48
We term a Monster any organised production in which the structure, 
arrangement or number of any of its parts do not conform to ordinary 
rules.
Buffon discusses natural monstrosity, but is not ready to suggest species 
modification and transformation over time, instead piously confirming 
that the ‘ordonnance [de la nature] est fixe pour le nombre, le maintien et 
l’équilibre des espèces’ [order of nature is fixed in relation to the amount, 
the preservation, and the balance of species].49 He states, as is generally 
accepted in all of these works of natural philosophy, that individuals 
themselves vary one from the next, and over the course of their own 
lives: change is a modus vivendi and the ‘habitude [de la nature] vari[e] 
autant qu’il est possible dans toutes les formes individuelles’ [nature 
45  Bonnet, Palingénésie philosophique, in Œuvres d’histoire naturelle et de philosophie, vol. 
7, t. 15, p. 392.
46  See Emita Hill, Andrew Curran, and Charles Wolfe on monsters in Diderot’s 
thought; see also Wes Williams for earlier deployments of the concept. Andrew 
Curran, Sublime Disorder: Physical Monstrosity in Diderot’s Universe (Oxford: Voltaire 
Foundation, 2001); Emita Hill, The Role of ‘le monstre’ in Diderot’s Thought (Banbury: 
Voltaire Foundation, 1972); Charles Wolfe, Monsters and Philosophy (London: 
College Publications, 2005); Wes Williams, Monsters  and Their Meanings in Early 
Modern Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), https://doi.org/10.1093/
acprof:oso/9780199577026.001.0001.
47  We touched on the question of monsters and monstrosity in the previous chapter.
48  Bonnet, Corps organisés, p. 102.
49  Buffon, De la nature. Seconde vue in Histoire naturelle, vol. 13 [1765], Œuvres, p. 999.
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habitually varies as much as possible across all individual forms].50 
Bodies are in flux, had said Leibniz in his Monadologie, comparing 
bodies to rivers: 
Car tous les corps sont dans un flux perpétuel comme des rivières ; et des 
parties y entrent et en sortent continuellement.51
For all bodies are in perpetual flux like rivers, and parts are continually 
coming in and going out of them.
While the allusion to rivers in flux nods to Heraclitus’s alleged remark 
about never stepping into the same river twice, it was not a truism, 
philosophical, medical or otherwise, to state that bodies were also in 
flux. Meslier also said that bodies are in flux, quoting Montaigne’s 
Apologie de Raimond Sebond to do so, and thereby inserting Montaigne’s 
Lucretian commentary that our thoughts, judgements, and soul suffer 
and are affected by these continual alterations. Montaigne’s own relation 
to Epicureanism is an interesting one that is not part of the story we 
are telling here, but it is perhaps useful to note that he deeply admired 
Lucretius’s poem, and cited it very frequently.52 Montaigne’s role in the 
transmission of De rerum natura is important, as these particular pages 
from Meslier’s Testament demonstrate: there is extensive quotation from 
Lucretius, and it is all lifted from Montaigne’s Apologie de Raymond 
Sebond.53
50  Ibid.
51  Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ‘Monadologie’, in Principes de la nature et de la grace 
fondés en raison et principes de la philosophie ou monadologie, ed. by André Robinet 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), p. 113 (§71); Monadology: An Edition 
for Students, ed. and trans. by Nicholas Rescher (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 234 
(translation lightly amended).
52  See Michael Screech, Montaigne’s Annotated Copy of Lucretius: A Transcription and 
Study of the Manuscript, Notes and Pen-Marks (Geneva: Droz, 1998) and Wes Williams, 
‘“Well Said/Well Thought”: How Montaigne Read His Lucretius’, in Lucretius and 
the Early Modern, ed. by David Norbrook, Stephen Harrison, and Philip Hardie 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 136–61, https://doi.org/10.1093/acp
rof:oso/9780198713845.003.0007. 
53  Meslier, Mémoire des pensées et sentiments de Jean Meslier, in Œuvres complètes, ed. by 
Desné, vol. 3, p. 48 n. 2.
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Il est certain, dit le judicieux Montaigne, que nos pensées, que nos jugemens, 
et que les facultés de notre âme souffrent selon les mouvemens, et les alterations 
du corps; lesquelles alterations sont continuëlles.54
It is certain, says the judicious Montaigne, that our thoughts, our judgements, 
and the faculties of our soul suffer according to the movements and alterations of 
the body, these alterations being unceasing.
There are two strands to draw out of this particular tradition of 
conceptualising individual bodies in flux: firstly, the expanding-
diminishing model of a body that will grow, flourish, and then decline 
and die, and secondly, the idea that illness and other changes can affect 
and alter its abilities and character at any given moment. I will take 
these strands one after the other. The first is a typically lofty example of 
the ineluctable forces of nature from the pen of Buffon:
Tout change dans la Nature, tout s’altère, tout périt ; le corps de l’homme 
n’est pas plûtôt arrivé à son point de perfection, qu’il commence à 
déchoir.55
Everything changes in Nature, everything alters, everything perishes; no 
sooner has the body of man reached its peak of perfection than it starts 
to decline.
In 1753, Diderot will pick up this notion of the flourishing and death of 
an individual to push back to the bigger question: might not a species 
follow the same pattern?
[…] dans les règnes animal et végétal, un individu commence, pour 
ainsi dire, s’accroît, dure, dépérit et passe; n’en serait-il pas de même des 
espèces entières?56
In the animal and vegetable realms, an individual starts, so to say, grows, 
lasts, declines and passes; might it not also be the same for whole species?
Although as we have already seen, Buffon will refuse to countenance 
such a notion.57
54  Meslier, Mémoire des pensées et sentiments de Jean Meslier, in Œuvres complètes, ed. by 
Desné, vol. 3, p. 53 (from Montaigne’s Apologie de Raimond Sebond).
55  Buffon, De l’homme in Histoire naturelle, vol. 2 [1749], Œuvres, p. 262.
56  Diderot, Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature, DPV, vol. 9, p. 331. 
57  Barbara de Negroni comments on Buffon’s opposition to ‘les thèses transformistes’, 
in Diderot, Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature, in Œuvres, p. 1206, n. 143.
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The principal of continual change in bodies is asserted again in the 
section on ‘Mort’ [Death] in the Éléments de physiologie: ‘Nul état fixe 
dans le corps animal: il décroît quand il ne croît plus’ [There is no fixed 
state in the animal body: it starts shrinking once it stops growing].58
The second strand is the notion of illness, which we have already seen 
in Montaigne via Meslier, and also in the previous chapter, in relation 
to Pascal.59 Bonnet will restate it in eighteenth-century physiological 
vocabulary:
Une maladie peut déranger toute l’Economie du Cerveau & anéantir 
l’Imagination, la Mémoire, le Raisonnement; elle n’annéantit pas l’Ame, 
& néanmoins elle est réduite à l’état de l’Ame de la Brute.60
An illness can upset the whole economy of the brain and annihilate 
imagination, memory, and reason; it does not annihilate the soul, which 
is nonetheless reduced to the state of the soul of a beast.
In the Éléments de physiologie, this view is the underlying assumption for 
the whole work and references to it are ubiquitous. Here is one, from 
part 1, ‘Des Etres’, chapter III, ‘Homme’, sub-section ‘Raison’:
Les facultés de l’homme se perdent sans retour, comme elles se perdent 
momentanément, c’est la même cause, dont l’effet dure ou cesse. Exemples 
pris de la lassitude, de la maladie, de la convalescence, de la passion, 
de l’ivresse, du sommeil, c’est ainsi que l’homme est successivement 
ingénieux ou stupide, patient ou colère, jamais le même; le plus constant 
est celui qui change le moins.61
Human faculties can be irrevocably lost just as they can be momentarily 
lost, the cause is the same, whether the effect endures or not. Examples 
can be found in tiredness, illness, convalescence, passion, drunkenness, 
sleep, and thus is man successively ingenious or stupid, patient or angry, 
never the same; the most constant is he who changes the least.
58  DPV 312/PQ 127/MT 135.
59  See above.
60  Bonnet, Analyse abrégée de l’Essai analytique sur les Facultés de l’Ame [?1764], in Œuvres 
d’histoire naturelle et de philosophie, vol. 8, t. 15, p. 38.
61  DPV 329/PQ 145/MT 150.
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i. The Gouty Man and the Fire
Thus far, these relaying maxims and patterns remain rather generalised. 
There are also specific examples which get picked up and reused. One 
such is the inverse example of the gouty man, enfeebled by his illness yet 
given remarkable strength by experiencing extreme emotion.
Here is Condillac’s version: 
Un homme, tourmenté par la goutte et qui ne peut se soutenir, revoit au 
moment qu’il s’y attendait le moins, un fils qu’il croyait perdu : plus de 
douleur. Un instant après le feu se met à sa maison : plus de faiblesse. Il 
est déjà hors du danger quand on songe à le secourir. Son imagination 
subitement et vivement frappée, réagit sur toutes les parties de son corps, 
et y produit la révolution qui le sauve.62
A man, tormented by gout and unable to support his own weight, sees at 
the moment he least expected it a son whom he’d thought lost: no more 
pain. An instant later his house catches fire: no more weakness. By the 
time anyone thinks of giving him any assistance, he has already got out 
of danger. The effect of imagination having been suddenly and deeply 
struck reaches every part of his body and produces the revolution which 
saves him.
This sentimental fiction of Condillac’s staggers under the weight of its 
implausibly compacted drama of the gouty father, the return of a son 
believed dead, and a sudden dangerous blaze, and fails to make any 
convincing physiological point. The version we meet in the Eléménts 
de physiologie is this (the gouty man has disappeared to be replaced by 
three separate characters):
* Mr de Buffon voit la flamme s’échapper avec de la fumée à travers 
les fentes d’un lambris; il arrache le lambris; il prend entre ses bras les 
planches à demi brûlées et les porte dans sa cour et  il se trouve qu’un 
cheval n’ébranlerait pas le fardeau qu’il a porté.  Une femme délicate 
est attaquée de vapeurs hystériques, de fureur utérine et trois hommes 
ne peuvent contenir celle qu’un seul d’entre eux aurait renversée, liée 
dans son état de santé. Le feu prend à la maison d’un avare, il prend son 
62  Condillac, Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines, ed. by Pariente and 
Pécharman, p. 129 (I.II, §88).
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coffre-fort et le porte dans son jardin, d’où il ne l’aurait pas remué pour 
dix fois la somme qu’il contenait.63
* Mr de Buffon sees flames and smoke escaping through the slits of a 
piece of wooden pannelling; he tears it off; he carries the half-burnt 
planks in his arms out into the courtyard and it emerges that a horse 
would not have been able to shift the load he carried. A delicate woman 
is attacked by hysterical vapours and uterine fury and three men are 
unable to restrain a person whom one of them could have knocked 
over and tied up unaided had she been in a state of health. The house 
of a miser catches light, he picks up his strong box and carries it into his 
garden, and then wouldn’t have been able to move it for ten times the 
sum it contained. 
Diderot’s three cases have fewer elements within them, taken separately, 
and although each one presents an extreme instance that certainly does 
contain melodramatic qualities, the physiological point about the body 
being capable of surprising strength in certain crisis circumstances 
(here, anxiety about treasured possessions—or just treasure—and 
hysteria)64 is clear. It is curious nonetheless that Buffon is referenced 
(we have not been able to find the source for this anecdote),65 and 
even more curious that Buffon features not as a natural philosopher 
organising and presenting anecdotal evidence, but as a player himself. Is 
there something at stake here, even if it’s just a joke about the ponderous 
Buffon skipping about with huge weights? An implicit parallel with the 
miser, mocking Buffon for his pride in his wood panelling? Condillac 
is not named or alluded to, but his version tells us that these sorts of 
63  DPV 327/PQ 143n/MT 149.
64  See Sabine Arnaud, On Hysteria: The Invention of a Medical Category between 1670 
& 1820 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2015), https://doi.org/10.7208/
chicago/9780226275680.001.0001. 
65  DPV and Terada have no references for this anecdote; PQ references the source in 
Buffon, Histoire naturelle, t.II, p. 429, ‘Histoire naturelle de l’homme. De la nature 
de l’homme’, but it does not seem to be there. Substantial hunting in Pietro Corsi 
et al.’s online edition of Buffon’s work also failed to turn up the anecdote (http://
www.cn2sv.cnrs.fr/article142.html). Buffon scholar Stéphane Schmitt supplies two 
references in Buffon to extraordinary strength in extraordinary straits, both in the 
Supplément, vol. 4, p. 372 (‘Addition à l’article de l’accouchement’ on labour pains) 
and p. 387 (‘Addition à l’article de la puberté’ on a young man in an ‘état de délire 
convulsif’ [a state of convulsive delirium]), but neither of these refer to Buffon 
himself. With thanks to Pietro Corsi and Stéphane Schmitt for helping to look.
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examples, particularly involving fire, pre-existed Buffon’s alleged 
experience, and were popping up in separate but overlapping texts.
ii. From Recycled Cases to the Specific
Memory is a recurring topic of interest to all these authors thinking 
about how the brain works (as we have already seen and will see again): 
stupidity, genius, and madness are used throughout these texts as 
conditions that illuminate the phenomena of memory, and vice versa. La 
Mettrie’s Traité de l’âme (1745) states that ‘les sots raisonnent mal, ils ont si 
peu de mémoire’ [idiots reason poorly, they have so little memory], and 
makes a link with the mad, whose ideas (he says) are disconnected, and 
in this sense ‘idiots’ are mad too, their ideas also being disconnected.66 
Condillac’s Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines (1746) makes the 
same analogy: the man without memory (and therefore also without 
imagination), being completely unable to link his ideas, would be 
incapable of thought at all, and would be an imbecile; the man who had 
too much memory and too much imagination would similarly be unable 
to think, also failing to have properly linked consecutive thoughts, and 
would be mad.67 Diderot’s version is less boxily categorising, and also 
less assertive: inexperience as well as failure or loss of memory will all 
have an effect on a man’s ability to link his ideas, and all lead to the same 
phenomenon, that is, that the man will seem mad. 
Si faute d’expérience les phénomènes ne s’enchaînent pas, si faute de 
mémoire ils ne peuvent s’enchaîner, si par la perte de la mémoire ils se 
décousent, l’homme paraît fou.68
If for lack of experience phenomena don’t link up, if for lack of memory 
they cannot be linked, if for loss of memory they become disconnected, 
a man will seem mad.
In all these circumstances, memory, sanity, and health exist in a 
sensitive and easily-disturbed relationship to each other, and Diderot 
66  Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Traité de l’âme, in Œuvres philosophiques, ed. by Francine 
Markovits, 2 vols (Paris: Fayard, 1987), vol. 1, p. 216.
67  Condillac, Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines, ed. by Pariente and 
Pécharman, pp. 98–99 (I.II, §34).
68  DPV 464/PQ 289/MT 279. See also ‘Il y a des phénomènes de mémoire qui ont 
conduit à la stupidité, à la folie’ (DPV 473/PQ 301/MT 289). 
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gives a number of examples involving that relationship being lost,69 or 
even never established, as in the case of the boy who lived with bears 
until the age of ten, who had no language other than bear grunts when 
brought into ‘civilization’, and who, once he had learnt language, could 
not remember his pre-language years with the bears. Diderot does not 
give all these details, tersely stating that ‘Les signes servent beaucoup 
à la mémoire. Un enfant de dix ans, élevé par les ours, resta sans 
mémoire’ [signs assist memory a great deal. A child of ten, brought up 
by bears, remained without memory].70 The background can be found 
in the anecdote’s previous appearances: in La Mettrie’s Traité de l’âme, 
in La Mettrie’s possible source, Jean-Pierre Crousaz’s Logique (1720), 
although here the boy is a man, and in Condillac’s Essai and again 
in his Traité: it comes (and Condillac gives the note accurately in his 
Essai) from Bernard Connor’s Evangelium medicum, seu medicina mystica, 
published in London in 1697, and emerges again in Rousseau’s Discours 
sur l’origine de l’inégalité, note III.71
The point here is that these writers all use this same example. There 
are other such cases, the blind boy operated on by Cheselden or the 
deaf man from Chartres being two more.72 Diderot does not use these 
69  DPV 469–70/PQ 297–98/MT 285–86; DPV 472–73/PQ 300–01/MT 288–89. He also 
talks about the volatility of the mind during fever or delirium, when the clever man 
and the fool can swap places owing to bodily illness. He considers that this is as 
important a deciding aspect of a person’s intelligence as the perfection or otherwise 
of their senses (Helvétius’s general view), see Réfutation d’Helvétius, DPV, vol. 24, p. 
515.
70  DPV 470/PQ 298/MT 286. 
71  La Mettrie, Traité de l’âme, p.236; Jean-Pierre Crousaz’, La Logique, ou Système de 
réflexions qui peuvent contribuer à la netteté et l’étendue de nos connaissances, 2nd edn 
(Amsterdam: L’Honoré et Châtelain, 1720), vol. 1, p. 32; Condillac’s Essai, §23, and 
Traité, p. 254–55; Bernard Connor, Evangelium medicum, seu medicina mystica, London 
in 1697, pp. 133–34; Rousseau’s Discours sur l’origine de l’inégalité, note III in the 
Œuvres complètes, ed. by Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard 
Pléiade, 1964), vol. 3, p. 196, and p. 1361, n. 5.
72  ‘Aveugle-né’ [man born blind]: Voltaire’s account seems to kick-start this particular 
series: Voltaire, Éléments de la philosophie de Newton, ed. by Robert L. Walters and 
W.H. Barber, Œuvres complètes de Voltaire (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1992), 
vol. 15, ch. 7. See Crousaz, Logique, vol. 1, pp. 33–34; La Mettrie, Traité de l’âme, pp. 
227–28; Condillac, Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines, p. 186 (I.VI §15); 
Diderot’s Lettre sur les aveugles (1749); Buffon, Histoire naturelle, vol. 3 (1749), p. 
314; Condillac, Traité des sensations (1753), III.V, p. 195. See Tunstall, Blindness and 
Enlightenment, pp. 133–36. ‘Sourd de Chartres’ [the man from Chartres born deaf]: 
Crousaz, Logique, vol. 1, p. 34; La Mettrie, Traité de l’âme, pp. 225–26; Condillac, Essai, 
pp. 156–57 (I.II.IV, §13), pp. 156–57; Buffon, Histoire naturelle (1749), p. 348.
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particular examples in the Éléments de physiologie, although they had 
appeared elsewhere in his œuvre. But they feature consistently across 
this corpus of texts that we are looking at, all of which provide material 
for the Éléments de physiologie. In the Lettre sur les sourds et muets, Diderot 
alludes to ‘nos muets de convention’ [our typical dumb people] and to 
the ‘questions dont on leur demanderait la réponse’ [the questions we 
would ask them to answer] as if those questions were always the same, 
and the deaf and dumb cases also the same.73 This common corpus tells 
us that, as Diderot hints, the same examples and questions bear down 
on all these thinkers. One of the features that typifies the Éléments de 
physiologie is that while he often does work with familiar positions or 
examples, he does so in concentrated form, often adding newer, more 
personal, or stranger examples. 
We can observe this shift from the general position (that humans 
differ from each other and over the course of any one life time 
according to physiology and state of health) to the striking and specific 
exemplification, in the change from the exasperated Réfutation d’Helvétius 
to the Éléments de physiologie. In the former, Diderot lambasts Helvétius 
for stating that humans are essentially the same everywhere, without 
regard for the sort of society they live in, and equally without regard 
to their physiological condition generally or at any given moment. 
He orders his reader to open the books of anatomists, doctors and 
physiologists, and to think about how a slight fever can make us quicker 
or slower. He asks us whether we have ever had a headache, implicitly 
challenging us to consider the effect it has on our thought processes. 
And meanwhile the ‘vous’, the collective you he is addressing, shades 
into a direct challenge to Helvétius himself (by then dead), chastising 
him for not having said a word about ‘les fous’ [mad people].74
In the Éléments de physiologie, this fieriness has cooled into detached 
description: the mental drama he records is all the more vivid for it. 
The notion that our state of mind at any given moment depends on our 
precise physiological condition gains a curious scenario: Diderot turns 
himself into a narrative of the husband and father whose familial anxiety 
is caused by a slightly fast pulse:
73  Diderot, Lettre sur les sourds et muets, ed. by Hobson and Harvey, pp. 95, 96.
74  Diderot, Réfutation d’Helvétius, DPV, vol. 24, p. 620.
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L’action des nerfs porte au cerveau des désirs singuliers, les fantaisies 
les plus bizarres, des affections, des frayeurs: Il me semble que j’entends 
crier ma femme: on attaque ma fille, elle m’appelle à son secours; je vois 
les murs s’ébranler autour de moi: le plafond est prêt à tomber sur ma 
tête; je me sens pusillanime, je me tâte le pouls, j’y découvre un petit 
mouvement fébrile: la cause de ma frayeur connue, elle cesse.75
The action of the nerves transmits strange desires to the brain, the most 
bizarre fantasies, affections, and fears: I seem to hear my wife crying out: 
my daughter is being attacked, she is calling me for help; I see the walls 
shake around me: the ceiling is about to fall on my head; I feel fearful, I 
check my pulse, I find it is beating slightly feverishly: as soon as I know 
what the cause for my fright is, it ceases.
So, nature is in flux, and man is in flux.
d. Matter in Flux
Matter can move from one form to another, not in the sense that stones and 
other materials might suddenly get up and start arranging themselves into 
a building (a lumbering joke Meslier makes) but in the course of natural 
material processes, write Meslier, Buffon and Bonnet. These processes include 
absorption by nutrition, says Bonnet, while any given being at any given 
moment is a composite of different substances or bodies, write Spinoza and 
Buffon. This can be exemplified by the differences between different sorts of 
matter such as stone and flesh, and transformations between them. Rousseau 
challenges any philosopher to come and tell him how a lump of rock can 
become a living creature. And what is the likelihood that nature in all its 
extraordinary functions and variety could have come about without a guiding 
hand, just by chance? Diderot’s answer can be found in the first part of the 
‘Rêve de d’Alembert’.
Meslier is quick to reject cartoonish versions of materialist thinking 
which simplify to the point of nonsense the notion of the circulation of 
matter. It is not, he says, that the materials of a house jump up and start 
building themselves:
Pareillement il seroit ridicule de dire ou de penser que les pierres et les 
bois qui composent une maison se seroient façonnés, assemblés, rangés, 
75  DPV 359/PQ 179/MT 179.
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et attachés d’eux mêmes ensemble pour bastir une maison, puisque tous 
ces materiaux là n’ont en eux mêmes aucun mouvement.76
Similarly it would be absurd to say or to think that the stones and 
pieces of wood that make up a house could have carved themselves, 
got assembled, arranged and bound all by themselves to build a house, 
because none of those materials in themselves have any movement. 
He explains how matter moves from one form to another in humans or 
animals through the simple processes of drinking and eating, and he 
also strikes a blow against abstraction (which these writers repeatedly 
do) by pointing out that it is not some general sort of unspecified matter 
which thinks, it’s matter in human or animal form (provocatively 
presenting them as interchangeable, and without comment here on the 
anti-Cartesian notion of the thinking animal):
Ce n’est pas précisément la matière qui pense, mais c’est l’homme 
ou l’animal composé de matière, qui pense, qui boit, qui mange, qui 
marche, qui dort; et comme les parties d’une pierre ou d’un morceau de 
fer ou de quelque autre chose que ce soit peuvent par leurs différentes 
modifications devenir chair et os et composer un corps organique et 
vivant, elles peuvent par conséquent faire un homme ou quelque autre 
animal capable de sentiment et de connaissance, et pour cela il ne faut 
point d’autre arrangement ni d’autres mouvements que ceux qui se 
trouvent ordinairement dans les hommes ou dans les autres animaux.77
It’s not exactly matter which thinks, but the human or the animal made of 
matter which thinks, drinks, eats, walks, and sleeps; and just as the parts 
of a stone or a piece of iron or whatever else it might be can, by going 
through different modifications, become flesh and bone and compose an 
organic living body, they can also therefore make a human or some other 
animal capable of feeling and knowledge, and for that nothing is needed 
apart from the arrangement or movements that are ordinarily found in 
humans or other animals.
76  Meslier, Mémoire des pensées et sentiments de Jean Meslier, in Œuvres complètes, ed. by 
Desné, vol. 2, p. 460.
77  Meslier, Anti-Fénelon, ed. by Jean Deprun, in Meslier, Œuvres complètes, ed. by Desné, 
vol. 3, p. 244, n. 22. Deprun quotes Vernière as saying (in his Spinoza et la pensée 
française avant la Révolution, 1954, t. 2, p. 368, n. 3) that Meslier ‘décrit, cinquante ans 
avant Diderot, le processus d’“animalisation” du Rêve de d’Alembert’ [describes, fifty 
years before Diderot, the process of “animalisation” from the D’Alembert’s Dream].
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This view of the individual (whether animal or human) as composite 
and as depending on its particular organisation for any specific character 
or capacities was also shared by Spinoza and Buffon. Spinoza simply 
states:
The human body is composed of a great many individuals of different 
natures, each of which is highly composite.78
Buffon’s amplifying style presents the same point differently and more 
repetitively, but is substantively identical:
[…] un individu n’est qu’un tout uniformément organisé dans toutes ses 
parties intérieures, un composé d’une infinité de figures semblables et 
de parties similaires, un assemblage de germes ou de petits individus de 
la même espèce, lesquels peuvent tous se développer de la même façon, 
suivant les circonstances, et former de nouveaux tous composés comme 
le premier.79
An individual is nothing more than a whole uniformly organised in all 
its internal parts, a compound of infinite shapes and similar parts, an 
assemblage of seeds or of mini individuals of the same species which are 
all capable of developing in the same way, circumstances permitting, and 
forming new ones all put together just like the first.
Buffon always takes great care to avoid provocation and also to avoid 
seeming materialist (the two being synonymous), so he will not touch 
directly on anything which casts doubt on the divine, and rather than 
talking about how inert matter might acquire or already possess in latent 
form the ability to think, he looks at it the other way round, describing 
how living matter becomes dead matter. This is a clever move, as it 
implicitly retains the notion of the movement between different forms 
of matter:
[…] il me paroît que la division générale qu’on devroit faire de la matière, 
est matière vivante et matière morte, au lieu de dire matière organisée et 
matière brute ; le brut n’est que le mort, je pourrois le prouver par cette 
quantité énorme de coquilles et d’autres dépouilles des animaux vivans 
qui font la principale substance des pierres, des marbres, des craies et 
des marnes, des terres, des tourbes, et de plusieurs autres matières que 
78  Spinoza, Ethics, p. 44: II/102, postulate 1. See above, on Bordeu and the composite 
animals.
79  Buffon, Histoire des animaux in Histoire naturelle, vol. 2 [1749], Œuvres, p. 144.
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nous appellons brutes, et qui ne sont que les débris et les parties mortes 
d’animaux ou de végétaux […].80
It seems to me that the general division that one should make in matter 
is that of living matter and dead matter, instead of talking about organised 
matter and base matter; base matter is nothing other than dead matter, 
and I would be able to prove it with the vast quantity of shells and other 
animal remains which make up the principle substance of all sorts of 
stone, marble, chalk, clay, earth, peat, and many other sorts of matter 
which we call base, and which are nothing other than the debris and 
dead parts of animals or plants.
Bonnet, who is also averse to making any pronouncements that may 
seem to undermine religion, and who in fact goes to great lengths to 
demonstrate his piety with fervent prayers and thanks to God,81 avoids 
generalising statement insofar as he can, instead talking in detail about 
the different forms of embodied matter and about the similarities and 
divergences between plant and animal life:
Comme la Plante, [l’Animal] végete: comme elle, il reçoit du dehors 
l’aliment qui le fait croître: comme elle, il multiplie. Mais à ces différentes 
actions, se joint chez lui le sentiment ou la perception de ce qui se passe 
dans son intérieur.82
Like the plant, the animal vegetates: like it, the animal receives 
nourishment from outside that makes it grow: like it, the animal 
multiplies. But to these different actions can also be added feeling or the 
perception of what takes place inside it.
Bonnet as we see is looking hard at the processes—here nutrition and 
reproduction—that are shared by both kinds of life form, and what 
differentiates the animal from the vegetable is qualitative in the sense 
that it is completely different but also quantitative in that it is an addition 
to a shared common root. He also looks a great deal at nutrition and 
at changing shape and size over time, as influenced by nutrition;83 we 
see Diderot picking this point up in the Observations sur Hemsterhuis, 
where he reflects with interest that thanks to the food he has ingested, 
80  Buffon, Histoire des animaux in Histoire naturelle, vol. 2 [1749], Œuvres, p. 157.
81  See for example Bonnet, Contemplation de la nature [1764] in Œuvres d’histoire 
naturelle et de philosophie, vol. 4, t. 7, pp. 185, 187.
82  Bonnet, Contemplation de la nature [1764], pp. 177–78.
83  Bonnet, Corps organisés, p. 100.
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and having as a baby ‘experienced sensation over the length of a foot 
and a half’, he now ‘experiences sensation along the length of five feet 
and a bit’.84 Diderot finds these transformative processes fascinating 
and also moving: he becomes exasperated with Hemsterhuis’s plodding 
exposition of this materialist doxa:
Et ce passage d’un règne à un autre, et ces êtres intermédiaires qui 
semblent appartenir à la plante et à l’animal, ne vous touchent-ils point?85
And this journey from one kingdom to another, and these intermediary 
beings which seem to belong to both plant and animal life, do they not 
move you?
Diderot’s point is that it is touching and awe-inspiring to contemplate, 
and indeed it is a particular feature of his materialism that he finds 
it so exciting and dynamic, where others simply see the petrifying 
gaping absence of the divine. Perhaps this is part of what Élisabeth de 
Fontenay is alluding to in the captivating title of her study on Diderot, 
Le Matérialisme enchanté.86
One of Diderot’s principal and gloomiest interlocutors, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, who makes sure that his later works reject materialism, 
morosely engages with the question of the transformability of matter in 
an important footnote to the ‘Profession de foi du vicaire savoyard’ in 
Émile (1762). As we see, rocks are still playing a key role in the debate, 
and Meslier had failed to do away with them:
Il me semble que loin de dire que les rochers pensent, la philosophie 
moderne a découvert au contraire que les hommes ne pensent point […] 
Mais s’il est vrai que toute matière sente, où concevrai-je l’unité sensitive 
ou le moi individuel ? sera-ce dans chaque molécule de matière ou dans 
des corps agrégatifs ? Placerai-je également cette unité dans les fluides et 
dans les solides, dans les mixtes et dans les éléments ? il n’y a, dit-on, que 
84  And he continues: ‘Comment suis-je parvenu avec l’âge à sentir sur une longueur 
de cinq pieds et quelques pouces. J’ai mangé. J’ai digéré. J’ai animalisé’ [How, with 
age, did I manage to feel along the length of five feet and a few inches. I ate. I 
digested. I animalised]. Diderot, Observations sur La ‘Lettre sur l’homme et ses rapports’ 
de Hemsterhuis, DPV, vol. 24, p. 304 (§136). The editors comment that he probably 
found the word ‘animaliser’ in Bonnet who uses it a lot or alternatively in Buffon.
85  Diderot, Observations sur La ‘Lettre sur l’homme et ses rapports’ de Hemsterhuis, DPV, 
vol. 24, p. 291.
86  Elisabeth Fontenay, Le Matérialisme enchanté (Paris: B. Grasset, 1981).
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des individus dans la nature! Mais quels sont ces individus ? Cette pierre 
est-elle un individu ou une agrégation d’individus ?87
It seems to me that far from saying that rocks think, modern philosophy 
has discovered, on the contrary, that men do not think. […] But if it is 
true that all matter can feel, then where shall I conceive the sensitive 
unity or the individual I to be? Will it be in each molecule of matter or in 
the aggregate bodies? Shall I put this unity equally in fluids and solids, 
in compounds and elements? There are, it is said, only individuals in 
nature. But what are these individuals? Is this stone an individual or an 
aggregate of individuals?
There is no room to unpack Rousseau’s multiple referents, which surely 
include Diderot, here.88 What is important for our purposes is to see 
that Rousseau cogently presents some of the problems with this aspect 
of materialist theory: they are problems which Diderot will pay close 
attention to, and reply to, in both the Rêve de d’Alembert and the Éléments 
de physiologie.89
e. The Natural Processes of Material Transformation
These natural processes of the material transformation of any living body 
include not only nutrition but reproduction and also death and decomposition. 
Reproduction involves the metamorphoses of forms and moreover their identical 
reproduction from one generation to another, writes Buffon with amazement. 
However, the moment when an actual living being can be said to have died is 
very difficult to determine: for example, at what point is a drowned man really 
dead, asks Leibniz? It is also difficult to identify the beginning and the end of 
87  Rousseau, Émile, in Œuvres complètes, vol. 4, p. 584 (authorial footnote); Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Emile, trans. by Allan Bloom (London: Penguin, 1979), p. 279 (slightly 
amended).
88  See the editorial footnote, Rousseau, Œuvres complètes, vol. 4, pp. 1540–41 for 
an overview of the philosophical interlocutors. François Pépin also reads the 
‘Profession de foi du vicaire savoyard’ as containing anti-Diderot anti-materialist 
polemic, in his La Philosophie expérimentale de Diderot et la chimie: philosophie, sciences 
et arts (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2012), pp. 480–83.
89  See the first part of the Rêve de d’Alembert, the ‘Suite d’un entretien entre M. 
d’Alembert et M. Diderot’ which is all about this question; see also d’Alembert’s 
dream-speech (‘Laissez là vos individus’ etc, Le Rêve de d’Alembert, DPV, vol. 17, 
p. 138 (and in Le Rêve de d’Alembert, ed. by Duflo, p. 104) and in the Éléments de 
physiologie, see ‘L’homme peut donc être regardé comme un assemblage d’animaux’, 
DPV 501/PQ 338/MT 314 (and quoted above).
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sensation, write Buffon and Bonnet. La Mettrie and Condillac take this to an 
extreme, and wonder whether an atom can think: they are genuinely asking the 
sort of question that we just saw Rousseau deriding. 
i. Reproduction
Diderot is moved when he contemplates the steps between one life 
form and another: Buffon asks us to feel admiration and wonder as we 
look at how a species renews itself and at how long that species can 
last (by extension therefore, he suggests that it does not necessarily last 
forever—this is something Diderot thinks about quite explicitly, both in 
the Rêve de d’Alembert and the Éléments de physiologie):
Cependant, quelqu’admirable que cet ouvrage [le corps d’un animal] 
nous paroisse, ce n’est pas dans l’individu qu’est la plus grande merveille, 
c’est dans la succession, dans le renouvellement et dans la durée des 
espèces que la Nature paroît tout-à-fait inconcevable.90
Yet, however admirable this work [the body of an animal] may appear to 
us, it is not even a single individual which is the greatest marvel, it’s in 
the succession, the renewal and the continuation of species that nature 
appears utterly inconceivable.
There are long chapters in the Eléménts de physiologie about human 
reproduction, its mechanisms, its organs, its mysteries and its mistakes: 
this is matter visibly moving through transformative processes, and 
Diderot’s curiosity about how it works and how it affects human 
experience—the two parts going hand in hand—is inexhaustible.
ii. The Beginning and End of Death
Buffon’s reclassification of matter into matière vivante and matière morte 
does not of course preclude its movement from one state to the other, and 
indeed his definition assumes transformation over time, in that what 
is dead must have once lived, because otherwise it cannot have died. 
This seems unproblematic. However, the difficulty is in assessing when 
death has occurred. What we now call a coma is the test case which is 
often referred to; in Diderot this discussion will be refracted through 
90  Buffon, Histoire des animaux in Histoire naturelle, vol. 2 [1749], Œuvres, pp. 134–35.
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the tale of a man thought to be drowned who then comes back to life.91 
Leibniz was debating the issue in his Monadology, written in French in 
1714, the year after Diderot’s birth (perhaps, by 1714, he had reached 
a foot and a half in length).92 As usual, Leibniz was in the middle of a 
polemic with the Cartesians:
Ils ont confondu avec le vulgaire un long étourdissement avec une mort 
à la rigueur.93
They, like the uneducated, mistook an extended lack of consciousness 
for actual death.
Buffon casts this sort of question in more diplomatic terms, preferring 
instead to talk about ‘l’incertitude des signes de la mort’, writing that:
[…] entre la mort et la vie il n’y a souvent qu’une nuance si foible, 
qu’on ne peut l’apercevoir même avec toutes les lumières de l’art de la 
Médecine et de l’observation la plus attentive […]94
the difference between death and life is often so faint that it is 
imperceptible even to those equipped with all the knowledge of the art 
of Medicine and with the keenest powers of observation.
The issue turns on sensation and perception: if the person does not 
respond to stimulus and appears to feel nothing, and if the observing 
doctor cannot perceive any movement, pulse or breathing, then the 
person may still not be dead, but they cannot be reached by the normal 
processes of empirical investigation, that is by sensation or perception. 
So there is a methodological problem. In the Éléments de physiologie, 
in a sub-section on the soul, or rather, the meaninglessness of the 
notion, Diderot asks about life and sensibility in the seeming absence 
91  Éléments de physiologie, DPV 333/PQ 151/MT 154 and also in Cabanis, see below.
92  In fact, Diderot was the first translator into French of the Latin version of the 
Monadology, in his Encyclopédie article ‘Leibnitzianisme’ in Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire 
raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, par une société de gens de lettres, ed. by Denis 
Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert, 28 vols (Paris: Briasson, David, Le Breton, 
Durand, 1751–72), vol. 9 (1765), pp. 369b-379b. With thanks to François Pépin for 
this information.
93  Leibniz, Monadologie, p. 14.
94  Buffon, Histoire naturelle de l’homme in Histoire naturelle, vol. 2 [1749], in Œuvres, p. 
279.
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of both.95 He specifically considers melancholic lethargy, catalepsy and 
drowning:
Où est-elle [l’âme] dans le noyé, qu’on rappelle à la vie de l’état de 
mort, ou d’un état qui lui ressemble tellement, que si le noyé n’avait 
point été secouru, il aurait persévéré dans cet état sans éprouver d’autre 
changement qu’une torpeur plus profonde.96
Where is it [the soul] in the drowned man, who can be recalled to life 
from the state of death, or from a state which resembles it so closely, that 
if the drowned man had not been treated, he would have continued in 
that same state without experiencing any change other than a deeper 
torpor.
The question turns on when sensation begins or ends in a living person, 
whether animals or even plants have feeling, and what sensation with 
limited brain power might mean in terms of experience. Buffon states 
quite clearly that the ‘espèce de sentiment’ [sort of feeling] that is 
mechanical sensation is very widely shared, and that it is by no means 
easy to differentiate the animal from the plant kingdoms according to 
that criterion: ‘Cette différence entre les animaux et les végétaux non 
seulement n’est pas générale, mais même n’est pas bien décidée’ [this 
difference between animals and plants is not only not a general one, it is 
not even clear or agreed upon].97
iii. The Beginning and End of Sensation
Bonnet asks at which level of organised bodies feeling is first manifested, 
and he does not appear to have an answer:
Mais quel est précisément l’échellon où le sentiment commence à se 
manifester? 
Du Polype ou de la Moule à une Plante, la distance paroït bien petite. 98
But what exactly is the stage at which feeling starts to be manifested?
95  DPV 333–34/PQ 150–51/MT 154.
96  DPV 333/PQ 151/MT 154.
97  Buffon, Histoire des animaux in Histoire naturelle, vol. 2 [1749], in Œuvres, p. 137.
98  Bonnet, Contemplation de la nature, in Œuvres d’histoire naturelle et de philosophie, vol. 
4, t. 7, p. 179.
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From the polyp or from the mussel to a plant, the difference seems 
extremely slight.
La Mettrie inverts the model, not asking how low down the ladder 
feeling begins, instead showing us a human, from the top of the ladder, 
pushed right down to the bottom and reduced to the state of a thinking 
atom:
un homme qui perdroit toute mémoire, seroit un atome pensant.99 
someone who lost all their memory would be a thinking atom.
Of course, the idea of a thinking atom is a contradiction in terms for 
those who plot nature along a line from simple to complex, and in any 
case what La Mettrie probably means is a feeling atom rather than a 
thinking one, thought requiring memory. Rousseau’s critique of this sort 
of thinking is more coherent than La Mettrie’s, but it still collapses over 
its own logic:
J’ai fait tous mes efforts pour concevoir une molécule vivante, sans 
pouvoir en venir à bout. L’idée de la matière sentant sans avoir des sens 
me paraît inintelligible et contradictoire. Pour adopter ou rejeter cette 
idée, il faudrait commencer par la comprendre, et j’avoue que je n’ai pas 
ce bonheur-là.100 
I have made every effort to conceive of a living molecule but I have not 
succeeded. The idea of matter sensing without having senses appears 
unintelligible and contradictory to me. To accept or to reject this idea, 
one would have to begin by understanding it, and I admit that I have not 
been so fortunate.
Rousseau strips the model back one stage further, to the idea of a 
living molecule. In his view, living is synonymous with feeling, and so 
he assumes the model is one with a molecule that feels, although as he 
then adds, it does not have any senses, so it cannot. Diderot’s version is 
most consistent, and although it does claim that the molecule can feel, it 
does not confuse the issue by also giving it sensory organs:
99  La Mettrie, Traité de l’âme, p. 172.
100  Rousseau, Émile, in Œuvres complètes, vol. 4, p. 575 (authorial footnote); Emile, trans. 
by Allan Bloom, p. 273 (slightly amended).
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L’homme, réduit à un sens, serait fou: il ne reste que la sensibilité, qualité 
aveugle, à la molécule vivante; rien de si folle qu’elle […]101
A human being reduced to one sense would be mad: the only thing left in 
the living molecule would be sensibility, a blind quality; there’s nothing 
so mad as that […]
Here we see him thinking in his habitually condensed way about the 
different levels of sensation as well as the different levels of complexity 
in organised bodies; we see him comparing the most developed (man) 
with the least developed (the living molecule), and we see it assessed 
in relation to medical and/or moral criteria: the man with only one 
sense would be mad; sensation is all that the living molecule has, and 
there is nothing madder than it. Here what neither the one-sensed man 
nor the simply sensory molecule possess is control or self-awareness: 
they, unlike the writer Diderot in this passage, cannot conduct any 
comparisons.
f. Knowledge Derived from the Senses
The only possible way to know anything is through the senses, write Spinoza 
and Condillac. La Mettrie, Buffon, Condillac, and Bonnet all set up and follow 
through the fiction of an initially sensorily-deprived person to work through the 
implications of this model. Abstract points or examples that are not based in 
nature, must be avoided, write Spinoza, Fontenelle, Buffon, Bonnet. Condillac’s 
examples tend to be hypothetical fictions, and impossible in nature. Geometers 
(or mathematicians, as we might call them) can become figures of fun, as we 
will see, and geometry is often presented as the opposite of knowledge (by 
Meslier, La Mettrie, and Buffon: even Spinoza calls his own geometrical method 
‘cumbersome’—twice). Precise research must be drawn on, and in fact there is a 
corpus of recycled examples. (Condillac, La Mettrie, and Buffon had all written 
about the man born deaf, from Chartres, and the child brought up by bears in 
Russia).102
101  DPV 486/PQ 318/MT 301.
102  As mentioned before.
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i. Knowledge from the Senses: Anti-Abstraction
The only possible way to know anything is through the senses, write 
Spinoza, Meslier, and Condillac. Spinoza’s Traité de la réforme de 
l’entendement, written in 1661, affirms the importance of empirical method 
and does so well before Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding 
(1689): to point out this chronology is not to dislodge Locke from his 
eminent perch or give Spinoza more prominence but simply to indicate 
that Locke was not the first to make these arguments, as we said earlier 
in the chapter. The really important point is that this position with 
respect to knowledge, that is to say, that it is derived from the external 
world via the senses, was reiterated in very similar terms over and over 
again throughout this period and that the reiterations seem to have 
been part of this century-long effort to get this view accepted, not just 
by some, and not as a particular philosophical stance, but as the truth. 
This is what defines this particular group of writers—that they keep 
repeating themselves and each other—and also what defines Diderot’s 
contribution, which is that after the magisterial synthesis which the 
Eléménts de physiologie constitutes, it was no longer necessary to repeat 
the same things, and natural philosophy could move on; we will see 
whether the second part of this book bears out such a view. 
The reason these writers or philosophers of the mid-seventeenth to 
the late-eighteenth centuries endlessly repeat the same things, without 
necessarily or even very often mentioning their other interlocutors or 
predecessors, is because the validity of their views about nature and 
the human mind were indeed questioned. In this context therefore it is 
not right to veer between judgements about originality and plagiarism, 
or even to cast aspersions about their relative boldness or by contrast 
the veiled diplomacy of their writings: in a hostile atmosphere of active 
censorship and the aggressive protection of orthodoxy, it is not really 
possible for non-orthodox writers and thinkers to exist in a relationship 
of progress and development from one to the next. Their relationship 
to one another may well have been fraught with polemic, rivalry, and 
disagreement, and demonstrably often was, but their relationship to the 
philosophical positions they were trying to get accepted meant that they 
simply needed to keep repeating them in various iterations until after 
more than a hundred years they were accepted. 
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This, therefore, is what Spinoza writes:
[…] avant tout il nous est nécessaire de tirer toujours toutes nos idées de 
choses physiques.103
before anything else we need always to draw all our ideas from physical 
things.
[il faut] savoir nous servir de nos sens et faire, d’après des règles et dans 
un ordre arrêté, des expériences suffisantes pour déterminer la chose que 
l’on étudie.104
[it is necessary] to know how to use our senses and conduct, according 
to rules and in an established order, experiments which are sufficient to 
define the thing being studied.
Spinoza frames his statements as injunctions: we must draw our ideas 
from physical things; we must learn how to use our senses and work 
out how to conduct reasoned and ordered experiments so that we can 
understand the thing we are studying. Meslier does not express this as 
an injunction which exhorts us to work and effort, instead presenting 
our sensory understanding of the world as an innate and effortless 
ability which he admires:
J’admire à la vérité cette faculté, et cette puissance que nous avons 
naturellement de penser, de voir, de sentir, ou de connoitre tout ce 
que nous faisons, tout ce qui se présente à nous, à nos sens, et à notre 
entendement.105
I truly admire that faculty and power which we naturally have to think, to 
see, to feel, or to know everything we are doing, everything that appears 
to us, to our senses, and to our understanding.
Condillac in the following passage from the Traité des sensations of 1754 
does not exhort or admire, he states. He sees all our mental operations 
and emotions as deriving at root from the same thing—sensation. Here 
the reader may notice a certain analogy with the way in which matter 
was described in the earlier part of this chapter: the model of the base 
103  Spinoza, Traité de la réforme de l’entendement, §99.
104  Spinoza, Traité de la réforme de l’entendement, §103.
105  Meslier, Mémoire des pensées et sentiments de Jean Meslier, in Œuvres complètes, ed. by 
Desné, vol. 2, p. 399.
 103Material World and Embodied Mind
material from which everything is made but which undergoes infinite 
transformations is the same:
Le jugement, la réflexion, les desirs, les passions, etc., ne sont que la 
sensation même qui se transforme différemment.106
Judgement, reflection, desires, passions, etc., are nothing other than 
sensation itself, differently transformed.
Diderot’s own Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature, published the 
same year as Condillac’s Traité, and in which he draws on the Pascalian 
tradition of the ‘pensée’ to produce neatly-shaped maxims, pronounces 
on this subject as follows:
Nous avons trois moyens principaux; l’observation de la Nature, la 
réflexion et l’expérience. L’observation recueille les faits, la réflexion les 
combine, l’expérience vérifie le résultat de la combinaison.107
We have three principal means; the observation of nature, reflection 
and experience. Observation gathers facts, reflection combines them, 
experience verifies the result of their combination. 
Logically, therefore, these empiricist thinkers—including here Spinoza, 
Fontenelle, Buffon and Bonnet—wish to avoid any abstract points or 
examples that are not based in nature. Spinoza sees abstraction as being 
liable to induce error:
Il faut ajouter que cette sorte d’erreur provient de ce que l’on conçoit les 
choses d’une façon trop abstraite.108
We should add that this sort of mistake arises from conceptualising 
things in too abstract a manner.
Fontenelle explains why mathematical thinking does not work when 
thinking about nature. He does not criticise mathematical thinking in 
itself; it is simply a mismatch, in that the information available about the 
physical world is incomplete and therefore liable to error. He writes in 
his ‘Loi de la pensée’ [Law of thought]:
106  Condillac, Traité des sensations, p. 11.
107  Diderot, Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature, DPV, vol. 9, p. 293 (‘Pensée’ 15). 
108  Spinoza, Traité de la réforme de l’entendement, §75.
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Comme je vois l’être mathématique entier, nulle idée ne lui peut être 
contraire; car je le vois par-tout de la même manière, toujours par une 
idée simple.
Mais comme je ne ne vois pas entier l’être physique de l’homme, je 
puis appliquer à la partie inconnue de cet être physique une idée prise 
ailleurs, et qui lui sera contraire. […]
Ainsi je ne puis concevoir les choses autrement qu’elles ne sont, que 
lorsqu’une partie de leur être m’est inconnue. Si je connoissois le tout, j’y 
verrais nécessité absolue d’être ainsi………109
A complete mathematical being, as I see it, can have no idea contrary to 
it, for I see it in the same way from all points, always via a simple idea. 
But as I cannot see the physical being of a human in their entirety, I might 
apply to the unknown part of this physical being an idea taken from 
elsewhere, and which will be contrary to it. […]
Thus I am only able to conceive of things as other than they are when a 
part of their being is unknown to me. If I knew them in their entirety, I 
would see the absolute necessity of their being as they are.
Meslier wages war on abstraction, and makes a conceptually important 
point when he rejects the idea of talking about matter in an unembodied 
form:
De même manière que quoique la santé, et la maladie ne soient que des 
modifications de la matière, ce ne seroit cepandant point proprement la 
matiere qui se porteroit bien, ni qui seroit malade.110
Similarly, although health and illness are nothing other than modifications 
of matter, it would still not be at all right to say that it was the matter that 
was well or ill.
It is not matter that is healthy or ill; it is an animal or a human that is.111
Nor is Meslier’s attack on abstraction itself abstract; it is specifically 
targeted at Cartesians and/or geometers. To what extent these two 
terms are interchangeable is not clear, but usage suggests that the earlier 
109  Fontenelle, ‘Loi de la pensée’, in ‘Fragments d’un traité de la raison humaine’, in 
Œuvres complètes, ed. by Alain Niderst (Paris: Fayard, 1996), vol. 7, pp. 475–98, p. 
494. 
110  Meslier, Mémoire des pensées et sentiments de Jean Meslier, in Œuvres complètes, ed. by 
Desné, vol. 3, p. 90.
111  This is a similar sort of idea to what we saw Meslier expressing in the Anti-Fénelon 
about it not being matter that thinks, but a person, etc. (see above).
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texts tend to talk about Cartesians when making this anti-abstraction 
argument, whereas the later ones attack geometers instead. Meslier is in 
the earlier camp, and his philippic is typically vitriolic. The difficulty is 
in deciding which particular iteration of his abuse is most pertinent, and 
in working out where to cut it:
Donc il est ridicule à nos cartésiens de pretendre que nos pensées, que nos 
raisonnemens, que nos connoissances, que nos desirs, que nos volontés, 
et que les sentimens que nous avons de plaisir, ou de douleur, d’amour 
ou de haine, de joye et de tristesse… etc., ne soient pas des modifications 
de la matiere sous pretexte que ces sortes de modifications de notre âme 
ne sont point étendües en longueur, en largeur, et en profondeur, et sous 
prétexte qu’elles ne sont ni rondes, ni carrées, et qu’elles ne peuvent 
(être) divisées ou coupées en pieces et en morceaux.112
It is therefore ridiculous of our Cartesians to claim that our thoughts, 
arguments, knowledge, desires, will, or the feelings that we have 
of pleasure, pain, love or hatred, of joy or sadness… etc., cannot be 
modifications of matter, on the pretext that these sorts of modifications 
of our soul do not stretch out lengthways, widthways, or have any depth, 
and on the pretext that they are not round or square and that they cannot 
be cut up into little bits and pieces.
His particular angle (although perhaps that geometrical metaphor is 
not one he would have chosen himself) is that Cartesians only conceive 
of material embodiment in bluntly physical, measurable terms, and that 
their view that our soul—which Meslier here equates with our thoughts, 
our reasoning, our knowledge, our desire, our impulses, and feelings 
of pleasure, pain, love, hatred, joy and sadness—cannot be material 
because none of these thoughts or feelings is physically locatable, is 
ridiculously reductive of what matter is. (Interestingly, as a critique of 
those who are supposed to wish to account for emotion and experience 
in measurable and even algebraic terms, it is almost identical to what 
Henri Bergson will later argue in his Données immédiates de la conscience 
of 1889.)
La Mettrie is a spiritual son of Meslier, in his energetic tirades at least: 
in his Traité de l’âme (1745) he lambasts geometers and their inability 
112  Meslier, Mémoire des pensées et sentiments de Jean Meslier, in Œuvres complètes, ed. 
by Desné, vol. 3, p. 33. Spinoza refers to fictions such as having an ‘âme carrée’ [a 
square soul] (Traité sur la réforme de l’entendement, p. 58).
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to work outside their ‘petite sphère’, giving a fairly comprehensive 
list of the things he considers them incapable of: physics, astronomy, 
metaphysics, ethics, physiology, and literature.113
Buffon, whose style is normally so different from both Meslier and 
La Mettrie, is as opposed to the notion of geometry and abstraction in 
the study of nature as they are, and nearly as hyperbolic:
Toutes ces abstractions sont des échafaudages pour soûtenir notre 
jugement, et combien n’avons-nous pas brodé sur ce petit nombre de 
définitions qu’emploie la Géométrie ! nous avons appellé simple tout ce 
qui se réduit à ces définitions, et nous appellons composé tout ce qui ne 
peut s’y réduire aisément, […] toutes ces figures géométriques n’existent 
que dans notre imagination, […] Dans la Nature au contraire, l’abstrait 
n’existe point, rien n’est simple et tout est composé […]114
All these abstractions are scaffolding we use to support our judgement. 
How many times have we embroidered on the very few definitions that 
Geometry uses! We called simple everything that could be reduced 
to these definitions, and composed everything which cannot easily 
be reduced to them, […] all those geometric figures exist only in our 
imagination, […] In nature on the contrary, there is no abstract, nothing 
is simple and everything is composed.
Buffon’s critique posits that the conceptual model geometry gives us 
of ‘simple’ and ‘complex’, that is a few ‘simple’ definitions built up 
into complex structures (‘échafaudages’) is purely abstract, and a sort 
of fiction that exists in our imagination, while in nature, there is no 
abstract, and there is no simple: everything is complex. 
Diderot has his own pithy ways of expressing his opposition to 
abstraction. We meet them throughout his œuvre. In the early Pensées 
philosophiques (1746) we find:
Toutes les billevesées de la métaphysique ne valent pas un argument ad 
hominem.115
113  La Mettrie, Traité de l’âme, p. 199.
114  Buffon, Histoire des animaux in Histoire naturelle, vol. 2 [1749], in Œuvres, p. 145.
115  Diderot, Pensées philosophiques, ed. by Michel Delon, in Œuvres philosophiques, ed. by 
Michel Delon and Barbara de Negroni (Paris: Gallimard, 2010), p. 8 (‘Pensée’ 17), 
and also Denis Diderot, Pensées philosophiques, Additions aux pensées, ed. by Jean-
Claude Bourdin (Paris: GF Flammarion, 2007), p. 8 (‘Pensée’ 17).
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All the nonsense of metaphysics is not worth a single ad hominem 
argument.
We meet it again in less condensed form in the Pensées sur l’interprétation 
de la nature (1753):
On en a conclu que c’était à la philosophie expérimentale à rectifier 
les calculs de la géométrie, et cette conséquence a été avouée même 
par les géomètres. Mais à quoi bon corriger le calcul géométrique par 
l’expérience? N’est-il pas plus court de s’en tenir au résultat de celle-ci?116
It was concluded that it was the job of experimental philosophy to correct 
the calculations of geometry, and this consequence has been accepted by 
the geometers themselves. But what is the point of correcting geometric 
calculation by experience and experiment? Isn’t it quicker just to use the 
results of the latter?
He rejects any equation (le mot juste) of geometry and ‘experimental 
philosophy’, that is, the study of nature, asserting that there is no need 
to correct mathematical calculation with an experiment: he recommends 
instead simply leaving the calculations aside, and sticking with the 
results of the experiment. This would constitute knowledge and 
information about the works of nature, that is to say, the truth, where a 
calculation cannot, because it’s an abstraction. 
In the Principes philosophiques sur la matière et du mouvement of 1770 he 
returns to the same theme, interestingly (for the editor of the Encyclopédie) 
rejecting the sort of thinking which seems to want to be rigorous by 
relying on uniform definitions. Diderot rejects the uniformity:
Il ne faut jamais dire, quand on est physicien, le corps comme corps; car ce 
n’est plus faire de la physique, c’est faire des abstractions qui ne mènent 
à rien.117
As a natural philosopher, one should never say the body as body, because 
that means stopping doing natural philosophy, and instead creating 
abstractions which lead nowhere.
116  Diderot, Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature, DPV, vol. 9, p. 286 (‘Pensée’ 2).
117  Diderot, Principes philosophiques sur la matière et le mouvement, ed. by Barbara de 
Negroni in Œuvres philosophiques, ed. by Michel Delon and Barbara de Negroni 
(Paris: Gallimard, 2010), p. 449.
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As we have seen, all these writers have reservations about the usefulness 
of geometrical abstraction, and some of them reject it outright. They 
want empirical evidence and specific case studies, and interestingly, 
there is a corpus of examples which they recycle. Condillac and La 
Mettrie write about the English boy born blind, whose cataracts were 
removed by William Cheselden, the man born deaf from Chartres, and 
the child brought up by bears in Lithuania; Buffon also writes about the 
bear child. Diderot of course also engages with this material particularly 
fully in his Lettre sur les aveugles (1749) and Lettre sur les sourds et muets 
(1751), while the anecdote about the child growing up with bears 
features in the Éléments de physiologie.118
ii. Sensory-Deprivation Fictions
Surprisingly perhaps, given that empiricism has an avowed status 
approaching a dogma amongst these writers, they often resort to fictions, 
specifically imaginary stories of sensory deprivation. Perhaps, however, 
we ought not to be surprised: insofar as there is a rather limited number 
of known cases, all of which are multiply recycled, it is likely that these 
Lockean writers will wish to find other ways of testing or investigating 
or simply communicating their hypotheses. A ‘fiction’ was indeed often 
the only way to test out the sort of hypothesis we would now blithely 
call ‘scientific’ in an era when other forms of testing were simply not 
possible for lack of technical capability, if for no other reason. By ‘fiction’, 
therefore, we mean following through a given idea in the imagination 
rather than in reality.119 La Mettrie, freely adapting the early Christian 
apologist Arnobius’s ‘belle conjecture’ [beautiful conjecture]—one of 
the ‘plus beaux morceaux de l’Antiquité’ [the most exquisite pieces of 
Antiquity], he says—imagines a baby kept underground in complete 
sensory deprivation and without human contact until adulthood in the 
118  See above, for the references to these recycled cases. See also Caroline Warman, 
‘Comment écrire le vécu? Diderot et le problème matérialiste de l’abstraction’, in 
Matérialisme(s) en France au XVIIIe siècle. Entre littérature et philosophie, ed. by Adrien 
Paschoud and Barbara Selmeci Castioni (Berlin: Frank and Timme, 2019), pp. 
103–13.
119  See Richard Scholar and Alexis Tadié, eds, Fiction and the Frontiers of Knowledge in Europe, 
1500–1800 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315582276.
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Traité de l’âme (La Mettrie’s fictions and examples are often cruel).120 
Buffon imagines a fully-grown man emerging into consciousness, asking
Si cet homme vouloit nous faire l’histoire de ses premières pensées, 
qu’auroit-il à nous dire ? quelle seroit cette histoire ? Je ne puis me 
dispenser de le faire parler lui-même, afin d’en rendre les faits plus 
sensibles : ce récit philosophique qui sera court, ne sera pas une 
digression inutile.121
If this man were to want to tell us the story of his first thoughts, what 
would he say? What would this story be? I cannot allow myself not to 
make him speak for himself, so that the facts make a greater impression: 
this philosophical tale will not take long, and will not be a pointless 
digression.
What follows is Buffon’s fictional first-person narrative of this suddenly-
awoken man’s experience: ‘je ne savais ce que j’étais, où j’étais, d’où 
je venais’ [I did not know what I was, where I was, or where I came 
from], he says (might the famous opening of Diderot’s Jacques le fataliste 
be echoing these words?).122 Buffon’s man gushes his amazement 
over several pages (‘je tombais de surprise en surprise’ [I tumbled 
from one surprise to the next])123 as he coherently and implausibly 
recounts his sensations and experiences in sequence. Condillac’s Traité 
des sensations (1753) famously follows through the fiction of a marble 
statue first being endowed with sight, then all the other senses in turn 
(interestingly, he was accused of plagiarising Buffon, while Condillac 
120  La Mettrie, Traité de l’âme, pp. 241–42; See L’Homme-machine, in Œuvres philosophiques, 
vol. 1, pp. 99–100 where La Mettrie lists examples of organs continuing to work after 
death, mixing instructions about how to conduct the experiments with anecdotes 
about a drunken soldier beheading a rooster and suggestions about dissecting 
executed criminals, or p. 113, where he describes the flexible state of an amniotic 
sac immediately before birth, adding that this was a phenomenon ‘que j’ai eu le 
plaisir d’observer dans une femme, morte un moment avant l’Accouchement’ [that 
I had the pleasure of observing in a woman who had died a moment before giving 
birth], or in the Traité de l’âme, p. 240, where La Mettrie boastfully recalls the honour 
the Maréchal de Saxe did him in providing details about a girl who ate her sister.
121  Buffon, ‘Des sens en général’, in Histoire naturelle, vol. 3 [1749], in Œuvres, pp. 
302–06 (p. 302).
122  Buffon, ‘Des sens en général’, p. 302.
123  Buffon, ‘Des sens en général’, p. 304.
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himself rebuts accusations of having plagiarised Diderot’s Lettre sur les 
sourds et muets).124
In his Essai analytique sur les facultés de l’âme, which he did not publish 
until 1760, Bonnet claims to have been working on a very similar fiction 
when Condillac’s Traité was published, and hence felt unable to publish 
his own version, despite his reservations at Condillac’s approach. As we 
see, his starting point is relatively close both to Buffon (the adult using 
his senses for the first time) and to Condillac (because he is also using a 
statue that comes to life):
Recourons donc à une fiction: elle ne sera pas la Nature; mais elle aura 
son fondement dans la Nature. […] Imaginons un Homme dont tous les 
Sens sont en bon état, mais qui n’a point encore commencé à en faire 
usage.125
Let’s have recourse to a fiction: it won’t be nature, but it will have its basis 
in nature. […] Let’s imagine a man whose senses are all in good shape, 
but who has never yet started to use them. 
Let’s imagine a man whose senses are all in good working order, but 
who hasn’t yet started to use them. Let’s! These fictions are all variously 
implausible, and also surprisingly unempirical and unphysiological, 
given that the various case studies of the lifting of sensory deprivation 
which these writers all allude to show that people have to learn to use 
their senses.126
The contrast between the recommended empirical approach and 
actual practice seems to be most extreme in the case of Condillac and his 
124  Buffon, Œuvres, p. 1465, n. 15; Condillac, ‘Réponse à un reproche qui m’a été fait sur 
le projet exécuté dans le Traité des sensations’, Traité des sensations, pp. 277–81.
125  Condillac, ‘Avis important au lecteur’, Traité des sensations, p. 9.
126  Rousseau rather entertainingly parodies this particular trope when he has the 
Savoyard vicar turn the argument back against materialist thinkers: ‘Supposons un 
sourd qui nie l’existence des sons, parce qu’ils n’ont jamais frappé son oreille. […] 
Plus je réfléchis sur la pensée et sur la nature de l’esprit humain, plus je trouve que 
le raisonnement des matérialistes ressemble à celui de ce sourd’ [Let us suppose a 
deaf man who denies the existence of sounds because they have never struck his ear. 
[…] The more I reflect on thought and on the nature of the human mind, the more 
I find that the reasoning of materialists resembles that of this deaf man] (Émile, 
in Œuvres complètes, vol. 4, p. 585; Emile, trans. by Bloom, p. 279-80). Although 
Rousseau’s analogy wittily turns materialists into deaf people, it perhaps gives the 
materialist standpoint more room for manoeuvre than may first appear, in that the 
cognitive model of sensory perception is still the referent: faith is like an extra sense, 
it’s not extra-sensory.
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statue. His discussion of the human mind is not rooted in any remotely 
physiologically plausible terms:
J’avertis donc qu’il est très-important de se mettre exactement à la place 
de la statue que nous allons observer. Il faut commencer d’exister avec 
elle, n’avoir qu’un seul sens, quand elle n’en a qu’un […]: en un mot, il 
faut n’être que ce qu’elle est.127
I point out therefore that it is very important to put yourself in the exact 
position of the statue that we are going to be observing. We must start 
existing with her, have only one sense when she only has one […]: in a 
word, we must be nothing other than what she is.
He orders us as readers to put ourselves exactly in the position of the 
thing we are observing, and to experience its staged and incremental 
perception with it, while remaining ourselves; we have finally to be 
nothing but it, while simultaneously being the aware readers he wants to 
persuade. Then there is the fact that this newly-sensorily aware being is 
made of marble (‘l’extérieur tout de marbre’ [exterior all of marble]):128 
which not even the most diehard materialist (which Condillac himself is 
very far from being) would ever attempt to argue possessed the ability 
to feel.
Diderot will unpick these sorts of inconsistencies in various ways. 
The first part of Le Rêve de d’Alembert (written 1769), stages a discussion 
between two philosophers: Diderot himself, and his Encyclopédie 
co-editor, the mathematician d’Alembert. Diderot talks d’Alembert 
through the steps by which a marble statue can become human and 
acquire sensation: first it must be ground into powder, then added to 
earth in which food is grown, then become absorbed into the growing 
plant, and then eaten by the man, finally being absorbed into his 
flesh and acquiring the ability to feel. This is a hypothesis which is 
plausible within nature, unlike Condillac’s version. In his Réfutation 
suivie de l’ouvrage d’Helvétius intitulé ‘De L’homme’, written in 1773–74, 
that is after the Rêve de d’Alembert, and, along with the Observations 
sur Hemsterhuis, an important staging post between the Rêve and 
the Éléments de physiologie, we see Diderot being sharper with the 
woolly thinking that underpins this frequently-recycled trope. The 
127  Condillac, Traité des sensations, p. 9. 
128  Condillac, Traité des sensations, p. 11.
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supposition Diderot is responding to sets forth a statue-man. This is 
what Helvétius had written:
Supposons un homme absolument insensible. Mais il serait, dira-t-on, 
sans idées, par conséquence une pure statue. Soit. Admettons cependant 
qu’il pût exister et même penser […]. 129
Let us suppose a completely unfeeling man. But he would be, it is said, 
without ideas, and by consequence a pure statue. Fine. But let us accept 
nonetheless that he could exist and even think.
Diderot reacts as follows, and we see him reply not only to Helvétius but 
also to Condillac, although his name is not mentioned.
‘Vous supposez un homme impassible.’ Mais un homme impassible à votre 
manière est un bloc de marbre… Vous demandez que ce bloc de marbre 
pense et ne sente pas  ; ce sont deux absurdités  : un bloc de marbre ne 
saurait penser, et il ne saurait non plus penser sans sentir, que sentir sans 
penser.130
‘You suppose a man without sensation.’ But your sort of man without 
sensation is a block of marble… You want the block of marble to think 
and not feel; that is absurd twice over: a block of marble is unable to 
think, and it would be as unable to think without feeling as it would be 
to feel without thinking.
For Diderot, this sort of fiction is an absurdity. Of course, as we know, in 
his own overtly fictional work, that is to say in novels like La Religieuse 
or Jacques le fataliste, he always draws attention to the ways in which 
fiction tests or stretches the truth. In the Éléments de physiologie, he never 
deploys a fictional hypothesis of the statue sort, always using instead a 
case study or anecdote rooted (or supposedly rooted) in nature and/
or lived experience to make or interrogate a particular point. The eagle-
eyed reader will have noted the qualification here: his cases are rooted 
or at least supposedly rooted in nature or experience. 
Part of what makes Diderot into such an extraordinary writer is that 
he can always work on (at least) two levels: firstly, working through 
the implications and ramifications of a given case or model with 
forensic consistency, while also dialoguing with or even parodying all 
129  Helvétius, in Diderot, Réfutation d’Helvétius, DPV, vol. 24, p. 533. 
130  Diderot, Réfutation d’Helvétius, DPV, vol. 24, p. 533.
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those who have written on similar areas or cases before.131 We will see 
an interesting example of this in the next section. In this part we have 
been looking initially at how the philosophers of this extended period 
repeatedly claimed that knowledge derives exclusively from sensory 
perception, then at the case studies they used and recycled, and at the 
philosophical fictions they also used and recycled, while continuing to 
seek acceptance for their views. We have also seen how Diderot pointed 
out and rejected the artificiality of these fictions, insisting on using 
empirical information, however initially inexplicable. 
In the next section, we will move on to look at how these writers 
understood what happened next in the cognitive sequence: we have five 
senses, give or take one or two, and they give us ideas. How does that 
work? Can we think of more than one thing at a time? Can we do more 
than one thing at a time?
g. Multi-Tasking and Levels of Awareness: Thinking 
and Walking
It is possible to focus on only one idea at any given time, wrote Pascal and La 
Mettrie. Ideas flow one from another in a natural sequence: they are born from 
one another, write Crousaz and La Mettrie. However, our brains may operate 
on two levels at once, a conscious and an unconscious one, writes Fontenelle. 
The particular fiction deployed here is of a person walking without realising 
what he is doing (this person is never a woman). In Spinoza’s version and 
in Fontenelle’s, he is sleepwalking; in Leibniz’s, he is not paying attention; in 
Condillac’s, he walks right across Paris. In Diderot, he gains a philosophical 
identity, walks, thinks, forgets, and never trips over.
Pascal formulates the notion that we can only think about one thing at a 
time with typical forthright certainty and brevity (and we looked at this 
in the previous chapter): 
131  For a brilliant investigation of this doubleness, see Tunstall’s study of the Lettre sur 
les aveugles, in Blindness and Enlightenment.
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Une seule pensée nous occupe. Nous ne pouvons penser à deux choses 
à la fois.132 
A single thought occupies us. We cannot think of two things at the same 
time.
La Mettrie says the same thing in his Traité de l’âme, and his use of the 
word ‘âme’, looking slightly dissonant in this context, shows us that he 
(provocatively) means it to be understood as mind. 
l’Ame ne peut avoir qu’une seule idée distincte à la fois.133
The soul can only have one distinct idea at once.
We encounter this view again—closest to its Pascalian formulation—in 
the Éléments: 
Nous ne pouvons être qu’à une seule chose à la fois.134
We can only be focused on one thing at a time.
But if we can only think of one thing at a time, one thought gives rise 
to another, in a sort of naturally logical sequence: as La Mettrie puts it, 
quoting Crousaz almost verbatim:
Toutes les pensées, comme l’observe judicieusement Crousaz, naissent les 
unes des autres; la pensée, (ou plutôt l’Âme dont la pensée n’est qu’un 
accident,) se varie et passe par différens états; et suivant la variété de ses états et 
de ses manières d’être, ou de penser, elle parvient à la connoissance, tantôt d’une 
chose, tantôt d’une autre. Elle se sent elle-même, elle est à elle-même son objet 
immédiat; et en se sentant ainsi, elle se représente des choses différentes de soi.135
All thoughts, as Crousaz judiciously observes, are born from one another; 
thought (or rather the soul, of which thought is a mere accident) varies 
and passes through different states; and according to the variety of its states and 
ways of being or thinking, it arrives at knowledge, sometimes of one thing and 
sometimes of another. It can feel itself, it is its own immediate object; and being 
132  Blaise Pascal, Les Provinciales, Pensées, et Opuscules divers, ed. by Gérard Ferreyrolles 
and Philippe Sellier (Paris: Livre de Poche ‘La Pochothèque’, 2004), p. 1081 (S§453). 
Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans. by Roger Ariew (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2005), p. 
142. Quoted above.
133  La Mettrie, Traité de l’âme, p. 186.
134  DPV 468/PQ 294/MT 283.
135  La Mettrie, Traité de l’âme, p. 217; Crousaz, La Logique (1718), vol. 2, p. 416.
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able to feel itself in this way, it is able to represent things to itself that are not the 
same as itself.
Crousaz’s formulation seems to have been a successful one: Diderot not 
only uses it in the Éléments, but also approves it explicitly:
Toutes les pensées naissent les unes des autres; cela me semble évident.136
All thoughts are born from one other; this seems obvious to me.
However, if one thought is considered as following on from the previous 
one in a temporal sequence, there can be multiple levels of simultaneous 
perception, not all of which are actually clearly perceived by us. These 
perceptions can be followed by decision and action which again are not 
always conscious. These thinkers are trying to work out how instinct 
relates to reason and to come up with models that account for different 
levels of consciousness. Spinoza sets out the problems: they relate in 
part to our faulty knowledge of bodily functions, in part to questions 
of divergent behaviour when conscious or unconscious and to related 
issues of transgression, and in part to the abilities and independence 
of the body as separate from the mind. Here he evokes the issue of the 
sleepwalker:
For no one has yet come to know the structure of the body so accurately 
that he could explain all its functions—not to mention that many things 
are observed in the lower animals which far surpass human ingenuity, 
and that sleepwalkers do a great many things in their sleep which they 
would not dare to do awake. This shows well enough that the body itself, 
simply from the laws of its own nature, can do many things which its 
mind wonders at.137
Leibniz is fully engaged with these questions. In his Nouveaux essais sur 
l’entendement humain he describes the ‘infinity of perceptions within us’ 
that we do not notice but which all together have an effect, and of which 
we are aware, at least in a nebulous way:
136  DPV 335/PQ 153/MT 156. François Pépin analyses the Leibnizian context to this 
sentence in his article: ‘Diderot et Leibniz Face à la chimie du vivant’, in Leibniz et 
Diderot: rencontres et transformations, ed. by Christian Leduc, François Pépin, Anne-
Lise Rey, and Mitia Rioux-Beaulne (Paris: Vrin, 2015), pp. 211–35 (p. 222), https://
doi.org/10.4000/books.pum.2153. 
137  Spinoza, Ethics, p. 72.
116 The Atheist’s Bible
[…] il y a mille marques, qui font juger qu’il y a à tout moment une infinité 
de perceptions en nous, mais sans Apperception et sans Reflexion, c’est à 
dire des changements dans l’Ame même, dont nous ne nous appercevons 
pas, parce que ces impressions sont où trop petites & en trop grand 
nombre, ou trop unies, en sorte qu’elles n’ont rien d’assez distinguant à 
part, mais jointes à d’autres, elles ne laissent pas de faire leur effet, & de 
se faire sentir dans l’assemblage, au moins confusément.138
There are a thousand signs that lead us to judge that at any moment 
there are an infinity of perceptions within us taking place without 
apperception or reflection, that is to say changes in the soul itself which 
we do not perceive because these impressions are either too tiny or 
too numerous or too clumped together, such that there is nothing to 
distinguish them separately. However, once joined up to others, they do 
not fail to have their effect and make themselves felt in the assemblage, at 
least in some confused way.
These petites perceptions are what create our tastes and understanding of 
the world, link us to the world around us.
Ces petites perceptions sont donc de plus grande efficace qu’on ne 
pense. Ce sont elles, qui forment ce je ne say quoy, ces gouts, ces images 
des qualités des sens, claires dans l’assemblage, mais confuses dans les 
parties; ces impressions que les corps, qui nous environnent, font sur 
nous & qui enveloppent l’infini; cette liaison que chaque être a avec tout 
le reste de l’univers.139
These tiny perceptions are much more effective that one might think. 
It is they who form that je-ne-sais-quoi, those tastes, and those images 
produced by the qualities of the senses, which are clear when they are 
put together but confused in their constituent parts; those impressions 
which the bodies which surround us make on us and which envelop the 
infinite; that link which every being has with all the rest of the universe.
138  Leibniz, Essais sur l’entendement humain, pp. 8–9.
139  Leibniz, Essais sur l’entendement humain, p. 10. See Richard Scholar, The Je-Ne-Sais-Quoi 
in Early Modern Europe: Encounters with a Certain Something (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199274406.001.0001 for a helpful 
discussion of this particular passage, pp. 169–71. With thanks to Richard Scholar for 
supplying this reference when Covid-19 restrictions prevented me from consulting his 
book myself. I have also (mostly) used his translation of this passage, which I am happy 
to record was better than my own!
 117Material World and Embodied Mind
And they are at work all the time, affecting us in determining our 
seemingly random decisions in the most concrete form. For Leibniz, 
they are not random in the slightest:
(…) ce sont ces petites perceptions qui nous déterminent en bien de 
rencontres sans qu’on y pense, & qui trompent le vulgaire par l’apparence 
d’une indifference d’equilibre, comme si nous étions indifférens de tourner 
par exemple à droite ou à gauche.140
It is these tiny perceptions which determine our actions in many 
encounters without us thinking about it, and which deceive the 
uneducated by making it seem as if we were paying no attention or were 
indifferent to our balance, as if, for example, we were indifferent as to 
whether we turned right or left.
Along with the reference to the sleepwalker which Spinoza uses, 
Leibniz’s particular scenario of someone walking along without 
seeming to use his rational mind to direct him will appear repeatedly 
in interesting variations: Diderot uses it at least three times, as we will 
see. Fontenelle’s ‘Fragment on the instinct’, possibly circulating before 
its first publication in 1757–58, has moved the scenario away from pure 
sleepwalking: in his version, a man is walking along in a reverie:
Je suppose un homme qui rêve en marchant, et rencontre en son chemin 
un pieu dont l’image se peint dans son oeil, mais dont il ne se détourne 
point, parce qu’il n’y fait point attention.141
Suppose a man who is day-dreaming as he walks along and who 
encounters a post on his path, the image of which is depicted in his eye, 
but which does not cause him to swerve because he’s not paying it any 
attention. 
Fontenelle discusses at length whether the man does or does not see the 
post, and whether his ability to see it or not is dependent on whether 
he is thinking about the post or not. Fontenelle does not resolve his 
story, and we never find out whether the man did or did not step round 
the post, although it is established that he could have done. Fontenelle 
concludes that ‘Le cerveau de cet homme supposé est en même temps 
140  Leibniz, Essais sur l’entendement humain, pp. 10–11.
141  Fontenelle, ‘Sur l’instinct’, in ‘Fragments d’un traité de la raison humaine’, in Œuvres 
complètes, ed. by Alain Niderst (Paris: Fayard, 1996), vol. 7, pp. 475–98 (p. 470).
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dans deux états’ [the brain of the man we are imagining is in two states at 
once].142 Condillac uses the same example in much extended form in the 
Essai, and he is clearly working with Leibniz’s model of the unperceived 
perceptions, and for him, there is no debate about whether the walking 
man will avoid the post—now he is in a named place, Paris: not only 
will the post not trip him up, but he will seamlessly avoid all obstacles:
L’imagination produit même souvent en nous des effets qui paraîtraient 
devoir appartenir à la réflexion la plus présente. Quoique fort occupés 
d’une idée, les objets qui nous environnent continuent d’agir sur nos sens 
: les perceptions qu’ils occasionnent en réveillent d’autres auxquelles 
elles sont liées, et celles-ci déterminent certains mouvements dans notre 
corps. Si toutes ces choses nous affectent moins vivement que l’idée qui 
nous occupe, elles ne peuvent nous en distraire, et par là il arrive que, sans 
réfléchir sur ce que nous faisons, nous agissons de la même manière que 
si notre conduite était raisonnée : il n’y a personne qui ne l’ait éprouvé. 
Un homme traverse Paris et évite tous les embarras avec les mêmes 
précautions que s’il ne pensait qu’à ce qu’il fait : cependant il est assuré 
qu’il était occupé de toute autre chose. Bien plus, il arrive même souvent 
que, quoique notre esprit ne soit point à ce qu’on nous demande, nous y 
répondons exactement; c’est que les mots qui expriment la question sont 
liés à ceux qui forment la réponse, et que les derniers déterminent les 
mouvements propres à les articuler. La liaison des idées est le principe 
de tous ces phénomènes.143
Imagination surprisingly often produces effects in us which would seem 
to necessarily result from the most immediate reflection. Even when we 
are completely occupied with an idea we’re having, the objects which 
surround us continue to act on our senses: the perceptions which they 
occasion trigger other connected ones, which in turn determine certain 
movements in our body. If all these things affect us less vigorously than 
the idea occupying us, they do not distract us from it, and so it can happen 
that, without thinking about what we’re doing, we continue doing it as 
if our conduct were rationally decided upon: there’s no one who hasn’t 
experienced this. A man walks across Paris and avoids every obstacle 
with as much care as if he were thinking about it, and yet it is certain 
that he was thinking about something completely different. Moreover, 
it surprisingly often happens that, although our mind is not focused on 
142  Fontenelle, ‘Sur l’instinct’, p. 472.
143  Condillac, Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines, ed. by Pariente and 
Pécharman, p. 103 (I.II. §. 42). He goes on to account for this phenomenon with 
instinct, which he discredits elsewhere, as we know.
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what we are being asked, we answer correctly; the reason being that the 
words used to formulate the question are connected to those that provide 
the reply, and that the latter trigger the right movements to articulate 
it. The way ideas are linked up is the principle underpinning all these 
phenomena. 
This clearly-explained extract is worth giving in full for the link it 
provides between Leibniz’s discussion of unperceived but determining 
perceptions, Fontenelle’s example of the man who successfully walks 
along while thinking about something else, and Diderot’s subsequent 
elaborations of these themes. Links themselves also become the focus 
in Condillac’s conclusion when he declares that the ‘liaison’ or linking 
of ideas is behind all these phenomena. Here the notion of the natural 
logical sequencing of ideas that we were looking at earlier reappears. 
For Condillac, however, the phenomena he is describing here are part 
of instinct, and instinct is still subordinate to reason. Diderot will be 
continuously interested in instinct throughout his works for the direct 
access it gives to the laws of nature. In this ‘pensée’ he explicitly subverts 
the hierarchy of reason over nature:
L’instinct va sans cesse regardant, goûtant, touchant, écoutant; et il y 
aurait peut-être plus de physique expérimentale à apprendre en étudiant 
les animaux qu’en suivant les cours d’un professeur.144
Instinct moves along constantly watching, tasting, feeling, listening, and 
there may be more experimental natural philosophy to be learnt from 
studying animals than from attending the lessons of a professor. 
In fact, Diderot rarely uses the term ‘reason’ (there is no chapter on 
reason in the Éléments, as we mentioned earlier): he prefers to talk about 
the will (‘la volonté’) whose conscious exercise he also considers to be 
much exaggerated. In the Rêve, Diderot re-uses the scenario of the man 
acting without consciously willing his actions to turn it into a full portrait 
of d’Alembert himself, as drawn rather aggressively by his interlocutor, 
the fictionalised Montpellier vitalist Bordeu, who rounds on d’Alembert 
when he asks whether Bordeu really does believe that free will is nothing 
more than the life-long cumulative result of continual small movements 
of desire and aversion:
144  Diderot, Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature, DPV, vol. 9, p. 290 (‘Pensée’ 10).
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Et c’est vous qui me faites cette question! Vous qui livré à des spéculations 
profondes, avez passé les deux tiers de votre vie à rêver les yeux ouverts 
et à agir sans vouloir […].145
Fancy that question coming from you! You who, buried in your abstruse 
speculations, have spent two-thirds of your life dreaming with your eyes 
open and acting quite without volition […]
We meet this scenario again in the Observations sur Hemsterhuis of 1774. 
This time the role of the philosopher (and therefore supreme rationalist) 
is played by Hemsterhuis, and the narrative is a little more elaborate:
Il ne me serait pas difficile de démontrer que Mr Hemsterhuis a passé les 
trois quarts de sa vie sans vouloir.
Il sort de chez lui la tête occupée d’optique ou de métaphysique; sans 
vouloir sortir, il est poussé hors de sa porte par un souvenir; chemin 
faisant, il évite des obstacles, sans y penser; il se rappelle un oubli qui 
le ramène chez lui, il y revient; et il exécute la chose qu’il avait oublié 
de faire, toujours à sa pensée. C’est alors qu’il est bien évidemment un 
automate chassé, détourné, ramené par des causes qui disposent de lui 
aussi impérieusement, qu’un choc dispose d’un corps choqué.
Sa rêverie philosophique cesse, et il ne sait rien ni de ce qu’il a dit, ni de 
ce qu’il a fait.146
It would not be difficult for me to show that Mr Hemsterhuis has spent 
three quarters of his life without exercising his will.
He goes out of his house with his head full of optics or metaphysics; 
without choosing to go out, he is impelled out of his door by a memory; 
as he walks along, he avoids any obstacles without thinking about them; 
he remembers something he had forgotten and so goes back home, 
where he carries out the thing he’d forgotten to do, still preoccupied with 
his thoughts. And in this case he is absolutely obviously an automaton, 
driven out of doors, guided around obstacles, and brought back by 
causes that propel him as imperiously as a collision propels a body that 
has been collided into.
Once his philosophical reverie ceases, he has absolutely no idea of what 
he has been saying or doing.
145  Diderot, Le Rêve de d’Alembert, DPV, vol. 17, p. 185; Denis Diderot, Rameau’s Nephew 
and D’Alembert’s Dream, trans. by Leonard Tancock (London: Penguin, 1966), pp. 
216–17.
146  Diderot, Observations sur La ‘Lettre sur l’homme et ses rapports’ de Hemsterhuis, DPV, 
vol. 24, p. 308.
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We have the single Fontenellian post multiplied into the Condillacian 
multiple obstacles as Hemsterhuis walks out of his house and 
unconsciously makes his way somewhere. The narrative has two novel 
elements—firstly, there is a rather complicated to and fro between 
remembering and forgetting: Hemsterhuis leaves home because he has 
remembered something, and then he comes back again because he has 
forgotten something else. He is doing his remembering and forgetting 
without conscious awareness, ‘toujours à sa pensée’—still immersed in 
his thought about optics or metaphysics: in Diderot’s words, he is an 
automaton, a body simply moving as pushed. Secondly—and still on the 
theme of memory—once he emerges from his ‘rêverie philosophique’ he 
has no memory of what he has said or done. This, for Diderot, appears 
to be tantamount to not having been consciously aware of making any 
decisions: what will be remembered, is what was being consciously 
thought because that is where the attention and the will were.
This scenario appears again in the Éléments, not once but twice, in 
the chapters on the will (III.vi, ‘Volonté’) and on the organs (III.viii, 
‘Des organes’). Diderot separates out the two strands of conscious 
decision-making and instinct, and develops both into fuller narrative 
elaborations.
Histoire expérimentale de [l’homme réel, agissant, occupé et mû]. Je le 
suis et l’examine; c’était un géomètre. […] La rue, où demeure cet ami, 
est embarrassée de pierres, notre géomètre serpente entre ces pierres, il 
s’arrête tout court. Il se rappelle que ses lettres sont restées sur sa table, 
ouvertes, non cachetées […] il revient sur ses pas, il allume sa bougie, il 
cachette ses lettres, il les porte lui-même à la poste; de la poste il regagne 
la maison où il se propose de dîner; il y entre, il s’y trouve au milieu 
d’une société de philosophes ses amis. On parle de la liberté et il soutient 
à cor et à cri que l’homme est libre: je le laisse dire, mais à la chute du 
jour, je le tire en un coin et je lui demande compte de ses actions. Il ne sait 
rien, mais rien de tout ce qu’il a fait; et je vois que machine pure, simple, 
et passive de différents motifs qui l’ont mû, loin d’avoir été libre, il n’a 
pas même produit un seul acte exprès de sa volonté […].147
Experimental story [of a man who is real, acting, occupied, and propelled]. 
I follow him and watch him closely: this man is a mathematician. […] The 
road where this friend lives is cluttered with stones, our mathematician 
147  DPV 485/PQ 315–16/MT 300.
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weaves between them and then stops short. He remembers that his 
letters are still on his table, open, and unsealed […] he goes back home, 
lights his candle, seals his letters, takes them to the post-office himself, 
and from there goes to the house where he means to dine; in he goes 
and finds himself in the midst of a group of philosophers who are his 
friends. Freedom is the topic of discussion, and he makes a great fuss 
about maintaining that man is free. I let him get on with it, but in the 
evening, I pull him aside and ask him to give me an account of what he’s 
been doing. He has absolutely no idea of his actions, and I see that he is 
a pure and simple machine, the passive recipient of the different motives 
which have driven him, and that far from being free, he has not produced 
one single action specifically of his own volition […].
The narrative illustrates the underlying philosophical question much 
more clearly than the others while still retaining certain familiar 
features—the road with the stones, the deep reverie, the forgetting, and 
then—new features, these—the philosophical discussion about free will 
amongst like-minded friends, and the presence of the watching friend 
throughout, who calls him to account. This narrative has been taken 
to be a return to Bordeu’s portrait of d’Alembert, with Diderot as the 
wise observer, and the baron d’Holbach as the friend at whose house 
he was debating philosophy and eating dinner. It is highly plausible 
that Diderot was indeed thinking directly about these particular friends, 
not least because in the Saint-Petersburg manuscript of the Éléments de 
physiologie he specifies the actual road on which d’Holbach lived, rue 
Royale-Saint-Roch.148 However, this is not the only reading: as we have 
seen, one philosopher can be replaced by another, and the narrative has 
a very real existence in prior tellings that do not describe an outing by 
d’Alembert one fine day. And of course, Diderot uses it again—this time 
without d’Alembert—just a few pages later:
Comment se fait-il que nous traversions Paris, à travers toutes sortes 
d’obstacles, profondément occupés d’une idée, par conséquent 
parfaitement distraits sur tout ce qui se rencontre, se passe, nous touche, 
s’oppose à nous, nous environne, sans accidents, sans nous tuer, sans 
blesser les autres? Comment se fait-il que dans les choses de pure 
habitude et de pure sensation nous les fassions d’autant mieux que 
nous y pensons moins? Nous montons parfaitement bien notre escalier, 
148  DPV p. 485, n. 369.
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pendant la nuit, si nous n’y pensons pas. Nous commençons à tatonner 
quand nous y pensons. Le jour, l’esprit occupé, nous le montons, nous le 
descendons comme s’il faisait nuit. Il y a plus: il fait nuit en plein midi, 
dans les rues, pour celui qui pense prondément et nuit profonde. L’œil 
nous mène; nous sommes l’aveugle. L’œil est le chien qui nous conduit 
[…].149
How does it happen that we can walk right across Paris and around all 
sorts of obstacles when we’re profoundly preoccupied by an idea, and 
hence perfectly unaware of everything on our route, everything taking 
place, affecting us, blocking us, surrounding us, and do all this without 
mishap, without getting killed or hurting anyone? How does it happen 
that in the case of things related to pure habit or pure sensation, the less 
we think about them, the better we do them? We can get up our stairs 
perfectly at night-time, as long as we aren’t thinking about what we’re 
doing. The instant we start thinking about it, we start groping our way. 
By day, when our mind is preoccupied, we go up and down them as if 
it were night-time. There’s more: at mid-day it’s night-time and darkest 
night too for someone in the streets who’s deep in thought. Our eyes lead 
us; we are blind. Our eyes are the dog which guides us […].
This is the same scenario, but ‘we’ (the author and his readers, in 
companionable complicity) are now the actors, walking across Paris 
oblivious to everything while never falling over and never knocking 
anyone else over either. For all our conscious awareness of our 
surroundings, it might as well be pitch black. And indeed, we are blind: 
our eye (just the one) leads us; it is a guide dog for the blind. Diderot 
continues to develop this idea: our organs (our senses, our inner organs, 
and even our limbs all count as organs for Diderot) have their own animal 
life and independence (and we will look further at this idea in the next 
chapter). Thus: ‘l’œil est un animal dans un animal, exerçant très bien 
ses fonctions tout seul’ [the eye is an animal within an animal, carrying 
out its functions very well all by itself]:150 over the course of the rest of 
the chapter, Diderot calmly works through the idea of the independence 
of organs, how they have their own tastes and dislikes, illnesses and 
varying states of health. The logical conclusion is inevitably that:
149  DPV 499–500/PQ 336–37/MT 313. Terada signals a further passage which also 
addresses the question of involuntary movement, from Marat’s De l’homme, see 
Éléments, ed. by Terada, p. 496, Source X.
150  DPV 500/PQ 337/MT 314.
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L’homme peut donc être regardé comme un assemblage d’animaux 
[…].151
Man can therefore be regarded as an assemblage of animals […].
This provides the new starting point for Diderot’s consideration of bodily 
and emotional states, along with logical consequences for differing 
ethical positions. It is very thorough-going determinism, and it leaves 
selfhood and identity in a somewhat precarious position. 
h. Selfhood and Memory
If we are only ephemeral body, and not eternal soul or reason, then what are we? 
The body has a self, and that self is coterminous with memory, write Condillac 
and Bonnet. What then is memory? Memory must be some kind of imprint, 
agree Spinoza, Leibniz, La Mettrie, Condillac, Bonnet, and Diderot: or is it? 
asks Bonnet; there are interesting phenomena related to the memory of different 
languages, and to memorising verse, explain Spinoza, La Mettrie and Diderot. 
Diderot considers brain and memory as a self-reading self-writing book.
When Condillac considers the question of the statue’s self, this is what 
he decides:
Son moi n’est que la collection des sensations qu’elle [la statue] éprouve, 
et de celles que la mémoire lui rappelle.152
Her self is nothing other than the collection of sensations which she [the 
statue] feels, and which come to her memory.
Condillac leaves no room for manoeuvre: the self is nothing but the 
combined feelings of the statue, along with those sensations retained by 
the memory. It is a hardline reductive definition, particularly for those 
of us whose memory is faulty. Not all philosophers are willing to be so 
brutal. Bonnet for example cannot quite bring himself to say it, when 
writing about his statue’s ‘personality’:
151  DPV 501/PQ 338/MT 314.
152  Condillac, Traité des sensations, p. 56 (I.vi): there’s an obvious translation problem 
here in gendering or not gendering the statue. Condillac uses the feminine form 
automatically, because statue is a feminine noun, and the female characterisation 
he develops is also supported by the fact that the statue is also of a woman. We 
therefore also follow the feminine.
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Sa personnalité est devenue plus composée; parce que le Moi s’est 
approprié par la Réminiscence un plus grand nombre de sensations. Son 
Essence personnelle a reçu successivement de nouvelles déterminations. 
Je sens que cette proposition exige que je la développe un peu plus.153 
Her personality became more complex because the self acquired a 
greater number of sensations through its memory. Her personal essence 
was successively determined in new ways by this means. I feel that this 
proposition requires further development. 
Bonnet does say that ‘personality’ becomes more complex the more 
sensations its memory has banked up; he also says that someone’s 
‘personal essence’ acquires new aspects over time with sensations; 
finally he admits that he needs to go into it a bit further. These various 
statements transmit a certain sense of unease, and the following 
paragraphs, in which he supposedly ‘develops this proposition a bit 
more’ (as he puts it), do not so much add anything, as say it again a few 
times while using the word ‘âme’ [soul]. Rousseau’s Émile says the same 
thing more directly, and, in being more personal, avoids the dogmatic 
reductiveness that characterises Condillac:
Je sens mon âme; je la connois par le sentiment et par la pensée [….] 
Ce que je sais bien c’est que l’identité du moi ne se prolonge que par la 
mémoire, et que pour être le même en effet, il faut que je me souvienne 
d’avoir été.154
I sense my soul. I know it through feeling and thought. […] What I know 
for sure is that the identity of the self is prolonged only by memory, and 
that in order to be actually the same I must remember having been.
Rousseau not only brings in the term of identity, he notices the thorny 
issue of continuity, and imposes continuous memory on himself: in 
order to be the same person he must remember what he was before. 
Diderot will consistently identify the self with memory, while also 
probing the various implications of continuity and interruption. In the 
Rêve de d’Alembert, d’Alembert asks Bordeu how he has managed to stay 
himself despite continuous change:
153  Bonnet, Essai analytique sur les facultés de l’âme [1760], in Œuvres d’histoire naturelle et 
de philosophie, vol. 8, t. 14, p. 212 (§702).
154  Rousseau, Émile, in Œuvres complètes, vol. 4, p. 590; Emile, trans. by Bloom, p. 283 
(slightly amended).
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D’ALEMBERT: A travers toutes les vicissitudes […] comment suis-je 
resté moi pour les autres et pour moi? 155
Taking into account all the changes […], how have I kept my own 
personality for myself as well as for others?
Bordeu replies, with reference to an animal’s sense of self (the 
conversation has been moving surreally):
BORDEU: Que c’était par la mémoire qu’il était lui pour les autres et 
pour lui: et j’ajouterais par la lenteur des vicissitudes.156
That it remained itself both for others and for itself thanks to memory. 
And I would add because of the gradualness of the change.
That because of the slow rate of change he has remained recognisable to 
himself and to others is perhaps not a particularly reassuring doctrine. 
In the Observations sur Hemsterhuis, Diderot testily scratches out 
Hemsterhuis’s association of self with soul:
* Le moi est le résultat de la mémoire qui attache à un individu, la suite 
de [ses] sensations. Si je suis un individu, c’est moi. Si c’est un autre 
individu, c’est lui. Le lui et le moi naissent du même principe.157
* The self is the result of memory attaching a sequence of sensations to an 
individual. If I am an individual, that’s me. If it’s another individual, then 
it’s him. The him and the me are born from the same principle.
So selfhood is the result of memory attached to an individual. And 
the difference between me and him is nothing more mysterious than 
that I have one set of sensations strung together into memories, and 
he has a different set. The Éléments de physiologie contains a very rich 
and fascinating chapter on memory, full of curious anecdotes, set 
piece recollections, and bizarre imagery, all of which test and stretch 
our notions of what memory might be and how it works. But it does 
155  Denis Diderot, Rêve de d’Alembert, DPV, vol. 17, p. 164; Rameau’s Nephew and 
D’Alembert’s Dream, trans. by Leonard Tancock (London: Penguin, 1966), p. 201.
156  Diderot, Rêve de d’Alembert, DPV, vol. 17, p. 164; Rameau’s Nephew and D’Alembert’s 
Dream, trans. by Tancock, p. 201.
157  Diderot, Observations sur La ‘Lettre sur l’homme et ses rapports’ de Hemsterhuis, ed. 
by Stenger, in Œuvres complètes, DPV, vol. 24, p. 329 (Diderot’s note number 191, 
responding to Hemsterhuis’s ‘notre âme, notre moi’).
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not move from its fundamental position that, as it tersely puts it: ‘La 
mémoire constitue le soi’ [memory constitutes the self].158
What then is memory? Is it an imprint? The notion that memory is 
an imprint in the waxy substance of the brain is age-old. It goes back to 
Pindar, Plato and Aristotle. Bacon, Descartes and Leibniz use it. Locke in 
fact uses the idea of white paper with writing, but Swift, paraphrasing 
him, reintroduces the wax motif with his tabula rasa.159 It seems to be 
the only model for memory ever used. Spinoza wrote in the Traité de la 
réforme de l’entendement:
Que sera donc la mémoire ? Rien d’autre que la sensation des empreintes 
qui sont dans le cerveau, jointe à une pensée relative à une durée 
déterminée de cette sensation, comme le montre la réminiscence.160
What will memory be then? Nothing other than the sensation of the 
imprints which are in the brain, in connection with a thought relating 
to the specific duration of this sensation, as we see in the case of 
reminiscence. 
La Mettrie has a general notion of all forms being created from matter as 
wax takes the shape of a seal:
Ces modifications [de forme] reçoivent leur être, ou leur existence, de la 
matière même, comme l’empreinte d’un cachet la reçoit de la cire qu’elle 
modifie.161
These modifications [in form] receive their being, or their existence, 
from matter itself, just as the imprint of a seal receives its shape from the 
wax which it modifies.
Memory is simply an extension of this metaphor:
158  DPV 471/PQ 298/MT 286.
159  See Brad Pasanek’s wonderful resource, hosted by the University of Virginia 
‘The Mind as a Metaphor’ (http://metaphors.lib.virginia.edu/about). The works 
referred to are, respectively, Pindar, Olympian 10; Plato, Theaetetus; Aristotle, De 
memoria (On Memory); Bacon, Temporis Partus Masculus (The Masculine Birth of 
Time); Descartes, Rules for the direction of the mind; Leibniz, New Essays on Human 
Understanding; Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding; Swift, Critical 
Essay upon the Faculties of the Mind.
160  Spinoza, Traité de la réforme de l’entendement, §83.
161  La Mettrie, Traité de l’âme, p. 131. 
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La cause de la mémoire est tout-à-fait mécanique, comme elle-même; elle 
paroît dépendre de ce que les impressions corporelles du cerveau, qui 
sont les traces d’idées qui se suivent, sont voisines […]162
The cause of memory, like memory itself, is entirely mechanical; it seems 
to depend on the proximity to each other of the corporeal impressions in 
the brain, which are the traces of the sequences of ideas […]
Memories are sensations which have been impressed on the mind, 
leaving traces of ideas. Condillac also applies the analogy very literally 
when considering what will remain in the memory and what will not:
Si la succession en renferme un grand nombre, l’impression des dernières, 
comme la plus nouvelle, sera la plus forte; celle des premières s’affoiblira 
par des degrés insensibles, s’éteindra tout-à-fait, et elles seront comme 
non avenues.163
If the sequence contains a great number, the impression made by the 
most recent ones, like the newest, will be the strongest; the impression 
made by the first ones will become fainter by imperceptible degrees, 
disappear completely, and it will be as if they had never happened.
This explains how a sensation can become a memory, that is, by leaving a 
lasting impression (we see how ubiquitous this model also is in English 
when we use a metaphorically identical but very common phrase like 
‘leaving a lasting impression’). But it does not explain how a memory 
is later recalled. The impression model really struggles to deal with this 
aspect. Here is Condillac’s attempt:
Quand une idée se retrace à la statue, ce n’est donc pas qu’elle se soit 
conservée dans le corps ou dans l’âme: c’est que le mouvement, qui en 
est la cause physique et occasionnelle, se reproduit dans le cerveau.*164
When an idea is retraced in the statue, it’s not as if it had been kept 
in the body or soul, it’s that the movement (which is the physical and 
occasional cause of the idea) is reproduced in the brain.
So, in sum, it is not that the memory is an object which is kept in a 
store until needed; it’s that the same movement re-occurs in the brain… 
Condillac’s assertive style does not hide the fact that this particular 
162  La Mettrie, Traité de l’âme, p. 172.
163  Condillac, Traité des sensations, p. 23 (I.ii). 
164  Condillac, Traité des sensations, pp. 33–34 (I.ii).
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explanation departs from his earlier model, and in so doing, stops 
making sense. In fact, as is obvious, his account has gone beyond what 
the wax imprint model can explain, and, having no precise knowledge 
of how a returning memory works, he is obliged to resort to a different 
mechanical model to do with movement.
Bonnet is simply more open about his lack of knowledge and his 
perplexity in this area. He turns Condillac’s model into a question, 
asking whether memories endure because of the mechanical energy 
with which they are first felt. But then he answers it sceptically, and with 
reference to the physiological composition of the brain:
Mais, ces mouvements que l’objet imprime à l’Organe ne se conserveroient-
ils point dans le Cerveau par l’énergie de sa méchanique? […]
[…] on a de la peine à concevoir la conservation du mouvement dans une 
Partie aussi molle que paroît l’être le Cerveau.165
But are these movements which the object impresses on the organ 
not preserved in the brain according to the energy of its mechanical 
operation?
It is tricky to conceive of movement being preserved in a part as soft as 
the brain appears to be.
Elsewhere he goes even further, chastising himself for his earlier 
feebleness in simply re-using this old wax-imprint model. In fact his 
model was one of fibres (related to the idea of nerve fibres)166 but we 
see in the following passage how the vocabulary of traces, pressure, and 
movement remain.
Je n’ai rien dit de ces traces, de ces ébauches qu’on suppose si gratuitement 
dans le cerveau, toutes les fois qu’on parle de l’Imagination & de la 
Mémoire: j’avoue, que n’ayant pu m’en former aucune idée, j’ai jugé plus 
philosophique d’admettre que les mêmes organes qui, ébranlés par les 
Objets, nous donnent tant de perceptions diverses, sont faits de manière 
que leurs parties constituantes reçoivent de l’action des objets certaines 
déterminations d’où résulte une tendance à se mouvoir dans un sens 
plutôt que dans un autre.167
165  Bonnet, Essai analytique sur les facultés de l’âme [1760], pp. 40, 42 (§55).
166  See Tobias Cheung’s article on fibres: ‘Omnis Fibra Ex Fibra: Fibre OEconomies in 
Bonnet’s and Diderot’s Models of Organic Order’, Early Science and Medicine, vol. 15, 
no. 1–2, 2010, pp. 66–104.
167  Bonnet, Analyse abrégée de l’Essai analytique sur les Facultés de l’âme, pp. 27–28.
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I have said nothing of these traces, these sketches in the brain which we 
so freely mention every time we talk of imagination and memory: I admit 
that, having been unable to form any idea of them myself, I judged that it 
would be more philosophical to suppose that these same organs which, 
shaken by objects, give us so many different perceptions, are made such 
that their constituent parts receive from the action of these objects certain 
determinations from which arises a tendency to move in one way or 
another.
Diderot takes all of these aspects and sends them into a spin. 
Pour expliquer le mécanisme de la mémoire il faut regarder la substance 
molle du cerveau comme une masse d’une cire sensible et vivante, mais 
susceptible de toutes sortes de formes, n’en perdant aucune de celles 
qu’elle a reçues et en recevant, sans cesse, de nouvelles qu’elle garde. 
Voilà le livre. Mais où est le lecteur? Le lecteur c’est le livre même. Car 
ce livre est sentant, vivant, parlant ou communiquant par des sons, par 
des traits,168 l’ordre de ses sensations; et comment se lit-il lui-même? En 
sentant ce qu’il est et en le manifestant par des sons.
Ou la chose se trouve écrite, ou elle ne se trouve pas écrite. Si elle ne se 
trouve point écrite, on l’ignore. Au moment où elle s’écrit, on l’apprend.
Selon la manière dont elle était écrite, on la savait nouvellement ou 
depuis longtemps. 
Si l’écriture s’affaiblit, on l’oublie, si l’écriture s’efface, elle est oubliée, si 
l’écriture se revivifie, on se la rappelle.169
To explain the mechanism of the memory it is necessary to view the soft 
parts of the brain as a mass of sensitive and living wax, but one which can 
take on all sorts of forms, losing none of those it has had, and ceaselessly 
taking on new ones which it will always retain. That is the book. But 
where is the reader? The reader is the book itself. For this book feels, 
lives, speaks or communicates its sensations in order, with sounds, with 
lines; and how does it read itself? By feeling what it is and by manifesting 
that through sounds.
Either the thing happens to be written, or it doesn’t. If it doesn’t happen 
to be written, we don’t know it. The instant it is written, we learn it.
Depending on the manner in which it was written, we learnt it anew or 
had known it for a long time. 
168  Trait is hard to translate in that it means lines or strokes (of hand-writing), but also 
features (as in expressions). Diderot probably means all these things. 
169  DPV 470/PQ 297/MT 285–86.
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If the writing weakens, we forget it, if the writing is rubbed out, it is 
forgotten, if the writing comes back to life, we remember it. 
Diderot takes the image of the malleable wax and makes the brain into a 
living, moving, reacting, self-sculpting mass that permanently contains 
its own past forms. This, he says, without signalling the change of image, 
is the book. What book? Diderot is picking up the other strand of this 
model: having investigated the notion of waxy forms, he returns to the 
notion that it is a book written on wax tablets (as Pindar, Plato, etc, had 
said). But if it is a book, it needs a reader, or so we are given to understand 
by virtue of his question asking where the reader is. Because of course 
the brain is not passive (unlike the wax in this age-old topos), and if we 
are going to remember something, we have to actively do something. 
So the brain reads itself, not by mechanical movement, as Condillac had 
stated and Bonnet had wondered, but in feeling its own existence. Thus 
far we have three self-performing actions, or rather, operations which 
are both active and passive at once:170 sculpting, reading, and feeling. ‘La 
chose’—the thing (not yet a memory)—is the sensation which is either 
written or not written—or rather happens or not to be written (there is no 
agency behind it being written or not) in the waxy book, and if it does 
not happen to be written, we are unaware of it, and at the moment of it 
being written—or writing itself—we learn it. Still this is not memory, it 
is sensation that we feel and therefore learn, or do not feel and therefore 
do not know. La manière of its writing—the manner or perhaps we could 
go so far as to say the style of the writing is what determines whether this 
thing is something we are learning anew or which we had known for a 
long while. And this thing, in the sentence we have just been looking 
at, is presumably a sensation which is familiar, and therefore one which 
we have had before and remember, or it is a new one, for which there 
is no existing trace. In the last sentence, forgetting explicitly ties us to 
questions of writing, given that this model tells us that if the writing 
fades we forget the thing, and once the writing has gone, it is completely 
forgotten, unless the writing comes back to life, in which case the thing 
will then be remembered. 
170  Citton analyses the same passage and the binary relationship between active and 
passive in his L’Envers de la liberté, pp. 479–80.
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The density of this image, its helter-skelter shifts, and its sheer 
implausibility make the passage very striking. Its bizarreness obliges 
us to linger on it, and it is perhaps therefore an illustration of what is 
written here about the manner of how something is presented making 
all the difference between it being entirely familiar and altogether fresh 
and novel (or memorable, of course). Thinking about his extended 
metaphor in the context of the earlier commentators, we can see that 
Diderot tests out and strains the various features of this well-known, 
even well-worn image. He pushes it as far as it will go, and farther. In 
so doing, he shows us where the weaknesses lie, and how a metaphor 
can carry meaning and implications that have their own shaping force. 
Its very pecularity draws attention to the conceptual and imaginative 
oddities and the implausibility of what it is that this model of the mind 
and memory is expected to do, and what features it appears to be 
required to accommodate and perform. And of course, memory does 
actually perform all the functions Diderot describes the self-reading, 
self-writing, self-performing book as doing. The philosopher of mind 
and specialist on memory, Krista Lawlor, writing more than two 
centuries later, identifies the features characterising memory as being 
autobiography, self-consciousness, memory traces, connectionism, trace 
and cue, re-presentation, reflexive thinking, and metarepresentational 
thought. She concludes that what is comprehensively lacking is ‘a 
specific model of how working memory might function to preserve 
content, while acknowledging that memory involves reconstruction’.171 
Diderot’s straining multi-model simultaneously provides a commentary 
on the inadequacies of the ubiquitous imagery, a precise description of 
what the brain and memory actually does, and also performs memorable 
writing that does indeed do that thing of leaving a lasting impression.
If all the self consists of is cumulative sensation over time, with 
memory also being a sensation felt in the present, then we depend 
entirely on our sensations for the quality of our selfhood. As Diderot 
put it to Hemsterhuis, just after having stated that ‘Le moi est le résultat 
171  Krista Lawlor, ‘Memory’, in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, ed. by Ansgar 
Beckermann, Brian P. McLaughlin, and Sven Walter (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2009), p. 674, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0039.
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de la mémoire […]’ [the self is the result of the memory], ‘Ce moi veut 
être heureux’ [this self wants to be happy].172
i. The Pursuit of Happiness
It is a virtue and therefore a duty to seek our self-preservation, nourishment, 
and happiness, write Spinoza, La Mettrie and Diderot.
Spinoza argues that if the multiple nourishment needs of the multiple 
body are met, then both it and the mind will be able to function well. He 
puts it more poetically than that:
 […] the human body is composed of a great many parts of different 
natures, which require continuous and varied food so that the whole 
body may be equally capable of doing everything which can follow 
from its nature, and consequently, so that the mind may also be equally 
capable of conceiving many things.173
He goes on to argue that anything that boosts human happiness is good, 
specifically because it will boost the power of the human body and mind:
Since those things are good which assist the parts of the body to perform 
their function, and joy consists in the fact that man’s power, insofar as he 
consists of mind and body, is aided or increased, all things which bring 
joy are good.174
To boost one’s ability to function properly in terms of body and mind 
is, concludes Spinoza, virtuous, and indeed ‘the foundation of virtue’:
 […] the foundation of virtue is this very striving to preserve one’s own 
being, and […] happiness consists in a man’s being able to preserve his 
being 175
As La Mettrie less carefully puts it in L’Homme-machine:
172  Diderot, Observations sur La ‘Lettre sur l’homme et ses rapports’ de Hemsterhuis, DPV, 
vol. 24, p. 330 (Diderot’s note 192).
173  Spinoza, Ethics, p. 159 (§ XXVII).
174  Spinoza, Ethics, p. 159 (§ XXX).
175  Spinoza, Ethics, p. 125 (II/222 (i)). Terada also suggests Spinozan sources for Diderot’s 
thinking in this area, see e.g. Spinoza, Ethics, proposition XIX, quoted MT 480.
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La Nature nous a tous créés uniquement pour être heureux; ouï tous, 
depuis le ver qui rampe, jusqu’à l’Aigle qui se perd dans la Nuë.176
Nature created us all solely to be happy—yes, all, from the worm crawling 
along to the eagle soaring on high.177
The Éléments agrees, and summarises this joint physiological and ethical 
position at the beginning of the chapter entitled ‘Passions’:
Il n’y a qu’une seule passion, celle d’être heureux.178
There is only one passion, and that is to be happy.
The chapter goes on to demonstrate how the fulfillment of bodily needs 
and happiness go hand in hand, as do sickness, frustration and misery.
The final sentence of the Éléments recapitulates this in firm form:
Il n’y a qu’une vertu, la justice; qu’un devoir, de se rendre heureux; qu’un 
corollaire, de ne pas se surfaire la vie et de ne pas craindre la mort.179
There is only one virtue: justice; only one duty: to make oneself happy; 
and only one corollary, not to overvalue one’s life and not to fear death.
One’s duty is to oneself, and it is to promote one’s own happiness, while 
not clinging onto life and not fearing death. On this virtuous, upright, 
deeply Epicurean sentiment, the Éléments de physiologie ends.
*
In this chapter I have tried to present the key structuring aspects of 
these theories of nature and the human understanding, or mind, or 
brain, and I have tried to show how Diderot fits them together into one 
seamless materialist system. I have also tried to bring out how these 
key structuring aspects appear again and again, and how their motifs 
often follow similar patterns and models, despite normal variation from 
one author to another. It is often not clear who was reading whom and 
therefore being influenced by whom; the reading routes are carefully 
hidden in the case of this often highly censored material. However, if it 
176  La Mettrie, L’Homme-machine, p. 92.
177  La Mettrie, Machine Man in Machine Man and Other Writings, trans. and ed. by Ann 
Thomson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 22.
178  DPV 486/PQ 317/MT 301.
179  DPV 514/PQ 362/MT 328. Terada usefully points us in the direction of Spinoza, 
Ethics, proposition XX, and to Boulainvillier’s Réfutation de Spinoza for other close 
source material.
 135Material World and Embodied Mind
seems clear enough that Diderot knew all these writers well (sometimes 
personally), the aim of this chapter has not primarily been to trace their 
influence or impact on the Éléments de physiologie. What instead I hope 
to have shown is that he is picking up these multifarious elements, 
responding to them, and creating a synthesis which no other author 
had previously brought together, in a style which was more explicit 
and forthright about its materialist determinism than any other, and 
therefore able to look at and probe its consequences and implications 
more clearly. This text is obviously not the first in which Diderot sought 
to express materialist positions: it is the last, and it contains aspects and 
developments of all those which lead to it, from the Pensées philosophiques 
of 1746 onwards. In the Observations sur Hemsterhuis and the Réfutation 
d’Helvétius, he repeatedly refers to his ‘philosophie’, a philosophy which, 
we infer, is more complex, thorough, instantiated, and rigorous than 
what these two interlocutors had proposed.180 He can only be referring 
to the Éléments, already underway at that time.181
180  Diderot speaks of ‘ma philosophie’ [my philosophy], ‘mon mot’ [what I have 
to say], and ‘ma philosophie’ [my philosophy] in Observations sur La ‘Lettre sur 
l’homme et ses rapports’ de Hemsterhuis, DPV, vol. 24, p. 261, 262, and 340 respectively, 
and again of ‘ma philosophie’ in Réfutation d’Helvétius, DPV, vol. 24, p. 588. 
181  See above, note 13, in Chapter 1.

4. Diderot the Physiologist
In 1764, Toussaint Bordenave, a surgeon respected both for his practical 
experience and his mastery of Latin, which made him doubly useful to 
his many students, brought out for their use an Essai sur la physiologie. His 
aim was to give a comprehensive but concise overview of the workings 
of the human body, and he drew closely on the work of the preeminent 
Swiss physiologist Albrecht von Haller, whose works were all written 
in Latin, and whose own condensed handbook on the subject, the 
Primae lineae physiologiae, Bordenave would later translate into French 
under the title Éléments de physiologie, no doubt driven by his continuing 
pedagogical impulse. His 1764 Essai is printed in a handy duodecimo 
size, and has 253 pages: he packs a lot of definition and description into 
his pages, and here, to give a flavour of it, is how he defines giving birth, 
from a physiological point of view: 
L’Accouchement est une fonction naturelle, par laquelle le foetus parvenu 
a un certain terme est expulsé au-dehors.1
Delivery is a natural function by which the foetus having reached a 
certain term is expelled outside.
There is nothing wrong with this definition from a mid-to-late eighteenth-
century point of view; it is clear and concise, while its emphasis on delivery 
as a natural function shows that Bordenave is within the mainstream of 
Haller-influenced physiological thinking in seeing physiology as not just 
anatomy but as the ensemble of (partly mechanical) processes within a 
living body. However, it is not exactly whizzy. It uses impersonal almost 
1  Toussaint Bordenave, Essai sur la physiologie (Paris: P. Al. Le Prieur, 1764), p. 203.
© Caroline Warman, CC BY 4.0 https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0199.04
138 The Atheist’s Bible
abstract substantives (‘l’accouchement’’; ‘le foetus’; ‘une fonction’; ‘un 
terme’) that completely detach the process from any specific living (and 
presumably gendered) body. It is also simultaneously tautologous (the 
foetus is not just ‘expelled’, but ‘expelled outside’) and incomplete: there 
is no mention of what this foetus is expelled out of—we assume a/the 
body. Bordenave’s definition is generalised and at once over-emphatic 
and underspecified. Compare it with what Denis Diderot says in the 
Éléments de physiologie:
‘L’accouchement est une espèce de vomissement [...].’2
Delivery is a sort of vomiting [...].
In essence, he is saying the same thing as Bordenave, but he is more 
severely concise and direct. He avoids the formalising and repetitive 
language so common to definitions (‘it is a natural function by which’, 
etc), and he also sidesteps the depersonalised mechanical model 
implicit in the notion of automatic expulsion. In comparing delivery 
to vomiting, he communicates the idea of the foetus being ‘expelled 
outside’ with piercing clarity, presenting it as an experience all humans 
(male as well as female) can relate to and have a bodily memory of, one 
that carries physical sensation and its associated emotional response 
in the shape of extreme discomfort.3 His definition is sparer, less 
formalised, much more violent, and much more effective. Its brevity 
and impact are typical of Diderot’s Éléments de physiologie more widely. 
He systematically avoids generalisation and abstraction and tends 
to communicate his point by connecting it to relatable experience, 
whether by example or—as here—by analogy. This chapter will look 
at Diderot’s Physiology next to other introductory overviews to the 
subject from the period, and will aim to show where it is similar to 
them and of course also where it diverges. It is not attempting to take 
into account the variety and specificity of Diderot’s medical reading 
2  Denis Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Jean Mayer, Œuvres complètes, 
DPV (Paris: Hermann, 1987), vol. 17, pp. 261–574 (p.440); Diderot, Éléments de 
physiologie, ed. by Paolo Quintili (Paris: Champion, 2004), p. 261; Diderot, Éléments 
de physiologie, ed. by Motoichi Terada (Paris: Éditions Matériologiques, 2019), p. 257 
[hereafter notated as DPV 440/PQ 261/MT 257].
3  This is not the first time we have mentioned vomiting. See also the mouthless oyster 
in Chapter 1.
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and influences: fine work has already been done in this area by Jean 
Mayer, Paolo Quintili, and Motoichi Terada.4 One of the things we 
will be arguing is, as has already been sketched out, that Diderot’s 
Physiology is better written and therefore that, quite concretely, it is a 
better introduction to physiology than many others were, or it would 
have been, had it been published. The vexed question of its publication 
history however is for later chapters.
***
But what is physiology? This is not a question which we have even 
touched on yet. The definition which Paris-trained medic Pierre Tarin 
(1725–61) gives in his Encyclopédie article is this:
PHYSIOLOGIE, s. f. de Φύσις, nature, & λόγος, discours, partie de la 
Médecine, qui considere ce en quoi consiste la vie, ce que c’est que la 
santé, & quels en sont les effets. Voyez Vie & Santé. On l’appelle aussi 
économie animale, traité de l’usage des parties; & ses objets se nomment 
communément choses naturelles ou conformes aux lois de la nature. Voyez 
Naturel & Nature.5
PHYSIOLOGY, feminine noun from Φύσις, nature, & λόγος, discourse, part 
of Medicine, which looks at what life consists of, what health is, and 
what their effects are. See Life & Health. It is also called animal economy, 
treatise of the use of parts; and its objects are commonly called things which 
are natural or which conform to the laws of nature. See Natural & Nature.
So, it is part of medicine, it specifically asks what life is, what health is, 
and what the effects of life and health are. It can also be called animal 
economy and treatise of the use of parts, and what it (all this) looks at, 
4  See their editions, and also Jean Mayer, Diderot, homme de science  (Rennes: 
Imprimerie Bretonne, 1959). See also Gilles Barroux’s study of the importance 
of medical knowledge for Diderot’s materialism: Le Cabinet médical de Diderot: la 
part de la médecine dans l’élaboration d’une philosophie matérialiste (Paris: Éditions 
Matériologiques, 2018), although Barroux does not specifically focus on the 
Éléments de physiologie.
5  Pierre Tarin, ‘Physiologie,’ Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et 
des métiers, par une société de gens de lettres, ed. Diderot and D’Alembert (Paris: Briasson, 
David, Le Breton, Durand, 1751-1772), vol. 12 (1765), p. 537, http://artflsrv02.
uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.11:1364.encyclopedie0416. See also 
the critical online edition Édition numérique collaborative et critique de l’Encyclopédie ed. 
by Alexandre Guilbaud, Alain Cernuschi, Marie Léca-Tsiomis and Irène Passeron, 
http://enccre.academie-sciences.fr/encyclopedie/. Also quoted in PQ, p. 11. 
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that is, the objects of its attention, are commonly known as things 
which are natural or conform to the laws of nature. One of the characteristic 
features of the Encyclopédie is the way in which it integrates cross-
references to connected articles: the immediate ring of closest related 
articles to ‘physiologie’ are Life, Health, Natural, and Nature. We notice, 
therefore, that the terms human and body do not feature in this first most 
concentrated nugget of the definition, although they appear in the first 
line of the next paragraph, which commences a more detailed exposition 
and description (the whole article is just over a thousand words). So 
physiology, despite belonging to medicine and therefore being inevitably 
and implicitly connected to human beings and illness, is in fact explicitly 
concerned with general questions about life and health. Beyond that, 
it is also to do with the animal economy, how the different parts of the 
body work together, and about how things are natural, how they do or 
do not conform to the laws of nature. Physiology could not therefore be 
called a limited field of enquiry, and it is not even principally to do with 
the human body.
In his article, Tarin mentions three authorities: firstly, Montaigne, a 
remark of whose he uses to cast ridicule on daft concretisations of the 
soul, and the other two—Herman Boerhaave and Albrecht von Haller—
to indicate the two greatest authorities in the field. Tarin had in fact 
executed a first translation of Haller’s Primae lineae physiologiae (‘First 
Lines’, 1747): it was published under the title Éléments de physiologie in 
1752, and was the only translation available in French until Bordenave’s 
tighter version of 1769 (this will be the version Diderot uses for his 
Éléments de physiologie as we can tell from the echoes in the phrasing; 
we will come to this aspect in due course). So Tarin very thoroughly 
associates his work with Haller, as indeed all the writers about 
physiology mentioned in this chapter do. Where there is polemic, it is 
not about whether Haller was or was not an authority on the workings 
of the human body. Haller himself would later write the revised and 
extended version of Tarin’s definition for Jean-Baptiste Robinet’s edition 
of the Supplément to the Encyclopédie (1776, 4 vols); Haller expanded it 
to nearly 25,000 words, relating in chronological order who made what 
discoveries in physiology from Pythagoras onwards: he jettisons Tarin’s 
 141Diderot the Physiologist
article apart from that first nugget definition which he retains as the 
introductory paragraph.6
Diderot’s ‘Système figuré des connoissances humaines’, that 
provocatively rearranged fold-out map of human knowledge which 
features at the beginning of the Encyclopédie, in fact places physiology 
as a subset of zoology, on a par with anatomy, medecine, and then a 
group of associated veterinary areas (‘la vétérinaire’, horse-riding, 
hunting, fishing, and falconry).7 Medicine has its own subsets, not 
including physiology. These are: hygiene (the art of preventing disease), 
pathology and ‘seméiotique’ (respectively the knowledge of disease 
and of its signs and symptoms), and therapeutics (the art of healing). 
By contrast, in the text accompanying the diagram of the ‘système 
figuré’, Diderot presents things slightly differently: medecine either 
focuses on the ‘economy of the human body’ and theorises (‘raisonne’) 
its anatomy, this area becoming physiology, or deals with illness and 
health, and how to avoid, recognise, and cure the former, and reinforce 
the latter.8 So there is clearly some variation in the understanding of 
where physiology sits as a branch of knowledge (whether or not it is 
a subset of medecine; its relation to anatomy), and within that, what it 
covers. We can tell that this is not just a question of uncertainty but of 
debate, even polemic, when we read that the influential Parisian medic 
and writer, Félix Vicq d’Azyr (1748–94) made a point of combining 
6  Albrecht von Haller (and Pierre Tarin), ‘Physiologie’, in Supplément à l’Encyclopédie 
ou Dictionnaire raisonné des Sciences, des Arts & des Métiers par une Société de Gens 
de lettres, ed. by Jean-Baptiste Robinet, 4 vols (Amsterdam: M.M. Rey, 1776–77), 
vol. 4 (1777), p. 344, http://artflsrv02.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.
pl?c.3:496.supplement2.
7  Religion, for example, appears as a sub-section of, in the first instance, ‘Reason’, 
secondly ‘Philosophie’, thirdly ‘Science de Dieu’, and fourthly ‘Théologie naturelle, 
Théologie révelée’. Only then comes ‘Religion’, immediately qualified by ‘d’où 
par abus, superstitions’ [whence, by abuse, superstitions]. The ‘Système figuré 
des connoissances humaines’ was first published as part of the prospectus of the 
Encyclopédie in 1750, and, as already indicated, features at the head of the first volume 
of the Encyclopédie proper (volume 1 was published in 1751), https://encyclopedie.
uchicago.edu/content/système-figuré-des-connaissances-humaines-0. See also the 
critical online edition Édition numérique collaborative et critique de l’Encyclopédie ed. 
by Alexandre Guilbaud, Alain Cernuschi, Marie Léca-Tsiomis and Irène Passeron, 
http://enccre.academie-sciences.fr/encyclopedie/. 
8  Denis Diderot, ‘Prospectus’ (1750), p. 8, see http://artflsrv02.uchicago.edu/cgi-
bin/extras/diderotimg.pl?0035_pg8_section3.jpg (the link for the prospectus as a 
whole is https://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/node/174).
142 The Atheist’s Bible
physiology and anatomy in his teaching: Laurence Brockliss and Colin 
Jones tell us that he ‘founded each part of his physiology course on an 
anatomical description of a vital organ’.9 Diderot also lobbies, in the final 
chapter of his Éléments de physiologie, for post-mortem dissection to be 
much more widespread; his argument is that only through anatomy can 
the science of medicine progress.10
Why should this be an issue? Indeed, what is the issue? It is not easy 
for the modern reader to comprehend the arguments of past centuries: 
for us, it is perfectly obvious that the detailed knowledge of the human 
body is in fact synonymous with advanced anatomical knowledge and 
furthermore, that anatomy and physiology occupy overlapping areas of 
biology. What this means, however, is that thinkers like Vicq and, before 
him, Diderot, won the argument, and that—to put it one way—our 
understanding of the sciences comes down to us from such as them—
and to put it another—that they influenced the shape of things to come. 
This is not to exaggerate the importance of any particular moment or 
group of thinkers—every link or generation in a genealogy is a crucial 
one, without which the cumulative inheritance would be different. 
The more general point is to recognise and understand that the field 
of knowledge broadly conceived is the result of a complex and multi-
generational intellectual genealogy, and within the context of this study, 
the aim is to look at one of those generations and, insofar as possible, at 
the precise historical conditions of its production. For instance, when we 
blithely throw the term ‘biology’ into the discussion as if it were a given, 
we ought perhaps to consider that neither term nor concept existed 
when Diderot was writing. It seems to have emerged in response to the 
debates pervading the wider fields of natural philosophy, physiology, 
and zoology, and its adoption was propelled into general usage by the 
French naturalist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744–1829).11 The fact that the 
9  Laurence Brockliss and Colin Jones, The Medical World of Early Modern France 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 426. They refer to Félix Vicq d’Azyr, ‘Discours 
sur l’anatomie: premier discours, Plan d’un cours d’anatomie’, in Œuvres de Vicq 
d’Azyr, ed. by J.-L. Moreau de la Sarthe (Paris: Duprat-Duverger, 1805), vol. 1, pp. 
35–124, https://doi.org/10.5962/bhl.title.48727. 
10  DPV 513–14/ PQ 354–55/ MT 325–26.
11  Shirley A. Roe tells us that ‘around 1800, the word “biology” began to be used 
independently by Lamarck and Bichat in France, and Karl Friedrich Burdach 
and Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus in Germany’ (Roe, ‘The Life Sciences’, in The 
Cambridge History of Science: Volume 4, Eighteenth-Century Science, ed. by Roy Porter 
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now familiar field of biology did not exist in the period we are looking 
at, but very soon would, is itself an indicator of the considerable change 
and reorganisation of the map of knowledge that was occurring at the 
time. François Duchesneau, eminent historian of eighteenth-century 
French physiology, puts it this way: ‘Le XVIIIe siècle, suggérions-nous, 
voit la transition des théories de l’être vivant à la théorie physiologique’ 
[The Eighteenth Century, we would suggest, sees a transition, from 
theories of the living being to physiological theory].12 This is a pithy 
encapsulation of an immense epistemological shift. Yet its retrospective 
assessment consigns the variation around the definition that we have 
been briefly sketching to a hazy past, as Duchesneau goes on to make 
clear:
La physiologie, division de la philosophie naturelle sans spécificité 
de méthodes ou de concepts thématiques dans la période précédente, 
acquiert l’autonomie d’un savoir empirique strictement délimité avec les 
Elementa physiologiae corporis humani (1757–1766) de Haller.13
Physiology, a part of natural philosophy without, in the preceding 
period, any specific methods or thematic concepts, gains autonomy as an 
empirical and strictly defined body of knowledge with the publication of 
Haller’s Elementa physiologiae corporis humani (1757–1766).
For Duchesneau therefore, the watershed is Haller, who establishes 
physiology as a defined empirical science. Haller’s impact was immense 
and Duchesneau’s clear statement gives him due prominence. It is 
however interesting to note that pre-Hallerian physiology is simply 
brushed aside as having been ‘sans spécificité’; such an attitude 
derives from a notion of history as progress, one which is particularly 
hard to avoid when looking at the history of science, where we have 
manifest and endless evidence that things can be done ‘now’ which 
weren’t possible or even conceivable ‘before’. So, to be clear: we are not 
suggesting that there is anything wrong, as in factually incorrect or 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 397–416 (p. 416), https://doi.
org/10.1017/chol9780521572439.018). Charles Wolfe analyses the knotty context 
and specifically the contribution of vitalism to the emergence of ‘biology’ in his 
study La Philosophie de la biologie avant la biologie: une histoire du vitalisme (Paris: 
Classiques Garnier, 2019).
12  François Duchesneau, La Physiologie des lumières: empirisme, modèles et théories, 
Histoire et philosophie des sciences (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2012), p. 685.
13  Ibid.
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intellectually faulty, with that sort of march-of-science history or with 
that view of the truth. It is just not what we are looking at: our focus is 
on the constituent elements and strands within physiology in the latter 
half of the eighteenth century in France so that we can understand what 
physiology was understood to be, what its debates were, what Diderot’s 
position in all this was, and finally, what his contribution was or might 
have been.
Major Debates in Physiology: Mechanism and Vitalism
The major debates around physiology, its definition and its mapping 
within medical knowledge more broadly turned on the approaches 
generally known as mechanism and vitalism. Mechanism was, as 
its name suggests, the theory that the body was best understood as a 
mechanism or machine, an infinitely complex assemblage of working 
parts, with pumps (such as the heart) and levers (such as the muscles), 
and so forth. René Descartes’ understanding of the body is exactly this. 
As the mention of Descartes serves to remind us, mechanism usefully 
hives off discussion of the soul, while continuing to press for empirical 
investigation of the body. Its primary tools of research are anatomy 
and dissection: if the body is a mechanism, then what better way to 
understand it than to take it apart? The pre-eminent mechanist was 
Dutch anatomist and chemist Herman Boerhaave (1668–1738) who 
taught generations of students at Leiden, amongst whom were the 
aforementioned Haller, the medically-trained philosopher La Mettrie 
(1709–51), author of L’Homme-machine (1747), and Louis de Jaucourt 
(1704–79), contributor of no fewer than seventeen thousand articles 
to the Encyclopédie including some on physiology and chemistry.14 An 
important sub-section of mechanism is iatromechanism (‘iatro’ is a 
prefix from the Greek word for ‘physician’); the crucial contribution its 
adherents made was to bring chemistry into the mechanist fold, viewing 
chemical processes in mechanical terms; iatrochemistry applies this 
approach to the body, seeing it as a chemical machine, with functions 
14  The leading contributors in these areas however were Venel (chemistry) and, 
in the area of physiology and medecine, Tarin and Ménuret de Chambaud. On 
chemistry in the Encyclopédie, see Christine Lehman and François Pépin, ‘La Chimie 
et l’Encyclopédie’, Corpus, revue de philosophie, 56 (2009).
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such as digestion or secretion being understood as primarily chemical 
processes.15 
Vitalism, with vita—‘life’—at its core, picks up something we have 
already touched on, that is to say, the enquiry into what life actually 
is. Vitalist medicine, particularly associated with the medical school of 
Montpellier, sees the body as the ensemble of its living functions; it is 
particularly interested in the life of the organs which it conceptualises 
according to a model of interdependent independence.16 For vitalists, 
to dissect a cadaver is a subordinate if not pointless activity, as the key 
object of enquiry—life—is no longer present. Hence the wide-spread 
practice of (animal) vivisection in the eighteenth century, amongst 
both mechanists and vitalists, given that the former understood the 
importance of looking at the living machine, and that the latter realised 
the need for detailed knowledge of physiology, that is, of the body’s 
constituent parts and how they work together in the ‘animal economy’.17 
The cleft stick that this put actual physiologists in is well if disturbingly 
expressed by Vicq d’Azyr in his heartfelt account of, on the one hand, 
dissecting a body whose muscles and nerves no longer respond to ‘the 
instrument’ and whose dead silence is a great enigma, and on the other, 
the awfulness of attempting to see or understand any phenomenon at all 
while inflicting extreme pain and fear on a live animal, in the midst of 
its convulsions, screams, and pouring blood. The first passage records 
post-mortem dissection; the second describes vivisection.
 [...] tout est insensible, tout est muet; le muscle ne se roidit plus sous 
l’instrument qui le blesse; le nerf est déchiré sans exciter ni trouble ni 
douleur; toute connexion, toute sympathie sont détruites, et les corps 
15  Laurence Brockliss and Colin Jones provide a helpful survey of iatromechanism 
and its main proponents, see in The Medical World of Early Modern France (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 419–33. See also Kurt Ballstadt’s deft mapping of 
Diderot’s attitude to iatromechanism in his Diderot: Natural Philosopher, SVEC 
2008:09 (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2008), pp. 204–05.
16  See Roselyne Rey, Naissance et développement du vitalisme en France de la deuxième 
moitié du 18e siècle à la fin du premier empire, SVEC 381 (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 
2000); Elizabeth Williams, A Cultural History of Medical Vitalism in Enlightenment 
Montpellier (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2003); and Pascal Nouvel, Repenser le vitalisme 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2011). For a more condensed introduction, 
see Timo Kaitaro, Diderot’s Holism (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 1997), pp. 117–23.
17  Rey, Naissance et développement, p. 139 (on animal economy); p. 405 (on vivisection).
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des animaux dans cet état sont une grande énigme pour celui qui les 
dissèque.18
Everything is unresponsive, everything is mute; the muscle no longer 
stiffens at the touch of the instrument which injures it; the nerve can be 
severed without provoking disturbance or pain; every connection, every 
sympathy is destroyed, and the bodies of animals in this state are a great 
enigma for he who dissects them.
Vicq contrasts the process of the post-mortem we have just read with the 
distress and uproar of vivisection:
 [...] pour un animal retenu par des liens, le plus léger mouvement est le 
signal de la douleur et redouble ses craintes; tout son corps se contracte, 
chacune de ses parties se soulève contre l’ennemi qui la menace ou qui 
la tourmente. Parmi des flots de sang et des convulsions, au milieu des 
cris aigus et des angoisses, comment ne pas se tromper sur le siège du 
sentiment? Qui pourroit se flatter, dans un bouleversement aussi général, 
de retrouver les traces des mouvements naturels? et quelles précautions, 
quelle sagacité ne faut-il pas pour en tirer quelques résultats utiles?19
For an animal who is tied down, the slightest movement is the signal of 
pain and intensifies its fear; its whole body contracts, each part of it rises 
up against the enemy which threatens or torments it. Amidst the pouring 
blood, the convulsions, the piercing screams and the anguish, how can 
we hope to find the root of the feeling? Who could suppose, within such 
general paroxyms, that it was ever possible to discern the trace of any 
natural movement? And what infinite amounts of care and sagacity are 
required to be able to draw any useful results from it!
Vicq is an expressive, self-questioning, and impassioned writer as 
well as an important physiologist, and he draws attention here to one 
of eighteenth-century culture’s defining characteristics, its interest in 
the question of sensibility, that is to say, the ability to feel sensation. 
Manifestly, life and sensibility are almost synonymous here.20 Haller’s 
extensive research into the property of sensation in bodies, and his 
careful differentiation of it into irritation and sensation, constitute his 
most important actual discovery, as distinct from his wider importance 
18  Félix Vicq d’Azyr, Traité d’anatomie et de physiologie (Paris: Didot l’Aîné, 1786), vol. 1, 
p. 2.
19  Vicq, Traité d’anatomie, p. 3.
20  This is an aspect we shall return to in Chapter 9, ‘1796-97: Cabanis and Destutt de 
Tracy at the Institut national’.
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as the author of a comprehensive and empirically-based account of 
human physiology.21
Irritation is a reactive convulsive property of human tissue; it is not 
necessarily consciously felt, unlike sensation, which operates through 
the nerves, and therefore by definition is felt. An easy way to grasp the 
distinction is to think of irritation in relation to the muscles: muscular 
action happens without our being particularly conscious of it (think 
of heart beats, for instance), whereas pain causes sensation, of which 
we are aware and to which we respond. Haller’s work on irritability 
was of great importance in helping physiologists to think about the 
specific properties of muscle fibre (or more widely what will come to be 
known as human tissue), and indeed Diderot was extremely interested 
in this aspect. In part, what the physiological concept of irritation did 
was provide fodder for materialist thinkers. If materialism posited that 
nothing exists in the universe other than matter in different combinations, 
and therefore that everything is made of matter, then one of its main 
questions was how matter could feel, and subsequently, if it could 
think; its many detractors derisively called on materialists to explain 
this, satirically asking if they thought rocks could think. Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau was one such, as we saw in the previous chapter.22 Haller 
himself was a devout Calvinist, and within physiology, firmly situated in 
the mechanist camp, and he rejected appropriations or extensions of his 
work which denied or questioned the existence of the soul.23 However, 
the concept of irritability did make it possible to see that matter could 
21  Andrew Clark gives an approachable and concise account of sensibility and 
irritability in his Diderot’s Part (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2008), pp. 49–53, https://doi.
org/10.4324/9781315257853; see also Hubert Steinke, ‘Haller’s Concept of Irritability 
and Sensibility and its Reception in France’, Mécanisme et vitalisme, ed. by Mariana 
Saad, special issue of La Lettre de la maison Française d’Oxford, 14 (2001), 37–70; and 
Duchesneau’s authoritative La Physiologie des lumières, pp. 217–58.
22  ‘Il me semble que loin de dire que les rochers pensent la philosophie moderne a 
découvert au contraire que les hommes ne pensent point’ [It seems to me that far 
from saying that rocks think, modern philosophy has discovered, on the contrary, 
that men do not think], Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Profession de foi du vicaire 
savoyard’, in Émile (1762), Œuvres complètes, ed. by Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel 
Raymond (Paris: Gallimard Pléiade, 1964), vol. 4, p. 584n; Emile, trans. by Allan 
Bloom (London: Penguin, 1979), p. 279 (slightly amended), as discussed above in 
Chapter 3.
23  For an immensely careful and illuminating account of this quarrel, see Marian 
Hobson, ‘Sensibility and Spectacle: the Medical Context for the “Paradox”’, in 
Diderot and Rousseau: Networks of Enlightenment, ed. by Kate E. Tunstall and Caroline 
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be reactive or responsive without consciousness, with a form of life 
and independence distinct from thought, whether or not thought was 
considered to be immaterial. Furthermore, a model according to which 
some sorts of organised matter have irritability and others sensibility 
makes it possible to conceptualise sensibility as a further development 
of irritability, and therefore to see it, and consciousness more widely, as 
a property of matter rather than of the soul.
Leading vitalists such as Théophile de Bordeu (familiar to readers 
of Diderot in the shape of the doctor in Le Rêve de d’Alembert) were 
directly challenged by Haller for using a notion of sensibility which 
was too broad-brush, giving too much self-organising autonomy and 
movement to the parts of the body.24 Yet Bordeu, in his work on the 
glands (1751), on the pulse (1756), and later on chronic diseases (1775), 
again and again returns to the question of the relation of part to whole, 
to the extent to which we can say that organs do or do not have their 
own particular life, using as his investigative principle this notion of 
the sensibility of flesh. The great anatomist Xavier Bichat (1771–1802), 
whose ground-breaking microscopy work on human tissue would found 
the medical sub-discipline of histology, claims Bordeu along with Haller 
as two of his three medical masters, so if one single thing is clear it is that 
this quarrel around sensibility and irritability was a productive one.25 
What may not yet be particularly clear is how working on the organs, 
on the relationship of part to whole, and on their interdependence or 
independence is at all the same thing as looking at the properties of 
sensibility or irritability in human fibre, or what we now call tissue. This 
is because the definition of what an organ is has changed, and this is 
in part due to Bordeu and others like him. In the first edition of the 
Dictionnaire de l’Académie française (1694), the organ is the ‘instrument 
de quelque faculté dans l’animal’ [the instrument of some faculty in 
Warman (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2011), pp. 65–90 (esp. pp. 75–83, ‘The 
Sensibility/Irritability Quarrel’).
24  Marian Hobson, ‘Sensibility and Spectacle’, p. 76.
25  Rey, Naissance et développement, p. 371. Bichat’s third master was Lazzaro Spallanzani 
(1729–99), and he shouldn’t really be relegated to a footnote. He is celebrated for his 
work refuting the theory of the spontaneous generation of matter, for establishing 
once and for all that human reproduction requires both ovum and sperm, and for 
showing that digestion is not a muscular process whereby the stomach physically 
grinds the food but a chemical one in which the food is turned into a solution by the 
action of acid. 
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the animal]; in the second edition (1762), it has become a ‘partie du 
corps servant aux sensations et aux opérations de l’animal’ [part of the 
body of use to the sensations and operations of the animal]; it changes 
in the sixth edition (1835) to become ‘partie du corps organisé, laquelle 
remplit quelque fonction nécessaire ou utile de la vie’ [part of the 
organised body, filling some necessary or useful function of life].26 This 
final definition is more or less the one we now work with, focusing on 
our vital functions, but it is clear that there is considerable change over 
the century, from ‘instrument of some faculty’ to ‘part of the body of 
use to the sensations and operations of the animal’ which is at once very 
important and very general. It might as well just mean ‘body part’, and 
the definition indicates a sort of problem with working out which bits 
exactly are of use, and in what way. This is where Bordeu’s insistence on 
the relation of part to whole was so important; it allowed physiologists 
to distinguish what exactly was a part that had autonomy, what wasn’t, 
and how those parts communicated. In his Recherches sur les glandes, 
Bordeu uses the metaphor of the swarm of bees to explore this idea. 
I would probably want to argue that Diderot’s famous development 
in the Rêve de d’Alembert of this exact same metaphor fed back into 
Bordeu’s thinking as we see it in the Recherches sur les maladies chroniques, 
where his model of the organisation of organs has moved on from the 
mechanical bee cog idea to take into account a more organic vitalist 
concept of reciprocity within the organism.27 As the previous sentence 
makes manifest, ‘organ’ and its multiple cognates are all coming under 
some pressure during this period: the term ‘organism’ is invented at 
the beginning of the century; ‘organisation’ has its own quite specific 
physiological meaning which also mutates throughout the century.28
26  ARTFL’s database of French dictionaries, Dictionnaires d’autrefois (https://artfl-
project.uchicago.edu/content/dictionnaires-dautrefois), is a vital tool for tracking 
definition shifts across time, see https://artflsrv03.uchicago.edu/philologic4/
publicdicos/query?report=bibliography&head=organe.
27  See Warman, ‘L’âme et la vie de l’organe dans la pensée vitaliste de Bordeu, Diderot 
et Bichat’, in Repenser le vitalisme, ed. by Pascal Nouvel (Paris: Presses universitaires 
de France, 2011), pp. 157–65; esp. p.162.
28  ‘Organism’ was coined in Latin in 1706 by George Ernst Stahl (1660–1734). 
See Georges Canguilhem, ‘Du singulier et de la singularité en épistémologie 
biologique’, in Études d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences, 2nd edn (Paris: Vrin, 
1970), pp. 223–34, as cited by Duchesneau, La Physiologie des lumières, p. 26. For 
a neat encapsulation of what the word ‘organisation’ itself means and comes to 
mean during this period, see Rey, Naissance et développement, p. 177, as quoted 
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This general account of the definitions and theories influencing 
physiology in the eighteenth century, specifically in France, and 
specifically with a view to enabling the reader to judge where Diderot 
locates himself, is inevitably cursory and reductive, forefronting 
certain aspects and omitting others. There is a longer heritage to the 
way in which physiological thought underpins vitalism than has so far 
been suggested; the chemist and physiologist Georg Ernst von Stahl 
(1660–1734) who has just been invisibly referenced (as the coiner of 
the term ‘organism’) conceptualised the soul in terms of energy which 
moved the inert matter of the body: his theory is known as animism.29 
Stahl’s animism was a crucial trigger for the development of vitalism 
in Montpellier through François Boissier de Sauvages (1706–67) who 
taught physiology and pathology there from 1734, and through him 
on Montpellier students such as Bordeu who qualified as a physician 
in 1744,30 and Paul-Joseph Barthez (1734–1806) who qualified ten 
years later in 1754, becoming known for his crusading theory of the 
‘principe vital’. Laurence Brockliss and Colin Jones explain this theory 
by Alexandre Wenger, Le Médecin et le philosophe: Théophile de Bordeu selon Diderot 
(Paris: Hermann, 2012), pp. 84–85.
29  Paolo Quintili, ‘Introduction’, in Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Paolo 
Quintili (Paris: Champion, 2004), pp. 34–35; Brockliss and Jones, The Medical World, 
pp. 427–29; and in greater detail Duchesneau, La Physiologie des lumières, pp. 25–67.
30  On Bordeu: Pierre Roussel, Éloge  historique de M. Théophile de Bordeu (Paris: Ruault 
et Mequignon, 1788), p. 7. Pierre Roussel was himself a Montpellier doctor trained 
in vitalism; his Système physique et moral de la femme (Paris: Vincent, 1775) was well-
received, and features on the reading list Diderot drew up for himself (see ‘Notes 
de la main de mon père sur la physiologie’, Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, ed. 
by P. Quintili, p. 389, and for the editor’s commentary, pp. 33–34). François Pépin 
convincingly argues that Stahl’s influence on Enlightenment vitalism is not in the 
mode of direct adoption, extension, or application, but is about countering his 
dualism: ‘il n’y a aucun lien possible entre l’animisme de Stahl et le vitalisme des 
Lumières. Il faut au contraire considérer que ce vitalisme se construit en large part 
contre Stahl, l’enjeu étant, non seulement d’étudier le vivant à partir du vivant en 
soulignant sa spécificité, mais d’inscrire les processus et les fonctions organiques 
dans le corps organique lui-même’ [there is no possible link between Stahl’s 
animism and Enlightenment vitalism. On the contrary, one should think of this sort 
of vitalism as constructed largely against Stahl, the issue being not only to study 
what life is in the living and thereby underline its specificity, but also to think of 
organic processes and functions in the context of the organic body itself]. François 
Pépin, ‘Diderot et Leibniz face à la chimie du vivant’ in Leibniz et Diderot: rencontres 
et transformations, ed. by Christian Leduc, François Pépin, Anne-Lise Rey, and Mitia 
Rioux-Beaulne (Paris: Vrin, 2015), pp. 211–35 (p. 235), https://doi.org/10.4000/
books.pum.2153.
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in their usual succinct and helpful way: the vital principal ‘was both a 
sensible and motor force, varied in its power from organ to organ, and 
operated sympathetically so that its activation in one spot could lead to 
its activation in another’.31 Barthez’s Nouveaux éléments de la science de 
l’homme (1778) is rather unlike the other works of physiology looked 
at in this chapter, in that it focuses uniquely on the presentation of its 
own theory, and is therefore neither introductory nor comprehensive.32 
It is nonetheless worth mentioning because of Barthez’s prominence 
as a vitalist looking at organs and their interconnectedness in ways 
not dissimilar to Bordeu’s thinking on the matter, and because his title, 
Nouveaux éléments de la science de l’homme, seems to promise something 
both introductory (‘elements’) and revisionary (‘new’), setting itself 
apart from other texts by choosing to describe its object as ‘the knowledge 
of man’ rather than ‘physiology’. Diderot includes Barthez’s book in the 
reading list he drew up for himself when working on his own Éléments 
de physiologie, but in fact only mentions the ‘principe vital’ once in the 
finished work.33
There is a further crucial ingredient that needs adding into the mix 
of concepts and models which Diderot had available to him, and it has 
already been mentioned both in relation to mechanism and vitalism: 
chemistry. Seminal mechanist and animist-vitalist physiologists 
Boerhaave and Stahl were both also chemists; their understanding of 
chemistry unsurprisingly splits along mechanical and vitalist lines. It 
was however the later research of Diderot’s chemistry tutor Guillaume-
François Rouelle (1703–70) and Encyclopédie contributor Gabriel François 
Venel (1723–75) that most influenced to Diderot’s thinking, and which 
leads François Pépin in his monumental study of the importance of 
chemistry for Diderot to conclude that chemistry provides him more 
than anything else with a ‘modèle de penser’ [model with which to 
31  Brockliss and Jones, The Medical World, p. 429.
32  Paul-Joseph Barthez, Nouveaux éléments de la science de l’homme [1778], 2 vols, 2nd 
edn (Paris: Goujon et Brunot, 1806).
33  ‘Notes de la main de mon père sur la physiologie’, Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, 
ed. by Quintili, p. 389 (and for the editor’s discussion of Barthez, pp. 43–44); 
the ‘principe vital’ is mentioned within the text on p. 126, almost in passing as a 
synonym for ‘life’, and therefore without any particular emphasis or attention being 
drawn to it. Terada adds depth to our knowledge of the extent to which Barthez 
contributes to Diderot’s thinking in the Éléments de physiologie, see esp. MT 161n, 
168n, 174n. 
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think] and ‘une source de modèles et d’orientations pour penser la 
nature et des processus’ [a source of models and perspectives to use 
for conceptualising nature and natural processes].34 Fermentation will 
be one such specifically chemical notion which, in Diderot’s hands, 
becomes a tool for thinking about change in matter, in bodies, and in 
species.35
In sum, eighteenth-century physiology can be understood as 
covering a spectrum of enquiry from the workings of bodies to life itself. 
Bodies themselves were understood to be a mixture of solids and fluids 
and needed to be investigated as such. There was great emphasis on the 
properties of flesh, specifically sensation and irritation, on the organs, 
their functions, and how they communicated or contributed to the body 
as a whole. These bodily functions generally include the following list: 
circulation, secretion, nutrition, digestion, respiration, sensation, and 
reproduction. The brain was mostly a mystery, although its physical 
appearance and constituent parts were recorded in ever greater detail.36 
Diderot’s Éléments de physiologie, like other general works of physiology, 
contains all these aspects, and takes up its own particular positions on 
them.
It might be helpful to indicate where critical literature has generally 
situated Diderot with respect to his physiological sources. The first point 
to make therefore, specifically in relation to this question, is that a clear 
differentiation has tended to be made between him and physiological 
writers who underwent professional medical training; he is understood 
to be at one remove from physiological research. Thus, he is seen to draw 
rather selectively on the careful physiological or anatomical descriptions 
of others, without also importing their conceptual frameworks.37 This 
34  François Pépin, La Philosophie expérimentale de Diderot et la chimie: philosophie, sciences 
et arts (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2012), p. 696.
35  Pépin, La Philosophie expérimentale, pp. 718–19.
36  Vicq’s Traité d’anatomie et de physiologie, coming out in 1786, two years after Diderot’s 
death, presents itself as ground-breaking in its investigations of the brain. It 
advertises itself as being the first of many volumes but in fact there was only one 
(was it too expensive a publication project?), and that one only covers dissections 
of the brain. The plates, of which there are seventy, are exquisite (Traité d’anatomie 
et de physiologie: avec des planches coloriées représentant au naturel les divers organes de 
l’homme et des animaux (Paris: de l’Imprimerie de Franç. Amb. Didot l’Aîné, 1786).
37  This is the case with respect to Jean-Paul Marat, Adriaan van der Spiegel (also 
known as Adrianus Spiegelius), Lorenz Heister, Marin Cureau de la Chambre, and 
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also applies to what is termed his appropriation and repurposing of the 
arguments or ideas of others, such that, as Andrew Clark puts it, their 
‘meaning must be renegotiated’.38 Jean Mayer hones in on how he rewrites 
his ‘informants’: ‘il ne prendra chez ses informateurs que l’essentiel, 
simplifiant leur prose, comme Pascal lorsqu’il s’inspire de Montaigne 
ou de Charron’ [he will take from his informants only the essential, 
simplifying their prose, like Pascal does when taking inspiration from 
Montaigne or Charron].39 One might say that the definition of giving 
birth that opens the chapter is a good example of this stylistic paring 
down, but it is an interesting question as to whether what Diderot does 
is simpler, precisely. Paolo Quintili has a nicely paradoxical way of 
expressing the balance between source text and its new home: he talks 
of the ‘originalité de la synthèse diderotienne’ [the originality of the 
diderotian synthesis].40 Motoichi Terada follows the same line when he 
talks about ‘l’éclectisme diderotien, qui tisse un texte original à partir 
d’emprunts variés’ [diderotian eclecticism, weaving an original text 
from various borrowings].41 Alexandre Wenger and others characterise 
the recycling of pre-existing elements by reference to that mutating, 
splitting and reforming basic organism of nature, the polyp: they call 
it Diderot’s ‘style-polype’.42 Clark will see this in transformational 
terms, talking about ‘a poetics of physiology’, and in part what he is 
doing is extending the implicit analogy between physiological theory 
and its stylistic expression that Wenger is also using; Clark pushes it 
further, establishing a parallel between the physiological focus on the 
relationship between part and whole which has already been alluded to 
in relation to Bordeu, and Diderot’s new ‘assemblages’.43 François Pépin 
will emphasise instead (and in less exalted terms) just how hard it is to 
others (Quintili, ‘Introduction’, p. 36), and also with respect to Roussel and A. L. 
Thomas on the female variety of the human (Quintili, p. 40). 
38  Quintili, ‘Introduction’, p. 76 (specifically with respect to Haller); Kaitaro, Diderot’s 
Holism, p. 14; Andrew Clark, Diderot’s Part (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2008), p. 75, 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315257853.
39  Mayer, Diderot, homme de science, p. 317.
40  Quintili, ‘Introduction’, p. 99.
41  MT 54. 
42  Wenger, Le Médecin et le philosophe, p. 90; he references essays by Jacques Proust, 
‘Diderot et la philosophie du polype’, Revues des sciences humaines, 182 (1981), 
21–30, and May Spangler, ‘Sciences, philosophie et littérature: le polype de Diderot’, 
RDE, 23 (1997), 89–107, https://doi.org/10.3406/rde.1997.1391.
43  Clark, Diderot’s Part, pp. 84, 81 respectively.
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‘séparer ce qui appartiendrait à un savoir constitué en dehors de l’œuvre 
de Diderot et ce que celui-ci en fait’ [separate what belongs to specialist 
knowledge from outside Diderot’s œuvre and what he does with it].44 
It seems helpful here to heed Wenger’s remark about the relationship 
between Diderot’s text and the field of physiology, despite the fact 
that he is referring to the Rêve de d’Alembert rather than the Éléments de 
physiologie: ‘ce texte, partie d’un tout dont l’achèvement se situe toujours 
dans le futur, est appelé à être révisé sans cesse’ [this text, part of a whole 
whose completion is always located somewhere in the future, requires 
constant revision].45 Hopefully, this reminds us why Diderot needs to 
draw on quite so many sources: it is not that he lacks originality or is 
a plagiarist, but rather that the area covered by physiology is vast and 
that he is integrating new developments; as a field of knowledge (what 
we now call a science) it was changing all the time, ceaselessly revised, 
modified, added to, whether in terms of specific details that came to be 
better understood, or in terms of the over-arching theories that make 
sense of the cumulative mass of local description and information. To 
have a single text which contained all this, was both introductory (in 
the sense that ‘éléments’ provide the basics), complete, up-to-date and 
accurate (in that it covered all constituent parts and how they operate 
together), and clear (in that the details did not overwhelm a sense of the 
whole) was (and remains) extremely challenging.
‘Il faudroit enfin un Descartes ou un Leibniz’46 
Physiologists of the period were aware of the difficulties of the 
genre, and repeatedly mention it as a challenge or a problem. Vitalist 
contributer to the Encyclopédie Ménuret de Chambaud gives a long 
list of what is required ‘pour faire une bonne physiologie’ [to do a 
good physiology] in his article OBSERVATION.47 Bordeu lambasts the 
‘faiseurs de physiologie ordinaire’ [‘the makers [writers/compilers] 
44  Pépin, La Philosophie expérimentale, p. 696.
45  Wenger, Le Médecin et le philosophe, p. 99.
46  [‘ultimately what is needed is a Descartes or a Leibniz’].
47  Ménuret de Chambaud, ‘Observation’, Encyclopédie, vol. 11, pp. 313–21 (p. 319), 
http://artflsrv02.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.10:1051:2.
encyclopedie0416.3346788.3346794. See also the critical online edition Édition 
numérique collaborative et critique de l’Encyclopédie ed. by Alexandre Guilbaud, 
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of ordinary physiology’] and Bordenave, lobbying for the qualities of 
his own Essai sur la physiologie, writes that ‘Je sçais qu’on ne manque 
point de Livres sur la Physiologie, mais ils sont ou trop abrégés, ou 
trop étendus, ou au-dessus de la portée des Etudians’ [‘I know that 
there is no lack of books on physiology, but they’re either too short, too 
long, or beyond the reach of students.’].48 Perhaps here he is allowing 
himself to criticise Haller, whose summum, the Elementa physiologiae 
corporis humani, ran to eight relatively indigestible (and Latin) volumes 
(1757–66); perhaps however Bordenave’s subsequent translation of 
Haller’s Primae lineae (1769) is an implicit avowal that his own Essai had 
not turned out to be quite so authoritative or popular as he had hoped. 
Vicq d’Azyr will be very critical of the sloppy and discursive writing 
styles of his brother physiologists (sadly, no sisters): ‘Ce qui a le plus 
contribué à rendre les descriptions informes et prolixes, c’est l’usage 
où la plupart des auteurs sont de s’interrompre pour disserter sur ce 
qu’ils exposent’ [What has contributed the most to the shapelessness 
and verbosity of [physiological] description is the habit that most 
authors have of interrupting themselves to comment on what they 
are describing].49 But then Vicq only completed the first volume of 
his ambitious and no doubt extremely expensive entreprise, the Traité 
d’anatomie et de physiologie, while Bordeu never did get round to writing 
a ‘physiologie’. He did however call for a philosophical genius to do so: 
‘Il faudroit enfin un Descartes ou un Leibniz, pour débrouiller ce qui 
concerne les causes, l’ordre, le rapport, les variations, l’harmonie, et les 
lois des fonctions de l’économie animale’ [ultimately what is needed is 
a Descartes or a Leibniz to disentangle everything relating to the causes, 
order, connections, variations, harmony, and laws of the functions of 
the animal economy].50 An interesting and surely significant appeal, 
this, in a book we know Diderot read, written by a friend of his whom 
he will later transform into a major voicepiece for materialist and 
medical theory in Le Rêve de d’Alembert (1769). Certainly, Diderot’s own 
Alain Cernuschi, Marie Léca-Tsiomis and Irène Passeron, http://enccre.academie-
sciences.fr/encyclopedie/. Cited in Quintili, ‘Introduction’, p. 21.
48  Bordenave, Essai sur la physiologie, p. iii.
49  Vicq, Traité d’anatomie, pp. 49–50.
50  Théophile de Bordeu, Œuvres complètes de Bordeu: précédées d’une notice sur sa vie et 
sur ses ouvrages, ed. by Anthelme Richerand (Paris: Caille et Ravier, 1818), vol. 1, p. 
208.
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Physiologie does attempt to cover all these aspects, although he leaves 
speculation about impenetrable causes aside, exorting us instead to start 
with the facts.51 So, if on the one hand there was a sense of the need for a 
‘bonne physiologie’ to rise above the ‘faiseurs de physiologie ordinaire’, 
to avoid tedious commentary, to be neither too short, too long or too 
hard for the student to understand, and if, on the other hand, at least one 
of these physiologists considered that the only person able to balance all 
the different aspects would be a philosopher of the stature of a Descartes 
or a Leibniz, then it does look as if there was room and even appetite for 
such as Diderot to have a go.
Indeed, in his 1964 edition of Diderot’s Éléments de physiologie, Jean 
Mayer ‘noted that it is superior, in many respects, to most other such 
tracts that were available at the time’.52 Kurt Ballstadt is more effusive 
than the cautious Mayer: he calls it ‘Diderot’s second encyclopedia’ and 
his ‘pièce de résistance’.53 Even Jean Rostand, who only knew the Éléments 
in the early incomplete draft (published by Assézat and Tourneux from 
the manuscript in the St Petersburg archive) writes the following words 
in praise of the Éléments: ‘Enfin, indépendamment de leur contenu 
scientifique, que de formules vives et plaisantes, dans les Éléments de 
physiologie, nous font souvenir du grand écrivain qu’était Diderot’ [Also, 
scientific content apart, how truly the vigorous and striking expressions 
we find in the Éléments de physiologie remind us of what a great writer 
Diderot was].54
Of course, we already know that there is another side to this story 
of praise: viz, that critics often refer to it as incomplete.55 We looked 
at how the mystification about fragments came to have purchase in 
Chapter 2. We will not open that question again here, returning instead 
51  DPV 336/PQ 154/MT 156.
52  See Jean Mayer’s first edition of the text (as opposed to his subsequent DPV edition), 
Éléments de physiologie (Paris: Didier, 1964), p. lvi, cited by Ballstadt, Diderot: Natural 
Philosopher, p. 209.
53  Ballstadt, Diderot: Natural Philosopher, pp. 209, 214, respectively.
54  Jean Rostand, ‘Diderot et la biologie’, Revue d’histoire des sciences et de leurs 
applications, 5.1 (1952), 5–17 (p. 15), https://doi.org/10.3406/rhs.1952.2892. Quoted 
in Wenger, Le Médecin et le philosophe, p. 114. This is in the context of Wenger 
strongly criticising Rostand for the way in which he fails to take into consideration 
the performative and dialogic aspects of the Rêve de d’Alembert: Wenger considers 
that this remark about the Éléments is Rostand’s way of compensating for having 
‘consciously amputated’ the Rêve of its crucial stylistic dimension.
55  See above.
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to the comparative analysis of different introductory works to the field 
of physiology in France in the second half of the eighteenth century. 
A simple way to grasp the continuities or differences in emphasis and 
approach is to compare their structure and contents, and to do so in 
chronological order of their publication (or, in the case of Diderot, 
composition). This handful of works, starting with Haller, have been 
chosen to span the period just before and after Diderot was writing so 
as to get some sense of what the field was like, and also in reference 
to their title: they need to be attempting some form of introduction or 
overview of physiology. Specialist works, even if they are known to have 
influenced Diderot’s thinking on physiology, will not therefore be taken 
into consideration.56
Introductory Physiologies: Structures and Contents
The master Haller’s one-volume Primae lineae physiologiae (1747) and 
his eight-volume master work the Elementa physiologiae (1757–66) move 
through the same sequence of body parts and functions. As he is the 
reference point for every subsequent physiologist we will be looking 
at, the sequence is worth describing. The Primae lineae, or Éléments de 
physiologie as both Tarin and Bordenave’s translations call it, plunges 
straight into a description of the fibre after only the briefest introduction. 
The Elementa physiologiae itself does not have a great deal of introductory 
matter, and after only a few pages establishing the recent history of new 
discoveries in physiology and anatomy and one introductory page on 
the wider subject of physiology and proper methods of observation, 
also gets straight into detailed description of the fibre.57 The Primae 
lineae has thirty-five chapters (there is no superstructure grouping these 
chapters into various parts), and their headings contain about an equal 
number of named body parts or elements of the body (such as cellular 
tissue and fat, or the heart, the brain, the intestines, etc) and functions 
(such as circulation, secretion, nutrition, muscular movement, etc). As 
we already said, Haller’s Elementa moves through the same sequence 
56  The interested reader may wish instead to consult Motoichi Terada’s edition, with 
its panoply of helpfully-reproduced sources.
57  The volumes of Haller’s Elementa physiologiae corporis humani are online at https://
catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/008593541.
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as the Primae lineae, although grouped into separate volumes. The first 
volume looks at the fibre, blood vessels, circulation of the blood and at 
the heart. Volume 2 looks in greater detail at the character of blood and 
then at secretions. Volume 3 looks at respiration and the voice; volume 
4 at the brain, nerves, and muscles. Volume 5 treats the internal and 
external senses. Volume 6 looks at deglutition, the stomach, the stomach 
lining, the spleen, pancreas and liver. Volume 7 turns to the intestine, 
the digestive fluid chyle, urine, semen and ‘women’s matters’. The final 
volume deals with the life of the foetus. Interestingly, there is no main 
heading dealing with the skeleton or with bones more generally.
Bordenave’s Essai sur la physiologie (1764) is close to Haller in 
terms of content and order with one principal difference: he also has 
a substantial first part entitled ‘Des Élémens ou principes en général’ 
which looks at the properties of matter and their different elements, 
including a section on sources of heat (air, water, oil, salt and earth). His 
‘Parties qui constituent le corps de l’homme’ [constituent parts of the 
human body] then broadly follows Haller’s sequence, with an increased 
focus on bodily functions as opposed to body parts in the chapter titles. 
Bordenave also inserts a chapter on sensibility and irritability in a 
prominently early position (after chapters on Fibre and then Cellular 
Tissue and Fat), which also draws closely on Haller.
Diderot’s Éléments de physiologie, which in terms of the dates of its 
composition (c.1773–c.84) falls between Bordenave and Vicq d’Azyr 
(1786), also has a first part. He names it ‘Des Etres’, and it starts, like 
Bordenave, with elements, matter, and molecules, moving on to consider 
life in its ‘végéto-animal’, ‘animal’, and human forms. He makes some 
strongly vitalist statements: ‘Sans la vie rien ne s’explique’ [without 
life nothing can be explained] and ‘Sans la vie, nulle distinction entre 
l’homme et son cadavre’ [without life, there is no distinction between 
a man and his corpse].58 He considers both sensibility and irritability 
as general properties of living things, looking in turn at life, death, 
movement, reproduction, species, size, the morality (or behaviour) 
of animals, their grace and beauty. In the chapter on Man he looks at 
reason, thought, and soul. His second part, the ‘Éléments et parties du 
corps humain’ [Elements and parts of the human body] is famously the 
58  Éléments de physiologie, PQ 126.
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part which is closest to Haller, with a first chapter on the fibre, and a first 
line of that first chapter which reproduces a sentence of Haller’s almost 
word for word.59 However, this chapter on ‘Fibre’ is preceded by a very 
unHallerian introduction, opening with the following sentence:
L’homme a toutes les sortes d’existence: l’inertie, la sensibilité, la vie 
végétale, la vie polypeuse, la vie animale, la vie humaine.60
Man has every kind of existence: inertia, feeling, vegetable life, polypous 
life, human life.
Diderot’s framing gives a decidedly materialist orientation to this second 
part on the ‘Elements and parts of the human body’, emphasising its 
relationship to the contextualising first part on ‘Beings’ more widely. It 
contains twenty-five chapters, and all, apart from one (‘Génération’), 
have an element or part of the human body as their title, and are not 
therefore organised according to abstracted bodily functions. In general, 
it contains a good deal of Hallerian physiology, but the order is different, 
starting with no fewer than four chapters on the basic constituent parts 
of flesh (fibre, cellular tissue, membranes, fat), then moving to the brain 
and nerves, thereafter muscles generally, then heart, blood, arteries and 
the lymphatic system, glands and other secretions, and bit by bit down 
the torso from chest to stomach and organs of digestion and excretion, 
and finally the reproductive organs, ending with the foetus.61 It packs a 
great deal of very succinct description into about a third of the length of 
Haller’s Primae lineae. 
59  ‘En physiologie la fibre est ce que la ligne est en mathématiques’ [in physiology 
the fibre is what the line is in mathematics], (PQ 156): Editors Jean Mayer and 
Paolo Quintili remind us of Haller’s Latin: ‘Fibra enim physiologo id est, quod linea 
geometrae’ (Elementa physiologiae, vol. 1, p. 2, quoted DPV 338n and Éléments de 
physiologie PQ 156n). Clark draws attention to Diderot’s meaningful substitution 
of mathematics for geometry, and points out that Diderot may have got the phrasing 
from Haller, but that it wasn’t original to Haller either. Haller got it from Francis 
Glisson (1597–1677), Professor of Physic at Cambridge from 1636. Clark, Diderot’s 
Part, p. 75.
60  DPV 337/PQ 155/MT 157.
61  Mayer points out that this second part is influenced in its broad conception by 
Bordeu’s emphasis on the triumvirate of brain, heart, and stomach, as well as being 
packed with physiological information from Haller’s Primae lineae and Elementa 
physiologiae. Mayer, Diderot, homme de science, pp. 279–80. Terada shows that while 
the earlier draft of the Éléments de physiologie, which we call SP, follows Haller’s 
conceptual ordering of subjects, the mature one, known as V, departs from it (MT 
53).
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The third part contains the ‘Phénomènes du cerveau’ [phenomena of 
the brain], and most of it does not have an equivalent in Haller.62 In its 
opening chapter, Diderot describes sensation and the sensory organs, to 
which the Primae lineae had given six separate chapters, book-ended by 
the topics of muscular movement and sleep; ‘Sleep’ in Haller’s treatment 
is then followed by twelve chapters on hunger and aspects of digestion. 
Diderot, as we see, organises things very differently: from sensation 
he moves to ‘the understanding’, memory, imagination, sleep, the will, 
passions, organs (which looks, Bordeu-fashion, at the extent of their 
independence and dependence), diseases, and finally the conclusion. 
Memory in fact is briefly treated in Haller as part of a chapter on ‘internal 
senses’, while sleep, as we have seen, has its own chapter. They do not 
have the rest of the chapter headings in common. So Diderot’s Physiology 
has its own quite distinct character, commencing with matter and living 
beings, then describing the human body, and finally moving to the mind 
and looking at our experience of the outside world and of ourselves, as 
rooted in our physiology and its particularities or (more often than not) 
pecularities.
Vicq’s Traité d’anatomie et de physiologie (1786) has a fifty-page 
opening discourse in which he discusses the difficulty of the subject, 
opines that physiologists should not attempt to track down causes but 
base their analyses on effects, as has only just begun to be attempted 
by ‘[les] écrivains les plus modernes’ [the most modern writers] and 
that enough is now known, however imperfect, to supply ‘des résultats 
utiles à la Médecine et à la Philosophie’ [useful results for both medicine 
and philosophy].63 The structure that he announces gives headings only 
to nine identified bodily functions, in the following order: digestion, 
nutrition, circulation, respiration, secretion, ossification, reproduction, 
irritability, sensibility.64 It is interesting to see ossification appear here, as 
bones do not feature as a chapter heading in the previous works we have 
been considering. Exactly how Vicq would have managed the structure 
cannot be predicted, given that all we have is this first volume. Apart 
62  Terada discusses, with respect to the ordering of Éléments de physiologie, part 3, what 
he calls ‘la singularité du châpitrage’ [the peculiarity of the chapter divisions) (MT 
97).
63  Vicq, Traité d’anatomie, pp. 6–7.
64  Vicq, Traité d’anatomie, p. 15.
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from its introductory discourse, it contains a seventy-page physiological 
vocabulary list with definitions, and then moves on to the plates 
describing the brain. 
Fig. 4.1 Felix Vicq D’Azyr, Traité d’anatomie et de physiologie, EPB 
F694. Plate 19, engraving showing dissection of the brain, Wellcome 
Collection, https://wellcomecollection.org/works/yprjdx8t, CC BY 4.0 
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The final work we will be looking at, the Nouveaux élémens de 
physiologie, signals its revisionary and introductory aim very clearly. Its 
author, Anthelme Richerand, would go on to edit Bordeu’s complete 
works.65 Dedicated to the influential ideologue Pierre-Jean-Georges 
Cabanis (whom we will be discussing in ‘9. 1796–97: Cabanis and 
Destutt de Tracy at the Institut national’), it appeared in 1801 and by 
1811 was being reprinted in its fifth revised edition.66 His Nouveaux 
élémens spans two volumes and has two parts: the shorter introductory 
first part discusses natural beings, differences between organic and 
inorganic bodies, animal and vegetable properties, life, sensibility, a 
series of Barthez-influenced chapters on sympathies between different 
parts of the body and on habit and the ‘principe vital’. Part two looks 
at the vital functions (digestion, absorption, circulation, respiration, 
secretion, nutrition, sensation, reproduction) and also contains separate 
chapters on movement, voice and speech, ending with a survey of 
ageing and variety in temperament, death and decay. The chapter on 
sensation (which falls at the beginning of volume 2) has subsections on 
the understanding, on passions, sleep and sleepwalking. The opening 
topics in part one are, of course, strikingly close to Diderot’s own 
opening section.67
Of all these figures, Haller is the only one not to include introductory 
matter setting human physiology in a vaster context, whatever that might 
be. It is interesting to consider the extent to which his omission of these 
sorts of questions might well be one of the factors enabling historians 
of science such as François Duchesneau to identify him as a founder of 
modern physiology, introducing a sort of medical modernity which is in 
fact synonymous with the abandonment of philosophical enquiry. Haller 
himself would have been anxiously determined to adhere to a religious 
and Calvinistic understanding of creation, and therefore left these 
questions aside precisely because they were important and polemical. 
The modern science of physiology with its delimited definition 
does not include such contextualising questions in its introductory 
65  Bordeu, Œuvres complètes, ed. by Richerand.
66  Anthelme Richerand, Nouveaux élémens de physiologie, 5th edn (Paris: Caille et 
Ravier, 1811).
67  We do not have the space here to develop this particular parallel, but Richerand 
appears again later in the book in ‘9. 1796–97: Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy at the 
Institut national’.
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overview textbooks.68 However, most of the physiologists mentioned 
in this chapter—Bordeu, Tarin, Bordenave, Barthez, Diderot, Vicq, 
and Richerand—all of whom were aware of and variously influenced 
by Haller’s work, did emphasise such questions, and perhaps this is 
because of the increasingly dominant vitalism in French physiology of 
the period. As François Victor Mérat de Vaumartoise, co-editor of the 
Dictionnaire des sciences médicales (1812–22) remarked in his definition 
of ‘Vitalistes’, ‘il n’est guère permis à l’époque actuelle de n’être pas 
vitaliste; les progrès des sciences médicales nous ont ramené de toutes 
parts à cette croyance en nous montrant le vide des autres opinions, 
et la puissance des forces de la vie’ [it is hardly acceptable in current 
times not to be vitalist; the progress of the medical sciences has in 
every instance reinforced the validity of this view while demonstating 
the nullity of any other opinion, as well as the power of the forces of 
life].69 If Vaumartoise’s strident assertion in fact indicates the continuing 
presence of debate rather than the contrary, there is no real doubt that 
physiology of the period did see itself as linked to understanding what 
life was. 
Diderot will answer this question from an unhesitatingly materialist 
point of view, and this, therefore, is what makes his Physiologie 
distinctive. The actual number of pages taken up by the description of 
68  Walter F. Boron and Emile L. Boulpaep open their Physiological textbook with 
the title question ‘What is physiology?’. This is their definition: ‘Physiology is the 
dynamic study of life. Physiology describes the ‘vital’ functions of living organisms 
and their organs, cells, and molecules. For centuries, the discipline of physiology 
has been closely intertwined with medicine. Although physiology is not primarily 
concerned with structure – as is the case for anatomy, histology, and structural 
biology – structure and function are inextricably linked beause the living structures 
perform the functions.’ Walter F. Boron and Emile L. Boulpaep, Medical Physiology, 
3rd edn (Philadephia, PA: Elsevier, 2017), p. 2. It is interesting to note, given the 
earlier discussion of the aims and conversely pitfalls of physiology manuals, that 
Boron and Boulpaep also have a sense of the difficulty of the entreprise: ‘We were 
intrigued by an idea suggested to us by W.B. Saunders: write a modern textbook of 
physiology that combines the expertise of a multi-author book with the consistency 
of a single pen’ (Preface to the First Edition, p. ix).
69  François Victor Mérat de Vaumartoise, ‘Vitalistes’, in Dictionnaire des sciences 
médicales, ed. by François Pierre de Chaumeton and F.V.M. de Vaumartoise 
(Paris: Panckoucke and Plomteux, 1812–22), vol. 58, p. 281. See also my ‘Charts 
and Signposts: Following Vitalism and Mechanism through the Encyclopédie, the 
Encyclopédie méthodique and the Dictionnaire des sciences médicales’, Mécanisme 
et vitalisme, ed. by Mariana Saad, special issue of La Lettre de la maison Française 
d’Oxford, 14 (2001), 85–104 (p. 96).
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human physiology is proportionally smaller than these other writers, 
while the opening and final sections on, firstly, the elements of life 
and death, and secondly, sensation, the mind, and experience, are 
proportionally greater. His Physiologie is characterised by descriptions 
which are more severely concise and selective than those of his peers, 
and also by a consistently anti-abstract approach. He gives many 
more case studies, examples, and anecdotes than these other writers 
who consistently describe a universalised body. For him, instead, 
it is always about a particular body in time and space, whether his 
own or someone else’s.70 If nature is matter and life is sensibility, and 
physiology is nature, matter, life and sensibility all in one conjoined 
mass, then what does that feel like? The point being, presumably, that 
that conjoined mass is what we are, no more or less and for no longer 
than it continues to function. This approach is what characterises 
Diderot’s particular brand of materialist vitalism. We will now turn to 
look at these two aspects of concise description and anti-abstraction in 
more detail.
***
Here is how Haller describes what the chest is, what it’s made of and 
what its three-dimensional form is:
Nous appellons POITRINE ou THORAX une espece de cage composée 
d’os & de cartilages, dont les intervalles sont remplis par des muscles; elle 
a la figure d’un cône obtus, plus étroit à la partie supérieure et presque 
ellyptique; cependant applati en devant et divisé à sa partie postérieure 
par une éminence.71
We will call CHEST or THORAX a sort of cage made of bone and 
cartilage with muscles filling the spaces in between; its shape is of an 
obtuse cone, narrower at the top and almost elliptical, flattened on the 
front and divided at the back by an eminence or raised part.
70  See Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, ‘j’avais 66 ans quand je me disais ces vérités’ [I 
was 66 years old when I told myself these truths] (DPV 313/PQ 129/MT 136); ‘Il me 
semble que j’entends crier ma femme’ [I seem to hear my wife cry out] (DPV 359/
PQ 179/MT 179).
71  Haller, Éléments de physiologie, trans. by Toussaint Bordenave (Paris: chez Guillyn, 
1769) vol. 1, p. 158 (ch. X: De la respiration, §CCLXXVIII), https://doi.org/10.5962/
bhl.title.43392. Spelling and accents: sic.
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A sort of cage made of bone and cartilage with muscles filling the 
spaces in between is relatively straightforward to visualise, although 
rather grotesque if taken literally. The second part with its sequential 
geometrical description is less easy to absorb or translate into an image. 
An obtuse cone, narrower at the top, almost elliptical, that is flatter on 
the front and divided at the back by an eminence, or raised part? If I 
did not know already what a chest looked like, I would have no idea 
how to translate this description into a meaningful shape. Elsewhere, 
it is described not as an obtuse cone but as a truncated one (a ‘cône 
tronqué’).72 Bordenave followed this definition very closely in his own 
attempt at a concise physiological manual. He writes:
La Poitrine ou Thorax est une espece de cage composé d’os, de cartilages 
et de muscles. Sa figure dans l’homme pourroit être comparé à un cône 
tronqué, applati sur le devant, dont la base est inférieure. Son plus grand 
diamètre est d’un coté à l’autre, et le plus petit de la partie antérieure à 
la postérieure.73
The Chest or Thorax is a sort of cage made of bone, cartilage, and muscle. 
Its shape in humans is comparable to a truncated cone, flattened on the 
front, and whose base is at the bottom. Its widest diameter is from one 
side to the other, and the narrowest from the front to the back.
As we see, the ‘sort of cage’ image is reproduced identically, although 
Bordenave adds a quick gloss to clarify that the geometrical description 
which follows relates to its shape as found in a human being. Thereafter 
he slightly rephrases Haller: using the notion of ‘truncated cone’, he 
retains the description of the flattened front, but instead of saying that 
it is narrower at the top, he says that the base—i.e. the wider part—is at 
the bottom; he then starts talking about diameter, anterior and posterior.
In terms of ekphrasis, his description is not very helpful. His and 
Haller’s descriptive method would work to a certain extent if the text 
were accompanied by a diagram, although arguably the diagram would 
render the description redundant. As a stand-alone description, it is 
simply confusing. Compare with Diderot’s description: 
72  Haller, Éléments de physiologie, trans. by Bordenave, vol. 1, p. 36 (ch. V: Du coeur, 
§LXXV).
73  Bordenave, Essai sur la physiologie, p. 102. 
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Poitrine, grande cavité formée par les côtes, le cou et le diaphragme.74
Chest, large cavity formed by the ribs, the neck, and the diaphragm.
His brevity is so startling as to be almost comical when compared 
to the efforts of Haller and Bordenave. He does not overlay his 
description with metaphorical cages, or geometrical abstractions and 
measurements. He simply calls the chest a large cavity formed by 
the ribs, the neck, and the diaphragm, producing an image in words 
which is immediately comprehensible and visualisable, keeping a 
consistent and unencumbered focus on what he is talking about—the 
body itself.
This approach to physiological description which I have called 
more severely concise and selective than that of his peers derives from 
unparalleled experience of describing things in words—the decades 
of work on the Encyclopédie articles and plates, and the experimental 
ekphrasis of painting and sculpture we find in the Salons. The 
concision is not an end in itself; it is about the clarity and efficacy 
of the textual description of a physical object, such that description 
becomes evocation in the most direct way possible. Freed from the 
labyrinth of detail that ensnares other physiologists (however much 
they attempt to clarify, explain, and make accessible in their various 
manuals, essays, and translations), Diderot starts but does not end 
with description. He defines, evokes, gives odd variants that may 
illuminate or may challenge existing knowledge, explains how the part 
or function of the body he is describing works with the whole, and he 
moralises, by which I mean, he comments on connected behaviour. 
This is the pattern that dominates in his Éléments de physiologie, and 
any one page would give examples of it. We will simply look here at the 
brief ninety-word sub-section describing the organ of taste, without 
however contrasting it with Haller’s more exhaustive physiological 
description; hopefully the way in which Diderot selectively uses and 
departs from Haller is now clear.75 The passage is relatively terse and 
not particularly striking.
74  DPV 392/PQ 210/ MT 211.
75  Haller, Éléments de physiologie, ch. XV: ‘Du Goût’, §CDXLVIII-CDLVIII; tr. Tarin, pp. 
103–06; tr. Bordenave, t. 2, pp. 18–26. Terada shows that in this section Diderot also 
draws on Antoine Le Camus’s Médecine de l’esprit, see MT 454, source notes xv–xviii. 
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Goût 
Si l’impression se fait sur les papilles de la langue, la sensation est du 
goût. 
Si le siège du goût est dans la langue, il s’affaiblit en approchant de 
l’épiglotte. Une fille, qui pour toute langue n’avait qu’un tubercule, 
goûtait. La langue a des papilles de deux espèces, des tronquées et des 
frangiformes.
Le palais, le tour de la bouche, le gosier sont encore des organes servant 
au goût. 
Le goût est le dernier des organes qui s’éteigne : il n’est donc pas étonnant 
que les vieillards aiment la table.76
Taste
If an impression is made on the papillae of the tongue, the sensation is 
one of taste.
Taste is based in the tongue and is weaker closer to the epiglottis. A girl, 
who had nothing but a tubercle for a tongue, could still taste. The tongue 
has two sorts of papilla, truncated and fungiform.
The palate, the whole mouth, and the gullet are also organs which 
contribute to taste.
Taste is the last organ to go, which explains why old people like eating 
so much.
Diderot defines and distinguishes taste in the wider context of 
sensation in general, locating it principally in the tongue but also 
looking at a counter-example which shows that even with only a sort 
of protuberance for a tongue, the organ of taste can still function. 
However, this counter-example is not generalised, unlike my gloss of 
it; Diderot turns the counter-example into a living case by attaching 
it—albeit cursorily—to the experience of one particular girl. He moves 
without explanation or any transitionary gestures to the different sorts 
of papillae (containing the taste buds), then surveying the subsidiary 
taste organs, to return at the end to taste as a sensory organ amongst 
others, to its life (its growth and decline) within the life of the body as a 
whole. The final clause moves further outwards, connecting physiology 
and its cycles to a sort of common knowledge or received wisdom 
76  DPV 449–50/PQ 274–75/MT 266.
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about old people, their behaviour and preferences. The passage as a 
whole is very economical (more than this commentary on it is able to 
be!), and gives only key points: what is taste; where is it located; what 
are its physiological mechanisms; what are its limits; what is its life 
cycle; what are the implications of this for human experience. 
These will be Diderot’s questions for every part of the body; if the 
patterns and processes of physiology determine, frame, and initiate 
every interrogation, it is never confined to them, and will always move 
on to consider the related aspect of human experience, bringing in 
observations of more or less moralising character and connecting them 
to shared knowledge about human life, its phases and types. Thus he 
consistently avoids abstraction by always asking the same question: 
what does it feel like? And by consistently asking this question, Diderot 
also avoids the sort of dehumanised approach which underpins Haller’s 
work, and is objectionable to read when it breaks surface, such as in the 
following instance, where Haller talks in comparative terms about the 
properties of skin:
La surface interne de l’épiderme est plus pulpeuse, demi-fluide & comme 
composée de mucus; celle des Européens se sépare difficilement, celle des 
Nègres d’Afrique plus aisément [...].77
The internal surface of the epidermis is more pulpy, semi-fluid and as if 
made of mucus; in Europeans, it can only be separated with difficulty, 
whereas in African Negroes it is much easier.
Of course, Haller is not trying to section the epidermis of living 
Europeans and Africans but is alluding to his difficulties in dissecting 
corpses; his vivisectional experiments related to animals, and this 
is a subject we touched on earlier in the chapter. Nonetheless, the 
generalisation about white and black skins has a nasty resonance, not 
least because Haller does not talk about white skin and black skin, he 
talks about Europeans and Negroes from Africa, which in the context 
of the eighteenth century means colonisers and colonised, masters and 
slaves. Furthermore, there is an implicit notion of hierarchy in the idea 
of the tougher European skin, as Haller’s following remarks, likening 
77  Haller, Éléments de physiologie, trans. by Bordenave, vol. 2, pp. 4–5 (§CDXXIX). 
Haller’s italics.
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black skin to animal skin, make all too clear.78 And although Diderot 
copies almost word-for-word some parts of this chapter on the sense 
of touch, including Haller’s definition of skin, he places this particular 
comparison of Haller’s elsewhere, in his chapter on Membranes, and he 
removes the connected remark about the similarity with animal skin.79 
What we do find in Diderot is an extended meditation on the difference 
between flesh, which is endowed with sensation, and wood, which is 
not. Again, Diderot is asking the question: what does it feel like? And it 
may well be that this passage is at least in part a subterranean reaction 
to Haller, and an implicit correction. It’s a bravura piece, and here it is:
Pourquoi tant de différence dans le pincer d’une tenaille de bois ou de fer 
et d’une tenaille de chair, ou de deux doigts ? 
La tenaille de bois ne sent pas, celle de chair sent ; la tenaille de bois ne 
souffre pas, celle de chair souffre, la tenaille de bois n’est pas chatouillée, 
la tenaille de chair l’est. La tenaille de bois ne se refuse pas à sa rupture, 
la tenaille de chair s’y refuse. La tenaille de bois ne sent ni sa force, ni sa 
faiblesse, la tenaille de chair la sent : la tenaille de bois, après sa rupture, 
ne se meut pas, la tenaille de chair se meut [  ...] la tenaille de chair 
était en conspiration, et reste en sympathie avec d’autres organes. La 
tenaille de bois ne s’accroissait, ni ne vivait, la tenaille de chair avait un 
78  ‘Chez ces derniers [les Nègres d’Afrique] elle est vraiment membraneuse, solide et 
séparable, ainsi que dans le palais des animaux’ [In the latter (African negroes) it is 
truly membranous, solid and separatable, similar to the palates of animals] (Haller, 
Éléments de physiologie, trans. by Bordenave, vol. 2, p. 4). Diderot uses this passage 
in his chapter on Membranes, but without the comparison to animal skin, see DPV 
344/PQ 162/MT 163.
79  ‘Ce qu’on appelle PEAU, est un tissu dense, composé d’une grande quantité de 
cellules extrémement rapprochées, dont les fibres sont entrelacées et embarrassées 
les unes dans les autres; elle est conséquemment extensible, contractile & poreuse’ 
[What is called SKIN is a dense tissue composed of a great number of cells which 
are extremely close together and whose fibres are interlaced and entangled; it is 
consequently extensible, contractile & porous] (Haller, Éléments de physiologie, trans. 
by Bordenave, vol. 2, p. 2 [§ CDXXVI]; Haller’s capitals and italics). And here 
is Diderot: ‘La peau est un tissu dense, composé d’un grand nombre de cellules 
rapprochées, dont les fibres sont entrelacées et embarrassées les unes dans les autres. 
Elle est extensible, contractile & poreuse’ [The skin is a dense tissue composed of a 
great number of cells which are close together and whose fibres are interlaced and 
entangled ; it is consequently extensible, contractile & porous] (DPV 447/PQ 272/
MT 163). He has simply removed the adverbs and the typographical emphasis. See 
the previous footnote for the reference to the Membrane chapter.
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accroissement, et sa vie. En général dans l’animal et dans chacune de ses 
parties, vie, sensibilité, irritation. Rien de pareil dans la matière brute.80
Why is there such a difference between the pinch of wooden or iron 
pincers and of flesh pincers, or of two fingers? 
The wooden pincers don’t feel anything, the flesh ones do; the wooden 
pincers have no pain, the flesh pincers do, the wooden pincers don’t feel 
any tickling, the flesh pincers do. The wooden pincers do not put up 
any resistance to being ripped apart, the flesh pincers do. The wooden 
pincers have no sensation of their strength or weakness, the flesh pincers 
do: the wooden pincers, once torn apart, don’t twitch, the flesh pincers 
do (…) the flesh pincers conspired with other organs, and remain in 
sympathy with them. The wooden pincers didn’t grow or live, the flesh 
pincers had growth, and their own life. In general in the animal and in 
each of its parts, there is life, sensibility, irritability. There’s nothing of the 
sort in raw matter.
This peculiar comparison of flesh pincers and wooden ones is peculiar 
precisely because it is depersonalised. If at the beginning we are 
reminded that the analogy is with fingers, thereafter Diderot prefers to 
use the defamiliarised image of the flesh pincers, thereby emphasising 
the parallel with the tool made from inanimate matter so as to pursue 
the imaginative investigation of what sensation is and how it works. 
It also inverts the expected perspective, in the same way that the 
comparison between love and a piece of fruit that this study opens with 
also did. There, we were asked to think about the question of desire 
from the point of view of the piece of fruit; here, instead of exploring 
the question of painful sensation being inflicted by pincers, we are 
thinking of painful sensation inflicted on pincers. And although this 
analogy is depersonalised, it is not abstract, because it is relatable; it asks 
its reader to relate to the questions, to follow the thought experiment, 
and to use that imaginative experience to consider life as characterised 
by sensation, or in this instance, pain. The narrative moves from the 
pleasurable notion of a tickling sensation to the violent one of severing, 
the flesh twitching in reaction to being severed, still ‘in sympathy’ with 
the other organs it is no longer attached to. And further, it uses this two-
part notion of severing and connection to ponder the relation of part 
80  DPV 449/PQ 274/MT 265–66.
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to whole, a question which was much debated at the time, as we have 
already mentioned.
Diderot’s ‘what does it feel like’ means, as we have said, that we 
hear about many people, including himself, in the course of these 
pages. Perhaps the most remarkable and certainly the longest examples 
recount, in a footnote which swells to take up the whole page, the stories 
of two couples who fall pregnant when it should have been anatomically 
impossible for them to do so.81
Fig. 4.2 The swollen footnote, BnF, Manuscrits, NAF 13762, f. 96v.-97r., 
Denis Diderot (copyist ‘E’), c. 1780, Pen and Paper, Denis Diderot, 
Éléments de physiologie, Fonds Vandeul, Bibliothèque nationale de 
France, CC-BY
81  I further analyse these cases in my chapter ‘“Autre fait arrivé au château de 
Nicklspurg, en Moravie”: Diderot and the Horrid Case Study’, in The Dark Thread: 
From Tragical Histories to Gothic Tales, ed. by John D. Lyons (Newark: University of 
Delaware Press, 2019), pp. 149–59. I thank John D. Lyons and the University of 
Delaware Press for allowing me to re-use some of that analysis here, and I would 
also like to record my gratitude to Professor Lyons and the University of Virginia 
for the generous funding which made it possible for me to attend the ‘Dark Thread’ 
conference (from which the edited book emerged) in Charleston, March 2016. 
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The footnote is in Part II of the Éléments de physiologie, in the 
long chapter on reproduction and how it occurs.82 (Diderot presents 
five different theories.) This footnote gives two examples from two 
different sources of the statement in the main body of the text about 
it being possible to get pregnant even when—as he carefully puts it—
the woman is infibulated, that is, without any apparent vagina. The 
first case relates how the lover of a young woman with this particular 
problem is not put off, but simply requires her to indulge him in a 
different way, as the text coyly says, going on to report that she happily 
obliged. 
Fig. 4.3 The resourceful lovers, BnF, Manuscrits, NAF 13762, f. 96r., 
Denis Diderot (copyist ‘E’), c. 1780, Pen and paper, Denis Diderot, 
Éléments de physiologie, Fonds Vandeul, Bibliothèque nationale de 
France, CC-BY 
Her stomach starts to swell and she calls a doctor, who pronounces 
her pregnant. She has no difficulty proving to him that this is 
impossible, and yet her stomach and bosom continue to swell, and 
she calls him a second time. He swears she is pregnant, but the young 
82  DPV 429–31/PQ 249–51/MT 247–48.
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woman and her lover pay no attention. After nine months she has 
terrible pains, and after horrendous tearing a baby is born ‘by the 
same route he was conceived’. Diderot finishes by saying he does 
not know whether the mother and child died or not, but that her 
particular ‘formation’ is in no way uncommon. He then supplies his 
scholarly source.83 
The second instance, repeated verbatim from an account by ‘Mr 
Nuch’ in the Journal historique et politique, is alluringly introduced 
as ‘another true story that took place in the castle of Nicklsburg 
in Moravia’—a good gothic setting for a lurid story. It involves a 
twenty-two-year-old soldier whose stomach started swelling and 
who complained of nausea. He was treated for dropsy, although to 
no effect. His stomach kept growing, but he felt fine, and it had no 
impact on his ability to carry out his duties which he kept on with 
very cheerfully. 
83  He writes, ‘je tiens ce fait de Monsr Louis, secrétaire de l’académie de chirurgie’ [I 
got this fact from Mr Louis, secretary of the academy of surgery]: Antoine Louis 
(1723–92), whom Diderot infers had related it directly to him, was a friend of his 
and contributor to the Encyclopédie. Louis had published on this topic An imperforata 
mulier possit concipere? (1755) (DPV 429, n. 269/PQ 250, n. 86/MT 247, n. 182). Mayer, 
Quintili, and Terada give a rejected fragment from the St Petersburg draft which 
explains that Louis left this anecdote out of the ‘Mémoires de notre Académie de 
Chirurgie’ (which Louis had founded) because decency would not allow otherwise 
(DPV 429/PQ 249/MT 247). Mayer also adds (n. 269) that this case is mentioned 
by Haller (Elementa, t.VIII, Ire partie, p. 22). In fact this is not accurate; in Haller, 
anything specific about the case is removed, which is alluded to very briefly and 
in generalised terms: ‘Etiam per anum, in quem vagina patebat, maritus feminam 
impraegnavit: alii uxoris urethrae ad venerem abusi sunt’ [Furthermore, a husband 
impregnated a woman through the anus, which connected with her vagina; others 
misused the wife’s urethra for intercourse]. With thanks to Ilya Afanasyev and 
Gustav Zamore for the translation.
Then, on 3 February 1774 he suddenly had acute pains in his lumbar 
region. First he was treated with sedatives, which did not work, then 
they gave him a lumbar puncture which also did not work. They tried 
bleeding him. Nothing worked, and the pains just grew worse and worse. 
He started going into convulsions. After ninety-seven hours of suffering, 
he died. This was all so surprising and baffling that an autopsy was 
performed, and imagine everyone’s surprise—interjects Nuch—when 
they discovered a sort of cyst or sac in the soldier’s abdomen in which 
they found a perfectly formed—although dead—baby boy. This sack 
was of course a uterus which communicated with the rectum by means 
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Fig. 4.4 The pregnant soldier carries on his duties blissfully unaware, 
BnF, Manuscrits, NAF 13762, f. 96r., Denis Diderot (copyist ‘E’), c. 1780, 
Pen and paper, Denis Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, Fonds Vandeul, 
Bibliothèque nationale de France, CC-BY 
of a very narrow tube that was even smaller, we read, than the ink feeder 
in a fountain pen. Otherwise, the soldier was ‘perfectly’ male both 
internally and externally. The unnamed and unpersonalised observers 
then remember that the soldier had complained he felt something 
moving inside him about thirty hours before he died. The story ends 
balefully: ‘they’ are in no doubt about how this all happened, but just 
for the avoidance of doubt, they seize the soldier’s bedfellow, clap him 
in irons and repeatedly ‘threaten him’ until he finally admits what ‘they’ 
had ‘violently suspected’. And there, with a cursory reference to the 
source, the footnote ends.84
84  Gazette des Deux-Ponts (1775), number 22. At the beginning of the anecdote, he 
had also referenced ‘Mr Nuch, chirurgien-major des troupes de la garnison de ce 
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Of course the history of medicine and of law is full of bizarre ‘cases’ 
that sometimes leap off the page in a way that brings their subjects to 
life—as many have noticed, not least Natalie Zemon Davis in her work on 
Martin Guerre and on the pardon cases in Fiction in the Archives.85 Such 
cases offer a very rich and deep meeting of high and low cultures, where 
the educated writer—a literate observer, whether lawyer or doctor—
commits to writing the events and words of those being observed, 
generally according to certain forms of professional code. These sorts of 
‘cases’ are obviously both problematic and revealing in equal measure, 
but when a writer such as Diderot extracts them from their original 
context and re-uses them, they begin to resonate in an entirely new way; 
as Clark put it, and as we quoted a few pages earlier, their ‘meaning 
must be renegotiated’.86 Diderot’s adoption and framing of these two 
tales and the way in which he brings them together gives them great 
prominence, even just in terms of space on the page. Lightly sketched as 
they are, both stories are full of human detail and character—the lovers 
in the first story who eagerly find a way round the woman’s irregular 
physical formation, and who repeatedly reject the doctor’s prognosis; 
in the second, the cheerful character of the soldier who willingly gets 
on with his duties, and the intimacy of the hidden relationship. The 
economy of the telling and the narrative trajectory increase—I would 
argue—the impact of the shadows around the story—that which is not 
known, or not said. The brutal statement about not knowing whether 
the mother and child died in the first case prods the reader to notice the 
callousness of the reporting observer, while also returning attention to 
the human outcome—certainly shocking and probably tragic for those 
involved. The shape of the Moravian story is not dissimilar, in that the 
relation of the everyday duties and interactions also end in baffled 
suffering and tragedy. In this case however, it seems more intensely 
tragic: the soldier suffers for ninety-seven hours, he does die, and so 
does the child, while his ‘bedfellow’ or rather his lover not only loses 
him, but is imprisoned because of their relationship, the violence of 
the suspicion being a transposition, we assume, of the way in which 
château’ as having certified it. See DPV 430, n. 270/PQ 250, n. 87/MT 247 (the entire 
source is given MT 433–35, Journal historique et politique, Genève, 1775, pp. 296–98).
85  Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in Sixteenth-
Century France (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987).
86  See above.
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he is treated. These cases sharply juxtapose the precise and sceptical 
empiricism of the doctor anatomist with a complex human situation in 
time—the emphasis is not only on the person with the malformed body 
but on the human relationships he or she has, and on the consequences 
of the bodily malformation on those relationships. The distance of 
the recording eye in combination with the intensity, strangeness, and 
tragedy of the human events make for a powerful mix.
The effect that the presence of these and other such narratives have 
on the Éléments de physiologie as a whole is to make sure we do not get 
lost in abstractions about physiology, matter and its movement. They 
tell us what it feels like to be a piece of matter, or a piece of malformed 
matter, experiencing love and tragedy. These people or characters are 
not special, not heroic, yet their experience is still intense, still worthy 
of attention and compassion. They are part of Diderot’s answer to the 
philosophical question about what happens to identity, individuality, 
and the all-round unique specialness and perfection of the human being 
when viewed as nothing more or less than the temporary happenstance 
of material organisation and physiology. These notions of uniqueness 
with their theological and hierarchical dimensions may all fall away 
when humans are viewed as a certain species of animal, and what is 
left may well be both fragile and impermanent, but perception and 
experience—what it feels like to be alive—are no less complex or intense. 
Or, in these cases, tragic. 
To briefly sum up: what distinguishes Diderot’s Éléments de physiologie 
from similar introductory surveys of the period is in part the way in which 
it is framed with materialist questions (about matter, life, experience, 
illness, and death). It is also characterised by its much sharper style, and 
by a resolutely anti-abstract approach; again we can link this to Diderot’s 
materialism and his interrogation of it, refusing to universalise. The 
basics of physiology involve, for Diderot, understanding our experience 
of being alive, of being ill, of feeling desire, of being driven by it. 
PART TWO
THE ÉLÉMENTS DE 
PHYSIOLOGIE, 1790–1823

5. 1790: Naigeon and the Adresse à 
l’Assemblée nationale
In 1784 Diderot died. The following year, the set of manuscripts which 
Diderot had prepared for Catherine II were sent off to her along with 
all his books.1 No catalogue of his library survives, and the books 
themselves have been dispersed or lost.2 The manuscripts, however, 
would go on to form the basis of the edition of his complete works that 
Jules Assézat and Maurice Tourneux prepared, and which came out in 
twenty volumes between 1875 and 1877. The Éléments de physiologie is 
to be found in volume nine, but this version, as indicated in Chapter 2, 
was an early draft of the text. Diderot had had another complete set of 
his manuscripts made, and these passed to his daughter, Angélique de 
Vandeul. Jacques-André Naigeon (1738–1810), a member of d’Holbach’s 
circle younger than Diderot by a generation, and, like him, a co-writer 
of the baron’s most famous work, the Système de la nature (1770), was 
named in Diderot’s will as his literary executor.3 It is to him that we now 
turn. 
Jacques-André Naigeon’s contribution to the Diderot story—as 
editor and guardian of Diderot’s works and reputation—was decisive, 
1  Gerhardt Stenger, Diderot, le combattant de la liberté (Paris: Perrin, 2013), pp. 703–04.
2  Sergeï V. Korolev has attempted to reconstitute it, see his study, La Bibliothèque de 
Diderot. Vers une reconstitution (Ferney-Voltaire: Centre international d’Études du 
dix-huitième siècle, 2014).
3  Denis Diderot, 7 June 1773, quoted in Maurice Tourneux, Review of Ernest Dupuy’s 
edition of the Paradoxe sur le comédien, Revue d’histoire littéraire de la France, 9.3 (1902), 
500–18 (p. 506); also Denis Diderot, Correspondance, ed. by Georges Roth and Jean 
Varloot, 15 vols (Paris: Minuit, 1955–70), vol. 12, p. 231 (3 June 1773). Naigeon 
would also quote it, and we give the text in its entirety in Chapter 10.
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and did not perhaps always work to Diderot’s advantage or to his own. 
This however is more owing to the unpredictable unfolding of what 
we now know as the French Revolution as if it was one event with one 
identity, and which Naigeon misread more than once, than to any innate 
inadequacy on his part. The remainder of this study is therefore as 
much about the Revolution and its cultural politics and polemics as it is 
about Naigeon or Diderot or any of the other figures we will be looking 
at. Its twists and turns cannot be relegated to some sort of decorative 
backdrop; it is the ‘context’ here which directly influences the form any 
‘text’ can take, with some truly odd, even distorting, results in the case 
of the hardline atheist materialist Éléments de physiologie. I will argue 
that for Naigeon, it was Diderot’s most important text bar none, and 
that pages 207–90 of his Mémoires historiques et philosophiques sur la vie 
et les ouvrages de Denis Diderot constitute its first, disguised, publication. 
This, however, did not occur until 1823, thirteen years after Naigeon’s 
death. This is despite Naigeon’s advertising the Mémoires as early as 
1792 in the article on ‘Diderot’ he wrote for the philosophy volumes 
of the Encyclopédie méthodique and again in his preface to Diderot’s 
Œuvres which came out in 1798. Yet, even in 1823, it was immediately 
banned and the publisher fined.4 As we can see from even this short 
overview, the story is convoluted in chronological terms and stretches 
beyond Naigeon’s named publication of Diderot’s Œuvres in 1798 across 
different texts with different genres, from the dictionary entry to the 
intellectual biography, and from the early years of the Revolution to the 
reign of the ultra conservative Charles X. Given this complexity, it seems 
clearest therefore simply to follow the years through in chronological 
order. This will involve moving between Naigeon and other players, 
specifically the politician-philosopher-lecturer Dominique-Joseph Garat 
and the philosophers Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis and Antoine Louis 
Claude Destutt de Tracy, later known as Ideologues after Destutt’s 
neologism of ‘Idéologie’, important figures who were not necessarily in 
sympathy with Naigeon and whom we will introduce in greater detail 
in due course. 
The story starts though with the first of Naigeon’s publications to 
touch on any of Diderot’s works since the latter’s death, and the first 
4  David Adams, Bibliographie des œuvres de Diderot, 1739–1900, 2 vols (Ferney-Voltaire: 
Centre international d’étude du XVIIIe siècle, 2000), vol. 2, p. 141.
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(and last)5 to engage directly with Revolutionary politics, seeking 
to influence decisions in the making.6 This is his Adresse à l’Assemblée 
nationale sur la liberté des opinions, sur celle de la presse, published in Paris 
in February 1790.7 
Detailed work by Pascale Pellerin, Raymond Trousson, and René 
Tarin has explored and explained why the consecrating glory bestowed 
on Voltaire and Rousseau is emphatically denied to Diderot throughout 
the Revolutionary years. They show how, for different reasons and at 
different moments, Diderot is persistently perceived as, in Pellerin’s 
words, ‘violent, extrémiste, ennemi implacable des rois et des prêtres’ 
[violent, extremist, and an implacable enemy of kings and priests].8 As 
Pellerin argues, this perception seems to be set on its juggernaut course by 
Naigeon’s vitriolically anti-clerical Adresse à l’Assemblée nationale, which 
tarnished Diderot by association. Naigeon’s description of priests as ‘des 
espèces de bêtes féroces qu’il faut enchaîner et emmuseler, lorsqu’on 
ne veut pas être dévoré’ [species of wild beasts that must be chained 
and muzzled if one wishes to avoid being devoured] was quoted and 
requoted in a relay race of righteous indignation, and rapidly associated 
with Diderot.9 This impression, that ‘derrière chaque phrase de Naigeon, 
le public observe l’ombre de Diderot’ [behind each sentence Naigeon 
wrote, the public saw the shadow of Diderot],10 and that that shade was 
a vengeful and violent one, was confirmed by Louis-Sébastien Mercier’s 
damaging anecdote, published in 1791, that Diderot used to say that ‘le 
genre humain […] ne sera heureux que quand on aura étranglé le dernier 
5   Apart from the censored preface to his edition of Montaigne, although that never 
made it to publication (see discussion below). 
6  I regret that Mario Cosenza’s study of Naigeon, All’ombra dei Lumi: Jacques-André 
Naigeon philosophe (Naples: FedOAPress, 2020) came out too late for my research to 
benefit from it. It is free to read here: http://www.fedoabooks.unina.it/index.php/
fedoapress/catalog/book/190. 
7  Jacques-André Naigeon specifies the month in which the Adresse was published 
in the ‘Discours préliminaire’ to his 3-volume dictionary: Encyclopédie méthodique: 
Philosophie ancienne et moderne, 3 vols (Paris: Panckoucke, 1791–94), vol. 1, pp. i–xxvi 
(p. xxii: the printed number on this page is ‘xii’ but this is an error): ‘cet écrit a 
été publié dans le mois de février 1790’ [this text was published in the month of 
February 1790].
8  Pascale Pellerin, ‘Naigeon: une certaine image de Diderot sous la Révolution’, 
Recherches sur Diderot et sur l’Encyclopédie, 29.2 (2000), 25–44 (p. 26), https://doi.
org/10.4000/rde.104. 
9  Pellerin, ‘Naigeon: une certaine image de Diderot sous la Révolution’, 37.
10  Pellerin, ‘Naigeon: une certaine image de Diderot sous la Révolution’, 35.
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roi avec les boyaux du dernier prêtre’11 [the human species […] will not 
be happy until the last king has been strangled with the guts of the last 
priest], and for all that Naigeon carefully and accurately restores this 
expression back to its rightful source, the parish priest Jean Meslier, in 
the article on him which appeared in the third volume of the Philosophie 
ancienne et moderne in 1794, it remained indelibly associated with Diderot, 
not least because of his poem, Les Eleuthéromanes, later published in 1796, 
contains a rephrasing of exactly this.12 So we see what the issue is, and it 
does not really matter a great deal that the exact phrase did not originate 
with him and in fact reached its pithy apogee in a reworking of Meslier 
authored by Voltaire in 1762, and thus that Diderot is the third not the 
first to come out with this threat to the twin authorities of church and 
monarchy; his being associated with it is not incorrect. And of course it 
gives superb ammunition to the anti-revolutionaries: Jean-François de La 
Harpe (1739–1803), literary critic and erstwhile philosophe in the ambit 
of Voltaire, whose imprisonment in 1794 is credited with transforming 
his views into reactionary conservatism, influenced generations to 
come when he wrote in his Cours de littérature of 1797 that Diderot was 
‘un auteur immoral et subversif mais aussi sanguinaire’ [not only an 
immoral and subversive author but also a blood-thirsty one].13 
And yet this is not the whole story. The Diderot (or the La Harpe) of 
1797 was not the Diderot (or the La Harpe) of 1790. And Naigeon’s Adresse 
was not universally negatively received; on the contrary, great swathes 
of it—twelve pages, no less—were quoted verbatim and approvingly 
in the Mercure de France in its issue of 5 March 1791, the journalist 
explaining that he preferred to provide the original given that his own 
views were identical: ‘nous nous sommes étendus sur ces idées et au lieu 
d’y mêler les nôtres qui sont absolument conformes à celles de l’Auteur, 
nous avons cité, en le resserrant, tout son système’ [we examined these 
ideas and instead of mixing ours in with them decided, given that they 
11  L. S. Mercier, De J. J. Rousseau considéré comme l’un des premiers auteurs de la Révolution 
(Paris: Buisson, 1791), vol. 2, p. 137; quoted in Raymond Trousson, Images de Diderot 
en France, 1784–1913 (Paris: Champion, 1997), pp. 29–30.
12  Diderot, Les Éleuthéromanes, ed. by Jean Varloot, in Œuvres complètes, ed. by H. 
Dieckmann, Jacques Proust, Jean Varloot (Paris: Hermann, 1975) [hereafter DPV], 
vol. 20, pp. 549–55.
13  René Tarin, Diderot et la Révolution française: controverses et polémique autour d’un 
philosophe (Paris: Champion, 2001), p. 143.
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follow the Author’s exactly, to quote, in condensed version, his whole 
system].14 And when we read the Adresse, we discover that the ‘public’ 
was not wrong to observe Diderot’s shade hovering behind Naigeon, as 
Pellerin put it: Naigeon in fact directly quotes, without acknowledging 
it, from a number of Diderot’s works. We find lengthy paragraphs from 
his Plan d’une université pour le gouvernement de Russie, and also sentences 
or recognisable expressions from the Éléments de physiologie, his letters, 
Jacques le fataliste, and the ‘Prière du sceptique’.15 Naigeon also invisibly 
quotes from D’Holbach’s Système de la nature, and (extensively) from his 
own articles on Cardan and Mirabeau, due to appear in 1792 and ‘An 
II’ (1793–94) in volumes 2 and 3 of the Philosophie ancienne et moderne 
(there may well be more extensive quotation even than this, but I have 
not been able to source any more). 
From the point of view of this study, then, it looks as if Naigeon 
was using his Adresse to prepare the way for his multi-staged Diderot 
publication project, and also as an advert or appetiser for his forthcoming 
Philosophie ancienne et moderne, with its important ‘Diderot’ article. If so, 
as we have already intimated, it did not work very well. It was his first 
misstep. But we can see from the text itself that he thought the time was 
ripe: ‘quand on a quelque chose de bon à dire, il faut se presser’ [when 
you have something good to say, you must hurry up and say it].16 In the 
pages that follow we will look at what ‘the good thing’ he had to say 
was, and why it was urgent. 
The goal of Naigeon’s one-hundred-page argument with its 
two lengthy notes, bringing the page count to 140, is in his sub-title: 
‘Examen philosophique de ces questions; 1°. Doit-on parler de Dieu, & 
en général de religion, dans une déclaration des droits de l’homme? 2°. 
La liberté des opinions, quelqu’en soit l’objet; celle du culte & la liberté 
de la Presse peuvent-elles être légitimement circonscrites & gênées 
de quelque manière que ce soit, par le Législateur?’ [Philosophical 
14  Mercure de France 1791: 5 mars 1791; ‘Nouvelles littéraires’, pp. 128–41 (p. 141).
15  It is not clear whether the ‘Prière du sceptique’ really was authored by Diderot. 
Adams does not include it in his Bibliographie des œuvres, but Christian Albertan 
and Anne-Marie Chouillet conclude that it was his, see Christian  Albertan  and 
Anne-Marie  Chouillet, ‘Autographes et documents’,  Recherches sur Diderot et sur 
l’Encyclopédie, 36 (2004), paragraphs 14–15, https://doi.org/10.4000/rde.618. 
16  Jacques-André Naigeon, Adresse à l’Assemblée nationale sur la liberté des opinions, sur 
celle de la presse, etc. (Paris: Volland, 1790), p. 9.
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examination of the following questions; 1. Should God and religion in 
general be mentioned in a declaration of the rights of man? 2. Can the 
freedom to have any opinion about any object, the freedom of worship 
and of the press ever be legitimately circumscribed and blocked in any 
way whatsoever by the Legislator?]. The answer Naigeon gives to both 
questions is an emphatic no. To the first one: ‘Les seules matières où 
il soit permis de parler de Dieu, sont celles de Théologie […]. Il faut 
le bannir de toutes les autres, sans exception […]’ [the only subject in 
which God may be discussed is Theology […] It must be banished from 
absolutely every other one without exception].17 And to the second: 
Le commerce des pensées ne doit être, sous quelque prétexte que ce soit, 
ni plus gêné, ni plus restreint que celui des denrées et des marchandises; 
c’est le même principe général d’utilité et de justice appliqué à des objets 
divers. S’il est des circonstances difficiles et momentanées, où la liberté 
absolue du commerce puisse être modifiée, suspendue même pour un 
temps, dans quelques-unes de ses parties; ce qu’il n’est pas de mon 
sujet d’examiner, il n’est aucun cas, sans exception où celle de penser et 
d’imprimer, puisse être légitimement limitée.18
The trade in thoughts must not, on any pretext whatsoever, be blocked 
or hindered any more than the trade in foodstuffs and goods; this is the 
same general principle of utility and justice applied to different objects. 
If there are any difficult and momentary circumstances in which the 
absolute freedom of trade can be amended or even suspended for a 
short time in any particular aspect is not something I can examine here. 
However, there is no case or exception when the freedom to think and to 
publish can be legitimately limited. 
Naigeon’s argument is an interesting one: the free circulation of thought 
is as important as the free circulation of goods, and can never be 
legitimately restricted. His view, expounded at length, is that personal 
satires, calumny or libel, can have no negative impact if they are false, 
and that they will mostly cancel each other out (p. 72) or be boringly 
written (the only unexpiatable crime, he writes, p. 74, sounding very 
like Voltaire), that ‘un bon Gouvernement’ would never tolerate 
unjust defamation, and further, that, while ‘un libelle diffamatoire’ [a 
defamatory libel] only imperils individuals, the freedom of the press is 
17  Naigeon, Adresse, p. 21.
18  Naigeon, Adresse, p. 76.
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a ‘bien général’ [general good] (p. 77). It is this entire section which the 
Mercure de France approvingly quotes at length, with some gaps.19 
These two views, broadly, on the one hand, that church and state 
should be separate and discussion of God limited to theological debate, 
and on the other, that freedom of the press should be absolute, are not 
particularly radical in Revolutionary France. Naigeon’s anti-clerical 
pro-tolerance pro-free speech stance is not even particularly far from 
the Voltaire of the Lettres philosophiques (1734). So it is interesting 
that this particular publication is associated in scholarly literature 
with an expression of anti-clericalism deemed excessive, and indeed 
typical of Naigeon.20 This view seems to replicate and pursue the anti-
Revolutionary rhetoric so effectively harnessed by La Harpe. Naigeon 
certainly does express unbridled animosity towards priests with their 
institutional power but that is not the only feature of his text, and as 
we have already seen, other aspects were also given the limelight, and 
viewed as well-expressed and important.21 
Let us turn to the aspect which is of most importance to this study, that 
is, Naigeon’s quotation from or stewardship of Diderot’s writings and 
thought, not omitting the Éléments de physiologie. As Naigeon’s quotation 
of Diderot’s texts in the Adresse seems not to be fully recognised, I will 
give it in full.22 Apart from the fact that this will hopefully be of interest 
to scholars of Diderot and Naigeon anyway, the relevance for this 
specific argument is to begin to chart and track the patterns of Naigeon’s 
quotation of and references to Diderot, which we will follow through his 
other publications all the way to the Mémoires of 1823.
19  Direct quotation (as opposed to paraphrase which begins and ends the Mercure 
review) is to be found in Mercure de France 1791: 5 mars 1791; pp. 133–39, relating to 
Naigeon’s Adresse, pp. 60–79.
20  See for example Pellerin, ‘Naigeon’, 33, 36. 
21  See for example Mercure de France 1791, p. 140, as quoted above.
22  Roland Mortier gives an ‘analyse détaillée de son contenu’ [detailed analysis of 
its content], remarking how Naigeon ‘se place […] sous l’égide de Diderot, dont 
l’autorité sera évoquée discrètement à d’autres occasions’ [places himself (…) 
under the auspices of Diderot, whose authority will be discreetly evoked on other 
occasions], one of these occasions being part of the section about the ‘Sorbonnistes’ 
which we quote below, but Mortier doesn’t name the source text or give precise 
references, so it’s not entirely clear whether he saw Naigeon’s ‘discreet evocation’ of 
Diderot as being in the order of quotation or just allusion. Roland Mortier, ‘Naigeon 
critique de la déclaration des droits’, RDE, 20 (1996), 103–13 (pp. 105, 107, 108, 111), 
https://doi.org/10.3406/rde.1996.1325. 
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Quotation and Allusion
The two most extensive verbatim quotations from Diderot are from 
his (then) unpublished Plan d’une université pour le gouvernement de 
Russie, and here both the title and the author are kept strictly quiet, 
although each passage is given in quotation marks and attributed to 
‘un philosophe’ (in the first instance) and ‘un philosophe moderne’ (in 
the second). This text, sent by Diderot to Catherine II in 1775 (and not 
implemented by her), was a continuation of what are now known as his 
Mélanges pour Catherine II and in which he planned the earlier stages of 
education.23 The two passages Naigeon quotes are anti-clerical. The first 
proposes that churches be turned into lunatic asylums, with the priests 
kept on to look after the inmates, and the second claims that priests 
trained at the Sorbonne are all either deist or atheist, and all the more 
intolerant and disputatious for it; he shudders at the idea that such men 
should be allowed to propound their fanatical theories to the population 
as a whole. Here are the passages. 
Naigeon is talking about how the population as a whole is ignorant 
and superstitious and ripe for fanaticism. This reminds him of:
ce que disoit un philosophe avec cette éloquence et cette énergie que 
donnent la hardiesse et la profondeur des pensées. ‘Le gros d’une nation 
restera toujours ignorant, peureux et par conséquent superstitieux. 
L’athéisme peut être la doctrine d’une petite école, mais jamais celle 
d’un grand nombre de citoyens, encore moins celle d’une nation un peu 
civilisée. La croyance de l’existence de Dieu, ou la vieille souche restera 
donc toujours: or qui sait ce que cette souche abandonnée à sa libre 
végétation, peut produire de monstrueux? Je ne conserverois donc pas 
les prêtres comme des dépositaires de vérités, mais comme des obstacles 
à des erreurs possibles et plus monstrueuses encore; non comme les 
précepteurs des gens sensés, mais comme les gardiens des fous; et leurs 
églises je les laisserois subsister comme l’azile ou les petites maisons 
d’une certaine espece d’imbécilles qui pourroient devenir furieux, si on 
les négligeoit entiérement’.24
23  See Laurent Versini, ‘Introduction [to Plan d’une université]’, in Denis Diderot, 
Œuvres, ed. by Laurent Versini (Paris: R. Laffont, 1995), vol. 3: Politique, p. 411.
24  Naigeon, Adresse, pp. 33–34. The section in quotation marks (‘le gros d’une nation’ 
to ‘entièrement’) is from the Plan d’une université pour le gouvernement de Russie, 
in Diderot, Œuvres complètes, ed. by Jules Assézat and Maurice Tourneux, 20 vols 
(Paris: Garnier Frères, 1875–77), vol. 3, p. 518, https://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/
Plan_d’une_Université_pour_le_gouvernement_de_Russie. 
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what a philosopher said with that eloquence and energy that bold and 
deep thoughts bestow on the speaker. ‘Most of a nation will always stay 
ignorant, fearful and, in conquence, superstitious. Atheism may be the 
doctrine of a small school, but never of a large number of citizens and 
even less of a nation that is somewhat civilized. Belief in the existence of 
God or the old stock will therefore always remain: yet who knows what 
monstrosity this old root, left to grow freely, might produce? I would 
never therefore allow the priests to stay on as the depositories of truth 
but I would keep them to block other possible errors, possibly even more 
monstrous; not as tutors for sensible people, but as wardens of asylums 
for the insane. As for their churches, I would allow them to continue to 
exist as the asylums or special refuges for the sort of imbecile that might 
become violent if they were completely neglected.
We notice how he characterises this ‘philosophe’ as possessing the 
eloquence and energy that audacious and profound thought bestows; 
this is a not atypical description of Diderot.
In the second passage, Naigeon has been relaying a remark about 
how those who teach theology do not believe in a word they say yet 
spend more time than anyone else engaged in disputation and lecturing; 
as before, this leads him into his quotation: 
sa remarque se trouve confirmée par celle d’un Philosophe moderne 
qui avoit fait autrefois sa Licence à Paris, & qui regardoit la Faculté de 
Théologie, comme une excellente école d’incrédulité. ‘Il n’y a guère de 
Sorbonnistes, dit-il, qui ne recelent sous leur fourure ou le déisme ou 
l’athéisme; ils n’en sont que plus intolérans & plus brouillons; ils le sont 
ou par caractere, ou par intérêt, ou par hypocrisie. Ce sont les sujets de 
l’Etat les plus inutiles, les plus intraitables & les plus dangereux. Eux 
& leurs adhérens, Prêtres ou Moines, ont souvent abusé du droit de 
haranguer le peuple assemblé. Si j’étois Souverain, & que je pensasse 
que tous les jours de Fêtes et de Dimanches, entre onze heures et midi, 
cent cinquante mille de mes Sujets disent à tous les autres, & leur font 
croire, au nom de Dieu, tout ce qui convient au démon du fanatisme & 
de l’orgueil qui les possède, j’en frémirois de terreur.’25
[this] remark is confirmed by what was said by a modern philosopher 
who had previously studied for his degree in Paris, and who regarded 
25  Naigeon, Adresse, pp. 46n–47n. The section in quotation marks (‘Sorbonistes’ to 
‘terreur’) is from the Plan d’une université pour le gouvernement de Russie, in Diderot, 
Œuvres complètes de Diderot, ed. by Assézat and Tourneux, vol. 3, p. 438, https://
fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Plan_d’une_Université_pour_le_gouvernement_de_Russie.
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the Faculty of Theology as an excellent school for incredulity. ‘There is 
not a single Sorbonne-trained priest’, said he, ‘who does not hide either 
deism or atheism beneath the fur-lined gown of their office; they’re all the 
more intolerant and argumentative because of it, whether by character, 
interest, or simple hypocrisy. They and their supporters, priests or 
monks, have often abused their right to harangue their congregations. 
If I were the sovereign, and I thought that every Sunday and feast day, 
between eleven o’clock and mid-day, one hundred and fifty thousand of 
my subjects were saying to all the rest of them whatever the demon of 
fanaticism and pride possessing them inspired them to say, and making 
them believe it in the name of God, I would be shuddering with fear.’
Both these passages are striking, and strikingly disrespectful. It is 
perhaps not surprising, given the outraged reaction that Naigeon’s 
Adresse provoked at least in some quarters, and moreover the way in 
which its more extreme expressions of anti-clericism were attributed to 
and blamed on Diderot (not incorrectly, as we are beginning to see), 
that Naigeon did not return to the Plan d’une université in either his 
‘Diderot’ article or in his fifteen-volume Œuvres de Diderot of 1798. It 
does, however, occupy twenty pages of his Mémoires sur Diderot (pp. 
352–73), where we meet these exact same passages again, along with 
many others.26
These two passages are, to my knowledge, the most extensive 
quotations from Diderot in the Adresse, and, as we have seen, they 
are prominently presented as quotations from the conversation of 
‘un philosophe’. Yet there are other sorts of quotation which are not 
demarcated from the text in any way. In the paragraph following the first 
passage (about priests guarding imbeciles kept in churches), Naigeon 
immediately follows on with a further substantial sentence, this one 
extracted from a letter Diderot wrote about meeting the unorthodox 
priest Dom Deschamps.27 It is thought to have been addressed to Mme 
de Maux, and it only survives because Naigeon copied it into a notebook 
of extracts from Diderot’s works and letters which is now part of the 
26  The first passage is replicated in Naigeon’s Mémoires historiques et philosophiques 
sur la vie et les ouvrages de Diderot (Paris: J. L. L. Brière, 1821 [1823]; repr. Geneva: 
Slatkine Reprints, 1970), pp. 360–61, and the second on p. 358. (And it reappears in 
the original manuscript of Naigeon’s Mémoires, F. 216.).
27  Léger Marie Deschamps (1716–74), known as ‘Dom Deschamps’, Benedictine monk 
and radical atheist thinker. 
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Fonds Vandeul in the Bibliothèque nationale.28 And the Adresse is where 
Naigeon subsequently placed this passage. In the letter, Diderot explains 
he is paraphrasing Deschamps’s views on the destructive consequences 
of social inequality. In the quotation, Naigeon simply quotes the idea 
without the framing introduction. It is:
[…] l’idée d’un état social où l’on arriveroit en partant de l’état sauvage, 
en passant par l’état policé au sortir duquel on a l’expérience de la vanité 
des choses les plus importantes, et où l’on conçoit enfin que l’espèce 
humaine sera malheureuse, tant qu’il y aura des Rois, des Prêtres, des 
Magistrats, des Loix, un tien, un mien, les mots de vice et de vertu, etc.29 
the idea of a social state that could ultimately be arrived at, having 
started from a primitive state and moving through a civilized state on the 
way, at the end of which people would have experienced the emptiness 
of all the most important things, and would finally understand that the 
human species will be miserable for as long as there are kings, priests, 
magistrates, laws, a yours, a mine, the words of vice and virtue, etc.
Here, the ‘etc.’ signals the end of this particular passage, and in fact it is 
how Naigeon tends to indicate a cut, as we will see more clearly when 
we look at the Mémoires sur Diderot. However, that cut is invisible to the 
reader unaware of Naigeon’s codes, and he then proceeds to argue that 
any reference to God, while useful in a legal code or charter, is completely 
unnecessary in a Declaration of Rights. It is not perfectly clear why 
one passage would be set apart from the rest of the text as an official 
quotation from ‘un philosophe’ and the other invisibly embedded, other, 
perhaps, than if it is owing to the desire to give those particular extracts 
of the Plan d’une université a bit more visibility, possibly with a view to 
later publication, which, if so, was dropped. It is not the passage’s status 
as an informal letter per se, as Naigeon does not always invisibly embed 
28  See Diderot’s letter to Mme de Maux, 31 August 1769, in Diderot, Œuvres complètes, 
ed. by Roger Lewinter, 15 vols (Paris: Club Français du Livre, 1969–73), vol. 8, p. 
895; Bibliothèque nationale de France, NAF 13783 134v.
29  Ibid. Pellerin states that this precise text ‘faisait référence à deux passages du 
Supplément [au voyage de Bougainville]’ [refers to two passages from the Supplément 
au voyage de Bougainville], citing the ‘adieux du vieillard’ and the dialogue between 
Orou and l’aumônier (Pellerin, ‘Naigeon’, 30), and of course she’s not wrong that 
these passages resonate, but it’s rather that the letter will (as often happened) 
have provided the source that Diderot later worked up into a finished text (the 
Supplément appeared in Grimm’s Correspondance littéraire in the course of 1773–74).
190 The Atheist’s Bible
extracts from Diderot’s letters. The Adresse proper opens with an extract 
from a letter which offers a sort of moral fable:
Un philosophe faisoit un jour cette question à un homme du monde: si 
le bal de l’opéra duroit toute l’année, que pensez-vous qu’il en arrivât? 
– Ce qui en arriveroit! C’est que tous les masques se reconnoitroient. – 
Eh bien, reprit le philosophe, ces masques-là sont les symboles de nos 
erreurs: souhaitez que le bal dure & ils finiront tous par être reconnus.30
One day, a philosopher put this question to a man of the world: ‘If the 
masked balls at the opera were on all year round, what do you think 
would happen?’ ‘What would happen? People would end up recognising 
all the different masks.’ ‘Well,’ replied the philosopher, ‘those masks 
symbolise our errors: you should hope that the balls carry on because 
then every single one will end up being seen through.’
As we have already begun to see, the relation of what ‘un philosophe’ 
said or did is a sure sign of the beginning of a quotation, and often (but 
not always)31 directly refers to Diderot. This extract, too, comes from a 
letter to Mme de Maux. The dialogical dialectical style is very familiar 
from our reading of Diderot, particularly from texts such as the Rêve de 
d’Alembert or the Neveu de Rameau, and indeed summer 1769, when this 
letter was written, is when he composed the Rêve, even if the moralising 
talk of masks and error feels closer to the Neveu. So, in sum, Naigeon 
does quote from the letters more than once, and he varies the way in 
which he presents or embeds his extracts.
At points, he even paraphrases them. One such, from what will 
become perhaps the most requoted part of the Adresse, certainly in anti-
Revolutionary texts, is where, in a development of the theme about 
30  Naigeon, Adresse, p. 11, quoting Diderot, letter to Mme de Maux, mai 1769?; in 
Diderot, Correspondance, Œuvres, ed. by Versini (Paris : Laffont, 1997), vol. 5, p. 947; 
Œuvres complètes, ed. by Lewinter, vol. 8, pp. 852–53 (source copy Naigeon NAF 
13783 132v). Identical except for N’s ‘souhaitez’; Diderot wrote more piously: ‘priez 
Dieu’ [pray to God]. This same opening passage will be regarded as striking and 
quoted by Jean-Philibert Damiron in his study on Naigeon (and others), Mémoire 
sur Naigeon et accessoirement sur Sylvain Maréchal et Delalande (Paris: Durand, 1857), 
reprinted in Mémoires sur les Encyclopédistes (Genève: Slatkine reprints, 1968), p. 
411. Damiron does not know that this is a quotation from an unpublished letter.
31  Other allusions to the views of perspectives of ‘un philosophe’ are to be found in 
Naigeon, Adresse, pp. 33, 46n, 55, 90, 91, 98; the references on pp. 11, 33, and 46n are 
to Diderot as we have seen; 55 is to Cardan; and the others are non-specific.
 1911790: Naigeon and the Adresse à l’Assemblée nationale
which sections of the law or constitution God, religion, and priests may 
(or may not) appear in, Naigeon describes priests as: 
des espèces de bêtes féroces qu’il faut enchaîner et emmuseler, lorsqu’on 
ne veut pas en être dévoré.32 
species of wild beasts that must be chained and muzzled if one wishes to 
avoid being devoured
We mentioned this extract in our introduction to Naigeon’s Adresse, and 
only return to it here to replace it in the context of an argument whose 
features we are beginning to be acquainted with. On the following page 
of the Adresse, Naigeon quotes—still invisibly—from the Système de la 
nature33 (1.29–30):
[…] l’histoire de Dieu est écrite en caractères de sang dans les annales de 
tous les peuples du monde […] 34
the history of God is written in characters of blood in the annals of all the 
peoples of the world
Naigeon was, as we know, one of d’Holbach’s assistants in the writing 
of the Système de la nature, along with Diderot. The extent of their 
contribution is not known; it is perfectly possible that Naigeon wrote this 
particular bit, or even Diderot himself. This hazy multiple authorship 
raises interesting questions about whether it is important (let alone 
possible) to identify any one voice over any other one.35 For the time 
32  Naigeon, Adresse, p. 37. Quoted by Pellerin, ‘Naigeon’, 35, 43: ‘... Moi, Naigeon, 
Encyclopédiste gagé, je ne puis croire que ce soit troubler l’ordre établi par la loi, 
que de mettre au grand jour mes principes Didérotiques, et de soutenir avec ce 
grand Maître de politique et de morale, qu’il n’y aura de bonheur sur la Terre, que 
le jour, où le dernier des Rois sera étranglé avec les boyaux du dernier des Prêtres’ 
[I, Naigeon, a sworn Encyclopedist, cannot believe that it would disturb the order 
established by law to expose my Diderotian principles to the light of day and claim 
with this great Master of politics and morals that there will be no happiness on 
Earth until the day that the last King is strangled with the guts of the last Priest]. 
Naigeon also quotes this image in his ‘Discours préliminaire’, p. xxii. The footnote is 
about Meslier but refers also the Naigeon’s Adresse.
33  D’Holbach, Système de la nature, ed. Josiane Boulad-Ayoub, 2 vols (Paris  : Fayard, 
1990), vol. 1, p. 30.
34  Naigeon, Adresse, p. 38. 
35  See also Caroline Warman, ‘Garden Centres Must Become the Jacobin Clubs 
of the New Revolution’, Voltaire Foundation, 20 November 2018, https://
voltairefoundation.wordpress.com/2018/11/20/garden-centres-must-become-the- 
jacobin-clubs-of-the-new-revolution/.
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being, let us leave it that Naigeon does lift and re-use recognizable 
chunks of Diderot’s words, and that, given that this study is attempting 
to establish whether a particular work of Diderot’s was circulating and 
if so, where and how, it is a necessary part of our process and method to 
trace and place quotation of this sort.
It is perhaps appropriate therefore that I now turn to the three very 
glancing quotations from the Éléments de physiologie that I have found 
in the Adresse. These passages are devoid of the vitriolic anti-clericism 
we have seen thus far, but they also question God, while the materialist 
theory underpinning the rejection of religion comes more clearly into 
view. The first is at the very end of a footnote, mainly quoting Thomas 
Hobbes, which itself expands on a point being made in the main body 
of the text about banning discussion and even the name of God from all 
areas of study apart from theology. Naigeon adds this:
Pascal dit expressément de Dieu, qu’on ne sait ni ce qu’il est, ni si il est.36
Pascal specifically says about God that we do not know what he is or 
whether he is.
In the conclusion to the Éléments de physiologie, we read this:
Pascal dit expressément de Dieu, qu’on ne sait ni ce qu’il est, ni s’il est.37
Pascal specifically says about God that we do not know what he is or 
whether he is.
The reference is slight, and its positioning at the end of a long footnote 
could hardly be less eye-catching. One might also feel sceptical about 
this being attributable to Diderot given that it is a reference to Blaise 
Pascal, and yet to the sceptic I would make two points; firstly, that 
this formula gives a rather specific twist to what Pascal had written 
in what is now known as his ‘wager’ or ‘le pari de Pascal’ (and which 
we discussed in Chapter 2), and secondly that ‘expressément’ does 
36  Naigeon, Adresse, p. 21n; see discussion of this particular passage in Chapter 
2. Reference to Denis Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Jean Mayer, Œuvres 
complètes, DPV (Paris: Hermann, 1987), vol. 17, pp. 261–574 (p.515); Diderot, 
Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Paolo Quintili (Paris: Champion, 2004), p. 358; Diderot, 
Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Motoichi Terada (Paris: Éditions Matériologiques, 
2019), p. 327 [hereafter notated as DPV 515/PQ 358/MT 327].
37  DPV 515/PQ 358/MT 327.
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not feature in the Pascal text; this sentence with its emphatic adverb 
does not sound like a cliché or a received idea; it sounds very written. 
Furthermore, it is not possible that Naigeon was still unaware of the 
Éléments de physiologie in 1790: he had had continuous access to the 
manuscripts at least from Diderot’s death on, and probably earlier, and 
as has been mentioned, integrated many pages from the Éléments into 
the Mémoires which he had been writing from 1784 onwards.38 It seems 
safe therefore to conclude that Naigeon is indeed quoting from it here, 
and that it has a marginal but perceptible presence in the Adresse. And 
indeed it is already there, twice, in the opening pages, where Naigeon 
declares that what the Assemblée nationale needs is ‘un esprit vaste et 
sage qui arrête et dessine le plan dans lequel ils doivent entrer’ [a mind 
of great depth and wisdom to decide on and sketch out the plan that the 
members of the Assemblée nationale need to adopt]; he says moreover 
that ‘les matériaux existent, il est vrai, mais épars et sans liaison, sans 
rapports entre eux’ [the materials exist, it is true, but they are scattered, 
disconnected, without relationships between them].39 He goes on to say 
that for the Assemblée nationale’s work, ‘il importe, sur-tout, que les 
fondemens en soient solides, & le choix n’en est pas indifférent, car ici, 
comme dans beaucoup d’autres cas, il n’y a qu’une seule manière d’être 
bien, & mille manieres d’être mal’ [the most important thing is that the 
foundations be solid, and the choices it makes do matter, for here, as in 
many other cases, there is only one way to be well, and thousands of 
ways of being bad].40
These ‘matériaux’ which are ‘épars et sans liaison’ [scattered and 
disconnected] recall the ‘Avertissement’ of the Éléments de physiologie, 
a passage we have already analysed in some detail, also in connection 
with Pascal, and which evokes the incomplete ‘matériaux’ written 
on its ‘feuillets épars et isolés’ [on scattered and separate scraps of 
paper] in contrapuntal echo to the introduction to Pascal’s Pensées by 
his nephew, Étienne Périer, in which he describes his uncle’s fragments 
as being ‘quelques matériaux épars et sans aucun ordre entre eux’ [a 
38  Jacques-André Naigeon, ‘Diderot’, in Encyclopédie méthodique: Philosophie ancienne 
et moderne, vol. 2, pp. 153–228 (p. 153); ‘Avertissement des Éditeurs’, in Naigeon, 
Mémoires sur la vie et les ouvrages de Diderot, p. v.
39  Naigeon, Adresse, p. 12.
40  Naigeon, Adresse, pp. 12–13.
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few scattered materials with no internal order]. We see these allusions 
re-echoing here in the opening pages of Naigeon’s Adresse, and they will 
return in his Mémoires.41
He follows on, as we saw, with this allusion to the single way of being 
good or well as opposed to the thousand ways of being bad or unwell, 
which he introduces as being applicable in many other cases. Here is the 
one he was probably thinking of:
Il n’est qu’une manière de se porter bien; il y en a une infinité de se porter 
mal.42
There is only one way of being well, but there are thousands of ways of 
being ill.
This is the opening sentence to the chapter on ‘Maladies’ in the third 
and final part of the Éléments. ‘Se porter’ in Diderot’s words has become 
‘être’ in Naigeon’s, to pull it away from its relevance to health, and 
yet, ‘être bien/être mal’ is rather clunky, particularly if what Naigeon 
is referring to here is the Assemblée nationale’s decision-making 
processes. It seems as if he did not wish to alter the original sentence 
beyond recognisability, instead affirming its sententious or axiomatic 
nature, rather than making it fit better in the context. 
So, what have we got here with respect to the Éléments de physiologie? 
Not much in terms of quantity, but some discernable references, one 
from its opening pages and another from its close, along with this third 
one about health and the variety of ‘ill’ ways of doing things, or simply 
of ‘being’ in the awkward rephrasing we find here, itself embedded in 
Naigeon’s own opening paragraphs, which, as we have already seen, are 
rich in precise quotation from Diderot. In sum, a marginal presence, yet 
in the sense that margins can also be the frame, or perhaps, to bring in 
Naigeon’s own metaphor of ‘[des] fondemens […] solides’, that on which 
the rest is built or which provides the ‘matériaux’ out of which it is built, 
bref, the assumptions that underpin Naigeon’s argument. Of such a sort 
is the definition of man from ‘un point de vue plus philosophique’ [a 
more philosophical view-point]—more philosophical, that is, than the 
religious view of man—as a ‘portion nécessairement organisée d’une 
41  Naigeon, Mémoires sur la vie et les ouvrages de Diderot, p. 291; discussed in Chapter 2.
42  DPV 508/PQ 347/MT 321.
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matière éternelle, nécessaire’ [a necessarily organised portion of eternal 
and necessary matter]: this definition of man is lifted from Diderot’s 
‘Prière du sceptique’ [The Sceptic’s prayer].43 The necessity of human 
material organisation, that is, its determined character, resurfaces again 
in the remark in passing about ‘ces hommes malheureusement nés’ 
[these humans born in an unfortunate form] who cannot be influenced 
or contained by law; this is specifically in the context of the importance 
of everyone having ‘le droit de tout dire et de tout imprimer’ [the right 
to say and publish anything] (p. 86); those who are ‘malheureusement 
nés’ [born in unfortunate form] must simply be destroyed, given 
that they cannot be punished. This particular formula appears to be 
related to the French version of Hobbes, but is most recognisable as the 
view of Jacques’s captain: ‘il prétendait qu’on était heureusement ou 
malheureusement né’ [his claim was that one was born in a fortunate 
or unfortunate form].44
Naigeon’s Strategy
To summarise and characterise Naigeon’s referencing of Diderot in the 
Adresse, then, we can say firstly, that Diderot is clearly present in this 
text in the form of exact quotation from a range of works, none of which 
were published in 1790 (although Jacques le fataliste had been circulated 
in the manuscript periodical, the Correspondance littéraire); secondly, that 
Diderot’s name is never given; thirdly, that Naigeon sometimes signals 
that he is quoting, by the simple deployment of quotation marks, and 
that these quotations are attributed to ‘un philosophe’; and finally, that a 
rough characterisation of the Diderot texts deployed here would suggest 
that they are primarily anti-clerical, secondarily anti-authoritarian and 
anti-hierarchical, and lastly, materialist. The verb ‘deployed’ suggests a 
43  Despite some question about the authorship of this piece, as referenced above, 
recent scholarship considers that this ‘Prière du sceptique’ was by Diderot: see 
Albertan and Chouillet, ‘Autographes et documents’, paragraphs 14–15.
44  Naigeon, Adresse, p. 87. ‘Hommes malheureusement nés’ may be a Hobbesian 
formula in French clothes; also in Jacques le fataliste: ‘[Jacques] prétendait qu’on était 
heureusement ou malheureusement nés’, see DPV, vol. 23, p. 189; also ‘dans une 
lettre à SV, Diderot écrit que la plupart des hommes “naissent moitié sots et moitié 
fous ”’ [in a letter to Sophie Volland, Diderot writes that most men ‘are born half 
stupid and half mad’], Diderot, Correspondance, ed. by Roth and Varloot, vol. 3, p. 98.
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strategy on Naigeon’s part. Are we right to use such a verb? Is there a 
strategy at work in his supposed ‘deployment’ of Diderot in this text, 
and if so, what is it? Of course, in asking this question, we set aside 
Naigeon’s explicit aim of convincing the Assemblée nationale to omit 
any mention of God and also to enshrine freedom of speech in the 
Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen as this is not the concern of 
our study. The question is thus not how Naigeon uses Diderot to boost 
his arguments, but more specifically, whether Naigeon uses this text as 
an occasion to publicise or publish Diderot, and if so, how. 
Without being able to produce a conclusive answer, we can 
nonetheless look at what Naigeon does say generally about readers, 
publication, timeliness, and quotation. In an early footnote, for example, 
he apologises for not having had enough time to integrate the footnotes 
with the main body of the text, but states that the ‘Lecteur attentif & 
intelligent’ [attentive and intelligent reader] will have no trouble 
linking the ideas and seeing the ‘rapport très-immédiat’ [very direct 
relationship] between the different text levels.45 This tells us immediately 
that Naigeon has an ideal reader in mind, and that this reader will 
understand his text in a way that others, undescribed but existing in 
implicit contrast to this ‘attentive and intelligent reader’, will not. So 
there are different levels of readers and different levels of understanding, 
and some will see what the text really means, whereas others will not. 
This is a hierarchisation of the elite reader that we will meet again in the 
Mémoires, when, specifically in the context of the ‘quelques matériaux 
épars et sans aucun ordre entre eux’ which we mentioned only a few 
paragraphs back in connection with the ‘Avertissement’ to the Éléments 
de physiologie and its allusion to Pascal’s Pensées, Naigeon says that these 
ideas, however scattered, will nonetheless have meaning ‘aux yeux du 
philosophe assez instruit pour couver les idées neuves et fécondes dont 
Diderot a semé ses recherches’ [in the eyes of the philosopher who is 
45  Naigeon, Adresse, p. 2. Naigeon makes a further appeal in the Adresse to a more 
advanced sort of reader when he talks about the ‘lecteur accoutumé à se rendre 
compte de toutes ses pensées’ [reader accustomed to justify his thoughts to himself] 
(Adresse, p. 62). This phrasing recalls one of Diderot’s letters to Sophie Volland, 
where he talks about the pleasure of ‘se rendre compte à soi-même de ses opinions’ 
[justifying one’s opinions to oneself] (Letter to SV, 14.7.62, quoted in Roland Mortier, 
‘Diderot et le problème de l’expressivité: de la pensée au dialogue heuristique’, 
Cahiers de l’AIEF, 13.1 (1961), 283–97, https://doi.org/10.3406/caief.1961.2204).
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sufficiently knowledgeable to appreciate the new and fertile ideas that 
Diderot planted in his work].46 So, looking at this notion of the ideal 
reader from the perspective of the Mémoires, we see that s/he (probably 
‘he’ for Naigeon) is ideal specifically in the way in which he will be 
learned enough to appreciate the new and productive ideas that Diderot 
seeded across his research. The ideal reader is one who is capable of 
appreciating Diderot.
The ideal writer, on the other hand, says what he means and publishes 
at the right time. Claude Adrien Helvétius’s De l’homme had met neither 
of these criteria, Naigeon tells us:
comme il avoit résolu de le faire imprimer, malgré les conseils de ses 
amis qui prévoyoient les suites funestes de son imprudence, il craint de 
laisser pénétrer ses vrais sentimens; mais on les apperçoit au travers du 
voile dont il cherche en vain à se couvrir.47
as he was determined to publish it, despite the advice of his friends, who 
foresaw the disastrous consequences of his imprudence, he was fearful 
of allowing his real views to be detected. Yet they are still perceptible 
through the veil with which he seeks in vain to cover them.
Helvétius wished to publish but also wished to get round censorship 
by disguising his real meaning; the result is a disaster, in that he fails 
to avoid censorship, and his attempt to disguise his real meaning 
leads, claims Naigeon, to pages and pages of tedious and confusing 
argumentation—‘des longueurs accablantes’.48 This sort of writing 
which attempted to disguise its real meaning had a name: ‘la double 
doctrine’.49 According to Naigeon, this is what Helvétius was using, and 
not only was it a failure, it was unworthy of a ‘philosophe’. Thus we read 
that:
L’usage de la double doctrine convient mieux à un Hiérophante dont 
l’intérêt est d’obscurcir les notions les plus claires, & qui ne vit que de 
l’ignorance & de la crédulité des Peuples, qu’à un Philosophe […]50
46  Naigeon, Mémoires sur la vie et les ouvrages de Denis Diderot, p. 291.
47  Naigeon, Adresse, p. 28n.
48  Naigeon, Adresse, p. 29n (this is a continuation of the note on p. 28).
49  For a thorough analysis of libertine rhetoric, see Isabelle Moreau, ‘Guérir du sot’: Les 
Stratégies d’écriture des libertins à l’âge classique (Paris: Champion, 2007).
50  Naigeon, Adresse, p. 28n.
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The deployment of the double doctrine better befits a hierophant in 
whose interest it is to make the clearest notions as obscure as possible, 
and whose survival depends upon the ignorance and credulity of the 
people, than it does a philosopher.
The brave, wise, and virtuous philosophe does not publish primarily 
for glory (‘Helvétius aimoit la gloire’ [Helvétius loved glory]), against 
the advice of his friends, resorting to ‘vains subterfuges’ in order to 
protect himself and thereby making his book incomprehensible. The 
philosophe tells the truth, whatever it costs, even if that means foregoing 
publication. Naigeon goes on to reprove Newton for having chosen to 
appease the theologians by giving some weak proofs of the existence 
of God (pp. 30–32), only subsequently quoting from a philosophe who 
wrote ‘avec cette éloquence et cette énergie que donnent la hardiesse et 
la profondeur des pensées’ [that eloquence and energy that bold and 
deep thoughts bestow on the speaker] and about most people being 
ignorant, afraid, and superstitious. This is the passage we have already 
quoted, starting ‘Le gros d’une nation’ [most of a nation] and that 
quotation is from Diderot. In this long castigation of writers who failed 
in their duty or judgement in one way or another, therefore, it is Diderot 
who is presented as the shining counter-example, even though his name 
is hidden. 
This all seems quite clear, even stridently so. Naigeon is in charge, 
and although Helvétius did not understand when the right time to 
publish was, Naigeon does, and that time is now, as he had said in his 
introduction:
[…] quand on a quelque chose de bon à dire, il faut se presser; car on est 
presque sûr que la vérité qu’on découvre aujourd’hui, & qu’on n’annonce 
pas, sera trouvée & publiée demain par un autre. Il est très-indifférent, 
sans doute, que l’Auteur d’une grande découverte s’appelle Newton ou 
Leibniz; ce [qui] importe beaucoup, c’est que cette découverte se fasse; 
mais il n’en est pas moins vrai que le soin de sa propre gloire n’est pas à 
dédaigner, & qu’il ne faut pas paroître suivre ceux qu’on peut précéder, 
ou à côté desquels on a droit de se placer.51
when you have something good to say, you must hurry up and say it; 
because you can be almost sure that the truth you discover today and 
51  Naigeon, Adresse, pp. 9–10.
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don’t publicise will be found and publicised by someone else tomorrow. 
It is completely irrelevant, no doubt, whether the name of the author of a 
great discovery is Newton or Leibniz; what is really important, is that this 
discovery should be made. And yet it is no less true that one’s own glory 
should not be neglected, and that one should not allow it to seem that 
one has followed in the footsteps of those one has preceded, or in whose 
company one has the right to stand.
Or is he quite so clear? This particular argument seems to be coming 
from a different angle. The right moment to publish in this presentation 
is based not on issues of censorship and prudence but on getting a move 
on and making sure someone else does not grab one’s rightful glory. Is 
he contradicting himself? Perhaps there is no need to set Naigeon’s two 
positions against one another, as if he were in bad faith for lambasting 
Helvétius’s interest in glory; perhaps it is enough simply to say that 
what Naigeon says in his introduction and what he says twenty pages 
later are two separate things, that so far as Naigeon is concerned, times 
have changed, and the interests of the nation require him to say ‘quelque 
chose de bon’ [something good] straightaway, and not neglect his own 
reputation—or that of the author whose manuscripts it is his job to 
look after and disseminate as he sees fit—in the meantime. But in any 
case, as we know, Naigeon’s confidence, both in the timing of his (and 
Diderot’s) anti-clerical message and in the readiness of his readers to 
hear it, was—ironically—completely misplaced. 
Thus far, in our attempt to understand whether Naigeon has a 
strategy, we have looked at what he says about readers, publication, and 
timeliness. He presents a strident display of confidence and knowledge 
combined, a sense of knowing better, that is not so much persuasive 
as dogmatic and dominant, and yet as we have also seen, there is a 
perceptible thread of self-contradiction that undermines some of what 
he says. We have not yet analysed an important aspect for this study, 
that is, his strategies or practices of quotation more generally.
Describing these practices of quotation reveals an economy that is 
so mixed that it is hard to discern any strategy. This is not to suggest 
that the result is a textual (or authorial) mess but rather that it is 
extremely complex. As we have already seen, he quotes Diderot on 
multiple occasions and from multiple texts, and also in multiple ways, 
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while never actually naming him.52 Some of the quotation is made 
textually prominent and visible as quotation by the straightforward use 
of quotation marks; some of it is introduced by ‘un philosophe disoit’ 
[a philosopher said] or ‘un philosophe faisoit un jour cette question’ [a 
philosopher one day asked this question]—and we note the emphasis 
here on orality and conversation rather than on written texts—and 
some of it is not given textual prominance of any sort but is invisibly 
embedded in a sentence—this may be simply an expression we can 
trace to a Diderot text or which echoes a Diderot text quite closely 
but does not replicate it exactly. But Diderot is not the only author he 
quotes. We also meet La Rochefoucauld half way through a sentence, 
his ‘il n’y a rien d’absolument bon et d’absolument mauvais’ [there is 
nothing absolutely good or absolutely bad] recycled into a statement 
presenting itself not as quotation but as a declaration of the truth.53 It 
would be tempting to extrapolate from this that for Naigeon, writing 
and philosophising is not about a display of authorial attribution 
and sources, but about a depersonalised or rather a de-authorialised 
establishment of the truth, if we did not have the counter-evidence 
of the paragraph on publishing in order to stamp one’s name on a 
discovery and maintain one’s rightful glory. Furthermore, in fact, we 
also find a great deal of attributed citation, predominantly from Latin 
authors. Tacitus and Horace appear frequently to lend their classical 
authority and clinch a point.54 Pierre Bayle is named and precisely 
referenced.55 Yet Lucretius is also quoted in Latin, without being named 
52  Elsewhere we have studied some of the striking behaviour around naming sources 
(or more often, not naming them) in the 1790s, and it seems that Naigeon’s practice 
of calling Diderot ‘un philosophe’ fits quite neatly into that analysis whereby 
certain unproblematic authorities are named, while others (generally Diderot) 
are anonymised. See Caroline Warman, ‘Caught between Neologism and the 
Unmentionable: The Politics of Naming and Non-naming in 1790s France’, Romance 
Studies, 31 (2013), 264–76, https://doi.org/10.1179/0263990413Z.00000000051. 
53  Naigeon, Adresse, p. 81; from François de La Rochefoucauld, Réflexions ou sentences 
et maximes morales (1665).
54  See for example Naigeon, Adresse, p. 5n (Horace); p. 41n (Tacitus). References 
to Tactitus in this period carry a particular polemical and political charge, see 
Catherine Volpilhac-Auger, Tacite en France de Montesquieu à Chateaubriand (Oxford: 
Voltaire Foundation, 1993).
55  Naigeon, Adresse, p. 84n (quotation from Pierre Bayle’s Dictionnaire historique et 
critique (Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1974), vol. 2, p. 2494, article PORTIUS).
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or referenced.56 Naigeon quotes a line of De rerum natura advising the 
writer to ‘bathe his work in the charm of the muses’ (‘musaeo contingens 
cuncta lepore’), and he places it at the end of a paragraph discussing 
how best to write about ‘des matières philosophiques’ [philosophical 
matters]. This is suggestive; Lucretius’s Epicurean poem about a world 
of atoms is an important text and model for the thinkers (and covert 
materialists) of the Early Modern period.57 The fact that Naigeon is at 
pains to advertise the references of all Latin sources apart from Lucretius 
means he is treated in the same way as Naigeon’s principle unnamed 
source, Diderot, and they are thereby associated.58 One wonders what 
the non-naming here is supposed to do. Presumably a learned reader, 
‘un lecteur attentif & intelligent’ [an attentive and intelligent reader], 
will not have very much trouble recognising Lucretius, and we know 
that contemporaneous readers did espy Diderot’s presence within 
Naigeon’s pages, even if, we assume, they were not acquainted with 
the specific texts being used. 
So Naigeon is hiding quotation in full view, at least to some extent. 
Is this a form of provocation directed either at the authorities or to the 
reader? Or is it a game of associations and connections? Or both? Or a 
series of implicit directions to the informed reader, so that they knew 
they were dealing with a text with a materialist undertow? Could it be 
all of these things? It is not very clear precisely how this functions or 
how we are supposed to read its allusions and intertextual flags, but 
it is clear, paradoxically, that the text is not quite so clear or so open 
as Naigeon’s loud rejection of the ‘double doctrine’—saying one thing 
while meaning another—would have us believe. In the Adresse, he also 
quotes—unacknowledged—whole pages of his own articles on ‘Cardan’ 
and ‘Mirabeau’ from his forthcoming three-volume philosophical 
dictionary, La Philosophie ancienne et moderne.59 These three volumes 
56  Naigeon, Adresse, p. 4: ‘musaeo contingens cuncta lepore’, from De rerum natura, 
book 1, line 934, meaning ‘bathing all with the charm of the muses’.
57  See for example David Norbrook, Stephen Harrison, and Philip Hardie, eds, 
Lucretius and the Early Modern (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), https://doi.
org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713845.001.0001.
58  See also Naigeon’s quotation of Lucretius in support of an allusion to Diderot and an 
injunction to crush fanaticism in his ‘Discours préliminaire’, Encyclopédie méthodique: 
Philosophie ancienne et moderne, vol. 1, p. xxiii.
59  Naigeon, Adresse, pp. 53–55 (‘Cardan’) and pp. 101–-9 (‘Mirabeau’). The Philosophie 
ancienne et moderne was part of Panckoucke’s immense Encyclopédie méthodique 
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were published in 1791, 1792, and in the Revolutionary ‘An II’, that is, 22 
September 1793–21 September 1794. ‘Cardan’ fills or rather constitutes the 
Supplement at the end of vol. 2 (alphabetically it should have appeared 
in vol. 1, which runs ‘Académiciens’ to ‘Collins’), and ‘Mirabeau’ 
appeared in vol. 3, in its expected alphabetical position, although it is 
not about Mirabeau at all but is instead a summary of the Système de la 
nature which had been (falsely) published under Mirabeau’s name by 
its real author, the baron d’Holbach, and his co-authors Diderot and 
Naigeon.60 And in a neat piece of reciprocal cross-text symmetry, where 
‘Cardan’ provides the entirety of the supplement to vol. 2, the extract 
from ‘Mirabeau’ provides almost the entirety of the nine-page first note 
of the ‘Additions’ to the Adresse. Naigeon is right to appeal to the ‘lecteur 
attentif’; he needs an attentive reader, as the rest of us get hopelessly 
confused! 
Confusion aside, there may be a few observations we could fairly 
make. Firstly, that these pieces of writing are not ‘neat’, to pick up on 
that adjective used a few lines back. The Adresse is not really a speech, 
and its different parts do need a ‘lecteur attentif’ to make sense of 
them all; the philosophical dictionary is not really a dictionary in any 
alphabetical sense—the entries are not published in clearly-planned 
alphabetical order, and ‘Mirabeau’ does not refer to ‘Mirabeau’, as the 
first line declares. And we clearly cannot argue that Naigeon thought of 
‘Cardan’ late in the publishing process, and therefore put it as a sort of 
rushed afterthought at the end of vol. 2, firstly because an article sixty-
seven pages long is not a rushed afterthought, and secondly, because he 
was already citing extensive passages from it in 1790. It may of course be 
the other way round, and that he developed passages from the Adresse 
in these later articles. It is not very easy to tell, and now is not the place 
to attempt any sort of conclusive analysis. What we can say is that there 
is some sort of overlap between the two works, that the Adresse and the 
three volumes of the dictionary are published in quite close proximity, 
project, aiming to update Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie, although dividing 
it into separate thematised volumes, hence the subsection under Naigeon’s 
editorship on ‘La Philosophie ancienne et moderne’.
60  Naigeon, ‘Cardan’, Philosophie ancienne et moderne, vol. 2 (1792), pp. 873–940; 
the section quoted or pre-quoted by Naigeon in the Adresse appears on p. 989; 
‘Mirabeau’, vol. 3 (an II), pp. 239–326; the section quoted in the Adresse appears on 
pp. 241–42.
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that even if Naigeon is not citing paragraphs from articles he has already 
prepared, he will already have been working on the dictionary, and yet 
he does not use the opportunity provided by the Adresse to explicitly 
advertise that other work. So the citation, if citation it is, is not about 
advertisement. 
Is he simply self-plagiarising? Is all this citation simply about 
Naigeon plundering the texts to which he had access, including his 
own? On the question of plagiarism, Naigeon himself has something to 
say, in the very ‘Cardan’ article we have been discussing. He has been 
talking about Cardan’s ‘larcins’ [thefts] from Aristotle, Theophrastus, 
Hippocrates, Galen, Celsus, and Dioscorides, and in particular from 
Pliny.61 He has this to say: 
[Pliny] n’oublie point de nommer les sçavans qui lui en ont fourni 
les matériaux  ; tandisque Cardan, bien loin de suivre cet exemple que 
l’équité, la reconnoissance, & l’intérêt même de sa gloire lui prescrivoient 
également, a voulu faire croire qu’en écrivant sur tant de sujets divers, 
il n’y employoit, pour me servir de l’expression de Montaigne, que ses 
propres & naturels moyens. C’est cette affectation à cacher les sources où 
il avoit puisé une partie de son savoir, qui l’a fait accuser de plagiat; & 
il faut avouer que ce n’est pas sans fondement. Scaliger assure même 
que le livre de Cardan sur l’immortalité de l’ame, n’est qu’un assemblage 
de plusieurs lambeaux pris ça et là, & que pour couvrir son vol, il mêla 
des déclamations ridicules aux doctrines qu’il avoit tirées des écrits de 
Pomponace & d’Augustin Niphus.62
[Pliny] never forgets to name the scholars whose works he has borrowed 
from, while Cardan, far from following this example which fairness, 
gratitude and even the interests of his glory equally prescribed, wanted 
everyone to think that in writing on all these diverse subjects, he 
employed nothing, to use Montaigne’s expression, other than his own 
natural means. It’s this affectation of hiding the sources from which he 
drew part of his knowledge that caused him to be accused of plagiarism, 
and we have to admit that this charge is not a baseless one. Scaliger goes 
so far as to assert that Cardan’s book on the immortality of the soul is 
nothing other than an assemblage of numerous bits and pieces gathered 
from here and there, and that to cover up his theft, he mixed various 
ridiculous declamations in with the doctrines that he had taken from 
Pomponazzi & Agostino Nifo.
61  Naigeon, ‘Cardan’, p. 931. 
62  Naigeon, ‘Cardan’, p. 932. 
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And, on this page alone, backing up not only his punctilious references 
to Montaigne and Scaliger but providing other learned allusions, we 
find no fewer than seven notes giving Latin original and detailed source 
information. So, Naigeon knows that making a text from ‘un assemblage 
de plusieurs lambeaux pris ça et là’ [assemblage of numerous bits and 
pieces gathered from here and there] can be seen as theft. Here he 
calls the practice of hiding a source an ‘affectation’. He acknowledges 
that accusations of plagiarism are not unfounded. He further says that 
fairness, gratitude, and even Cardan’s reputation or glory required 
him to acknowledge his borrowings, but that Cardan pretended they 
were all his anyway. How curious this is! The impression of virtuous 
and scholarly authorship is further reinforced by the closing signature: 
‘cet article est du citoyen Naigeon’ [this article is by Citizen Naigeon].63 
The ‘lecteur instruit’ [knowledgeable reader], Naigeon further adds, 
will be able to make their own mind up about Cardan’s work, and 
about what is true and useful, and what its faults are.64 That appeal 
to the superior sort of reader again! We really do need him (and he 
is definitely male)! Of course, here the dates may well be significant, 
and Naigeon’s reproof of the naughty Cardan who is otherwise, as a 
‘médecin philosophe’ [medical philosopher] much praised, may be a 
form of response to Naigeon’s own critics who had derided the Naigeon 
of the Adresse as Diderot’s lapdog or monkey.65 Yet Naigeon was not 
accused of plagiarism, so far as I know. 
If this display of righteous reproof and virtuous referencing is a 
response to Naigeon’s critics, then it takes the form of a simple denial, and 
of course it is a straightforward lie insofar as it applies to Naigeon’s own 
work. But one wonders whether there is something more complex going 
on than either denial or local inconsistency. Perhaps what we find here 
is the ‘double doctrine’ Naigeon had lambasted Helvétius for. Perhaps 
that very reproof was itself an example of the ‘double doctrine’ in action, 
whereby Naigeon was really disseminating the work he claimed to 
criticise, an ironic denunciation that not only gave further page space to 
63  Naigeon, ‘Cardan’, p. 940. 
64  Naigeon, ‘Cardan’, p. 938. 
65  Naigeon, ‘Cardan’, p. 938; La Harpe famously called Naigeon ‘le singe de Diderot’ 
[Diderot’s monkey], see Jean-François La Harpe, Œuvres, 16 vols (Paris: Verdière, 
1820), vol. 11, p. 41. 
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Helvétius but also advertised to the ‘attentive’ or ‘informed’ reader that 
censorship-bypassing codes of clandestine rhetoric were in operation 
in the Adresse? That he considered that some prudence was required 
is evident from the fact that while he did reference and name some 
sources, he never named Diderot, and that he was right to be cautious 
is only too clear from the outraged responses of some—but not all—
reviewers. In any case, so far as the reputations of both Naigeon and 
Diderot were concerned, the damage was done anyway. Whatever the 
reasons informing Naigeon’s explicit condemnation of plagiarism in the 
case of Cardan, however, we can see that it would have been impossible 
for Naigeon as a writer who did also embed unacknowledged quotation 
in his work not to notice the irony. Whether his readers—or perhaps just 
the really attentive and informed one—noticed, and were even meant 
to do so, is not a question we can resolve here. We can, however, say 
that Naigeon is a more complicated and tricksy writer than has been 
considered to be the case, and we can also say that in the Adresse, he 
did disseminate some of Diderot’s hitherto unpublished manuscripts, 
drawing on some of the most intensely anti-authoritarian passages to 
do so, moreover. The extent to which this was an organised strategy of 
publication, of which the ‘Diderot’ article he wrote for the Encyclopédie 
méthodique was another part, with his edition of Diderot’s Œuvres of 
1798 and the Mémoires historiques et philosophiques of 1823 completing 
the quartet, is not something we can yet determine, although we will 
continue to track which Diderot texts Naigeon named or published or 
described, and where, and how. We now turn to the article on ‘Diderot’.

6. 1792: Naigeon’s Article  
on ‘Diderot’ in the  
Encyclopédie méthodique:  
Philosophie ancienne et moderne
The article ‘Diderot’ which we find in the second volume of Jacques-
André Naigeon’s philosophical dictionary does not, of course, hide 
either Denis Diderot’s name or the extracts from his work.1 Published 
in 1792, it was written, Naigeon tells us, in November 1789, very close 
to (and quite possibly overlapping with) the writing and publication of 
the Adresse à l’Assemblée nationale in February 1790 (another date which 
Naigeon himself supplies).2 At seventy-five double-columned pages, it 
is a substantial article, and indeed it is here that Diderot’s significant 
if brief Principes philosophiques sur la matière et le mouvement, written in 
1770, are first published, as Naigeon is pleased to announce, all three 
pages of them.3 So this article holds an important place in the story of 
the publication of Diderot’s works, in part for the Principes philosophiques 
and in part for the details Naigeon supplies about his ‘intime ami’ 
1 Jacques-André Naigeon, ‘Diderot’, in Encyclopédie méthodique: Philosophie ancienne et 
moderne (Paris: Panckoucke, 1792), vol. 2, pp. 153–228.
2  Naigeon, ‘Diderot’, Philosophie ancienne et moderne, vol. 2 (1792), p. 153, n. 3: ‘on écrit 
ceci au mois de novembre’. For the dating of the Adresse, see above.
3  Naigeon, ‘Diderot’, pp. 192–95. See also Michel Delon’s edition, in Denis Diderot, 
Œuvres complètes, ed. by H. Dieckmann, Jacques Proust, Jean Varloot (Paris: 
Hermann, 1975), [hereafter DPV], vol. 17 (1987), p. 10.
© Caroline Warman, CC BY 4.0 https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0199.06
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[intimate friend].4 And yet it is not quite what one might expect. It 
does not give a comprehensive list let alone survey of Diderot’s works, 
which, for example, Naigeon does do in the case of Condillac, the article 
about whom fills the first 135 pages of this same volume, even though 
he complains bitterly about the ‘extrême secheresse’ [extreme dryness] 
of Condillac’s writing and the courage and patience needed to wade 
through it all, and even though the first extracts he quotes in it are in 
fact from Diderot, as part of his demonstration that the ‘idée mère’ 
[mother idea] for Condillac’s famous statue was Diderot’s.5 So there is 
an odd disproportion here; odd in that Condillac gets almost twice as 
many pages despite the philosophical priority being given very clearly 
to Diderot, and despite the fact that Naigeon claims to find Condillac 
hard going. Why is this? 
There seem to be two connected reasons; firstly and most explicitly, 
because Naigeon states on the first page of the article that he has reserved 
the longer discussion of Diderot’s Œuvres for his Mémoires, but possibly 
also out of caution. It is an article that does not foray far into the Diderot 
œuvre; apart from the brief Principes philosophiques mentioned above, 
Naigeon limits discussion to Diderot’s published works and to various 
extracts and reviews. Thus we also hear about the Pensées philosophiques 
(pub. 1746), the Additions aux pensées philosophiques (pub. 1770), the 
Lettre sur les aveugles (pub. 1749)—presented in gobbet form as twenty-
nine numbered ‘pensées’ along with an exposition of its treatment of 
the Molyneux problem—the Lettre sur les sourds et muets (pub. 1751), 
the Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature (pub. 1753), along with some 
extracts on education, some sixty ‘Reflexions philosophiques sur divers 
sujets’, and various reviews emphasising the importance of style. This is 
a presentation of Diderot’s writings that has four distinguishing features; 
firstly, their status as (mostly) published; secondly, their speculative 
philosophical nature; thirdly, the emphasis on the importance of style 
in philosophical writing; and fourthly, their arrangement in ‘pensée’ or 
4  Naigeon, ‘Diderot’, p. 153.
5  Naigeon, ‘Condillac’, Philosophie ancienne et moderne, vol. 2 (1792), pp. 1–135 
(‘extrême secheresse’, p. 105; pp. 5–7 for the discussion of how Condillac’s Traité des 
sensations was inspired by Diderot’s Lettre sur les sourds et muets; the quotation fills 
more than two columns, pp. 6–7).
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gobbet form.6 This version of Diderot is an authoritative, predominantly 
published, often gnomic thinker, who pronounces on important matters 
connected to the philosophical or educational matters of the day. If 
Naigeon is stoutly defending and often re-stating Diderot’s importance 
here, then, he is nonetheless not adding very much to what is already 
published and known, apart from the three pages of the Principes 
philosophiques. So there are some reasons to think that this version of 
Diderot is indeed a cautious one.
However, as mentioned, this article comes complete with opening and 
closing references to the Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, references 
which make clear its subservience to this grander, deeper, longer work 
which readers are explicitly advised to consult despite the fact that it 
hasn’t yet been published. Furthermore, of the three paragraphs on the 
first page of this article, two of them discuss not Diderot and his writing 
but Naigeon’s internal debates about when to publish these Mémoires. 
The dominant position this discussion is given, at the very head of the 
article, communicate how difficult it was for Naigeon to work out how 
to publish what and when, and how continuously the political situation 
affected his choices. So if there was a strategy on Naigeon’s part to 
publish Diderot’s work in phases, we can see how it was repeatedly 
changed and updated. Thus he talks of ‘ces mémoires que je n’aurois pu 
faire imprimer, il y a six mois’ [these memoirs which I would not have 
been able to publish six months ago] without inviting the persecution 
of ministers and judges—and it is here that he inserts the footnote 
dating the writing of the article to November 1789—and of ‘ces mémoires 
pensés & écrits par-tout avec cette liberté si nécessaire dans les matières 
philosophiques’ [these memoirs were thoroughly conceptualised and 
written with that freedom which is so crucial in philosophical matters] 
and which now, thanks to the ‘heureuse révolution qui s’est opérée 
dans l’ordre des choses’ [happy revolution which has occurred in the 
order of things] ‘pourroient être insérés tout entiers dans cet article’ 
[could be inserted entire into this article].7 ‘Liberté’ here is in no way an 
empty rhetorical flourish, nor even an uncomplicated echo of one of the 
Revolution’s slogans; it has a specific meaning in this context, of course, 
6  For Naigeon’s remarks on Diderot’s style, see ‘Diderot’, pp. 154, 164, 217; for Diderot’s 
stinging review of the translation of Beccaria’s Recherches sur le style, see p. 223.
7  All quotations from Naigeon, ‘Diderot’, p. 153. 
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related to free-thinking and the ‘libertins’ or free-thinkers, who are to be 
understood in seventeenth-century terms as those who do not conform 
to the orthodoxy of the church, and in eighteenth-century terms more 
insultingly as those who are immoral or amoral, and is therefore a term 
directly associated with atheism and materialism. This is Naigeon’s 
‘liberté’ [freedom], and it is an attitude and a style, as he tells us, that 
one writes and thinks with: ‘pensés & écrits par-tout avec cette liberté’. 
So the printed matter discussed in the article comes attached to a silent 
and extensive supplement in the form of these free-thinking Mémoires: 
‘quoiqu’ils ne soient point encore imprimés, j’y renvoye néanmoins le 
lecteur’ [although they have not yet been published, I nonetheless refer 
the reader to them].8
So why, if the ‘heureuse révolution’ [happy revolution] is now 
propitious to free expression, does he choose not to publish them within 
the article? He gives four reasons in his first explanation, and two in 
his second. Firstly, then, they would take up too much space; secondly, 
they have a different ‘objet’ or aim, thirdly, they could not be written in 
the same style and with the same details, and fourthly, he would not 
be able to have the same ‘excursions’ or digressions. His subsequent 
explanation makes a pact with the reader to fulfil a duty towards his 
late friend and write these Mémoires which his predilection for peace 
and quiet (‘l’amour du repos’), along with some other, more urgent, 
more imperious considerations (‘des considérations peut-être encore 
plus fortes, plus impérieuses’), have prevented him from doing. ‘Mais 
un jour plus pur nous luit’: a brighter day beckons. Six reasons for not 
publishing or not having written them yet, including this ominous 
last one, with its allusion to important considerations! No one has 
ever accused Naigeon of being a minimalist, but this is a clear case not 
purely of maximalism but of making sure that the reader’s attention is 
repeatedly fixed on these Mémoires. Six reasons, a cross-reference to the 
unpublished memoirs, and substantial discussion on this opening page, 
along with a further cross-reference within the body of the article, and 
a final one on the closing page serve to emphasise and re-emphasise 
how incomplete the article is without the Mémoires, and how important 
8  All quotations from ibid.
 2111792: Naigeon’s Article on ‘Diderot’ in the Encyclopédie méthodique
this latter work is for the understanding of Diderot.9 And we know that 
what specifically characterises the Mémoires is ‘cette liberté si nécessaire 
dans les matières philosophiques’ [that freedom which is so crucial in 
philosophical matters]. In fact, the cross-reference on the closing page is 
even more specific. Here it is:
Ce seroit ici le lieu de parler de plusieurs ouvrages purement 
philosophiques qui se trouvent parmi les manuscrits de Diderot  ; mais 
j’ai donné, dans les mémoires sur sa vie, une analyse raisonnée de celui 
de ces ouvrages qui m’a paru le plus profond  : j’entre même à ce sujet 
dans des détails qui ne seront pas sans quelque utilité pour les lecteurs 
qui s’occupent de ces matières difficiles, et qui, déjà éclairés par leurs 
propres méditations, seront capables de suivre et de cultiver les idées de 
ce philosophe.10
This would be the place to speak about the many purely philosophical 
works amongst Diderot’s manuscripts. However, I have given, in the 
memoirs about his life, an analytical account of the particular work of his 
that I thought most profound: I even go, on this subject, into details which 
will not be without some use for those readers who make it their business 
to consider these difficult matters, and who, already enlightened by their 
own meditations, will be capable of following and developing the ideas 
of this philosopher.
Here we meet again that invitation which we saw in the Adresse to those 
special readers who engage with difficult matters and are capable of 
following and developing Diderot’s ideas. And in fact it is not all 
Diderot’s writings or a group of them that Naigeon wishes to draw 
attention to here, it is a single one: ‘celui de ces ouvrages qui m’a paru le 
plus profond’—the particular one he considers to be the most profound. 
Examination of the Mémoires—which, despite these repeated references 
to its existence and imminent publication will remain unpublished until 
1823—will show that he was talking about the Éléments de physiologie, 
which, with a tally of fifty pages of re-woven quotation, the Rêve coming 
9  Naigeon writes, regarding Diderot’s imprisonment at the château de Vincennes 
in 1749: ‘De plus longs détails sur cette affaire seroient déplacés dans cet article; 
on les trouvera dans les mémoires dont j’ai parlé ci-dessus, & j’y renvoye le lecteur’ 
[it would be misplaced to give more detail on this affair in this article  ; more 
information can be found in the memoirs I mentioned above, and I refer the reader 
to them] (‘Diderot’, p. 166).
10   Naigeon, ‘Diderot’, p. 228.
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in second at about thirty, and no other work anywhere near, is the 
single text to which he gives most prominence. As we will see, he is 
still advertising it as well as advertising that he is still working on it in 
the preface to the Œuvres de Diderot which he published in 1798. We 
will come to that preface, as well as to the Mémoires themselves in due 
course, according to the chronological approach which we adopt here 
and which aims on the one hand to provide some order and sense of an 
unfurling narrative, whereby what follows is aware of and informed by 
what has preceded, and on the other to give a sense of the complexity 
and unpredictability of the context. In the meantime, we will leave 
Naigeon, so active and vocal in these early 1790s, with his repeated 
allusions to Diderot and to the Mémoires, and his intimations of a work 
characterised by particular freedom, one that was more profound than 
any other. Naigeon was not a marginal figure, as the many reactions to 
his Adresse, and the centrality of his position as editor of the Philosophie 
ancienne et moderne volumes, go to show. His readers, and perhaps not 
just those especially alert and erudite ones he kept winking at, will have 
been aware that there was more Diderot in the offing, that there was a 
particularly important free-thinking text which they had not yet seen. 
The Éléments de physiologie, unnamed at this point though it was, but 
quoted in the Adresse and alluded to in ‘Diderot’, thus already has a 
shadowy presence in print, repeatedly signalled both as imminent 
and as hugely important. And for any readers who knew how, or who 
simply knew where Naigeon lived, the Mémoires were accessible in draft 
manuscript form, perhaps even the Éléments de physiologie themselves. 
In any case, someone apart from Naigeon had a copy, as we will now go 
on to discuss.
7. 1794: ‘Le citoyen Garron’, the 
Comité d’instruction publique, 
and the Lost Manuscript of the 
Éléments de physiologie
This person appears to have been called ‘le citoyen Garron’. We know 
of his existence from the 1837 catalogue of Parisian bookseller Pierre 
Leblanc. In a letter dated ‘Germinal quartidi 4, l’an II de la République’, 
that is, 24 March 1794, he presented a manuscript of the Éléments de 
physiologie to the Comité d’instruction publique [Committee for Public 
Eduction] of the Convention nationale. Leblanc was selling both the 
presentation letter and the manuscript itself. Marvellous detective 
work by Maurice Tourneux established that the manuscript was still 
on Leblanc’s lists until 9 March 1846, when it disappeared; in 1954, 
Jean Pommier discovered that the manuscript had been sold only three 
days later, on Thursday 12 March 1846, for the quite high sum of 220 
francs, to a certain ‘pottier’. Editor of the Éléments, Jean Mayer, who 
records these transactions in such beautifully precise detail, was not 
able to trace the manuscript any further, and nor was Paolo Quintili 
in his edition of 2004.1 It remains unlocated, yet it seems unlikely that 
1  See Denis Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Jean Mayer, Œuvres complètes, 
DPV (Paris: Hermann, 1987), vol. 17, pp. 261–574 (p. 270, n. 28), [hereafter DPV]; 
Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Paolo Quintili (Paris: Champion, 2004), p. 32 
[hereafter PQ]. Mayer harvests these details from two sources by Maurice Tourneux 
(both now freely consultable on Gallica), Les Manuscrits de Diderot conservés en Russie 
© Caroline Warman, CC BY 4.0 https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0199.07
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it has been destroyed, given its identity as an expensively-acquired 
manuscript with documented provenance and a supremely famous 
author, and also given well-worn traditions within families of wealth 
stewardship and transmission. Let us hope that it emerges from a 
strong box some day. 
This manuscript was described in some detail by Hippolyte 
Walferdin (1795–1880), a native of Langres like Denis Diderot, a 
politician, sometime inventor, and one of the editors of the Brière edition 
of Diderot’s works in twenty-two volumes (1821–23), of which Jacques-
André Naigeon’s Mémoires historiques et philosophiques sur la vie et les 
ouvrages de Denis Diderot was the last volume, and also, separately, of the 
Salons.2 Walferdin describes a manuscript entitled ‘Physiologie’ that falls 
into three parts, of which the first two ‘se composent de descriptions 
d’un organe etc…’ [are made up of descriptions of organs and so on]—a 
description which is accurate insofar as it goes but does not express (or 
invite) much interest; he states that it is not until towards the end of 
the second part and in the third part that Diderot starts drawing any 
conclusions. He goes on to say that he only spent an hour examining it 
but that he recognises from those last two parts a number of passages, 
specifically the ones about the miser and the woman written about by 
the scientist Girolamo Fabrici d’Acquapendente, and says they come 
either from the Rêve de d’Alembert or the Mémoires. In fact, they are 
not from the Rêve but from the Mémoires, Naigeon having lifted them 
verbatim from the Éléments de physiologie, although it is not hard to 
see why Walferdin isn’t quite sure, given the way Naigeon knits them 
(Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1885), pp. 27–28; and Tourneux’s angry review of Ernest 
Dupuy’s edition of the Paradoxe sur le comédien which appeared in the Revue d’histoire 
littéraire de la France, 9.3 (1902), 500–18 (pp. 506–07); Tourneux confirms that historian 
of the Revolutionary papers, James Guillaume, has checked there is no trace in the 
papers of this committee (p. 506n). See also Jean Pommier, ‘Lueurs nouvelles sur les 
manuscrits de Diderot’, Bulletin du bibliophile, 5 (1954), 201–17. It is worth drawing 
attention here to the fact that in 1885 Tourneux dated the letter ‘an IV’, whereas in 
1902 he dated it as ‘an II’. Pommier addresses this discrepancy and clarifies that the 
correct date (as transcribed in the auction catalogue) is ‘l’an 2e’ (Pommier, ‘Lueurs 
nouvelles’, p. 207); he further explains that the day of the month is the first ‘quartidi’ 
of Germinal, that is to say ‘4 Germinal’, which translates in the Gregorian calendar as 
24 March 1794 (Pommier, ‘Lueurs nouvelles’, pp. 209–10, n. 3). 
2  See Denis Diderot, Œuvres complètes, ed. by Jules Assézat and Maurice Tourneux, 20 
vols (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1875–77), vol. 10, p. 88, https://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/
Page:Diderot_-_Œuvres_complètes,_éd._Assézat,_X.djvu/98. 
 2151794: ‘Le citoyen Garron’
together in the Mémoires. How he does that will be the subject of Chapter 
12. Walferdin clearly knows the Mémoires and Diderot’s writings well, 
and he is trying to work out where this unpublished manuscript fits; he 
records Naigeon’s note about Diderot having copied out extracts from 
Haller’s Physiologie which he burnt once he had finished writing on the 
subject, and he mentions a manuscript ‘des éléments de physiologie et 
mélanges […] sur les passions’ [including elements of physiology and 
varia […] on the passions] which Jean-Baptiste-Alexandre Paulin had 
not published;3 Walferdin notices that there is ‘quelque chose sur les 
passions’ in the Leblanc manuscript too. 
What is interesting here is the palimpsest of different manuscripts and 
topics, and the confusion created by the slippage between them. What 
was in Naigeon’s Mémoires described merely as extensive extracts from 
Haller which Diderot used and then burnt once he had completed ‘les 
deux dialogues’ [the two dialogues], is almost imperceptibly upgraded 
in Walferdin’s description to ‘les mémoires sur la physiologie’ [notes 
on physiology] which Diderot had burnt once he finished writing Le 
Rêve de d’Alembert. He considers that this manuscript was the point of 
departure for the Rêve. He further records that the manuscript contains 
a crossed-out paragraph contradicting Jean-Paul Marat’s theory of the 
soul, noting that Marat’s work came out in 1775, and that Diderot died in 
1784 (thereby unwittingly providing the evidence that the Éléments was 
written after the Rêve, composed in 1769), that Naigeon claims Diderot 
had planned to write a physiological thesis in the form of a series of 
letters to Naigeon himself, and that this particular manuscript bears no 
resemblance to a series of letters. He ends with a laconic remark that the 
manuscript seems to come from a certain ‘Mr Moette de Versailles’ who 
he believes was the translator of Lucina sine concubitu.4
There is enough information here to draw a few clear conclusions. 
Firstly, that this was a separate manuscript copy of the Éléments; the 
3  Jacques-André Naigeon, Mémoires historiques et philosophiques sur la vie et les ouvrages 
de Denis Diderot (Paris: J. L. L. Brière, 1821 [1823]; repr. Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 
1970), p. 222n. Jean-Baptiste-Alexandre Paulin (1800–59) brought out the important 
Mémoires, correspondance et ouvrages inédits de Diderot, publiés d’après les manuscrits 
confiés en mourant par l’auteur à Grimm in four volumes in 1830: this is where the Rêve 
de d’Alembert, amongst other texts, was first published in full.
4  Note transcribed in full, Mayer DPV 270–71. Walferdin’s note is in the Bibliothèque 
de la ville de Reims (ms 2127), with the manuscript of Naigeon’s Mémoires sur 
Diderot.
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two we still have did not, so far as we know, ever leave their archive 
repositories, and nor is the passage lambasting Marat crossed out in 
either version.5 Secondly, it must be a mature iteration of the work and 
therefore similar (if not identical) to the Vandeul full-length copy in that 
it is organised in three parts. Thirdly, it had readers beyond the restricted 
circle of those whom we know for sure had access to the manuscript 
in one version or another, that is, Naigeon, Diderot’s daughter and her 
husband, and Catherine II of Russia. These readers were the Citoyen 
Garron (the person who sent the manuscript), the members and/or 
clerks of the Comité d’instruction publique (to whom it was sent), and 
‘Mr Moette de Versailles’ (in whose hands it ended up). 
This ‘Mr Moette de Versailles’ and translator from English of Lucina 
sine concubitu is Jean-Pierre Moët (1721–1806). The Lucina was the work 
of Sir John Hill, a lurid mixture of medicine and prurience, as well as 
a satire against the Royal Society, published under the name Abraham 
Johnson. It examines various cases of women becoming pregnant without 
intercourse.6 This is a topic which Diderot examines in connection with 
abnormal genital configurations and pregnancies in both sexes,7 and 
about which Acquapendente (whose presence in this manuscript is 
one of the few details Walferdin noticed, as we saw) also wrote.8 What 
we also know about Moët is that he was a freemason of importance, 
having held prominent positions in the Grand Orient in the 1750s and 
1760s, that he was also involved in the theatre, being co-director (with 
Charles Simon Favart and others) of the Opéra Comique (1757–63), 
that he translated Emanuel Swedenborg from Latin (his translations 
were published posthumously), that he was the son of a well-regarded 
bookseller, and that, according to the entry in Jean Sgard’s Dictionnaire 
des journalistes, ‘il se piquait d’être encyclopédiste’ [he liked to make out 
he was a contributor to the Encyclopédie].9
5  SP AT p. 378; DPV 334/PQ 153; Naigeon, Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, p. 221 
(Marat is not named).
6  Sir John Hill, Lucina sine concubitu (London: M. Cooper, 1750). 
7  See Éléments de physiologie, Part 2, Chapter 24 on ‘Génération’ [Reproduction], esp. 
DPV 428–33/PQ 248–53/ Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Motoichi Terada (Paris: 
Éditions Matériologiques, 2019), pp. 242–50 [hereafter MT], and above.
8  Girolamo Fabrici d’Acquapendente (1537–1619), author of De formatione ovi et pulli 
tractatus accuratissimus (Patavii [Padova]: A. Bencii, 1621). DPV 429/PQ 249/MT 246.
9  See Marie-Rose de Labriolle, ‘Moët’, in Dictionnaire des journalistes, 1600–1789, ed. 
by Jean Sgard (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1999), http://dictionnaire-journalistes.
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Moët was therefore a man with connections in multiple arenas of 
Enlightenment sociability. We do not appear to know what he was 
doing in the 1790s or early 1800s, but given that he was the person in 
whose hands the copy of the Éléments de physiologie sent to the Comité 
d’instruction publique ended up, he must be a player of some sort, while 
conversely, his various affiliations tell us something about the groups 
that might have been interested in Diderot’s work on physiology—
perhaps those special readers to whom Naigeon repeatedly alluded. 
In this light, Moët’s connections to medical texts and to the religiously 
unorthodox freemasons seem particularly resonant. Furthermore, if we 
consider his profile, and his repeatedly collaborative roles, whether as 
translator or journalist or within the theatre or as a freemason, it seems 
unlikely that he kept himself out of circulation, detached, private. The 
opposite seems more likely to be the case, that is, that he came across 
the manuscript because of his connections, and that he would have 
continued to share it with kindred spirits. Speculation aside, we can add 
him to the list of known readers of this text. But what of the ‘citoyen 
Garron’ and the members of the Comité d’instruction publique? How, if 
it was presented to the Convention as a form of national treasure via this 
important Committee, did it find its way to Moët, and why?
Any answer to these questions cannot be more than hesitant, as 
we only have circumstantial evidence, and there is no record or trace 
of it in the archives of the Comité d’instruction publique, published by 
the remarkable scholar James Guillaume at the end of the nineteenth 
century.10 Guillaume himself confirmed this lacuna to Maurice 
gazettes18e.fr/journaliste/581-jean-pierre-moet. See also Alain Bernheim, ‘The 
Mémoire justificatif of La Chaussée and Freemasonry in Paris until 1773’, originally 
published in Ars Quatuor Coronatorum, 104 (1992): ‘On ‘the 19th day of the 6th moon 
of the year 2299 of the rebuilding of the second Temple of the Great Architect of the 
Universe (vulgar era, 25 September 1763)… Jean-Pierre Moët… General Secretary 
and Grand Orator of the Most Worshipful Grand Lodge of France’ was elected 
Sovereign of the Conseil d’Orient, and a certificate to that effect was delivered to 
him.’ (Source given as Bibliothèque nationale, FM5 37). http://www.freemasons-
freemasonry.com/bernheim25.html.
10  Procès-verbaux du comité d’instruction publique de la convention nationale publiés et 
annotés, ed. by James Guillaume, 7 vols (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1891–1957) : 
vol. 4 (1891) is the specific volume, covering 21 March 1794 – 28 August 1794, it 
would have been mentioned in.
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Tourneux.11 What we do know, however, is that the Comité d’instruction 
publique was extremely concerned about the fate of manuscripts and 
books, and that it published numerous decrees and instructions relating 
to their preservation and forbidding destruction. On 25 Ventôse an II 
(15 March 1794), it adopted the proposal made by its feeder committee, 
the Commission temporaire des arts, on ‘la manière d’inventorier et de 
conserver tous les objets qui peuvent servir aux arts, aux sciences et 
à l’enseignement’ [the methods for making an inventory and looking 
after all the objects that may be of use to the arts, sciences, and for 
teaching purposes];12 it is interesting therefore, that the manuscript of 
the Éléments de physiologie was sent when it was, just nine days later, 
on 4 Germinal an II (24 March 1794). It is just possible—but of course 
completely unprovable—that it was offered to the Comité in direct 
response to that instruction. So why is it not mentioned in their records? 
Would they really have been so uninterested in a work on this topic, 
written by a figure of the stature of Diderot, that they would not have 
bothered even to mention it in passing?
In fact, on the contrary: there was a flurry of reports on saving and 
stocking books and manuscripts for the nation at exactly this moment. 
Prominent member of the Comité d’instruction publique, Henri 
Grégoire (better known as Abbé Grégoire) published his Rapport sur la 
bibliographie only a few weeks later on 22 Germinal an II (11 April 1794), 
its aim being to prevent the dispersal and loss of the books and precious 
objects of the nation; he describes the state of human knowledge and 
the steps that still need to be made, and he does so by invoking the 
progress already made by the ‘rédacteurs de l’Encyclopédie’ [editors of 
the Encyclopédie].13 He talks of bringing together all these materials and 
11  Maurice Tourneux’s review of Ernest Dupuy’s edition of the Paradoxe sur le comédien 
which appeared in the Revue d’histoire littéraire de la France, 9.3 (1902), 500–18 (p. 
506n). 
12  See the French senate webpage recording how preserving heritage became part of 
governmental responsibilities : ‘Au service d’une politique nationale du patrimoine : 
le rôle incontournable du Centre des monuments nationaux’, https://www.senat.
fr/rap/r09-599/r09-59933.html. The remit of the Commission temporaire des arts 
is explained here: https://data.bnf.fr/fr/13533855/france_convention_nationale__
commission_des_arts/. It existed between 18 December 1793 and 19 December 
1795, that is, a relatively short time, hence the ‘temporaire’ in its name.
13  Henri Grégoire, ‘Rapport sur la bibliographie’, in Procès-verbaux du comité d’instruction 
publique de la convention nationale publiés et annotés, ed. by James Guillaume, vol. 4, 
pp. 120–29.
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of transmitting them to the generations of the future. His instructions 
were immediately sent off around France, to be adopted with immediate 
effect.14 This is not the report of a man to disregard an unpublished work 
by Diderot, one of those ‘rédacteurs de l’Encyclopédie’ he had explicitly 
mentioned. Grégoire’s report of 22 Germinal came hot on the heels of 
another report dated 15 Germinal (itself only nine days after the letter 
and manuscript were sent), specifically on how to set up a depository 
for manuscripts: this report was written by Félix Vicq d’Azyr, not only 
a key member of the Commission temporaire des arts, but one of the 
most prominent anatomists of the time;15 his recommendations were 
adopted.16 On other occasions, Vicq d’Azyr and ‘le citoyen Poirier’, 
that is, ex-Benedictine monk Dom Germain Poirier (1724–1803),17 are 
charged with examining and requisitioning manuscripts for the state, 
including those of the ‘ci-devant Académie des sciences’ [what was 
hitherto known as the Académie des sciences]; Vicq is recorded as 
announcing that ‘parmi ces manuscrits des pièces infiniment précieuses 
pour les sciences et les arts, notamment des lettres écrites de la main 
même de Descartes’ [amongst these manuscripts there are pieces which 
are infinitely precious for the arts and sciences, in particular letters 
handwritten by Descartes himself].18 It seems vanishingly unlikely that 
a manuscript of Diderot’s on the subject of physiology would have gone 
unnoticed by someone like Vicq d’Azyr. 
Furthermore, the Comité d’instruction publique itself was highly 
organised and interested in its own records: it appointed a ‘chef des 
archives de la Commission’ (‘committee’ and ‘commission’ seem to be 
used interchangeably) on the 29 Germinal an II (18 April 1794);19 it had a 
14  Grégoire, ‘Rapport sur la bibliographie’, p. 129.
15  Félix Vicq d’Azyr featured in Chapter 4 for his work on the brain. 
16  Procès-verbaux de la commission temporaire des arts, ed. by Louis Tuetey (Paris: 
Imprimerie nationale, 1912), p. 125.
17  H. Dufresne, ‘Une vocation historique: Dom Germain Poirier 1724-1803’, Bulletin des 
bibliothèques de France, 11 (1956), 755–66, http://bbf.enssib.fr/consulter/bbf-1956-
11-0755-001. See Tourneux Review of Dupuy’s Paradoxe (1902), p. 507, about Poirier 
being tasked by Diderot’s family to hunt through Grimm papers for anything of 
Diderot’s. 
18  Procès-verbaux de la commission, ed. by Tuetey, p. 175 (20 Floréal an II/9 May 1794); 
for another example, see 5 Floréal an II/24 April 1794, pp. 148–49. 
19  This is Dagobert Eustase Broquet, aged thirty-one, with extensive experience as a 
private tutor in languages and literature and 18 months study of ‘l’art de guérir’: 
Procès-verbaux du comité, ed. by Guillaume, vol. 4, p. 229 (29 Germinal an II).
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sub-section (distinct from the Commission des arts) with no fewer than 
ten clerks specifically tasked with bibliography and cataloguing, and 
whose bureau chief, le citoyen Bardel, receives particular congratulation 
for his tireless efforts.20 Meanwhile, le citoyen Mathieu reports on the 
correct internal procedures for recording items received, which, as 
Guillaume notes, was probably in response to an instruction to assess 
the secretariat’s functioning, its lapses and possible losses.21 So even 
if, as we see, there is a suggestion that things may have gone missing, 
this committee is far from indifferent to that happening, and is actively 
attempting to address the issue. 
I mentioned only having circumstantial evidence to offer about what 
might have happened to this particular manuscript of the Éléments de 
physiologie. We have simply no idea why, assuming it did actually reach 
the Comité d’instruction publique, it was not recorded and kept, or why, 
if it was disappeared on purpose, that is, either hidden or stolen, the 
letter of gift would have been preserved with it, given that that would be 
evidence of irregularity, at the very least. But what we can see from this 
rapid survey of the archiving and cataloguing operations of the Comité 
d’instruction publique and of its public statements and instructions 
about the preservation of manuscripts and books during precisely this 
period is that it is unlikely that the absence of Diderot’s manuscript was 
a simple oversight. 
The more we pore over such documentation as there is, the less 
likely the oversight option seems. Naigeon worked for the Commission 
temporaire des arts, for example. He appears not to have been a fully-
fledged member like his brother Jean-Claude (1753–1832), a painter 
known as Naigeon l’aîné, that is Naigeon senior, despite the fact that 
he was younger than Jacques-André (1735–1810). Yet, despite not being 
a fully-fledged member of the Commission temporaire des arts, our 
20  Procès-verbaux du comité, ed. by Guillaume, vol. 4, p. 775 (23 Messidor an II).
21  Mathieu’s report on procedures to follow within the secretariat with respect to 
recording and processing items received can be found in the Procès-verbaux du 
comité, ed. by Guillaume, vol. 4, pp. 775–77, and Guillaume’s note, p. 776n. It is 
interesting therefore to note that despite all this bibliographical activity, there is no 
catalogue extant of the 12,000 books that the Comité d’instruction publique held, 
and which were transferred en masse to the library of the Assemblée nationale 
in 1796, after the termination of the Comité d’instruction publique’s activities in 
October 1795.
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Naigeon’s signature appears in the register of the final session.22 Was 
he working there in March 1794? An official member whose presence 
is not in doubt was the naturalist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, whose 
Recherches sur l’organisation des corps vivants (1802) shared a number of 
the preoccupations we find in the Éléments de physiologie, particularly 
the first part, ‘Des Êtres’, and whose wary attitude to the generality of 
his readers as well as evocation of some superior individuals is strongly 
reminiscent of the attitude we have already seen Naigeon taking.23 So, it 
seems likely the Éléments would have found an eager reader in Lamarck, 
were he ever to have come across them.24 The secretary of the Comité 
d’instruction publique itself was a medical man, René-François Plaichard 
de la Choltière, and the records repeatedly mention medical works 
or questions being referred to him for review and report.25 Moreover, 
one of the tasks of the Comité d’instruction publique at this time was 
the setting up of medical schools.26 Again, it seems implausible that 
someone like him, with the role he had, would have been uninterested 
in Diderot’s Éléments de physiologie.
It is of course not impossible that Diderot’s manuscript was 
unrecorded or missed out of incompetence, but that it wasn’t simply 
thrown away we know from the fact that it ended up with Moët. What 
seems perhaps more likely is that it was intercepted, hidden, secreted 
or stolen, in full knowledge of its interest. By whom and at what level 
22  Procès-verbaux de la commission, ed. by Tuetey, p. ix, n. 5 (5 Nivôse an IV/26 December 
1795). Guillaume lists the published members of the Commission temporaire des 
arts: Procès-verbaux du comité, ed. by Guillaume, vol. 3, pp. 502–03.
23  J.-B. Lamarck, Recherches sur l’organisation des corps vivans, ed. by J. M. Drouin (Paris: 
Fayard, 1986), pp. 55–56 (p. 59).
24  For reasons of space, and also because I’d already bitten off far more than I could 
chew, I regretfully set aside pursuing potential links with Lamarck. I go a little 
bit further in my article: Caroline Warman, ‘Caught between Neologism and the 
Unmentionable: The Politics of Naming and Non-naming in 1790s France’, Romance 
Studies, 31 (2013), 264–76, https://doi.org/10.1179/0263990413Z.00000000051. 
25  For example, medical works are sent to Plaichard on 11 Germinal (p. 59), 29 Prairial 
(p. 652), 1er Thermidor (p. 835), 27 Thermidor (p. 941). This is a representative 
not an exhaustive list. Guillaume records the members of the Comité d’instruction 
publique in his ‘Introduction’: Procès-verbaux du comité, ed. by Guillaume, vol. 4, pp. 
ii–x. 
26  Laurence Brockliss and Colin Jones, The Medical World of Early Modern France 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 804–11; and Eugène Despois, Le Vandalisme 
revolutionnaire: fondations litteraires, scientifiques et artistiques de la convention (Paris: 
Germer Baillière, 1868), p. 116.
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of seniority, again, we cannot know. Raymond Trousson, although he 
does not mention the Éléments de physiologie, wonders how various 
unpublished manuscripts of Diderot’s somehow made their way into 
the pages of the pro-philosophe journal, the Décade philosophique. He 
speculates that the most likely route for these leaks is via its own editor, 
Pierre Ginguené (1748–1816), who, as deputy to the ‘Commissaire’ of 
the Comité d’instruction publique, Dominique-Joseph Garat (1749–
1833) from January 1795, and then Commissaire himself from August 
1795, and finally (briefly) its Director General, before its closure, would 
have had access to the depository where the confiscated papers of the 
ex-editor of the Correspondance littéraire, Friedrich Melchior, Baron von 
Grimm, were held.27 Something of this order seems likely to be the case, 
although it could not have been Ginguené or Garat at this point (that is, 
March 1794), as they seem not yet to have been involved in the Comité 
d’instruction publique. Indeed, they were both about to be arrested, and 
Garat would be sentenced to death, surviving only thanks to the fall of 
Maximilien Robespierre.28
This is perhaps the point at which we should remind ourselves what 
was happening in Revolutionary Paris at this moment, beyond the 
Comité d’instruction publique and its bibliographical instructions and 
concerns. On the day the letter presenting the Éléments de physiologie 
to the Comité was dated, 4 Germinal (24 March), the Hébertistes were 
all executed. Georges Danton, Camille Desmoulins and others were 
executed on the 16 Germinal (5 April). This is the height of the Terror, 
and Diderot himself was not exempt from Robespierre’s condemnatory 
attentions at this point: on 18 Floréal (7 May), four days after Ginguené 
had been arrested, Robespierre made a speech condemning the 
Encyclopedists, calling them charlatans, and accusing them of having 
persecuted ‘la vertu et le génie de la liberté en la personne de ce Jean-
Jacques’ [the virtue and genius of freedom as embodied in the person of 
27  Raymond Trousson, Images de Diderot en France, 1784–1913 (Paris: Champion, 1997), 
p. 42. See also William Murray’s Dictionnaire des journalistes entry on ‘Garat’ and Jean 
Roussel’s on ‘Ginguené’ for the exact dates of these various offices: William Murray, 
‘Garat’, in Dictionnaire des journalistes, 1600-1789, ed. by Jean Sgard (Oxford: Voltaire 
Foundation, 1999), http://dictionnaire-journalistes.gazettes18e.fr/journaliste/329-
dominique-garat; and Jean Roussel, ‘Ginguené’, in Dictionnaire, http://dictionnaire-
journalistes.gazettes18e.fr/journaliste/343-pierre-ginguene.
28  See Murray, ‘Garat’ and Roussel, ‘Ginguené’, in Dictionnaire des journalistes, ed. by 
Sgard.
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Jean-Jacques Rousseau].29 This was not the moment for one of the most 
prominent committees of the Revolutionary government to be recording 
as a national treasure a manuscript of this condemned charlatan.30 Much 
better to keep it quiet.31
Why did ‘le citoyen Garron’ send it at this point, then? Was he a 
blinkered idiot? Paolo Quintili suggests that it was probably because 
of the plans for the Écoles normales that were at that point being 
considered.32 It is true that the École des armes et des poudres (Weaponry 
and Gunpowder School), set up to disseminate knowledge about arms 
production across the embattled Republic, and thereby massively and 
rapidly increase it, was being presented as a new model for hyper-
efficient education during precisely this period, and that the Comité 
d’instruction publique would pick up the baton in an announcement of 
29 Floréal an II (20 May 1794) about its intention ‘à propager l’instruction 
publique sur le territoire entier de la République par des moyens 
révolutionnaires semblables à ceux qui ont été déjà employés pour les 
armes, la poudre et le salpêtre’ [to propagate public education across 
the entire territory of the Republic by the revolutionary means already 
employed for weaponry, gunpowder and saltpetre].33 So it is possible 
29  René Tarin, Diderot et la Révolution française: controverses et polémique autour d’un 
philosophe (Paris: Champion, 2001), p. 60.
30  Receiving manuscripts of Rousseau’s, however, was a cause for celebration and 
public announcements: see 7 Fructidor, ‘293e séance: ‘offre de manuscrits de 
Rousseau (par Jussieu et Girod)’, along with Gregoire’s response, Procès-verbaux du 
comité, ed. by Guillaume, vol. 4, p. 977. 
31  Paolo Quintili writes that ‘Garron non poteva scegliere periodo peggiore’ [Garron 
could not choose a worse time], concluding that ‘La Convenzione non solo non 
s’interessò agli Éléments ma ne respinse il manoscritto senza che se ne trovi più 
alcuna traccia fra i procès-verbaux delle sue commissioni’ [the Convention did not 
only take no interest in the Elements but also rejected the manscript without there 
being any trace left in the procès-verbeaux of its committees]. There is no specific 
evidence to support the hypothesis that the Convention rejected the manuscript, 
other than the absence of any trace in the Procès-verbaux. Paolo Quintili, ‘Diderot e la 
Rivoluzione francese: miti, modelli, riferimenti nel secolo XXI’, Quaderni materialisti, 
2 (2003), 81–106 (p. 105). 
32  Quintili, ‘Diderot e la Rivoluzione’, p. 105. 
33  Procès-verbaux du comité, ed. by Guillaume, vol. 4, p. 451. Quoted in Dominique 
Julia, ‘La Fondation de l’école normale de l’an III’, in L’École normale de l’an III: une 
institution révolutionnaire et ses élèves, Introduction historique à l’édition des Leçons, 
ed. by Dominique Julia (Paris: Éditions Rue d’Ulm, 2016), pp. 83–104 (p. 86). I 
discuss the rise and fall of the École normale further here: Caroline Warman, 
‘“The Revolution Is to the Human Mind What the African Sun is to Vegetation”: 
Revolution, Heat, and the Normal School Project’, The Critical Genealogy of Normality, 
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that plans to set up new schools for the education of the new Republic 
are what triggered the gift, and it is also possible that the manuscript 
was sent in response to the Comité’s adoption on 25 Ventôse (15 March) 
of the Commission temporaire des arts’ recommendation regarding ‘la 
manière d’inventorier et de conserver tous les objets qui peuvent servir 
aux arts, aux sciences et à l’enseignement’ [the methods for making 
an inventory and looking after all the objects that may be of use to the 
arts, sciences, and for teaching purposes], as already mentioned; a 
combination of the two is also possible. We cannot determine with any 
certainty why it was sent when it was, and one of the reasons for this is 
that we do not actually know who ‘le citoyen Garron’ is.
The sales catalogue describes the content of his letter:
En tête du volume se trouve une Lettre datée de Germinal quartidi 4, l’an 
IV de la République, par laquelle le citoyen Garron présente au comité 
d’Instruction Publique cet Ouvrage, qu’il reçut du citoyen Diderot 
quelque temps avant sa mort, comme un témoignage de sa confiance et 
de son amitié.34
At the front of the volume there is a letter dated Germinal quartidi 4, year 
4 of the Republic, in which Citizen Garron presents to the Committee of 
Public Education this work which he was given by Citizen Diderot some 
time before his death as a mark of his trust and friendship.
This description sounds very much like a close paraphrase or perhaps 
even a quotation. We will not be far from the truth if we suppose that ‘le 
citoyen Garron’ said something like ‘je présente au comité d’Instruction 
Publique cet Ouvrage, que je reçus du citoyen Diderot quelque temps 
avant sa mort, comme un témoignage de sa confiance et de son amitié’ 
[I present to the Committee of Public Education this work which I was 
given by Citizen Diderot some time before his death as a mark of his 
trust and friendship].
It tells us two things about ‘le citoyen Garron’ therefore: firstly, he 
is filled with revolutionary and republican fervour, given that he is so 
ceremoniously making a presentation of the manuscript to the new 
government, and also given that Diderot has become ‘le citoyen Diderot’. 
ed. by Peter Cryle, special issue, History of Human Sciences (2020), 1-18, https://doi.
org/10.1177/0952695120946992.
34  Tourneux, Les Manuscrits de Diderot conservés en Russie, p. 28; Pommier, ‘Lueurs 
nouvelles’, p. 202.
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Secondly, we learn that he is a friend of Diderot’s, someone in whom 
Diderot has confidence, and to whom he wishes to leave something 
supremely precious. We do not know of anyone by this name this close 
to Diderot. We are stumped. If it is a pseudonym, we do not have any 
answers either. However, in the section that follows, we will look at 
some of the possibilities for who ‘Garron’ might be. 
Tourneux tersely brushes aside the name ‘Garron’, saying it is 
‘vraisemblablement’ [probably] Pierre-Henri Marron (1754–1832), a 
French Huguenot pastor who arrived in Paris in 1782. In support of this 
identification, Tourneux cites the opinion of bookseller and historian 
Étienne Charavay (1848–99), according to whom the ‘M’ of Marron’s 
signature was very similar to a ‘G’.35 But is there any evidence Diderot 
and Marron ever met?
Emboldened by the notion that the name may have been 
mistranscribed, and by similar evidence of mistranscription in the 
archives of the Comité d’Instruction Publique itself,36 some interesting 
possibilities, all of which may be completely erroneous, suggest 
themselves. They can be divided into two camps: firstly, those whom we 
know knew Diderot; secondly, those who were active in the Republican 
government in some way. 
So, Jean-Baptiste Garant or Garand (c.1730–80) has nearly the right 
name, and knew Diderot a bit and executed the only portrait of Diderot 
that Diderot himself really liked.37 
35  Tourneux, Les Manuscrits de Diderot conservés en Russie, p. 28.
36  See the confusion around the collection left by the émigré of a certain ‘Jeannin 
Flammant’; Guillaume comments that ‘il faut probablement identifier ce ‘Jeannin 
Flammant’ avec le ‘Jeannin Chamblanc’ ou ‘Jallin-Chamblant’ à l’occasion duquel 
avait été rendu le decret du 10 octobre 1792’ [this ‘Jeannin Flammant’ should 
probably identified as ‘Jeannin Chamblanc’ or ‘Jallin-Chamblant’]. Procès-verbaux 
du comité, ed. by Guillaume, vol. 4, p. 945n.
37  In his Salon de 1767, he wrote that ‘Je n’ai jamais été bien fait que par un pauvre 
diable appelé Garant’ [my likeness has never been done well apart from by a poor 
devil called Garant]: Denis Diderot, Salon de 1767, ed. by Else Marie Bukdahl, 
Michel Delon, and Annette Lorenceau (Paris: Hermann, 1995), p. 83. The portrait 
no longer exists, but the engraving commissioned by Grimm does: Denis Diderot (c. 
1760), by Jean-Baptiste Garand, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Denis_
Diderot_by_Jean-Baptiste_Garand.jpg.
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Fig. 7.1 Portrait of Diderot by Jean-Baptiste Garand, as engraved by 
Pierre Chenu, Jean-Baptiste Garand; engraver Pierre Chenu, 1760, 
Photo by Spiessens (2013), Wikimedia, https://upload.wikimedia.org/
wikipedia/commons/8/88/Denis_Diderot_by_Jean-Baptiste_Garand.
jpg, Public Domain
Against Garand’s case are the fact that they did not know each other 
at all well, and that he had died in 1780, and could not therefore have 
been the author of a letter written in 1794. So it seems unlikely that it 
was him. 
Next, we can offer Gaschon (first name and dates unknown), who 
seems to have been a banker of some sort, and who was a close and 
trusted friend of the Volland family. Roger Lewinter tells us that ‘Mme 
Volland et Sophie plaçaient de fortes sommes par son entremise  : 
8,000 livres le 31 décembre 1771, et 20,000 en 1781’ [Mme Volland and 
Sophie invested large sums with his help: 8,000 livres on 31 December 
1771, and 20,000 in 1781].38 Diderot mentions him quite regularly and 
affectionately in his letters to the Vollands during the period 1759 to 
1774. But could ‘sch’ really be mistaken for ‘rr’? Perhaps. 
Third in this series is Dominique-Joseph Garat (1749–1833), a figure 
who bridges these two camps as both an acquaintance of Diderot and as 
someone active in the Republican government. Indeed, he has already 
appeared in this chapter as a Revolutionary politician on the verge 
of arrest and as someone who would later be involved with the very 
38  Denis Diderot, Œuvres complètes, ed. by Roger Lewinter, 15 vols (Paris: Club Français 
du Livre, 1969–73), vol. 3, p. 754, n. 6 (relating to a letter from Diderot to Sophie 
dated Langres, 31 juillet 1759). 
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committee to which the manuscript and dedicatory letter was sent. He 
was Minister of Justice after Danton, and at the latter’s recommendation, 
from 9 October 1792; from 14 March 1793 until his resignation on 20 
August 1793 he was Minister of the Interior; arrested in September 
1793, then released under house arrest, he was rearrested in 1794 
and condemned to death on 2 Thermidor 1794, and not immediately 
released after the fall of Robespierre.39 He only emerged from prison at 
the demand of various members of the new Convention, who wanted 
him to be appointed Commissaire of the Comité d’instruction publique, 
which he duly was, as we have seen. He would go on to be a key mover 
in the establishment of the École normale, also lecturing there himself. 
As a young journalist for the Mercure de France in 1779, he had 
penned a remarkable—and now famous—portrait of Diderot in a state 
of almost crazed exaltation, as someone who could not stop talking, 
who whacked Garat’s thigh for emphasis as if it were his own, and who, 
continually inspired, ranged from theatre to legislation to antiquity and 
history, whose imagination transported him to any place, subject, and 
time.40 Diderot himself, having read this portrait, declared that he was 
‘point éloigné d’aimer’ [not far from loving] Garat.41 Garat seems like an 
option; an ‘r’ more or less seems insignificant, while a hasty ‘t’ can look 
like a messy ‘n’ without too much of a stretch, and indeed does.
Fig. 7.2 Garat’s signature from the registers of the Académie française, 
Dominique-Joseph Garat, ?1803, Pen and Paper, Académie française, 
http://www.academie-francaise.fr/les-immortels/dominique-joseph-
garat, CC-BY
39  Murray, ‘Garat’, in Dictionnaire des journalistes, ed. by Jean Sgard (Oxford: Voltaire 
Foundation, 1999).
40  Garat dans le Mercure de France, 15 February 1779. Reprinted in Denis Diderot, 
Correspondance, ed. by Georges Roth and Jean Varloot (Paris: Minuit, 1955–70), vol. 
15, pp. 130–31.
41  Diderot, Correspondance, vol. 15, p. 131, n. 14.
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Against Garat being the signatory is his own celebrity or notoriety as 
a politician of the Revolution; would his signature not have been quite 
well known, and his name not recognised? Whether or not Garat owned 
and sent the manuscript, the lectures on the ‘analyse de l’entendement’ 
[analysis of the human understanding] that he went on to give at the 
École normale overlap strikingly at points with the third part of the 
Éléments de physiologie, and Garat therefore has to be part of our story. 
We will examine those lectures in a later section.
The first candidate clearly in our second camp, that is, those active 
in the Republican government, rather than straddling both like Garat, is 
the Assemblée nationale deputy, anti-slavery campaigner and lawyer, 
Jean-Philippe Garran de Coulon (1748–1816), known during the 
Revolutionary years as ‘Jean-Philippe Garran’. He would have been 
an admirer of Guillaume-Thomas Raynal’s Histoire des deux Indes (to 
which Diderot contributed so substantially), he had contributed to the 
‘Jurisprudence’ volumes of the Encyclopédie méthodique42 and, as a deputy, 
he published on a wide number of subjects, including disasters in the 
colonies, the sentencing of Louis XVI, and the government of Poland.43 
In favour of Garran is his name, his networks and interests. He would 
probably have considered that any substantial manuscript by Diderot 
would be important, without himself being particularly invested in the 
subject of physiology. This may be a reason supporting the idea that 
he would have gifted any such manuscript to the Republic. However, 
against him is any evidence that he knew Diderot in the slightest.
Finally, we have a homonymic ‘Caron’ who petitioned to be taken on 
as a clerk for the Comité d’instruction publique on 15 Messidor (3 July 
42  The Encyclopédie méthodique was divided into different subject areas (including 
three on philosophy, edited by Naigeon, as discussed in Chapter 6) and ran to more 
than 200 volumes in all. 
43  See Encyclopédie méthodique. Jurisprudence, ed. by M. Lerasle and ‘un ensemble de 
juristes’ of whom Garran de Coulon is one (A Paris, chez Panckoucke), 1782–89, 10 
vols (see BnF catalogue entry: https://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb307966921); 
Garran as unique author, Opinion de J.-Ph. Garran,... sur les causes et les remèdes des 
désastres des colonies, lue à la séance du 29 février 1792... (Paris: Impr. nationale, [n.p.]); 
Sur le jugement de Louis XVI (Paris: chez les directeurs de l’imprimerie du Cercle 
social, 1793); Recherches politiques sur l’état ancien et moderne de la Pologne, appliquées à 
sa dernière révolution (Paris: impr. de J.-J. Smits, an III [1794]). There is an engraving 
of him here: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b6943332w. 
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1794) and was duly given a job on 19 Thermidor (6 August 1794).44 His 
petition has not survived, and we have no information about him, other 
than that he was taken on. Was he Pierre-Siméon Caron (1757–1806), a 
theatrical impresario and book collector who had some success with a 
puppet show in 1784, and who might possibly have known the Jean-Pierre 
Moët in whose hands the manuscript ended up. This Caron published 
a curious collection of 11 volumes of rare and licentious works, and he 
sounds more like the eponymous anti-hero of the Neveu de Rameau than 
a conscientious clerk.45 The clerk and the puppeteer/book collector/
writer are quite likely to be two separate people, neither of whom had 
anything to do with the manuscript. And while we are on the name 
‘Caron’, a more famous (and probably equally unlikely candidate) is 
Pierre-Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais (1732–99), that is, the famous 
playwright, who was well-known to Diderot, but never close; there is 
only one (rather formal) letter from Diderot to Beaumarchais.46 
To summarise: there is no obvious Garron. Tourneux, on weak 
evidence, suggests the Protestant pastor Pierre-Henri Marron. We, 
in turn, and on the basis of no evidence at all, but simply working 
around possible mistranscriptions and homonyms of the name itself 
amongst those who knew Diderot, and who therefore had some claim 
to friendship, propose the painter Jean-Baptiste Garand (who had 
been dead since 1780), the Volland intimate and banker Gaschon, the 
journalist and Revolutionary politician Dominique-Joseph Garat or 
even Beaumarchais, who would have styled himself ‘le citoyen Caron’ 
during the Revolution. More weakly even, because we lack evidence of 
acquaintance of any sort, we offer Assemblée nationale deputy Garran 
de Coulon, who, as ‘le citoyen Garran’, at least has the merit of having 
almost the right name, and, finally, the unknown clerk of the Comité 
d’instruction publique, taken on five months after the manuscript was 
sent. What this tells us more than anything is that it is almost pointless 
to try to identify a candidate because we simply do not have enough 
information; we are not even in a position to suggest that it might be a 
44 Procès verbaux du comité d’instruction publique, ed. by Guillaume, vol. 4, pp. 741 and 
907 respectively.
45  Pierre Siméon Caron, Collection d’anciennes facéties, 6 vols (Paris: [n.p.], 1798–1806).
46  Diderot to Beaumarchais, in Œuvres complètes, ed. by Lewinter, vol. 12, pp. 789–91 
(letter of 5 August 1777).
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pseudonym. And how quickly our efforts descend into the farcical, with 
late eighteenth-century Paris turning into a caricature of itself! What? A 
puppeteer and publisher of lewd old books? Beaumarchais the sometime 
gunrunner and spy? We might as well set to writing storylines for the 
computer game Assassin’s Creed, where bibliographer, ex-Benedictine 
monk, and Vicq d’Azyr’s co-worker Germain Poirier does indeed feature 
in some exciting manner.47 Will some other researcher have better luck? 
I hope so. 
Meanwhile, the name that stands out as most plausible, because the 
name could have been misread, because he did know Diderot, because 
he was clearly an admirer, and because he did go on to address very 
similar topics, is Garat. Whether or not the manuscript came from him, 
it is to him that we now turn, in order to explore the echoes between 
his lectures and Diderot’s text. His future position as Commissaire of 
the Comité d’instruction publique means, after all, that if anyone could 
have had access to this manuscript, it would have been him. 
47  For example: https://assassinscreed.fandom.com/wiki/Dom_Poirier.
8. 1794–95: Garat and the  
École normale
We already know a bit about Dominique-Joseph Garat from the previous 
section. We know that he had been a journalist, had met Denis Diderot 
and immortalised him in the pages of the Mercure de France; we know 
that he was a politician of some visibility during the Revolution. We also 
know that he was appointed Commissaire of the Comité d’instruction 
publique after his release from prison and the lifting of his death 
sentence, that he wrote the report on whose basis the École normale was 
set up, and was heavily responsible for its conceptualisation, organised 
as it was around his own lectures on the Analyse de l’entendement.1
A few more details seem necessary to understand Garat’s background 
and perhaps also to make better sense of some of the hypotheses this 
chapter will advance.2 His admiring portrait of Diderot was in fact 
something of a professional speciality: he was a celebrated and prize-
winning author of eulogies of French statesmen and advisors to kings 
1  Pierre-Louis Roederer (1754–1835) wrote that: ‘le cours de Garat devait être le cours 
préliminaire de tous les autres’ [Garat’s lectures were to be the foundation of all the 
rest], Journal de Paris, 7 March 1795. Quoted in Jean Dhombres, ‘Lettres et sciences: 
la cohabitation de 1795 à l’école normale’, in L’École normale de l’an III, ed. by Jean 
Dhombres (Paris: Éditions ENS, 2008), vol. 4, p. 17, https://doi.org/10.4000/books.
editionsulm.1445. 
2  Sources for the information that follows (and more) are: William Murray, ‘Garat’, 
in Dictionnaire des journalistes, 1600-1789, ed. by Jean Sgard (Oxford: Voltaire 
Foundation, 1999), http://dictionnaire-journalistes.gazettes18e.fr/journaliste/329-
dominique-garat and Gérard Gengembre, ‘Introduction’, in Leçons d’analyse et 
d’entendement de Garat, ed. by G. Gengembre et al., in L’École Normale de l’an III, ed. by 
Jean Dhombres, vol. 4, pp. 45–50, https://doi.org/10.4000/books.editionsulm.1458.
© Caroline Warman, CC BY 4.0 https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0199.08
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through the ages, and also of Enlightenment scientist Bernard le Bovier 
de Fontenelle.3 (In 1820, he would return to the subject of Fontenelle in 
his Mémoires sur la vie de M. Suard, sur ses écrits et sur le dix-huitième siècle 
[Memoirs on the life of Mr Suard, his writings, and on the eighteenth 
century], a curious work that we shall have occasion to discuss in 
Chapter 11.)4 He attended Mme Helvétius’s influential salon in Auteuil, 
as Diderot also had (although they probably did not overlap), and he 
was also a member from 1779 of the connected masonic lodge which 
astronomer Jérôme Lalande had set up in 1776 with Mme Helvétius’s 
support, the Loge des Neuf Sœurs.5 Two further members of both Salon 
and Lodge are the doctor philosopher Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis 
(1757–1808) and his friend the philosopher Antoine Louis Claude 
Destutt de Tracy (1754–1836); all three, roughly of the same generation 
(Garat was born in 1749), would write on sensations, ideas, and 
human understanding, although at this point (1794–95) none of them 
had yet published anything on this particular area; Garat’s published 
École normale lectures would be their first text of this sort, to be rapidly 
followed by Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy, as we shall see in the next 
section/chapter. But we are getting ahead of ourselves. 
It seems as if initially Garat had no plan to deliver lectures on this 
topic himself; the Swiss philosophe and naturalist Charles Bonnet was 
named instead.6 Bonnet’s Essai analytique sur les facultés de l’âme (1760) 
would be much praised by Garat (a house speciality, as we have seen) 
in his first lecture; he declares that ‘nul n’a connu mieux que lui le 
mécanisme de la pensée’ [no one knew the workings of thought better 
than he].7 This is not the first time Bonnet has featured in this study; we 
looked at Bonnet’s contribution in Chapter 3. But Bonnet was unable 
3  Michel de l’Hospital (1778), Abbé Suger (1779), Charles de Sainte-Maure (1781) 
and Fontenelle (1784). The Académie Française awarded the last three prizes. 
Murray, ‘Garat’, in Dictionnaire des journalistes.
4  Dominique-Joseph Garat, Mémoires historiques sur la vie de M. Suard, sur ses écrits, et 
sur le XVIIIe siècle; par Dominique-Joseph Garat, 2 vols (Paris: A. Belin, 1820).
5  See Louis Amiable, Une loge maçonnique d’avant 1789: La Loge des Neuf Sœurs, ed. 
by Charles Porset (Paris: Éditions maçonniques de France, 2014), pp. 35, 245–46. 
See also Dominique Julia, ‘La Mise en œuvre du décret du 9 brumaire: les mesures 
préparatoires’, in L’École normale de l’an III: une institution révolutionnaire et ses Élèves, 
ed. by Dominique Julia (Paris: Éditions Rue d’Ulm, 2016), pp. 115–69 (p. 130).
6  Julia, ‘La Mise en œuvre du décret du 9 brumaire: les mesures préparatoires’, p. 119.
7  Dominique-Joseph Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement [1796], ed. by G. 
Gengembre et al., L’École normale de l’an III, ed. by Jean Dhombres, vol. 4, p. 74. 
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to take up the position, as he had unfortunately died eighteen months 
before, in May 1793. As Dominique Julia wryly observes, it makes 
one wonder what effect the Revolutionary upheavals were having on 
communication networks within the republic of letters.8 It is indeed 
curious that the death of such an important scholar would not have been 
known in Paris.9 Might Garat have put forward the celebrated Bonnet as 
a blind, in full knowledge that he had died the year before, in order to 
offer himself up as a replacement in seeming humility and selflessness? 
Partly what we are evoking here—in the hypothetical republic of 
letters, or more specifically in the Cercle d’Auteuil or the Loge des Neuf 
Sœurs—are a series of unofficial networks whose workings, efficacy 
and reach are not perfectly visible or readable to us, although we can 
trace membership and speculate on connections. The case of the Comité 
d’instruction publique and its École normale are different. These are 
prominent, official, even show-case parts of the government of the new 
Republic. So they have a different relationship to records, accountability, 
and reputation. We have already discussed the records of the Comité 
d’instruction publique, so we already know that while its official 
workings and records may tell a story of transparent officialdom, there 
are also many gaps and unknowables. Yet it does matter that they are 
official organs of the government and also that they are self-consciously 
new creations of it, reflecting its republican values, because this means 
that when they speak, they speak for the government. They are public 
not private; institutional not individual. And we cannot therefore 
separate content from form. Perhaps we never can, but if we are even 
considering suggesting that anything from the Éléments de physiologie 
might have made its way into Garat’s Cours, from, that is, a clandestine 
and unavowable materialist manuscript written by one of Maximilien 
Robespierre’s personae non gratae, and which the Comité d’instruction 
publique avoided recording when given it, and onto one of the most 
visible stages of the virtuous new Republic, then it seems obvious that 
8  Julia, ‘La Mise en œuvre du décret du 9 brumaire: les mesures préparatoires’, p. 119.
9  Richard Whatmore considers it unlikely that news of Bonnet’s death would not 
have got through to Paris, as communication between Geneva and Paris was good, 
email 22.2.2019; see also Richard Whatmore, ‘Revolution and Empire’, in Against 
War and Empire: Geneva, Britain and France in the Eighteenth Century (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2012), pp. 228–70 (ch. 7), for ample evidence of letters getting 
through between the two cities.
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anything revealing any aspect of its origins will have had to be well 
hidden. Its form would have to be completely different. It would have to 
fit and reflect the École normale. And thus the first question to address 
is what was the École normale? What was its form, its function, its 
mode? Were these disputed? Was it successful? 
The École normale of 1795, its rise and demise
So, although the idea and indeed the name of the Normal School as 
a training academy for teachers was imported from Germany, its 
conceptualisation as a rapid revolutioniser of teaching across the new 
Republic was directly borrowed from a highly successful military model.10 
This was the project to bring citizen students from across the country to 
the École des armes et des poudres (Weaponry and Gunpowder School) 
to learn to make canons and the saltpetre and gunpowder to go with 
them, the idea being that not only would the students learn to make 
them but that they would return to their districts and then run foundries, 
and that the military production line would be vastly increased: this was 
an urgent national need in 1794, when France was engaged in fighting 
Spain, Portugal, Austria, Prussia, Hanover, and Britain. It worked, and 
it also functioned as a way of spreading Revolutionary fervour, as the 
students returned to their districts with offical governmental bulletins 
in hand.11 The decree setting it up and requiring each district to send 
two citizens aged between twenty-five and thirty within five days, was 
announced on 14 Pluviôse an II (2 Feb 1794), and the lessons, lasting 
three ‘decades’ i.e. thirty days (a ‘decade’ referring to ten days rather 
than years), were due to start on the 1er Ventôse; this duly happened, 
10  See Étienne François, ‘L’École normale: une création allemande?’, in L’École normale 
de l’an III, pp. 31–49. Some of the following analysis can also be found (more fully 
developed and more fully focused on the École normale itself) in Caroline Warman, 
“The Revolution Is to the Human Mind What the African Sun is to Vegetation”: 
Revolution, Heat, and the Normal School Project’, The Critical Genealogy of Normality, 
ed. by Peter Cryle, special issue, History of Human Sciences (2020), 1-18, https://doi.
org/10.1177/0952695120946992. I would like to express my thanks to Peter Cryle 
and to the History of Human Sciences for allowing me to draw on my article here, and 
also acknowledge my gratitude to Peter Cryle (again) and Elizabeth Stephens for 
inviting me to their ARC-funded conference workshop on the Critical Genealogy of 
Normality in Italy, June 2018, where this work was first presented.
11  Quoted by Dominique Julia, ‘La Fondation de l’école normale de l’an III’, in L’École 
normale de l’an III, pp. 83–104 (p. 86).
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and the first graduates of this school were returning to set up or 
revolutionise their local foundries by 2 Germinal (22 March 1794), just 
after a grand ‘fête civique’ to mark the end of the lessons, in which 
the pupils ceremonially presented the saltpetre, gunpowder and one 
bronze canon that they had made to the Convention nationale.12 Jacobin 
politician Bertrand Barère (1755–1841), member of the Comité de salut 
public (Committee of public safety) under Robespierre and one of the 
few who survived his fall to continue as a member of the government, is 
loud in his acclamation:
L’ancien régime aurait demandé trois ans pour ouvrir des écoles, pour 
former des élèves, pour faire des cours de chimie ou d’armurerie. Le 
nouveau régime a tout accéléré. […] C’est ainsi que l’influence de la 
liberté rend tous les fruits précoces et les institutions faciles.13
The old régime would have asked for three years to open schools, train 
students, and complete lessons in chemistry or armoury. The new régime 
has accelerated everything. […] This is the influence of freedom, it makes 
all fruit ripen early, it makes institutions easy.
This is a curious passage. It naturalises the industrial production of 
weaponry as a harvest as it also naturalises acceleration in terms of an 
early harvest, and of course it also naturalises the new régime and the 
process of freedom as a sort of sun. But it took a while (even in these 
accelerated times) for it to get off the ground. It was Robert Lindet’s 
report on the state of the nation, delivered on behalf of the Comité 
de salut public to the Convention nationale on the 4e jour des sans-
culottides an II (20 September 1794) that reactivated the project. Lindet’s 
aim was to make ignorance and darkness—les ténèbres—disappear, and 
to spread light and knowledge. He wanted the Convention nationale to 
‘éclairer le peuple, de l’attacher à la Révolution’ [enlighten the people 
and make them love the Revolution, bind them to it]: he thinks all 
French citizens should be educated to be like those from the canton du 
Valais in Switzerland:
Dans le Valais, tout habitant sait cultiver son champ, les arts et les 
sciences ; toute maison renferme une collection des meilleurs livres, des 
12  Quoted by Julia, ‘La Fondation de l’école’, p. 85.
13  Archives parlementaires, 1ere série, t. 85, Paris, Éditions du CNRS, 1964, p. 208–09, 
quoted in Julia, ‘La Fondation de l’école’, p. 85.
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outils les plus ingénieux des différents arts et métiers et des instruments 
d’agriculture, dont le possesseur sait faire usage.14
In the Valais, every inhabitant knows how to cultivate his field, the 
arts and crafts, and knowledge more generally; every house contains a 
collection of the best books and also of the best tools for arts and crafts, 
as well as for agriculture, and their owner knows how to use them all, 
moreover.
The response of the Convention nationale to Robert Lindet’s call for 
action was to instruct the Comité d’instruction publique to produce a 
report within 2 ‘décades’ (that is, twenty days), and its official document 
used the same terminology of acceleration we saw in Bertrand Barère’s 
speech:
La Convention nationale, voulant accélérer l’époque où elle pourra faire 
répandre dans toute la République l’instruction d’une manière uniforme, 
charge son Comité d’instruction publique de lui présenter, dans deux 
décades, un projet d’écoles normales […]15
The National Convention, wishing to accelerate that time when it will 
be able to spread education uniformly across the Republic, charges its 
Committee of Public Education to present to it, in 20 days, a project for 
normal schools […]
This is where Garat comes in. He duly wrote the report—although it 
came in 10 days late—and it was delivered by government minister 
Joseph Lakanal.16 
On 9 Brumaire (30 October 1794), Garat’s report was adopted and 
decreed. One citizen for every 20,000 population was to be sent by each 
district to Paris by the end of ‘Frimaire’ (December). Each future ‘élève’ 
or pupil of the École normale would be reimbursed for their travel 
expenses and paid an allowance. 1500–1600 new pupils duly arrived in 
Paris.
14  Robert Lindet, ‘Rapport sur l’état de la France’, in L’École normale de l’an III: une 
institution révolutionnaire et ses élèves (2). Textes fondateurs, pétitions, correspondances 
et autres documents (janvier-mai 1795), ed. by Dominique Julia (Paris: Éditions rue 
d’Ulm, 2016), p. 42. 
15  Quoted in Julia, ‘La Fondation de l’école’, p. 94.
16  ‘Rapport sur l’établissement des écoles normales’, in L’École normale de l’an III: une 
institution révolutionnaire et ses élèves (2). Textes fondateurs, pétitions, correspondances 
et autres documents (janvier-mai 1795), ed. by Dominique Julia (Paris: Éditions rue 
d’Ulm, 2016), pp. 43–49. 
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The official opening session was on 1er Pluviôse an III, where high 
levels of enthusiasm and repeated applause were reported.17 The subjects 
taught were to be Maths, Geometry, Chemistry, Physics, Natural History, 
Agriculture, Literature, The Analysis of the [human] Understanding, 
Morals, The Art of Speaking, Geography, and Political Economics. The 
idea was that each lesson would be followed at a distance of a few days 
by a debate; in the lesson the professor alone would speak, but in the 
debate, the pupils would be allowed to intervene. The lecturers were 
not allowed to read out their work but had to speak it, supposedly 
improvising. Stenographers would take down what was said, and 
present proofs of the lessons to the lecturers three days later, which 
the lecturers would have three hours to correct, and which would then 
be printed and distributed to the students, who would be able to use 
them to prepare for the debates. The debates were also taken down by 
the stenographers, and given to the lecturers to correct—this time they 
had three weeks to do it. The student speakers however were not given 
proofs, and were unable to participate in the corrections, as at least one 
of them bitterly complained.18 In fact the debates stopped occurring 
relatively quickly—around the end of the month of Ventôse (that is, 
20 March 1795).19 After increasing discussion about the École normale 
and its functioning, some of which was also to do with the practical 
living conditions of the students and the sheer expense of it all, the École 
normale was closed down on 30 Floréal an IV (19 May 1795), with most 
of the lessons still incomplete.20 The stenographed corrected versions 
of lessons and debates would be publicly published, as it were, only a 
few months later, in the autumn of 1795 (l’an IV de la République), and 
dispatched to all the students in their home districts.21
17  Dominique Julia, ‘Le Déroulement des leçons dans l’amphithéâtre du muséum’, in 
L’École normale de l’an III, pp. 333–70 (p. 344).
18  This is Louis de St Martin, quoted by Stéphane Baciocchi and Julia in ‘Un hiver à 
Paris’, in L’École normale de l’an III, pp. 307–70 (p. 317).
19  Dominique Julia, ‘Les “Conférences” de l’école normale: typologie des débats’, in 
L’École normale de l’an III, pp. 371–421 (p. 388).
20  Stéphane Baciocchi and Dominique Julia, ‘La Dissolution de l’école’, in L’École 
normale de l’an III, pp. 425–62 (p. 440).
21  They were republished in an extended edition in 1800–01 and then again in 1808, 
and are now the subject of a critical edition (1992–2008). See Dominique Julia, 
‘Sources et bibliographie’, L’École normale de l’an III, pp. 616–17, and also ch. 14 ‘Le 
Destin ultérieur des Leçons: les éditions des Séances des écoles normales’, pp. 463–81.
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The school had been a mixed success. it was supposed to have been 
only four months long, as indeed it was, but it had started late and none 
of the lessons were completed. Whether it would repeat on a yearly basis 
had not been addressed.22 But, in any case, it was supposed to operate 
rapidly and efficiently, and it was relatively obvious that this had not 
happened. 
The material organisation had been patchy, and the concrete 
conditions appalling, for both organisational and natural reasons. 
Students had arrived by the end of Frimaire (20 December) as they had 
been ordered to, but lessons did not start until a month later, whereas 
the modest allowances and travel expenses promised to the students by 
the Convention were not forthcoming until the lessons actually started. 
No accommodation had been provided for the students, of whom there 
were between 1500–1600, and the venue for lessons, the amphitheatre or 
lecture hall of the Muséum d’histoire naturelle, could only accommodate 
about half of them. It was also one of the coldest winters of the century 
and the Seine froze over so no supplies of wood or food could get into 
the city, which made conditions even worse. There were therefore 1,500 
disgruntled students knocking about Paris, and there was some anxiety 
about the possibility of unrest. Once the lessons actually started, they still 
did not follow the advertised rota: some of the professors did not finish 
their lessons (Garat was one), some did not come at all (André Thouin, 
supposed to teach Agriculture, stayed in Belgium with the French army; 
Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, due to teach ‘Morale’, came late), and some 
were simply inaudible.23 Despite the main mission of the École normale 
being to train teachers so as to facilitate the rapid onward transmission 
of all this knowledge, few of the lessons addressed the actual mechanics 
of teaching. One of the principal pillars of this particular lecture format 
was that they would be taken down by stenographers who would 
then write them up, and they had to be printed and distributed to the 
students in time for them to prepare for the planned follow-up debates. 
22  The whole project was disbanded and not repeated again, as it had initially been 
supposed to, see the Projet du comité d’instruction publique, 1er Prarial an II, 20 May 
1794, article 13, in L’École normale de l’an III: une institution révolutionnaire et ses élèves 
(2). Textes fondateurs, pétitions, correspondances et autres documents (janvier-mai 1795), 
ed. by Julia, p. 41.
23  Julia, ‘La Mise en œuvre du décret du 9 brumaire: les mesures préparatoires’, p. 121; 
and Julia, ‘Le Déroulement des leçons’, p. 334.
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Yet the stenographers never managed to turn the lectures round in time 
and, subject to the same appalling conditions as everyone else, became 
ill and went off sick. Some of the debates became heated and politically 
contentious—Garat for instance was accused of preaching materialism 
and atheism, as we will see, and he was not the only one.24 Some students 
started making representations to the Convention to be allowed home—
many had families needing support. 
Meanwhile, the École normale—which was originally a Jacobin 
initiative from before Robespierre’s fall—came under the suspicion 
because of it. The Assemblée des quatre sections réunies d’Auxerre 
officially wrote to the Convention on 30 Ventôse (20 March 1795) to 
ask for an ‘épuration générale de l’École normale’ [general purification 
of the École normale] whose élèves, they say, were chosen under 
Robespierre.25
None of this made the operation of the École normale easy, and 
indeed it never ran smoothly. It did not behave as it was conceived of 
behaving, that is, rapidly, efficiently, without loss of substance or speed 
in the transmission. 
Interestingly, it was the speed and extent of the ambition that one 
deputy honed in on in the debate of 27 April 1795 about whether to 
24  Stéphane Baciocchi and Dominique Julia give details of these accusations in their 
article ‘La Dissolution de l’école’: Antoine-Alexandre Barbier ‘est formellement 
accusé par le Conseil général de la commune d’avoir “comme Chaumette prêché 
l’athéisme et d’en avoir fait une profession de foi publique”’ [is formally accused 
by the General Council of the commmune of having ‘like Chaumette preached 
atheism and of having made a public avowal of his faith in it’]; Pierre Fontanier 
was denounced on 2 Germinal (22 March 1795) for atheism along with ‘les 
commissaires qui, pour convertir le peuple à la raison, lui prêchaient l’athéisme 
en style révolutionnaire’ [the commissioners who, in order to convert the people 
to reason, preached atheism in the revolutionary style]; Joseph Fourier (one 
of the élèves who in fact teaches maths to the other élèves) wrote to his friend 
Bonnard on 28 Ventôse an III (18 March 1795): ‘J’entends toutes sortes de contes 
à ce sujet. Je n’ajouterai jamais foi à de pareilles sottises, et ce qui rend tout ceci 
incroyable encore, c’est qu’on me présente, dit-on, comme un dilapidateur et un 
ivrogne’ [I am hearing all sorts of stories on this topic. I will never believe in such 
nonsense, and what makes it even more unbelievable is that apparently I am being 
presented as a spendthrift and drunkard] (‘La Dissolution de l’école’, pp. 431, 431, 
433 respectively). On Fontanier, see also http://lakanal-1795.huma-num.fr/wiki/
Fontanier_Pierre from the Prosopographie des élèves nommés à l’école normale de l’an III, 
ed. by Stéphane Baciocchi and Dominique Julia, http://lakanal-1795.huma-num.fr/
wiki/Présentation.
25  Baciocchi and Julia, ‘La Dissolution de l’école’, pp. 437–38.
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close down the École normale or not. This is what Pierre-Marie-Augustin 
Guyomar, député (elected representative) des Côtes-du-Nord and cloth 
merchant from Guingamp, said:
Lorsque l’École normale fut établie, la manie des anciens gouvernants 
régnait encore ; on croyait alors qu’on pouvait faire des savants en quatre 
mois  ; on voulait révolutionner jusqu’à la science […]. J’observerai que 
vouloir des cultivateurs faire des savants, c’est une brillante chimère  ; 
pourvu qu’ils sachent lire, écrire et compter, c’est tout ce qui leur est 
nécessaire.26
When the École normale was set up, the mania of the old rulers still held 
sway; it was then thought that it was possible to make scholars in four 
months; they wanted to revolutionise everything, even knowledge […] In 
my view, to want to make scholars out of farmers is a brilliant chimera; as 
long as they can read, write, and count, that’s all they need.
In ‘manie des anciens gouvernants’ we recognise of course a criticism 
of the Jacobins, now presented as obsessives and subject to mania. 
The speed is presented as ridiculous, as is the aim we heard positively 
presented by Lindet in his report to the convention on 20 Sept 1794, only 
seven months earlier (and subsequent to the fall of the Jacobin régime), 
that is, to imitate the inhabitants of the Swiss canton of Valais, who read 
and are interested in their fields and in arts and sciences. Lindet’s aim 
had been to create an equality that was also an aspiration. Guyomar’s 
restatement of the needs of farmers is a back-to-basics sort of notion, and 
makes something as complex and ambitious as the École normale in its 
1795 incarnation appear broadly redundant, even a sort of perversion, a 
monster of mixed parts, like the mythical chimera.
Garat’s Lectures on the Analysis of Human 
Understanding
Garat is right in the middle of all this. His role in orientating the 
ambition of the school was decisive: he wanted the school no longer 
26  Guyomar, as relayed by the Journal de France no. 942, 8 Floréal an III (27 April 1795), 
in Une institution et ses élèves (2): Textes fondateurs, ed. by Julia, Appendix 3 (Les 
débats à la Convention), p. 67; also quoted in Baciocchi and Julia, ‘La Dissolution 
de l’école’, p. 445.
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simply to train teachers but to be ‘la première École du monde’ [the first 
School in the world].27 He chose the subjects and put forward lecturers 
with whom he had long-standing intellectual affinities, as Julia puts 
it.28 He also tried to get Cabanis to join them (he declined on health 
grounds).29 And as mentioned, once Bonnet’s hoped-for contribution 
was no longer an option, and Garat had begun to occupy the conceptual 
space initially (or supposedly) intended for the Genevan naturalist, he 
gave his own lectures on the Analysis of the Understanding centre stage, 
presenting their analysis of analysis as the starting point and touchstone 
of everything else, as we will see. 
Why would the Analysis of the Understanding come before all other 
subjects and be presented as the foundation of all? In common-sense 
terms, because once one learns to think and learns to learn, then one 
can learn anything. Thus, Garat envisages his pupils going out to teach 
learning in general, forming efficient clear minds. This aim is, in his 
words, perfectly specific: ‘il n’y a qu’une seule manière de bien penser’ 
[there is only one way of thinking properly], and is the foundation ‘de 
tout ce qu’il y a de plus grand et de plus réel dans les espérances conçues 
pour le perfectionnement de l’esprit humain et pour l’amélioration 
universelle des destinées humaines’ [of everything that is grandest and 
most real in the hopes conceived for the perfecting of the human mind 
and the universal improvement of human destinies].30 We see the aims, 
values, and claims of the Republican government in this sentence. In any 
case, to discover this single manner of thinking well or, in alternative 
terms, of directing the mind (‘l’esprit’), there is ‘un seul moyen’ [a 
single means] which is ‘de le bien connaître, de le suivre pas à pas dans 
tout ce qui lui arrive et dans tout ce qu’il fait, depuis les sensations qui 
lui sont communes avec les animaux, jusqu’aux conceptions les plus 
compliquées de la plus vaste intelligence’ [to know it well, to follow it 
step by step in everything that happens to it and everything it does, from 
27  Garat, letter to Lakanal, 15 Nivôse an III (4 January 1795), quoted in Julia, ‘La Mise 
en œuvre du décret du 9 brumaire: les mesures préparatoires’, p. 120. See also 
Gérard Gengembre, ‘Introduction’, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement de Garat, p. 48.
28  Julia, ‘La Mise en œuvre du décret du 9 brumaire: les mesures préparatoires’, p. 132.
29  Julia, ‘La Mise en œuvre du décret du 9 brumaire: les mesures préparatoires’, p. 152, 
n. 40 (from the same letter of 15 Nivôse to Lakanal, see note 27).
30  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, ed. by G. Gengembre et al., in L’École Normale 
de l’an III, ed. by Jean Dhombres (Paris: Éditions ENS), pp. 43–160 (p. 85).
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the sensations it shares with animals all the way to the most complicated 
conceptions of the greatest intelligence].31 
As this term ‘sensations’ immediately tells us, Garat’s programme is 
to teach the theory of sense-based knowledge with which we engaged 
briefly in Chapter 3; whether in doing this he also addresses how to 
teach learning is a moot point. However, he describes the processes 
by which a sensation becomes an idea and can then be compared to 
another sensation-based idea; from comparison we come to judgement, 
and connectedly to memory and imagination. He also talks about 
how language is a part of this process. In doing so, Garat ‘adopte 
un sensualisme dans la continuité de Diderot’ [adopts a sort of 
sensationalism following on from Diderot], as Béatrice Didier summarily 
puts it in her introduction to Garat’s lectures.32 But Didier might easily 
also have said Buffon or Condillac or Bonnet or any number of other 
adherents of sensationist empiricism. Condillac and Bonnet indeed are 
often mentioned by Garat; Diderot never. The aim of these lectures is, 
declares Garat, no less than to establish ‘une science toute nouvelle, 
qui ne remonte pas plus haut que Bacon’ [a completely new science, 
which goes no further back than Bacon], and the first thing he addresses 
therefore is the history of this new science.33 Eulogy-like, his ‘Première 
leçon’ runs through Francis Bacon, John Locke, Thomas Sydenham 
(1624–89, English physician), Bonnet and Condillac, with glancing 
references to César Chesneau Dumarsais, Isaac Newton, Galileo, and 
Johannes Kepler.34 We note in passing the preponderance on this list of 
31  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 67 (Programme).
32  Béatrice Didier, ‘Les cours littéraires de l’an III: tradition et innovation’, in L’École 
normale de l’an III, ed. by Jean Dhombres, vol. 4, p. 30. Michèle Crampe-Casnabet 
argues that Garat presents a ‘reduced’ (rather than reductive) version of sensualism; 
see her ‘Garat à l’École normale: une entreprise de réduction du sensualisme’, in 
Langages de la Révolution, 1770-1815). Actes du 4e colloque international de lexicologie 
politique (Paris: Klincksieck, 1995), pp. 177–84.
33  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 69 (Programme).
34  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, pp. 71–73 (Bacon); pp. 73–74 (Locke); 
p. 74 (Sydenham, Bonnet); pp. 74–75 (Condillac); p. 75 (Dumarsais); pp. 72–73 
(Newton), p. 75 (Galileo, Kepler). His ‘Seconde leçon’ will range beyond these 
references, bringing in classical authorities Plato, Virgil and Horace, and from 
‘recent’ European thought, Michel de Montaigne, Nicolas Malebranche, Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz, Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and altogether in a clump, 
‘les Lavoisier, les Berthollet et les Laplace’ (p. 83): of all these, only Rousseau is 
more than a passing reference (p. 86). Garat will deploy his pluralising trope—‘les 
Lavoisier’ etc, i.e. people like Lavoisier— again, see below. Jean-Luc Chappey looks 
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seventeenth-century rather than recent luminaries, and the presence of 
only two Frenchmen, Condillac and Dumarsais. 
His conviction that human understanding or reason is sense-
based leads logically to a second conviction, which is that in order to 
understand thought, we need to understand sensation. The connections 
between thought and sensation, and beyond them, the capacities of 
a given human being, are emphasised from the very beginning of his 
lectures. 
Tout ce que fait l’homme, tout ce qu’il veut, et même, à beaucoup 
d’égards, tout ce qu’il peut, dépend, en dernière analyse, de la manière 
dont il sent les choses, dont il les voit, dont il en raisonne, dont il les 
entend, en quelque sorte.35
Everything man does, everything he wants, and often, in many respects, 
everything he is capable of, depends, in the final analysis, on how he 
feels things, how he sees them, what he thinks about them, how he makes 
sense of them, in some way.
Thus, it is not surprising to discover in his second lecture a particular push 
to improve, or in his term ‘perfectionner’ [to perfect], the functioning 
of our senses. He does not, however, draw attention to this in the plan 
(also in the second lecture) he outlines, whereby what he identifies as 
‘sections’ (rather than separate lectures) will address firstly, the senses, 
sensations, and the origin of understanding (p. 77); secondly, the faculties 
of the human understanding (his italics, p. 80); thirdly, the theory of 
ideas of all sorts (p. 83); fourthly, the immediate and intimate way in 
which the theory of language or languages is connected to the theory 
of ideas (p. 86); and fifthly, method, and how ‘bien sentir, bien se servir 
de ses facultés, bien former ses idées, bien parler […] ne sont qu’une 
seule et même chose’ [to sense well, to be able to use one’s faculties well, 
to form one’s ideas well, to speak well […] are one and the same thing] 
(his italics, p. 89). We have already seen his rhetorical tendency to focus 
at the importance of lists and the way in which they construct ‘l’unité d’un groupe 
d’individus’ [the unity of a group of individuals] during the Revolution, and 
although his remarks refer to a slightly earlier period and are specifically interested 
in biographical dictionaries, they are also illuminating here, see Jean-Luc Chappey, 
Ordres et désordres biographiques: dictionnaires, listes de noms, réputation des Lumières à 
Wikipédia (Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 2013), p. 176.
35  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 65 (Programme).
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on a single way of thinking properly and a single way of directing the 
mind, and here we see him present the proper ways to feel, use one’s 
faculties, form ideas, and speak, as being one single thing. So, he has a 
plan, and it seems coherent, emphatically so. This, however, is all we 
have, apart from the two debates, in which he mainly repeats what he 
had already said in the lectures, and also defends himself against various 
accusations levelled at him, one by an anonymous letter, and the other 
by one of his students, the theosophist Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin 
(1743–1803), of connections to either atheism or materialism.36 (We will 
turn to these accusations in due course.) This is all we have because the 
lecture transcriptions that we do have are incomplete, and there are no 
transcriptions at all for lessons we know from other sources that he did 
give.37 Furthermore, he did not complete his lecture course.38 
However, the material we do have is cause for interest in itself. 
As will already be evident, Condillac’s influence is overt, and it was 
noticed by the students.39 In this context, the word ‘analyse’ is almost 
36  The ‘Programme’ and ‘Première leçon’ were given on 11 Pluviôse an III (30 January 
1795). The ‘Seconde leçon’ was given on 23 Pluviôse (11 February). The ‘premier 
débat’ and ‘second débat’ took place on 29 Pluviôse (17 February) and 9 Ventôse 
(27 February) respectively. For an outline of the content of Garat’s lectures and 
debates, see ‘Chronologie et résumés des leçons et des débats’, Léçons d’analyse de 
l’entendement, in L’École normale de l’an III, vol. 4, pp. 63–64.
37  The final part of the second lecture is missing (p. 63). A lecture from 19 Pluviôse an 
III (7 February 1795) is missing from the record: in the second debate (9 Ventôse/27 
February) Garat reads out a letter from Saint-Martin referring to ‘la conférence 
du 19 pluviôse’ (p. 100), and another student, Duhamel, also mentions it in his 
remarks in the same debate (p. 113). There are eyebrow-raised reviews in the press 
of a lecture he supposedly gave on 4 Ventôse (22 February) which appears to have 
discussed a theory of a sixth sense connected to love (the press accounts focus with 
fascinated sarcasm on a detail about a heightened sense of smell connected to sex): 
see le Courrier universel du citoyen Husson (9 Ventôse/27 February), p. 2, and also 
the Courrier universel ou l’Écho de Paris, des départements et de l’étranger (30 Floréal 
an III/19 May 1795), quoted by Julia, ‘Le Déroulement des leçons’, p. 356. Julia also 
refers to a memoir by Charles-Marie de Salaberry which mentions this lecture, Mon 
voyage au Mont d’Or (1802). Finally, Paul Dupuy gives two further dates for missing 
transcriptions of lectures from the 18 and 24 Ventôse (8 and 14 March respectively); 
they are mentioned in the Feuille de la République (Paul Dupuy, ‘L’École normale 
de l’an III’, in Le Centenaire de l’École normale, édition du Bicentenaire [1895] (Paris: 
Presses de l’École normale supérieure, 1994), pp. 1–200 (p. 170), https://doi.
org/10.4000/books.editionsulm.1538. 
38  We don’t know why this is, but there are at least two plausible explanations, which 
we discuss below.
39  L’élève Fournier wrote a letter describing Garat, specifically mentioning his 
enthusiastic admiration for Condillac (and Bacon and Locke), see Jean-Robert 
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automatically associated with Condillac; ‘Condillacian analysis’ is a 
well-known and influential mode of analysis with a wide range of 
applications in ‘Enlightenment’ thought.40 His posthumously published 
work, La Logique (1780) seems particularly pertinent in connection to 
Garat’s lectures—its full title is La Logique ou les premiers développemens 
de l’art de penser, and the relevance to Garat is not hard to see.41 Divided 
into two parts, it first focuses on ‘Comment la nature même nous 
enseigne l’analyse’ [How nature itself teaches us analysis], containing 
chapters such as ‘Que l’analyse est l’unique méthode pour acquérir 
des connoissances’ [How analysis is the only method to acquire any 
knowledge] (Chapter 2), ‘Que l’analyse fait les esprits justes’ [How 
analysis produces accurate minds] (Chapter 3), ‘Analyse des facultés 
de l’âme’ [Analysis of the faculties of the soul] (Chapter 7).42 The 
second part is entitled ‘L’analyse considérée dans ses moyens et dans 
ses effets, ou l’art de raisonner réduit à une langue bien faite’ [Analysis 
considered in its means and effects, or the art of reasoning reduced to 
well-made language].43 Garat is not only influenced by Condillac, he 
is clearly modelling his lectures on La Logique, already a well-known 
Armogathe, ‘Garat et l’école normale de l’an III’, Corpus, revue de philosophie, 14–15 
(1990), 143–54 (p. 149).
40  As Arnaud Orain puts it, ‘Condillac would raise algebraic analysis to the status 
of method [for] all science. The famous philosopher labeled analysis as a means 
for the “invention” of ideas: by comparing two ideas which are “known” the 
thinker is going to engender a third, which then leads to an “unknown”—a new—
idea. Now Condillacian “analysis” was to become the great scientific method of 
the age of Enlightenment and was to be defended, in particular, by D’Alembert 
in the Encyclopédie for all fields of knowledge as the “method of invention”’. See 
Arnaud Orain, ‘Physiocratic Arithmetic versus Ratios: The Analytical Economics 
of Jean-Joseph-Louis Graslin’, in The Economic Turn: Recasting Political Economy in 
Enlightenment Europe, ed. by Steven L. Kaplan and Sophus A. Reinert (London: 
Anthem Press, 2019), pp. 193–220 (p. 208), https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvb1htk7.12. 
Orain refers to Condillac’s 1749 Traité des systèmes (Œuvres philosophiques, ed. by 
Georges le Roy (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948), vol. 1, pp. 119–217, 
213n); and d’Alembert’s entry on  ‘Éléments d’une science’, in Encyclopédie ou 
dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, par une société de gens de 
lettres, ed. by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert, 28 vols (Paris: Briasson, 
David, Le Breton, Durand, 1751–72), University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie 
Project (Autumn 2017 Edition), ed. by Robert Morrissey and Glenn Roe, http://
encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/, vol. 5 (1755), p. 495a.
41  Condillac, ‘La logique’, in Œuvres philosophiques, vol. 2, pp. 369–416.
42  Condillac, ‘La logique’, pp. 374, 376, and 384, respectively.
43  Condillac, ‘La logique’, p. 393. There are many passages on reforming and perfecting 
language; see for example ‘La logique’, II.iii–iv, pp. 399–400.
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text and claimed repeatedly by Antoine Lavoisier as his inspiration 
in reforming chemical nomenclature and language in the ‘Discours 
préliminaire’ of his seminal Traité élémentaire de chimie (1789).44 The 
famous Condillac is Garat’s pre-eminent authority, referred to in the 
course of the lectures alone eight times, ahead of Locke with seven 
mentions and Bacon with six. Yet the direction Garat takes his lectures 
in, insofar as we have them, is not quite the same. Instead of this 
specific Condillacian focus on perfecting language, Garat looks at 
perfecting the senses, and claims total novelty in even asking whether 
it can be done.45 In the conclusion to this second lecture, he makes sure 
to anchor this question in Condillacian technique, emphasising that all 
this will be done ‘analytiquement’.46 And yet the claim for a completely 
new area, however Condillacian, has been made.
Nor are all of the references to Condillac entirely eulogizing. Garat 
wonders whether ‘la sécheresse de ses narrations dépouillées de toute 
imagination et de toute beauté de style’ [the dryness of his accounts 
devoid of any imagination or stylistic beauty] can be forgiven.47 On 
the faculty of imagination, he chastises his eminent forebears—whom 
he lumps together—for insufficiently separating out the operations of 
memory, judgement and reason from imagination: 
les Locke même, et les Condillac, n’ont pu éviter le vague de certaines 
idées  ; c’est pour avoir négligé de faire ces distinctions qu’on a eu, sur 
l’imagination, des opinions si opposées  ; qu’on a regardé cette faculté 
44  Antoine Lavoisier, Traité élémentaire de chimie, présenté dans un ordre nouveau 
et d’après les découvertes modernes (Paris: Cuchet, 1789), pp. v, xx, xxxi–xxxii, 
https://doi.org/10.5962/bhl.title.67783. 
45  ‘Il n’y a pas lieu de s’étonner que de pareilles questions n’aient pas été faites dans 
les siècles où l’on était persuadé que nos connaissances n’étaient point originaires 
de nos sensations; mais il y a lieu à s’étonner que depuis un siècle que cette vérité a 
été mise dans un si grand jour, on n’ait pas même songé à les faire’ (Leçons d’analyse 
et d’entendement, Seconde leçon, p. 79, analysed and translated below).
46  ‘Nous serons assurés à l’avance qu’il n’existe et ne peut exister d’autre moyen de 
bien voir et de bien observer, de bien penser et de bien s’énoncer, que de s’énoncer, 
de penser, d’observer et de voir analytiquement […]’ [We can be sure in advance 
that there neither exists or could exist any other way of seeing well and observing 
well, of thinking well and speaking well, than of speaking, thinking, observing, and 
seeing with the analytic method] (Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, Seconde leçon, 
p. 89).
47  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 75 (Première leçon).
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brillante de l’entendement, tantôt comme la folle de la maison, tantôt 
comme la divinité […].48 
Even the Lockes and the Condillacs were unable to avoid vagueness in 
certain ideas; it’s because these careful distinctions were not made that 
there have been such opposing views about the imagination, and that 
this brilliant faculty of the understanding has sometimes been regarded 
as the resident madwoman of the house, and sometimes as a goddess […]
Interestingly, in the Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, Jacques-
André Naigeon would also accuse Locke and Condillac of vagueness 
on the ‘operations de l’entendement humain’, and he attributes the 
accusation to Diderot.49 On the question of ‘moral ideas’, Garat again 
marks a separation between Condillac and his own, more embodied and 
experience-based, view.
Condillac a pensé que nous formons les idées physiques sur des modèles 
que nous présente la nature, et les idées morales sans modèles. Je ne 
crois pas cette opinion de Condillac très exacte ; je la soumettrai à votre 
examen : vous jugerez si nos idées morales, mémoire les notions sur les 
vices et les vertus, n‘ont pas leur modèle dans nos diverses actions et dans 
leurs effets, comme les idées physiques ont leur modèle dans les objets 
extérieurs qui frappent nos sens.50
Condillac thought that we form our physical ideas according to the 
models which nature gives us, and our moral ideas without models. I do 
not believe that this opinion of Condillac’s is quite right; I will set it out 
for your consideration, and you will judge whether our moral ideas, that 
is to say, our notions of the vices and virtues, do not have their own model 
in our different actions and their effects, as the physical ideas have their 
model in the external objects which strike our senses.
So Condillac is an important presence, but Garat does not treat his work 
as if he were a strict disciple. He credits it, gestures to it, and diverges 
from it. There is no reason to be automatically suspicious of this sort 
of academic strategy; do we not all use and acknowledge the work of 
those who have come before us, while seeking to carve out a small 
niche for our own contribution? And yet there is some reason to be 
48  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 81 (Seconde leçon, original italics).
49  Naigeon, Mémoires historiques et philosophiques sur la vie et les ouvrages de Denis Diderot 
(Paris: J. L. L. Brière, 1821 [1823]; repr. Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1970), p. 207.
50  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 84 (Seconde leçon, original italics).
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suspicious in this particular case, because the specific aspects on which 
Garat diverges from Condillac are ones which are already present in 
Diderot’s Éléments de physiologie. Diderot recommends improving the 
senses, and wonders why we do not,51 he considers imagination to be 
a crucial tool of the mind,52 while his chapter on the passions looks 
consistently and uniquely at passion and action as determined by 
nature.53 These are striking parallels: could they be coincidental? Or—
one step up—do they demonstrate a general awareness of Diderot’s 
thought in this area, as imbibed through discussion at Mme Helvétius’s 
salon d’Auteuil? Or, a further step up, do Garat’s lectures suggest that 
he must have been aware of the Éléments de physiologie specifically? 
A direct comparison of the texts will quickly reveal whether there is 
anything in the suggestion that Garat may have been aware of or even 
using the Éléments de physiologie.
The following passages, all drawn from the second lecture of 
23 Pluviôse (11 February), fill out the areas of possible proximity 
mentioned above, that is, broadly, sensation and the senses, their 
variation and improvability (‘perfectionnement’); the imagination and 
its role in the mind; and finally, passions and natural determinism. The 
order is not quite the same as Garat presents them in, as I have chosen 
to follow the normal logical sequencing from simple to complex that 
all these works on the human understanding follow; that Garat does 
not quite do the same thing here is partly because he is announcing 
what he will do, not systematically doing it (which as we know he 
never does get round to doing, for reasons we will address in due 
course). However, they all come from the same dense few pages (pp. 
79–82). Garat’s statement comes first, and, for ease of comparison, is 
followed immediately by the closest equivalent from the Éléments de 
physiologie. My own commentary will be limited to drawing out their 
similarity or divergence.
51  Denis Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Jean Mayer, Œuvres complètes, DPV 
(Paris: Hermann, 1987), vol. 17, pp. 261–574 (pp. 455–57) [hereafter DPV]/
Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Paolo Quintili (Paris: Champion, 2004), p. 
282 [hereafter PQ]/Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Motoichi Terada (Paris: 
Éditions Matériologiques, 2019), p. 272 [hereafter MT].
52  DPV 475/PQ 303/MT 290.
53  DPV 486–98/PQ 317–34/MT 301–11.
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a. The Variation of Sensations
[Garat] La sensibilité elle-même […] parait différer d’un homme à un 
homme, et dans le même homme, d’un instant à un autre instant.54
Sensibility itself […] appears to differ from one man to the next, and 
within the same man, from one moment to the next.
[Diderot] La variété des sensations s’explique, ce me semble, assez bien 
par la variété des manières dont un même organe peut être affecté […].55
De là ce qui est peine dans un instant, devient plaisir dans un autre ; de 
là ce qui est plaisir pour moi, est peine pour vous […].56
The variety of sensations can be quite well explained, it seems to me, by 
the variety of ways in which a single organ can be affected […].
Hence what is pain one moment becomes pleasure the next; hence what 
is pleasure for me is pain for you […].
For Garat, sensibility differs from one man to the next, and within one 
man from one instant to the next. For Diderot, the variety of sensations 
can be explained, he thinks, by considering the many ways in which 
the same organ can be affected, and thus what is pain one moment is 
pleasure the next, and what is pleasure for me is pain for you. Garat 
expresses the same opinion as Diderot, although Diderot has a more 
thinking-aloud quality. He is also more physiological, mentioning 
organs,57 and he specifies pain and pleasure and who is feeling them 
(you and me), where Garat is more abstract and detached.
b. Misleading Senses; Senses Which Correct Each Other
[Garat] Lorsqu’un de nos sens est prêt à nous tromper, tous les autres 
sont prêts à nous avertir de sa superchérie.58
When one of our senses is poised to deceive us, all the others are poised 
to warn us of its deception.
54  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 80 (Seconde leçon).
55  DPV 459/PQ 285/MT 275.
56  DPV 460/PQ 285/MT 275.
57  An organ, as we may remember from Chapter 4, is a general physiological term for 
any body part, including the sensory organs.
58  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 78 (Seconde leçon).
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[Diderot] Combien  l’organe de l’œil serait trompeur, si son jugement 
n’était pas sans cesse rectifié par le toucher.59
What a deceiver the organ of the eye would be if its judgement were not 
constantly rectified by the touch.
Garat explains that when one sense is about to mislead us, the others all 
jump in to alert us to its trickery. Diderot remarks on how misleading 
the eye would be if its views were not ceaselessly corrected by the sense 
of touch. Where Garat gives one (unnamed) sense being corrected by 
all the others, Diderot avoids the abstracts, not even generalising the 
sense of sight but specifically focusing on the ‘organ of the eye’ being 
corrected by touch. They both use the word ‘tromper’ in different forms. 
In the following example, which considers blindness in connection to 
the other senses, Garat also brings together sight and touch:
[Garat] Vous savez, et vous y pensez peut-être avant que je vous en 
parle, vous savez quelle étendue, quelle finesse, quelle sagacité presque 
miraculeuse, l’organe du tact acquiert dans les infortunés que la nature 
ou des accidens ont privés de l’organe de la vue.60
You know, and perhaps you are thinking about it before I mention it 
to you, you know what range, what subtlety, what almost miraculous 
discernment, the organ of touch acquires in those unfortunate people 
whom nature or accident have deprived of the organ of sight. 
[Diderot] Il est vrai que quelquefois le vice naturel d’un organe se répare 
par l’exercice plus fréquent d’un autre. Si l’aveugle a perdu la sensation 
des formes et de tous les sentiments qui en émanent, il est bien plus 
sensible aux cris […].61
It is true that sometimes the natural defect of an organ can be compensated 
by the more frequent exercise of another. If the blind man has lost the 
sensation of shapes and all the feelings that arise from them, he will 
nonetheless be much more sensitive to different calls.
Garat evokes the extraordinary levels of subtle information the sense 
of touch can provide a blind person with; he suggests his audience is 
already thinking of the example before he even mentions it. This tells 
59  DPV 457/PQ 282/MT 273.
60  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 79 (Seconde leçon).
61  DPV 508/PQ 347/MT 321.
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us how widespread familiarity with this sort of sensationist thinking 
was during this period, after a century of print discussion about it.62 
Diderot’s well-known Lettre sur les aveugles (1749), is presumably an 
automatic reference point for any such discussions, and it is interesting 
to see how Garat refers to unspoken associations that his audience 
already have with what he is saying, ones that must here include the 
otherwise unmentioned Diderot.63 Is it an overly suspicious reading 
to suggest that Garat’s reference to the listeners’ thoughts is a way of 
avoiding mentioning Diderot’s name? Whether or not it is a conscious 
strategy of simultaneous avoidance and evocation, he certainly does not 
mention Diderot. The text from the Éléments de physiologie is similar if 
not identical to Garat’s. Diderot states—in general mode—that it is true 
that a fault in one organ is often compensated for by using another one 
more frequently. He turns to the experience of a blind person who loses 
the sensation of shapes and connected feelings, but who becomes much 
more sensitive to calls or shouts.
c. Perfecting the Senses, in Particular, the Sense of Touch
[Garat] Nos sens qui sont aussi des organes de notre corps, et les plus 
délicats de tous, ne pourroient-ils pas de même par des exercices bien 
appropriés à ce but, acquérir plus de finesse, plus d’énergie, plus 
d’étendue?64
Could our senses, also organs of our body and the most delicate of all, 
not also by means of carefully tailored exercises gain greater precision, 
more energy and range?
[Diderot] Nous exerçons nos sens comme la nature nous les a donnés 
et que les besoins et les circonstanc  s l’exigent  : mais nous ne les 
perfectionnons pas : nous ne nous apprenons pas à voir, à flairer, à sentir, 
à ecouter, à moins que notre profession ne nous y force.65
62  See above, Chapter 3, section ‘Knowledge Derived from the Senses’.
63  Garat does mention Diderot’s name once, in the first debate, as one of those, along 
with Rousseau and Claude Adrien Helvétius (Diderot comes last), in whose works 
‘la métaphysique’ has been identified and criticised. This in itself is an odd claim. 
(Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 95 (Premier débat)).
64  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 79 (Seconde leçon).
65  DPV 456–57/PQ 282/MT 272.
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We exercise our senses as nature gave them to us and as need and 
circumstance dictate, but we do not perfect them; we do not teach ourselves 
to see, to smell, to feel, to hear, unless our profession forces us to.
Garat considers that sensory organs are parts of our body, and can 
therefore, like other parts of the body, be improved by means of carefully-
crafted exercises. They would thereby acquire more precision, force, and 
reach. Diderot takes it from the other end; he states that we use our 
senses as nature has given them to us and as need and circumstance 
require but we do not work on them to make them better; we do not 
teach ourselves to see, scent, feel, or listen unless our profession forces 
us to. This explicit criticism constitutes an implicit recommendation, 
suggesting that we should do. In the next extracts, Garat asks whether it 
would be possible to create an art of seeing or an art of touching; Diderot 
imagines what a perfected art of touching would be able to do.
[Garat] Est-il possible de créer un art de voir, qui apprendrait à voir plus 
rapidement et à de plus grandes distances, un plus grand nombre d’objets 
à-la-fois sous toutes leurs formes et avec les nuances les plus légères de 
leurs couleurs ? Est-il possible de créer un art de toucher qui apprendrait à 
distinguer et à démêler rapidement sur la surface des corps, des formes, 
des contours, des polis et des asperités que nous ne pouvons pas même 
soupçonner, parce que nous ne nous sommes pas exercés à les démêler 
par nos sensations, et à les distinguer par des noms ?66 
Is it possible to create an art of seeing, which would teach us to see a 
greater number of objects faster and at greater distances, and also in all 
the detail of their shapes and the slightest tones of their coloring? Is it 
possible to create an art of touch which would teach us to distinguish and 
rapidly tell apart the shapes, contours, the smoothness and roughness 
of the surfaces of bodies to an extent that we cannot even suspect at the 
moment because we are not practiced in using our sensations to tell them 
apart, and we have no names for these qualities?
[Diderot] Je conçois un toucher si exquis qu’il suppléerait aux quatre 
autres sens. Il serait diversement affecté selon les odeurs, les saveurs, les 
formes et les couleurs.67
I conceive of a touch so exquisite that it would replace the four other 
senses. It would be differently affected by different smells, tastes, shapes 
and colours.
66  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 79 (Seconde leçon).
67  DPV 448/PQ 273/MT 265.
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Garat asks whether it is possible to create an art of seeing which would 
teach us to see a greater number of objects in greater precision both of 
colour and shape, and to do this quicker and at greater distances. He 
wonders whether it is possible to create an art of touch which would 
make it possible for someone to perceive and distinguish subtleties of 
shape, outline, and surface that are currently unimaginable, because we 
have no practice in differentiating these sorts of sensation, and we do not 
have any words to describe them. Diderot is briefer and less exhortatory. 
He simply, ecstatically, and slightly surreally imagines a sense of touch 
that would be so exquisite it would replace the other four senses, and 
would be differently affected by smell, flavour, shape, and colour.
Interestingly, Garat follows this passage with an exclamation of 
amazement that no one before has thought to consider how to improve 
or extend sensory perception:
Il n’y a pas lieu de s’étonner que de pareilles questions n’aient pas été 
faites dans les siècles où l’on était persuadé que nos connaissances 
n’étaient point originaires de no s sensations; mais il y a lieu à s’étonner 
que depuis un siècle que cette vérité a été mise dans un si grand jour, on 
n’ait pas même songé à les faire.68
There’s no reason to be surprised that such questions were not raised in 
those centuries when people were persuaded that our knowledge did not 
originate with our sensations; but there is reason to be surprised that in 
the century since this truth has been made so illuminatingly clear, no one 
has even thought to ask them.
Given that the Éléments de physiologie does draw attention to exactly this 
area, one is almost inclined to think this is a pointed remark. 
d. Perfecting the Senses: The Eyesight of the Savage Who Sees a 
Ship Far Out at Sea
[Garat] Des voyageurs assurent que des hottentots, du haut des rochers 
du cap de Bonne-Espérance, découvrent à l’œil nud, dans l’immensité de 
l’océan, des vaisseaux que les européens peuvent à peine percevoir avec 
le telescope.69
68  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 79 (Seconde leçon).
69  Ibid.
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Travellers tell us that from the top of the rocks of the Cape of Good Hope, 
Hottentots can see ships out in the vastness of the sea with their bare 
eyes, ships which Europeans are scarcely able to see with a telescope.
[Diderot] Un mot sur les formes vagues et indécises pour l’œil. Par 
exemple, je ne vois en mer qu’un point nébuleux qui ne me dit rien, mais 
ce point nebuleux est un vaisseau pour celui qui l’a souvent observé et 
peut-être un vaisseau tres distinct. Comment cela s est-il fait ? D’abord, 
ce n’était pour le sauvage, comme pour moi, qu’un point nébuleux.70 
A word on shapes which are vague and unclear to the eye. For example, 
I can’t see out at sea anything but a nebulous and meaningless blob, but 
that nebulous blob is a ship for someone who’s often seen it, and perhaps 
even a very distinct ship. How has that happened? Initially it was nothing 
for the savage but a nebulous blob, just as it is for me.
Garat’s comparison of the ‘primitive’ man who can see better than a 
European is presented via the medium of travellers’ anecdotes. He tells 
of the ‘Hottentot’, who, looking out at sea from the cliffs of the Cape of 
Good Hope, see ships that Europeans can barely see even with the aid 
of a telescope. Diderot’s is more personal. He compares his own vision, 
which tells him there is a blob out at sea, to that of someone who is 
used to looking far out at sea, a person who is subsequently described 
as a savage; this person sees not a blob but a precisely-delineated ship. 
An earlier passage in the Éléments de physiologie, in the section on sight, 
had already clarified the comparison envisaged, i.e. that practice makes 
perfect, and that the ‘savage’ provides the exemplary model.
[Diderot] Tel qui ne voit pas comme le sauvage, verrait comme lui, si son 
œil était exercé.71
Someone who can’t see as well as a savage would be able to if he practiced 
looking more.
Garat takes the idea of practising and perfecting the range of one’s 
senses in some rather concrete directions. He suggests that the way in 
70  DPV 476/PQ 304–05/MT 291. Terada supplies Diderot’s probable source in Jean-
Paul Marat’s De l’homme, MT 475, n. iii. It is of course possible that Garat also draws 
on Marat irrespective of whether or not he also draws on Diderot. My argument 
that he is using the Éléments de physiologie has to be based on the sheer accumulation 
of similarities rather than on any single passage.
71  DPV 457/PQ 282/MT 273.
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which Galileo’s telescope successfully extended the normal boundaries 
of human vision should be a model for what can be achieved without any 
enabling instrument, and simply by dint of greater skill:
[Garat] Galilée a prodigieusement étendu, par le secours d’un instrument 
[le téléscope], la portée de l’organe de la vue; mais ne peut-il pas exister 
pour tous les organes de tous nos sens des moyens d’étendre leur sphère 
sans le secours d’aucun instrument, et seulement par une manière plus 
heureuse ou plus habile de s’en servir?72
Galileo hugely extended the reach of the organ of sight with the help 
of an instrument [the telescope], but are there no means by which we 
might extend the sphere of all our sensory organs without recourse to 
an instrument, and simply by learning a better or more skilful way of 
using them?
There is no follow-up here to how this might be achieved, just this 
comparison with an instrument, and then a suggestion that somehow 
such extensions should be possible; perhaps ‘extension’ is the wrong 
term, simply a transposed metaphor deriving from the image of the 
telescope, and that what we should really call it is ‘internalisation’?73 
There is something curious here about how an external and mechanical 
tool, normally used to supplement natural sensory capacities, is here 
given as a model for what the senses could do by themselves if only they 
tried. Garat is suggesting that humans could internalise the functions 
of external tools. It is a rather bizarre application of the idea that the 
senses might be improvable, perfectible, and it does not seem clearly 
realisable in any way at all. A humbler way of increasing productivity is 
also offered; the cup of coffee:
72  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 79 (Seconde leçon).
73  Diderot’s witness on matters of blindness, the ‘aveugle-né du Puiseaux’ [man born-
blind of Puiseaux], makes some striking remarks about telescopes, and Garat may 
have them in mind here. However, the ‘aveugle-né du Puiseaux’ does not want to 
have a telescope or sight at all; he’d rather have long arms. See Diderot, Lettre sur 
les aveugles: à l’usage de ceux qui voient; Lettre sur les sourds et muets: à l’usage de ceux 
qui entendent et qui parlent, ed. by Marian Hobson and Simon Harvey (Paris: GF 
Flammarion, 2000), pp. 33, 35  ; Tunstall, Kate E., Blindness and Enlightenment: An 
Essay, with a new translation of Diderot’s Letter on the Blind (1749) and a translation of La 
Mothe Le Vayer’s ‘Of a Man-Born-Blind’ (1653) (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), pp. 173, 
176. With thanks to François Pépin for this reminder.
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[Garat] Une tasse de café ne donne pas du génie  ; mais elle donne au 
génie le mouvement avec lequel il va produire et créer.74
A cup of coffee does not bestow genius, but it does bestow on the genius 
the impetus he needs to produce and create.
It does not bestow genius, but it propels a genius into movement so 
that he can start producing and creating; it gets a genius going. We find 
no such passages in the Éléments de physiologie about internalising or 
transposing a telescope-like capacity to other senses, or about drinking 
coffee. 
e. Memory and Imagination
Memory, however, is something both Garat and Diderot consider to 
have been wrongly overlooked:
[Garat] La mémoire n’a pas toujours obtenu et n’obtient pas encore une 
grande considération parmi les philosophes.75
Memory has not always attracted much interest amongst philosophers, 
and it still doesn’t.
[Diderot] L’empire de la mémoire sur la raison n’a jamais été assez 
examiné.76
The power memory has over reason has never been sufficiently examined.
We have already quoted the passage in which Garat chastises writers 
such as ‘the Lockes and the Condillacs’ for being a bit vague about 
the imagination, ‘cette faculté brillante de l’entendement’ (p. 81). For 
Diderot, imagination is more important than memory; the first has the 
power to move and inspire, while the latter is simply a faithful copyist.
L’imagination est un coloriste, la mémoire est un copiste fidèle. 
L’imagination agite plus et l’orateur et l’auditeur que la mémoire.77
Imagination is a colourist, memory is a faithful copyist. The imagination 
stirs up both orator and listener more than memory does. 
74  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 80 (Seconde leçon). 
75  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 81 (Seconde leçon).
76  DPV 474/PQ 302/MT 289.
77  DPV 480/PQ 309/MT 295.
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So there is a similar estimation of the importance of imagination for 
both. How do they define it? 
[Garat] Qu’est-ce, en effet, Que l’imagination? c’est la faculté de se 
peindre les objets absents, comme s’ils étaient présents encore, avec tous 
leurs traits, toutes leurs formes, toutes leurs couleurs, avec toutes les 
circonstances de tems et de lieu qui les précèdent, les accompagnent et 
les suivent.78
What, in fact, is imagination? It’s the capacity to paint absent objects to 
oneself as if they were still present, with all their features, all their forms, 
all their colours, all the circumstances of the time and place which came 
before them, went alongside them, and which followed them.
[Diderot] Faculté de se peindre les objets absents, comme s’ils étaient 
presents, d’emprunter des objets sensibles des images qui servent de 
comparaison, d’attacher à un mot abstrait un corps, voilà l’idée que j’ai 
de l’imagination.79
The capacity to paint absent objects to oneself as if they were present, 
to borrow from perceptible objects images that serve for comparison, to 
attach a body to an abstract word, that is the idea I have of imagination.
Here, for the first time, we have a word-for-word echo. The definition that 
Diderot claims as his personal view (‘l’idée que j’ai de l’imagination’) 
is identically replicated in Garat: imagination is the ‘faculté de se 
peindre les objets absents, comme s’ils étaient présents’ [capacity to 
paint absent objects to oneself as if they were present]. Garat fills in 
his initial proposition by detailing the sorts of ways in which absent 
objects might be depicted as if they were present. Diderot sketches his in 
more gnomically: he talks about taking images from sensory objects so 
as to enable comparison, and of putting an abstract term together with 
a body (presumably so as to give it life? He does not say so). So the first 
part of the definition is identical, although the second diverges. 
Is this evidence that Garat was using the Éléments de physiologie? One 
might counter the idea that here Garat really must be copying Diderot 
by saying that this definition sounds so simple it cannot be unique just 
to them; it must be a very common formulation. But where else do we 
find this potentially very common formulation? A wide search has not 
78  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 81 (Seconde leçon).
79  DPV 475/PQ 302/MT 290.
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turned it up yet.80 Importantly, Condillac does not define imagination in 
this way, and although he does indeed use the counter-balancing notion 
of the absent or present object, he uses it to discuss how comparison 
works.81 Condillac’s definition of imagination is this: ‘les idées qu’on se 
fait sont des images qui n’ont de réalité que dans l’esprit ; et la réflexion 
qui fait ces images, prend le nom d’imagination’ [the ideas that one has 
are images with no reality other than in the mind; the reflection that 
these images produce takes the name of imagination].82 What Diderot 
and Garat do, whether separately or together, briskly rewrites Condillac.
Immediately following Garat’s description of imagination, as quoted 
above, he is moved to exclaim: 
[Garat] Qui ne voit qu’une pareille faculté, qui tient plus longtemps les 
objets sous vos yeux, vous donne le temps et les moyens de les contempler 
plus à loisir, de les considérer sous toutes leurs faces, pour en saisir tous 
les rapports ; de rapprocher les objets absents des objets présents et de les 
comparer, comme si tous étaient présents encore ?83
Who doesn’t see that such a capacity, which keeps objects before your 
eyes for longer, gives you the time and the means to contemplate them 
at greater leisure, to consider them from all different sides and capture 
all the relationships between them, to bring absent objects close to the 
objects which are present and to compare them as if they were all still 
there? 
[Diderot] L’homme à imagination se promène, dans sa tête, comme un 
curieux dans un palais.84
80  Nor has Motoichi Terada found anything. He comments, about this chapter as a 
whole, that ‘Diderot rédige ce chapitre avec peu de sources explicites’ [Diderot 
writes this chapter with few explicit sources] (MT 290, n. 233).
81  In his paragraphs on comparison, Condillac writes this: ‘Un objet est présent ou 
absent. S’il est présent, l’attention est la sensation qu’il fait actuellement sur nous; 
s’il est absent, l’attention est le souvenir de la sensation qu’il a faite. C’est à ce 
souvenir que nous devons le pouvoir d’exercer la faculté de comparer des objets 
absens comme des objets présens. Nous traiterons bientôt de la mémoire’ [An object 
is present or absent. If it is present, the attention is the sensation that it makes on 
us at that moment; if it is absent, the attention is the memory of the sensation that 
it did make. It is to this memory that we owe the power of exercising the faculty 
of comparing objects that are absent in the same way as we compare objects that 
are present] (Condillac, ‘La logique’, I.vii, p. 385, just a few paragraphs above his 
definition of the imagination, see the following note).
82  Condillac, ‘La logique’, I.vii, p. 385.
83  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, pp. 81–82 (Seconde leçon).
84  DPV 475/PQ 303/MT 290.
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The imaginative man walks about, in his head, like a curious person in 
a palace.
Garat’s rhetorical question addresses a ‘you’ who gets to contemplate 
objects at leisure; he ends with a repetition of the definition he had 
already given. Diderot’s imaginative man strolls around his head like a 
curious visitor in a palace. Their central image of the man who is either 
leisurely (Garat) or strolling (Diderot) contemplating the objects of his 
curiosity has a certain parallelism.
At this point, Garat begins to describe people (‘des hommes’) with 
intense levels of imagination. Imagination, sensibility, calculation, 
vision, and discovery go hand-in-hand. He draws a rousing picture 
of the genius, whose imagination is like an army scout and a military 
commander, or like the rays that precede sunrise, whose intuitions lead 
to the greatest discoveries. And this, he concludes, is what constitutes 
the great philosopher: someone whose reason is practically nothing but 
one huge imagination working according to strict rules.
L’imagination est l’attribut des hommes de la sensibilité la plus forte et 
la plus exquise : elle est cette sensibilité meme ; et plus on sent, plus on 
a de moyens de voir, d’apprendre et de créer. L’observation et le calcul 
vérifient ; mais c’est l’imagination qui marche en avant pour découvrir ce 
qu’il faut soumettre au calcul et à l’observation. Elle est entre les facultés 
de l’entendement, ce que sont dans les armées, ces avant-gardes qui vont 
aux reconnaissances, qui devinent et voient en même-tems dans quelle 
forêt l’ennemi peut être caché, et les sommités dont il faut s’emparer pour 
tout voir et pour tout dominer. C’est à l’imagination qu’appartiennent 
ces pressentimens, qui sont comme ces jets de lumière qui précèdent le 
soleil, avant que son globe apparu sur l’horizon, ait dissipé les ténèbres. 
L’histoire des sciences en fait foi ; les découvertes les plus sublimes et les 
plus utiles au genre humain ont commencé par n’etre que les soupçons 
de quelqes hommes de génie ; et la raison des grands philosophes n’a été 
presque jamais qu’une imagination vaste, soumise à des règles exactes. 
En un mot quand on n’a que de l’imagination, et qu’on en a beaucoup, 
on est à-peu-pres un fou ; quand on n’a que de la raison, on peut n’être 
qu’un  homme assez commun  ; quand on a une raison sévère et une 
imagination brillante, on est un homme de génie.85
Imagination is the attribute of men with the most powerful and exquisite 
sensibility: it is sensibility  itself; and the more we feel, the more ways 
85  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 82 (Seconde leçon).
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of seeing, learning, and creating we have. Observation and calculation 
verify, but it is the imagination which walks ahead to discover what needs 
to be calculated and observed. The relationship of the imagination to the 
faculties of the understanding is the same as that of the reconnoitring 
scouts to the army, simultaneously intuiting and seeing which forest 
the army might be hiding in, which vantage points need to be seized in 
order to gain total overview and total sway. It’s to the imagination that 
these presentiments belong: they are like those rays of light that pierce 
through before the sun rises above the horizon and dispells the shadows. 
The history of knowledge shows this to be the case; those discoveries 
which are most sublime and useful to the human race started by being 
no more than the guesses of a few men of genius, and the reason of the 
great philosophers has almost never been other than a vast imagination 
subjected to exact rules. In a word, when one only has imagination, and 
a lot of it, one is almost mad; when one only has reason, one might only 
be a rather mediocre person, but when one possesses severe reason and 
a brilliant imagination, one is a man of genius.
On reading this, one is unavoidably reminded of the portrait Garat 
drew of Diderot in 1779, someone he described then Ile grand homme 
dont j’avais tant de fois admiré le génie’ [the great man whose genius 
I had so often admired].86 Garat makes it really hard for us here to 
continue to maintain a sceptical attitude towards the notion that he may 
have been drawing on Diderot’s work. In the space of two paragraphs, 
he distances himself from those who are otherwise loudly trumpeted 
as the masters in this area, he gives a definition of the imagination 
which is word-for-word identical to Diderot’s which he then illustrates 
with the image of a person engaged in unhurried contemplation, an 
image we also find in Diderot, and finally, he launches into rapturous 
description of the genius’s imagination, their imagination being 
tantamount to an extremely fine sensibility, and whose intuitions are 
the discoveries of the future, which itself is strongly reminiscent of the 
intensely admiring portrait of Diderot he had published sixteen years 
earlier. 
***
86  Garat in the Mercure de France, 15 February 1779. Reprinted in Denis Diderot, 
Correspondance, ed. by Georges Roth and Jean Varloot (Paris: Minuit, 1955–70), vol. 
15, pp. 130–31. See above.
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Summarising the results of this comparison, we see that there are 
repeated points of similarity: Diderot talks about the variation of 
sensory perception within one person over time and from one person 
to the next; so does Garat. Diderot explains that a sense operating 
alone would make mistakes, but that the senses work together to 
correct each other’s misperception; so does Garat. Diderot talks about 
perfecting or improving the senses, and how professional expertise 
leads to much greater skill in the use of one sense or another; Garat talks 
about developing skills in each separate sense, and remarks on how 
extraordinary it is that no one has thought about this before. Diderot 
discusses this point with the aid of a comparison between the practised 
‘savage’ and the unpractised and practically blind ‘European’; so does 
Garat. Diderot states that the question of memory has never been 
sufficiently considered; so does Garat. Diderot defines the imagination 
as the faculty of creating images of absent objects as if they were present; 
so does Garat. Some differences: Garat extends his thinking about how 
to improve sensory perception firstly by asking whether we cannot all 
internalise telescopes; Diderot does not (although they do feature in his 
Lettre sur les aveugles): Garat talks about the effect of coffee on speeding 
up the cogs of a genius (although coffee cannot actually create genius 
in the first place); Diderot does not. Garat includes a rhapsodic passage 
that culminates with a description of the ‘grand philosophe’ and the 
‘homme de génie’ and the importance of their imaginative insights that 
is rather similar to what he had written about Diderot before. In none 
of this is there a single mention of Diderot’s name. Does this mean he is 
absent? On the contrary, I think he is present. 
There seem to be simply too many parallels for this to be just a 
coincidence, or the coincidental use of the same sources by both Diderot 
and Garat. One or two, maybe. But not at this density and level of 
similarity. I conclude therefore that Garat is demonstrating not only 
a general awareness of Diderot’s thought but a detailed awareness of 
the relevant sections of part III of the Éléments de physiologie. Whether it 
was him who also wrote the letter gifting the manuscript to the Comité 
d’instruction publique, as surmised in the previous section, or whether, 
as Commissioner of this same Comité d’instruction publique, he might 
have taken the manuscript under his protection (or nicked it), and then 
planned to use it for his own lectures on human understanding (which, 
262 The Atheist’s Bible
as we may remember, he was not initially planning to do, hoping to 
bring Bonnet in; he himself would probably have lectured on ancient 
history as he did elsewhere),87 we simply cannot know. We do not have 
enough evidence. But we probably do have enough evidence to say, 
now, that Garat did have access to the third part of the Éléments, and 
that we can see that he did from close comparison of the texts. What he 
would have gone on to do in his lectures, had he completed them, or 
had the transcriptions of those he did give themselves been completed 
and published, again, we cannot know. What we do have are the two 
debates that followed these lectures, including Garat’s rebuttal of a 
letter accusing him of atheism and also the attack on him made by one 
of the students, Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin, who accused him of 
materialism. In the context, this is highly salient material, and we turn 
to it now.
Saint-Martin’s attack on Garat
The idea of the debates was to allow some discussion of the lecture 
material to take place. As we mentioned earlier, the lectures themselves 
were supposed to have been transcribed in good time before the debate 
for the students to mull them over, but they never were. In the case of 
the two debates relating to Garat’s lectures that we have, it looks less 
like discussion than like fire-fighting. Letters and questions have been 
sent in to Garat, and he is trying to reply to them; students also ask 
questions directly. There is a certain formality and politeness (and much 
use of the appellation ‘Citoyen’), but at points it becomes heated. The 
first one took place on 29 Pluviôse (17 February) and the second on 
9 Ventôse (27 February).88 Garat opens the first one with a detailed 
rebuttal of an anonymous letter he has received, in which his morality 
and belief in the immortality of the soul are challenged.89 Garat swipes 
away the challenge without too much trouble, but related challenges 
87  Garat lectures on history at the lycée called the Athénée from 1786 onwards and 
continues to do so during the Revolution (Gengembre, ‘Introduction’, pp. 46, 49).
88  See notes above for the details of the dates on which other lessons or debates by 
Garat may have taken place. 
89  Jean-Robert Armogathe argues that this letter was written by La Harpe, and was 
part of an ongoing spat between the two. Jean-Robert Armogathe, ‘Garat et l’école 
normale de l’an III’, p. 152.
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return in the second debate, which in its printed version is fifty pages 
long (as opposed to ten pages for the first debate, and six and twelve 
for the first and second lectures respectively). In fact, part of the reason 
for this is that Saint-Martin subsequently expanded his objections into a 
letter, which was published separately in 1795 and included in the 1802 
edition of the Débats.90 That the exchange of views started taking on a 
momentum of its own is relatively clear from this length and from the 
publication record.91
The first stage of Saint-Martin’s attack ends with this demand:
Citoyen professeur, nous pouvons donc sortir de ce doute désésperant, 
auquel vous nous aviez réduits  ; nous pouvons, dis-je, devant tous les 
hommes qui voudront réfléchir aux observations que je vous représente, 
prononcer hautement que la matière ne pense pas : et c’est là le troisième 
amendement que je sollicite.92
Citizen Professor, we can thus get out of the despairing doubt to which 
you have reduced us; we can, I repeat, in front of all those who will wish 
to think about the observations which I present to you, loudly proclaim 
that matter does not think: and that is the third amendment which I seek.
Garat has a long response, which boils down to this: I never said that in 
the first place. Here it is:
J’ai été plus circonspect encore que Locke; je n’ai ni énoncé, ni annoncé 
aucune opinion sur les rapports de la matière et de la pensée: cependant 
on a dit, on a imprimé plusieurs fois dans les journaux et dans les 
pamphlets que je faisais de la matière une sustance éternelle, et de la 
pensée un de ses attributs. Vous-même, citoyen, vous dont je suis loin 
d’accuser les intentions, vous paraissez croire que ces deux assertions 
ont été avancées par moi dans cette École.
J’ai regret d’entrer dans ces explications; mais on les a rendues trop 
nécessaires. Jamais je n’ai dit que la matière est éternelle: jamais je n’ai 
dit que la matière pense; jamais je ne le dirai.93
90  See Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, pp. 117–52 (Second débat). Saint-
Martin had published it under the title Lettre à un ami ou Considérations politiques, 
philosophiques et religieuses sur la Révolution française, suivi du Précis d’une conférence 
publique entre un élève des Écoles normales et le professeur Garat (Paris, 1795).
91  See also Julia’s analysis of ‘Saint-Martin contre Garat’ in ‘Les “Conférences” de 
l’école normale: typologie des débats’, L’École normale de l’an III, pp. 403–06.
92  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 103 (Second débat). 
93  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 112 (Second débat). 
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I have been even more circumspect than Locke; I have neither expressed 
nor declared any opinion on the connections between matter and thought, 
but nonetheless people have said and often written in newspapers and 
pamphlets that I was defining matter as an eternal substance and stating 
that thought was one of its attributes. You yourself, Citizen, whose 
intentions I am far from calling into question, you seem to believe that 
these two assertions have been advanced by me in this School.
I regret having to go into these explanations, but it has become all too 
necessary to do so. Never have I said that matter was eternal: never have 
I said that matter could think; and never will I do so.
He goes further; he separates the question of matter completely from 
sensation, so that he does not have to address the former. This is his 
explicit policy, in which, as he says, he follows Condillac:
L’abbé de Condillac, qui parle peu de religion, écarte presque toujours 
ces faits matériels associés aux causes et aux actes de l’intelligence: en 
cela j’ai imité et j’imiterai toujours Condillac; non de peur de paraître 
matérialiste; si je l’étais, je craindrais peu de le paraître: non de peur de le 
devenir dans ces recherches physiologiques; si le matérialisme était une 
vérité, je le croirais utile comme toutes les vérités; mais parce que tout 
ce mécanisme de nos nerfs, de leur système et de leurs rapports avec le 
cerveau et les sensations, est beaucoup trop mal connu encore.94
Reverend Condillac, who speaks little about religion, almost always 
avoids the material facts associated with the causes and actions of 
intelligence: in that I have always imitated Condillac and always will; 
not for fear of seeming like a materialist; if I were one, I wouldn’t worry 
much about seeming to be; not for fear of becoming one by undertaking 
research in physiology; if materialism was true, I would find it useful like 
all truths are; but because this mechanism of the nerves, of their network 
and of the links between the brain and sensations, is still much too poorly 
understood.
This is an illuminating passage, not least for the way in which it bestows 
a religious identity on Condillac, who was indeed a tonsured priest. 
However, in all the many previous mentions of his name, he had not 
once been given that clerical title. So, Garat is clearly using it here 
for protection, as a shield specifically to fend off these accusations 
of materialism (which is, as we have already seen, understood to be 
94  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 113 (Second débat).
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a synonym for irreligion). And secondly, it brings to the fore Garat’s 
general understanding of what Condillac can do for him (and what 
Garat thinks Condillac does for himself as well), which is avoid any 
connection to materialism by dint of never mentioning anything to do 
with it, ‘it’ being interpreted directly by Garat here as any aspect of 
physiology.95 It is very helpful to see Garat make this pair of associations 
so overtly—materialism and irreligion; materialism and physiology—
and show us how he considers he can best protect himself from any 
such attack. He subsequently and almost immediately makes a further 
raid on religious language in an attempt to close down the issue, when 
he declares that sensations are ‘les premiers phénomènes dont se saisit 
la bonne métaphysique’;96 what good metaphysics starts with (note also 
his use of the theological term ‘metaphysics’):
Voilà ma profession de foi, puisqu’il a fallu en faire une. Il est bien 
clair que ceux qui ont supposé que je faisais ici une espèce de cours de 
matérialisme m’ont accusé, et ne m’ont pas compris.97 
And there’s my profession of faith, seeing as I had to make one. It is very 
clear that those who supposed that I was giving some sort of course in 
materialism have accused me without understanding me. 
His profession of faith, there it is. An affirmation of belief rather 
than ‘a sort of course in materialism’; an either/or situation in which 
it was absolutely necessary to deny and quash the latter proposition. 
Unfortunately for him, it did not work. As mentioned, Saint-Martin 
amplified the dispute further by pursuing it via publication with his 
Lettre à un ami ou Considérations politiques, philosophiques et religieuses sur la 
Révolution française, suivi du Précis d’une conférence publique entre un élève 
95  Naigeon and Cabanis explicitly criticise Condillac’s silence with respect to 
physiology and consider it a serious weakness, as we will see. Their view that he 
should be mentioning physiology suggests that they favour Diderot’s physiologically-
based account of the mind. In the case of Naigeon, we know this to be true, because 
his Mémoires publish the first version of the Éléments; in Cabanis’s, the argument 
has to be made with greater circumspection; for Cabanis, see below, for Naigeon, 
see his comment ‘Condillac n’en avait pas même une teinture superficielle [de la 
médecine] : ignorance qui influe sur toute sa philosophie, et qui réduit à un petit 
nombre de pages ce qu’elle a d’utile’ [Condillac had not the slightest knowledge of 
medicine, and his ignorance of it has an impact on his entire philosophy, reducing 
its usefulness to a very few pages], Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, p. 216.
96  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 113 (Second débat).
97  Ibid.
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des Écoles normales et le professeur Garat (Paris, 1795), which the editors 
of the 1802 edition included in the debates, possibly in order to prevent 
it flairing up yet again, although in fact any further developments were 
stopped short with Saint-Martin’s death in 1803. In that Lettre à un ami, 
Saint-Martin directly and sarcastically addressed Garat’s Condillac 
strategy:
J’admire toutefois comment vous vous êtes garanti du matérialisme en 
vous rangeant, comme vous le faites, sous les enseignes de Condillac.98
Nonetheless I admire how you have protected yourself from materialism 
by standing, as you do, under the banner of Condillac.
In a way, all he is doing here is echoing what Garat himself had already 
said, that is, that he is a follower of Condillac and therefore cannot be 
reproached with materialism, but it is helpful to have Saint-Martin 
confirm that he also considers that that is what Garat is doing. He then 
proceeds to deride Garat for thinking that Condillac might be able to 
shield him, as within the pages of that philosopher’s work there are 
practically ‘pas de passages qui ne me repoussent’ [no pages which do 
not repel me].99 Saint-Martin does not even like Bacon very much. 
Saint-Martin was a spiritualist, and his first work, Des erreurs et de 
la vérité, was published in 1775. Born in 1743, he was more than fifty 
when he was a student at the École normale, and he was therefore older 
than Garat himself (the decree requiring districts to send students to 
the new École normale specified that they should be between twenty-
five and thirty years old, as we saw).100 So he is not a typical student 
in any way; he may well have been looking for a dispute of this sort in 
order to publicise his own work and position. If so, he certainly found 
it. In his autobiography, unpublished until 1961, he declared with great 
self-satisfaction that his friends thought he personally had brought 
down the École normale, and thus thwarted its aim, clear to him from 
98  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 134 (Second débat).
99  Ibid.
100  On Saint-Martin, see Gérard Gengembre, ‘Introduction aux cours sur l’analyse de 
l’entendement’, pp. 56–61, ‘Appendice n°12 – L’élève Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin’ 
in Une institution révolutionnaire et ses élèves (2): Textes fondateurs, ed. by Julia, pp. 
287–307, and also Nicole Jacques-Lefèvre, Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin, le philosophe 
inconnu (1743-1803): un illuministe au siècle des lumières (Paris: Dervy, 2003), esp. pp. 
183–204.
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the beginning, of establishing ‘atheism and the doctrine of matter 
throughout the Republic’:
Ce but m’avait paru assez clair dès le commencement. C’était d’établir 
l’athéisme et la doctrine de la matière dans toute la République, et 
plusieurs de mes camarades ont pensé que ma séance avec Garat avait 
été le coup de grâce de l’École.101
This aim seemed clear enough to me from the very start. It was to 
establish atheism and the doctrine of matter throughout the Republic, 
and many of my friends thought that my session with Garat was the 
killer blow for the School.
Dominique Julia dismisses these claims as ‘guère plausibles’ [scarcely 
plausible].102 Earlier in this chapter, we briefly sketched in the multiple 
reasons the École normale folded: there was an increasing volume of 
denunciations and even demands for an ‘épuration générale’ of any 
lurking Jacobins, there were attacks in the press, the élèves petitioned 
to go home. Some of the criticisms were about how the content of the 
lectures was too advanced and that the specific aspect of how to teach 
had been neglected. Stéphane Baciocchi and Dominique Julia lay this 
all out in their remarkable chapter on ‘La Dissolution de l’école’.103 It 
is clear from their analysis that there were multiple factors leading to 
it being closed down. Saint-Martin’s accusation of materialism is yet 
another attack, and therefore joins a host of problems that the École was 
experiencing. 
With respect to Garat himself and his decision not to complete his 
lectures or to publish the ones he had completed, the landscape is a little 
different. On 19 Ventôse an III (9 March 1795), that is to say, ten days after 
the bruising second debate took place on 9 Ventôse (27 February), Garat 
was attacked from a different direction, denounced to the Convention 
by Louis-Philippe Dumont (deputy of Calvados) as the defender of 
the September Massacres of 1792 and an actor in the insurrection of 31 
May 1793: the Convention decrees that ‘la conduite des chefs et auteurs 
101  Saint-Martin, Mon portrait historique et philosophique (1789–1803), § 537; in 
‘Appendice n°12 – L’élève Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin’, Appendix 12, in Une 
institution révolutionnaire et ses élèves (2): Textes fondateurs, p. 293. For details on the 
autobiography and its publication by Robert Amadou, see ibid., p. 285.
102  Julia, ‘Les “Conférences” de l’école normale: typologie des débats’, p. 406.
103  Baciocchi and Julia, ‘La Dissolution de l’école’, pp. 425–62.
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de l’insurrection du 31 mai (vieux style) sera examinée par le Comité 
de sûreté générale’ [the conduct of the leaders and instigators of the 
insurrection of 31 May (old style) will be examined by the Committee 
of General Safety].104 Dominique Julia states that Garat abandoned his 
functions at the École normale from this moment, specifically in order 
to defend himself, publishing his defence in May of that year.105 This 
was his Mémoires sur la Révolution ou exposé de ma conduite dans les affaires 
et les fonctions publiques, completed two days before the closure of the 
school on 30 Floréal an IV (19 May 1795).106 And yet, if the Feuille de 
la République is to be believed, Garat did give one further lecture, on 
24 Ventôse (14 March).107 However, the urgency of Garat’s need to deal 
with this denunciation and the ensuing action by the Comité de sûreté 
générale is unarguable. 
But is it for this reason alone that Garat failed to complete his 
lectures, announced with such fanfare as something he had been 
thinking about for twenty years and which caused him bitter regret not 
to have completed when he was ‘au pied de l’échafaud’, [at the foot of 
the scaffold] as he had rousingly announced in the closing words of 
his first lecture?108 He could have completed them later, once he had 
been cleared of the suspicions against him, which he duly was.109 The 
1800–01 edition of the Cercle social was still plaintively requesting that 
he do so, printing on the very first page of their volumes 7 and 8 that ‘le 
citoyen Garat n’a plus qu’à réviser également ses premières Leçons sur 
l’analyse de l’entendement humain; et les Élèves des Écoles normales 
104  Quoted in Julia, ‘La Mise en œuvre du décret du 9 brumaire: les mesures 
préparatoires’, p. 129.
105  Armogathe says Garat finished writing his Mémoires sur la Révolution on 17 May 
1795/28 Floréal de l’an III, see Armogathe, ‘Garat et l’école normale’, p. 152.
106  Dominique-Joseph Garat, Mémoires sur la Révolution ou exposé de ma conduite dans les 
affaires et les fonctions publiques (Paris: J. J. Smits, l’an III de la République [necessarily 
1795 and not 1794, as the BnF catalogue has it]). Gengembre says that this was 
much more than a simple self-defence, reminding us that this ‘brochure obtient un 
réel succès’ [this brochure had real success] (Gengembre, ‘Introduction aux leçons 
d’analyse de l’entendement de Garat’, p. 48).
107  See above, note 37 in this chapter, as mentioned in Dupuy, ‘L’École normale de l’an 
III’, in Le Centenaire de l’École normale, p. 170.
108  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement, p. 76 (Première leçon). This statement does 
somewhat go against the fact that we know he hadn’t initially planned to give them, 
intending this topic for Bonnet, as mentioned. It may have had a merely rhetorical 
function, to create a sense of excitement and urgency.
109  Julia, ‘La Mise en œuvre du décret du 9 brumaire: les mesures préparatoires’, p. 129.
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ne tarderont pas à en jouir’ [Citizen Garat has only to revise his first 
Lectures on the analysis of the human understanding, and the Pupils of 
the Écoles normales will immediately be able to enjoy them].110 But he 
never did release either the unpublished transcriptions or the ungiven 
lectures. He could have completed this long-contemplated work, and 
there was clearly an appetite for him to do so; the publishers certainly 
thought so. I tend to agree, therefore, with nineteenth-century historian 
Paul Dupuy, who said that he believed that ‘la raison pour laquelle 
la plus grande partie de son enseignement fait défaut dans le journal 
sténographique des séances, c’est qu’il a craint de donner prise à ses 
ennemis qui l’accusaient d’athéisme’ [the reason for which most of his 
lectures are missing from the Stenographic Journal of the sessions is 
that he feared to give ammunition to his enemies who were accusing 
him of atheism] and that ‘au milieu du déchaînement de rancunes qui 
le menaçait et finit par l’atteindre le 19 Ventôse, il jugea sans doute 
plus prudent de ne plus laisser imprimer ses leçons’ [in the midst of 
the torrent of resentment that threatened and finally overwhelmed him 
on 19 Ventôse, he no doubt judged it wiser not to allow his lectures to 
be published].111 He stopped, fearing further controversy, perhaps not 
only for himself, but also for the theories of the understanding he had 
only begun to reveal, and which had become inextricably linked with 
accusations of atheism and materialism, theories which we have argued 
were influenced by Diderot’s Éléments de physiologie. In stopping his own 
publication, he prevented the association from continuing, and he did 
not return to the theme in print until his curious Mémoires sur Suard et 
sur le dix-huitième siècle (1820), which we will be examining in a later 
chapter. His particular analysis of human understanding, however, 
passed over to Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy, proponents of ‘Idéologie’, 
as the latter would come to name it in 1796; they claimed his Cours as 
their source text.112 In November 1795, Cabanis and Destutt were invited, 
110  Séances des écoles normales, recueillies par des sténographes, et revues par les professeurs. 
Nouvelle édition: débats, vols 7–8 (Paris: Cercle-social, 1800–01), pages unnumbered 
(opening page).
111  Dupuy, ‘L’École normale de l’an III’ in Le Centenaire de l’École normale, [1895] p. 171. 
This hypothesis is alluded to, without commentary, by Julia, ‘Le Déroulement des 
leçons’, p. 361, n. 24.
112  See Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme: 
introduction de Serge Nicolas suivie des commentaires de François Thurot et A.L.C. Destutt 
de Tracy, 2 vols (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2005 [Facsimile of the 1802 1st edition]), vol. 1, 
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along with Garat, to become members of the Institut national, decreed 
on 3 Brumaire an IV (25 October 1795), five months almost to the day 
that the École normale had closed. The Institut national replaced the 
erstwhile Académies royales as a stage for French research, and it was 
devoid of troublesome students. Garat, Cabanis, and Destutt were made 
members of the Section Analyse des idées [Analysis of Ideas Section], 
and it is to that institution and the lectures Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy 
gave there that we now turn.
p. xiv (Preface) [for the avoidance of doubt, this is the edition hereafter referenced 
when quoting from this work]. See also Marc Regaldo, Un milieu intellectuel: la Décade 
philosophique (1794-1807), 5 vols (Thesis--Université de Paris IV: Paris-Sorbonne, 
1976), vol. 5, p. 725. We find a short but precise overview of the connections between 
Garat, Cabanis, and Destutt de Tracy in Mariana Saad, Cabanis, comprendre l’homme 
pour changer le monde (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2016), pp. 28–35.
9. 1796–97: Cabanis and Destutt 
de Tracy at the Institut national
Pierre Daunou (1761–1840) rose to prominence as the author of the 
Constitution de l’an III (1795) which ushered in the Directorate, and 
also as the mover behind the law of 3 Brumaire an IV (25 October 1795) 
reforming public education and known as the Loi Daunou.1 This law 
set down rules for primary, secondary, and ‘specialised’ education, and 
it also created the Institut national des sciences et des arts, of which he 
then became president. Before the Revolution, like Dominique-Joseph 
Garat, Daunou had been a minor author and a winner of academy 
prizes—with a study of Boileau’s literary influence (Académie de 
Nîmes, 1787) and an investigation into the origins, extent, and limits 
of paternal authority (Académie de Berlin, 1788).2 He had also been, 
like Garat, a regular member of Mme Helvétius’ salon in Auteuil, and 
continued to be.3 Daunou’s Institut national des sciences et des arts was 
set up with the following aims:
1  Loi Daunou, adopted on 5 Fructidor an III (22 August 1795). Wikipedia 
Contributors, ‘Lou Daunou’, Wikipedia, 20 February 2020, https://fr.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Loi_Daunou. 
2  See De l’influence littéraire de Boileau in Nîmes (1787), and a Mémoire sur l’origine, 
l’étendue et les limites de l’autorité paternelle in Berlin  (1788). For an insightful 
exploration of this particular characteristic of eighteenth-century France, see Jeremy 
L. Caradonna, The Enlightenment in Practice: Academic Prize Contests and Intellectual 
Culture in France, 1670–1794 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012).
3  There are many descriptions of this salon and their role in it. The major study is 
(still) Antoine Guillois, Le Salon de Madame Helvétius: Cabanis et les idéologues (Paris: 
Calmann Levy, 1894). Mariana Saad neatly sums up what is known in her Cabanis, 
comprendre l’homme pour changer le monde (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2016), pp. 
20–21.
© Caroline Warman, CC BY 4.0 https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0199.09
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1.° à perfectionner les sciences et les arts par des recherches non 
interrompues, par la publication des découvertes, par la correspondance 
avec les sociétés savantes et étrangères  ; 2.° à suivre, conformément 
aux lois et aux arrêtés du directoire exécutif, les travaux scientifiques 
et littéraires qui auront pour objet l’utilité générale et la gloire de la 
république.4
1. To perfect the sciences and arts by means of uninterrupted research, by 
means of the publication of discoveries, by means of correspondence with 
learned societies in France and abroad; 2. To undertake, in accordance 
with the laws and decrees of the executive directory, scientific and 
literary work whose purpose is the general utility of all and the glory of 
the republic.
There had been no single research institution of this sort before. The 
various (previously royal) Académies had been dissolved in 1793. As we 
saw, the École normale awkwardly straddled the gap between research 
and teacher-training institutions. The Institut national des sciences et 
des arts emphatically reintroduced the research focus, specified in this 
passage as being uninterrupted. Uninterrupted by students and their 
awkward questions, certainly, because there were none. 
It had three departments or ‘classes’: the ‘sciences physiques et 
mathématiques’, the ‘sciences morales et politiques’, and ‘littérature 
et beaux-arts’, and the three ‘classes’ were divided into a number 
of ‘sections’. First in the list of ‘sections’ for the ‘sciences morales et 
politiques’ was the ‘Analyse des sensations et des idées’. Each section had 
six Parisian members and six associate members from around France: 
in the case of the ‘Section Analyse des sensations et des idées’, Garat 
and Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis were Parisian members, and Antoine 
Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy, resident in Auteuil, an associate 
member.5 The Institut national held its meeting at the Louvre, renamed 







5  The members are all given at the beginning of volume 3: Mémoires de l’Institut national 
des sciences et des arts: sciences morales et politiques (Paris: Baudouin, 1798 /99), vol. 3, 
pp. iv–viii.
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the Palais national des sciences et des arts. Their lectures were published 
in the Mémoires de l’Institut national des sciences et des arts: in the case of 
the ‘classe’ of Sciences morales et politiques, only five volumes were 
published, as Napoleon Bonaparte closed it down in 1803.6 No lecture 
by Garat is recorded, which, in the context of the furore around his 
lectures at the École normale, is unsurprising and yet stark; it is not as if 
he did not have anything to say on the subject, as we know, and what he 
had said was left incomplete.7 Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy, however, 
did give numerous lectures, all of which were published, initially in 
installments in the Mémoires de l’Institut, and then separately. Cabanis’s 
became the Rapports du physique et du moral, first published in 1802, and 
then in a revised edition in 1805, with further posthumous editions in 
1815 and 1824. Destutt de Tracy’s were published as the Mémoire sur 
la faculté de penser in the Mémoires de l’Institut, to which he added the 
Dissertation sur quelques questions d’idéologie, a new extended version in 
the Projet d’éléménts d’idéologie à l’usage des écoles centrales de la République 
française (1801), then the Idéologie proprement dite of 1804, which was the 
first volume of the Éléments d’idéologie. This grew into four volumes, was 
completed in 1815, and republished in 1824.
As we see therefore, unlike Garat’s, the lectures of Cabanis and 
Destutt de Tracy not only made it into publication in the Mémoires 
but also flourished as separate works through various editions. And 
as we also see when we look at the publication dates, these works are 
published not so much separately as in tandem. This impression is 
further reinforced when we see that it was Destutt who wrote the eighty-
page summary or ‘Table analytique’ for the second edition of Cabanis’s 
Rapports sur le physique et le moral (1805).8 Their focus on the ‘analyse des 
sensations et des idées’ is a shared one, and when we read their works, 
it is clear that the project is a shared one whose ideas benefit from the 
amplification they receive from being said twice, or rather, not just twice 
but many many times over by two different voices occupying slightly 
different positions on the same terrain, one more physiologically-informed 
6  The volumes came out between An IV (1795/96) and An XII (1803/04).
7  Garat was sent as French Ambassador to Naples in 1798, but his tenure was brief.
8  Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme (Paris: 
Crapart, Caille et Ravier, 1805), vol. 2, pp. 559–640. Pierre Sue provided an index for 
this same edition, pp. 651–720.
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(Cabanis), the other self-consciously occupying the same space as 
Condillac, with his work not just on sensations but on grammar and 
logic (Destutt). The style of both is strikingly ceremonious and oral, 
emphasising the origin of these texts as lectures delivered at the Institut 
national. As we will see, both writers retain these markers of oral delivery 
generally, alongside references to the Institut specifically, and thereby 
stake a firm claim to virtuous republican authority and identity. As Jean 
Starobinski remarks with customary incisiveness in his analysis of ‘la 
chaire, la tribune, le barreau’, that is, of sermons, political speeches, and 
legal utterances, ‘le lieu d’où l’on parle’, that is, where one speaks from, 
is crucially important in determining or even authorising its meaning, 
and neither Cabanis nor Destutt de Tracy intend to let us forget it.9 We 
will return to these markers of style in due course, but first we need 
to see what they actually said, in order to establish whether or not 
their lectures are relevant to the argument we are attempting to make 
here, that is, that Diderot’s Éléments de physiologie was known by these 
writers, and that its influence can be perceived at various moments in 
their writings. Thus far, all that has been established is that they were 
in the same section of the same class as Garat at the Institut national, 
and that they would have known him anyway as a fellow-member of 
the Cercle d’Auteuil, Mme Helvétius’s salon, and that the same goes 
for Daunou (although he was in a different section of the same ‘Classe 
des Sciences morales et politiques’: his section was ‘Sciences sociales, 
et Législation’).10 Jacques-André Naigeon, too, was made a member of 
the Institut national, Classe des Sciences morales et politiques, but the 
section he was invited to be part of, interestingly, was ‘Morale’.11 One 
sees why he would not have been invited to join the section ‘Analyse 
des sens et des idées’—his reputation as a diehard atheist and his public 
association with Diderot would hardly have helped keep the field of 
their enquiries controversy-free where, as we will see, there is some real 
proximity to Diderot and to materialism in their work.
9  Jean Starobinski, ‘La Chaire, la tribune, le barreau’, in Les Lieux de mémoire. II. La 
Nation, ed. by Pierre Nora (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), vol. 3, pp. 425–86 (p. 481).
10  See Institut national de la République française (Paris: Baudouin, Brumaire An VI 
[Oct–Nov 1797]), Lois et réglement, liste des membres.
11  Naigeon doesn’t appear to have given any lectures. 
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Both Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy make the ‘analyse des sens’ into 
the analysis of life itself. In so doing, they are more ambitious than 
Garat. He starts with sensation, the senses, their flaws, correctibility, 
and perfectibility. And indeed he does not get a lot further than that. 
But Cabanis and Destutt cover more ground, and use more words. Once 
comfortably commenced, and with thousands of words to cushion him, 
Cabanis plants this aphoristic statement in the middle of a long and 
multi-claused sentence: 
[…] vivre, c’est sentir […].12 
To live is to feel.
Destutt restates this foundational principle as a question, with the help 
of a judiciously-deployed synonym and syntactical reformulation:
Qu’est-ce qu’exister, si ce n’est le sentir? 13 
What is it to exist if it isn’t to feel?
It is interesting to see how cautiously these formulas are planted and 
stated. By the time he gets to the Idéologie proprement dite of 1801, Destutt 
is able to state with more confidence and more prominence that: 
12  Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme: introduction de Serge Nicolas 
suivie des commentaires de François Thurot et A.L.C. Destutt de Tracy, 2 vols (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 2005 [Facsimile of the 1802 1st edition]), vol. 1, p. 91 (lecture 2) [N.B. 
For the avoidance of doubt, where the edition is not specified in footnotes, this is the 
one used.]. 
13  Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy, Mémoire sur la faculté de penser, De la 
métaphysique de Kant, et autres textes, ed. by Anne Deneys and Henry Deneys (Paris: 
Fayard, 1992), p. 69; lecture 2. Destutt de Tracy gave his Mémoire sur la faculté de 
penser initially as four Mémoires in five installments; he then revised it and re-read 
it at the Institut; the Mémoires de l’institut national, vol. 1, give the text of the second 
reading, while recording the date of the very first lecture. The approved text has 
three parts, which are each sub-divided into chapters: part 1 has twenty-seven pages 
in the 1992 edition, and two chapters; part 2 has sixty-seven pages and six chapters; 
part 3 has forty-four pages and two chapters. We assume that part 1 constituted the 
first lecture, and that part 2 includes lectures 2 and 3, and maybe part of 4; part 3 
therefore may include some of part 4, and certainly part 5. The dating between parts 
1 and 2 in any case is clear: Destutt differentiates them temporally by talking about 
what he did ‘dans la première partie’ [in the first part] and what he is going to do 
‘Aujourd’hui’ [today] (Mémoire sur la faculté de penser, p. 65 [Préface to part 2]). 
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Penser, sentir et exister ne sont pour nous qu’une seule chose.14
To think, to feel, and to exist are in our eyes nothing other than the same 
thing.
These statements are very close to one another, and very close also to the 
starker aphorism we find in Diderot’s Éléments de physiologie, that:
Sentir, c’est vivre.15 
To feel is to live.
Cabanis’s ‘vivre, c’est sentir’ chiastically mirrors Diderot’s ‘sentir, 
c’est vivre’, while Destutt’s ‘Qu’est-ce qu’exister, si ce n’est le sentir?’ 
affirms the same parallelism between existing/being alive and feeling 
via a rhetorical question. The similarity of these statements by Diderot, 
Cabanis, and Destutt is striking, and yet it is hardly conclusive with 
respect to any putative influence by or presence of the Éléments 
de physiologie specifically. Perhaps all it does is show that Diderot, 
Cabanis and Destutt are in alignment with respect to a basic notion of 
sensationism. Interestingly, however, Destutt immediately follows his 
statement that ‘Penser, sentir et exister ne sont pour nous qu’une seule 
chose’ [To think, to feel, and to exist are in our eyes nothing other than 
the same thing] with the following curious remark: ‘J’ai cru fermement 
ne l’avoir pas appris de Condillac’ [I firmly believed I did not learn this 
from Condillac].16 
For the suspicious reader, this is a gift. Is Destutt drawing attention 
to the fact that he did not learn it from Condillac in order to plant the 
idea of having learnt it from someone else, that is, Diderot? He could be. 
One might want to argue, on the basis of Condillac’s Traité des sensations 
of 1754 or his less well-known but arguably more relevant La Logique, 
published posthumously in 1780, that sensation and life are obviously 
presented as equivalent in some sort of way, and this is certainly true. 
14  Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy, Idéologie proprement dite, in Œuvres complètes, 
ed. by Claude Jolly (Paris: Vrin, 2012), vol. 3, p. 191.
15  Denis Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Jean Mayer, Œuvres complètes, DPV 
(Paris: Hermann, 1987), vol. 17, pp. 261–574 (p. 447) [hereafter DPV] /Diderot, 
Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Paolo Quintili (Paris: Champion, 2004), p. 271 
[hereafter PQ] /Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Motoichi Terada (Paris: 
Éditions Matériologiques, 2019), p. 263 [hereafter MT] .
16  Destutt de Tracy, Idéologie proprement dite, p. 191.
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But we would have to point out nonetheless that Condillac never says 
so in so many words, and that his style is circumlocutory rather than 
pithy or aphoristic. That the little aphorisms in Cabanis and Destutt 
linking life, existence and sensation are very close to an almost identical 
aphorism we find in the Éléments de physiologie cannot be denied, but nor 
does it prove knowledge or influence. It is nonetheless suggestive, as is 
Destutt’s curious statement about not having learnt it from Condillac. In 
any case, we cannot at this point exclude the notion that there may have 
been knowledge on their part of Diderot’s Éléments, and that it might 
have influenced them. It is a possibility.
***
Yet while we can see that it is a possibility, we also see how cautious 
Cabanis and Destutt are, how carefully they present this definition of 
life as sensation. Whether Diderot’s influence is present or not is only 
part of a problem which requires them to avoid the sort of charge of 
materialism which Garat had been subjected to, and which had so 
quickly got out of hand. When Cabanis and Destutt pick up the baton, 
they do so protected by the newly founded Institut national, according 
to its codes, and therefore with new forms of virtuous distance between 
themselves, their work, and anything that could be called materialist. 
Part of this is the distance they keep from Naigeon, nicely muzzled in 
the ‘Morale’ section. Fortunately, moreover, one of the key terms of the 
Institut is the notion of improvement or ‘perfecting’: the Constitution de 
l’an III, article 298, states that ‘Il y a, pour toute la République, un Institut 
National, chargé de recueillir les découvertes, de perfectionner les arts et 
les sciences’ [There is, for the entire Republic, a National Insitute, charged 
with recording discoveries and with perfecting the arts and sciences].17 
The Loi du 3 Brumaire an IV, titre IV, article premier, states that the 
Institut National ‘est destiné à perfectionner les sciences et les arts par 
des recherches non interrompues, par la publication des découvertes, 
par la correspondance avec les sociétés savantes et étrangères’ [To 
perfect the sciences and arts by means of uninterrupted research, by 
means of the publication of discoveries, by means of correspondence 
17  Institut national de la République française (Paris: Baudouin, Brumaire An VI (Oct–
Nov 1797), p. 1.
278 The Atheist’s Bible
with learned societies in France and abroad]:18 we quoted this earlier. 
So, ‘perfectionner’, to perfect the sciences and arts, or more accurately 
translated, the different branches of knowledge and the different skills 
and crafts, is the fundamental aim of the Institut National. Cabanis 
and Destutt de Tracy have nothing to worry about therefore when they 
talk about perfecting the senses: they are speaking the language of the 
Institute itself, even if perfecting the senses is not the same operation 
as perfecting branches of knowledge or crafts, and is manifestly closer 
to materialist positions about the processes of embodied thought. Yet 
the term ‘perfectionner’ legitimises this area of their thinking, such that 
there is no evidence whatsoever of the sort of syntactical caution and 
embedding that we saw when, in passing, or as a rhetorical question, 
they defined life as sensation. We remember of course that Garat had 
also enthusiastically proposed learning to perfect the senses, and this 
shared feature of their thought provides a key link between his Cours 
and their Mémoires, and a perceptible moment of transmission from him 
to them. Whether Diderot is also behind this notion remains a moot 
point. 
On reading Cabanis, we see how grand, how educational, this notion 
of perfecting the senses has become:19
Si notre première étude est celle des instrumens que nous avons 
reçus immédiatement de la nature ; la seconde est celle des moyens qui 
peuvent modifier, corriger, perfectionner ces instrumens. Il ne suffit 
pas qu’un ouvrier connoisse les premiers outils de son art ; il faut qu’il 
connoisse également les outils nouveaux qui peuvent en agrandir, en 
perfectionner l’usage, et les méthodes par lesquelles on peut les employer 
avec plus de fruit. 
La nature produit l’homme avec des organes et des facultés déterminées : 
mais l’art peut accroître ses facultés, changer ou diriger leur emploi, créer 
en quelque sorte de nouveaux organes. C’est-là l’ouvrage de l’éducation, 
qui n’est, à proprement parler, que l’art des impressions et des habitudes.20
If our first objects of study are the instruments which we have received 
directly from nature, the second are the means by which we may modify, 
18  Institut national de la République française (Paris: Baudouin, Brumaire An VI (Oct–
Nov 1797), p. 3.
19  Mariana Saad examines the importance of ‘perfectibility’ for Cabanis’s thought 
more widely in her study: Cabanis, comprendre l’homme, pp. 239–68.
20  Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, pp. 75–76 (lecture 1).
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correct, and perfect these instruments. It is not enough for a workman 
to know the basic tools of his craft; he must also know all the new tools 
which can expand and perfect it and the methods by which they can 
most fruitfully be used.
Nature produces man with organs and faculties already directed to a 
certain purpose, but skill can extend his faculties, change or direct their 
use, and in a certain way create new organs. This is the job of education, 
which is nothing other, properly speaking, than the art of impressions 
and habits. 
Cabanis’s rather ceremonious and amplificatory style makes it hard to 
quote him briefly (unless snatching a tiny clause out of a big sentence, 
as I did earlier), but his meaning is clear: ‘we’ must study, firstly, the 
‘instruments’ we receive from nature, and secondly, how to use them, 
and how to use them better; this, he declares, is the job of education. 
That what he means by ‘instruments’ and ‘organes’ denotes the senses 
and the physiology of their functioning is indicated by the fact that 
the ‘Histoire physiologique des sensations’ will provide the basis for 
his entire ‘Programme’.21 So, Cabanis is returning to that notion of 
working on the senses and improving them that Garat had proposed, 
but, although he does use the term ‘instrument’, he is not suggesting the 
actual internalisation of a tool as Garat had in the case of the telescope, 
nor does he mention coffee as a way of boosting the faculties.22 His notion 
is about learning to use the ‘organs’ skilfully, of extending their range, 
and changing or directing their use. As such, it is closer to Diderot’s 
remarks quoted earlier about practice and skill.23
The passage from Destutt—from his Mémoire sur la faculté de penser, 
first published in the Mémoires de l’Institut in 1798—is more ambitious 
again. He argues that if we come to understand the multiple, rapid, 
and often imperceptible sensations that give rise to our thoughts, we 
can begin to reform our sensations and our judgements, and thus, 
ultimately, begin to improve or perfect ourselves, and, subsequently, in 
21  Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, p. 80 (lecture 1).
22  For extra verification, see Pierre Sue’s remarkable index of ‘Table des matières’, 
published, along with Destutt de Tracy’s highly helpful Table analytique, at the end 
of the second volume of the 1805 Second edition (pp. 651–720). There is no mention 
of ‘téléscope’ at all, and just two passing mentions of ‘café’.
23  See above.
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due Condillacian form, perfect signs and language. These are worthy 
objectives of the virtuous Republic. 
[…] il faut commencer par jeter un coup d’œil sur les effets du 
perfectionnement graduel des individus, du perfectionnement successif 
de l’espèce, de l’usage des signes, et de la rédaction perpétuelle de 
chacun de ces trois phénomènes sur les deux autres.24
We must start by looking at the effects of the gradual perfecting of 
individuals, the successive perfecting of the species, the perfecting 
and the use of signs, and of the way each of these three phenomena 
perpetually rewrite the other two.
So, for Destutt de Tracy too, the perfecting of sensory skills is the 
first step in this far-reaching project of human improvement, at once 
individual and social. 
This emphasis we see in Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy on the 
improvement of the senses looks outwards to the actual operation of 
our five senses, but also inwards to our understanding and ability to 
perceive internal sensation. This focus on internal sensation was not 
present in Garat’s published Cours. It is present, however, in Diderot’s 
Éléments de physiologie. In proper ‘éléments d’une science’ style, as Jean 
le Rond d’Alembert had defined the matter in the Encyclopédie, the 
Éléments de physiologie indicate ‘la voie des découvertes à faire’ [the path 
towards new discoveries].25 Here is what Diderot had written:
24  Destutt de Tracy, Mémoire sur la faculté de penser, ed. by Anne and Henry Deneys, p. 
136 (beginning part 3).
25  D’Alembert had explained ‘Élémens des sciences’ as follows: ‘Des élémens bien faits, 
suivant le plan que nous avons exposé, & par des écrivains capables d’exécuter 
ce plan, auroient une double utilité: ils mettroient les bons esprits sur la voie 
des découvertes à faire, en leur présentant les découvertes déjà faites; de plus ils 
mettroient chacun plus à portée de distinguer les vraies découvertes d’avec les 
fausses; car tout ce qui ne pourroit point être ajoûté aux  élémens  d’une Science 
comme par forme de supplément, ne seroit point digne du nom de  découverte. 
Voyez  ce mot. (O)’ [Well-constructed basic elements, according to the plan that we 
have presented, when they are prepared by authors capable of carrying out such a 
project, would be useful in two ways. In the first place they would be setting good 
minds on the road to future discoveries by presenting prior discoveries to them. 
And secondly, they would be putting everyone in a better position to distinguish 
true discoveries from false ones. For anything that could not be added as a 
supplement to the basic elements of a Science would not be worthy of being called 
a discovery . See Discovery.] Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts 
et des métiers, par une société de gens de lettres, ed. by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond 
d’Alembert, 28 vols (Paris: Briasson, David, Le Breton, Durand, 1751–72), vol. 5, pp. 
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Ce que nous connaissons le moins, ce sont les sens intimes, c’est nous, 
l’objet, l’impression, la représentation, l’attention.26
What we know least are the intimate senses, that is, ourselves, the object, 
the impression, the representation, attention.
What is original about this is not the description of the route from 
external object to internal impression and representation, but the way 
in which this process connects to or in some way produces ‘nous’, that 
is ‘ourselves’, and the very notion of ‘les sens intimes’ [intimate senses] 
that enable our internal awareness and ‘attention’. Cabanis does not use 
this term of ‘les sens intimes’ but he does assert that ‘les impressions 
internes’ [internal impressions] need looking at, and that this is a 
‘question nouvelle’ [new question]. He asks why ‘analyst philosophers’ 
have not considered this before:
Les philosophes analystes n’ont guère considéré jusqu’ici que les 
impressions qui viennent des objets extérieurs, et que l’organe de la 
pensée distingue, se représente, et combine  : ce sont elles seulement 
qu’ils ont désignées sous le nom de sensations  ; les autres restent pour 
eux dans le vague.27
Analyst philosophers have barely considered until now anything but 
those impressions which come from external objects and which the organ 
of thought distinguishes, represents to itself, and combines: it is only to 
them that these philosophers have attributed the name of sensations: the 
rest remain in a sort of vague area for them.
Cabanis goes on to present two options: either to follow Condillac ‘et 
quelques autres’ [and various others] in assuming that all our ideas 
come via our senses from the outside world, or, alternatively, to ask 
whether ‘les impressions internes’ might be part of this process:
491–97 (p. 497), https://artflsrv03.uchicago.edu/philologic4/encyclopedie1117/
navigate/5/1752/; «Elements of the sciences»,  translated by Lauren Yoder, The 
Encyclopedia of Diderot & d’Alembert Collaborative Translation Project.  Ann Arbor: 
Michigan Publishing, University of Michigan Library, 2011, http://hdl.handle.
net/2027/spo.did2222.0001.133. See also the critical online edition Édition numérique 
collaborative et critique de l’Encyclopédie ed. by Alexandre Guilbaud, Alain Cernuschi, 
Marie Léca-Tsiomis and Irène Passeron, http://enccre.academie-sciences.fr/
encyclopedie/.
26  DPV 468/PQ 294/MT 283.
27  Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, p. 103 (lecture 2).
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La question nouvelle qui se présente, est de savoir s’il est vrai, 
comme l’ont établi Condillac et quelques autres, que les idées et les 
déterminations morales se forment toutes et dépendent uniquement de 
ce qu’ils appellent sensations; si par conséquent, suivant la phrase reçue, 
toutes nos idées nous viennent des sens, et par les objets extérieurs: ou 
si les impressions internes contribuent également à la production des 
déterminations morales, et des idées, suivant certaines lois dont l’étude 
de l’homme sain et malade peut nous faire remarquer la constance […].28
The new question that arises is to find out whether it is true, as Condillac 
and various others have established, that ideas and moral decisions are 
all formed from and depend solely on what they call sensations, and hence 
whether, to use the common phrase, all our ideas come from the senses 
and from external objects, or whether internal impressions contribute 
equally to the production of moral decisions and ideas, in accordance 
with certain laws which the study of humans in health and illness show 
to be equally constant […]. 
As for Destutt de Tracy, he talks in his Mémoire sur la faculté de penser 
about the ‘sentiment intime’ using the same adjective that Diderot had, 
and in the Idéologie proprement dite about the ‘sensations internes’.29 
Interestingly, in the recent critical edition of this latter text, editor Claude 
Jolly draws attention specifically to the idea of internal sensations, 
saying that neither Condillac nor Bonnet had gone beyond the five 
external senses and that this idea of a sixth internal sense is original to 
Cabanis, by whom Destutt de Tracy is directly influenced on this point.30 
And yet, as we know, Diderot had conceptualised this notion of ‘les sens 
intimes’, and not only that, he had also indicated that more work needed 
to be done to develop knowledge in this area. At the very least, it is of 
28  Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, pp. 104–05 (lecture 2). 
He also talks about those signs which remain ‘cachés dans l’intérieur; ils sont pour 
l’individu lui seul’ [hidden within; they are for the individual alone] (vol. 1, p. 73); 
he references ‘le sens interne’ [the internal sense] (vol. 1, p. 231 ital. in orig.).
29  Destutt de Tracy, Mémoire sur la faculté de penser, p. 74 (Part II, §1); Idéologie proprement 
dite, p. 100.
30  Jolly comments as follows: ‘Tant Condillac que Charles Bonnet réduisaient la 
sensibilité aux cinq sens. C’est Cabanis qui, dès les premiers mémoires lus dès l’an 
4 (1796) devant la seconde classe de l’Institut national, a élargi son champ aux 
sensations internes. Destutt de Tracy lui est sur ce point directement redevable’ 
[Condillac like Charles Bonnet reduced sensibility to the five senses. It is Cabanis 
who, from the very first memoirs read out in Year 4 (1796) to the second class at 
the Institut National, extended the field to internal sensations. Destutt de Tracy is 
directly indebted to him on this point.] (Idéologie proprement dite, p. 100n.).
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interest to note that while neither Condillac or Bonnet had mentioned 
‘les sensations internes’, Diderot had done, and therefore that Cabanis 
was not original in doing so. The coincidence of these points in the work 
of Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy, on the one hand, and in Diderot’s, on 
the other, is striking.
There is also an interesting replication and development of an 
approach we already saw in Garat: there is total radio silence with 
respect to Diderot, even when talking about the cases of people born 
blind, which in this context is an almost automatic recall of the well-
known Lettre sur les aveugles, and at the same time, while there are 
frequent mentions of the avowed master Condillac, very many of 
these are critical.31 I hope I may be forgiven for showing this aspect 
via a mash-up of passages, the point that I am trying to make here 
being the multiplicity of anti-Condillacian statements, rather than 
the specific nature of the objections. Thus Cabanis, talking about ‘les 
assertions de Condillac’ [Condillac’s assertions] criticises their ‘extrême 
généralité’ [extreme generality] which is ‘absolument contraires aux 
faits’ [completely in opposition to the facts]; he praises Claude Adrien 
Helvétius and Condillac only to regret that ‘ils ont manqué l’un et 
l’autre de connoissances physiologiques, dont leurs ouvrages auroient 
pu profiter utilement’ [they both lacked any physiological knowledge, 
and their works would have much benefited from it]; he asserts his 
own accuracy under a mask of worry about diverging from his views: 
‘Quand nous croyons nous écarter des vues de ce grand maître, il est 
bien nécessaire d’étudier soigneusement et d’assurer nos pas’ [when we 
consider we may be diverging from the opinions of this great teacher, 
we must be extremely careful to watch where we step]; talks about ‘une 
suite d’actions qui sont bien plus inexplicables encore, suivant la théorie 
de Condillac’ [a series of actions that are even more inexplicable if we 
follow Condillac’s theory]; and praises ‘les belles analyses de Buffon, de 
Bonnet et de Condillac’ [fine analyses of Buffon, Bonnet, and Condillac] 
31  The ‘aveugle-né’ is mentioned in Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de 
l’homme, vol. 2, p. 435; Destutt de Tracy, Idéologie proprement dite, p. 259. Critical 
mentions of Condillac follow in the main text. Respected Cabanis scholar Mariana 
Saad generally views him as being a faithful adherent of Condillacian theory, but 
does nonetheless point out how he contests ‘un des points essentiels de la théorie 
de la connaissance de Condillac’, which is the existence of an immaterial soul (Saad, 
Cabanis, comprendre l’homme, p. 30).
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only then to point out ‘une certaine fausse direction qu’elles pourraient 
faire prendre à l’idéologie et (le dirai-je sans détour?) sur les obstacles 
qu’elles sont peut-être capables d’opposer à ses progrès’ [a sort of wrong 
direction that they might make ideology go in and (shall I say it without 
roundaboutation?) the obstacles that they might be capable of setting in 
its way] and, having indeed decided to say it straight, states that ‘Rien 
sans doute ne ressemble moins à l’homme, tel qu’il est en effet, que ces 
statues […]’ [There is no question that there is nothing which resembles 
man as he really is less than these statues].32 We see that where Cabanis 
does also contest the theories of thinkers apart from Condillac (Buffon 
and Bonnet, for instance), it is he who is the red thread throughout.33 
Destutt de Tracy’s criticisms of Condillac are more frequent and 
sharper in tone. In the Mémoire sur la faculté de penser, we find the 
following remarks: ‘Est-il bien vrai, comme Condillac le dit, que 
[….]. Je ne le pense pas’ [Is it really true, as Condillac says, that […]. 
I don’t think so]; ‘Ici Condillac me paroît commencer à s’écarter de 
son exactitude ordinaire’ [Here Condillac seems to me to depart from 
his usual precision]; ‘Ici, quelque respect que j’aie pour Condillac, je 
dirai nettement que ce n’est pas le sentiment de la statue qui est vague, 
que c’est l’idée de l’auteur qui est louche et mal déterminée’ [Here, 
whatever respect I have for Condillac, I have to say that it’s not the 
statue’s feeling which is vague, it’s the author’s concept which is askew 
and ill-defined]; ‘Condillac, qu’il faut toujours citer, lors même qu’il ne 
satisfait pas entièrement […]’ [Condillac, whom one is always obliged 
to cite, even when he is not entirely satisfactory]; ‘Je n’ai pas besoin de 
dire pourquoi je n’ai pas, comme Condillac, fait du raisonnement une 
partie particulière de la faculté de penser’ [I have no need to say why 
I have not, unlike Condillac, made reason into a particular part of the 
faculty of thought]; ‘Il n’est donc pas très-exact de dire avec Condillac 
32  Cabanis (page references in order of appearance): Rapports du physique et du moral de 
l’homme vol. 1: Préface, p. xvi [the preface was first published in the 1802 edition]; 
lecture 1: p. 37; lecture 2: p. 113; p. 130; Part 10 (parts 7–12 of the 1802 RPM had not 
been given as lectures at the Institut national, and were new to the 1802 version), 
vol. 2, p. 442.
33  Other modern authorities Cabanis mentions (without necessarily contesting them) 
are Francis Bacon, René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes (p. 29); 36: John Locke (p. 36); 
37: Bonnet, Helvétius, Condillac (p. 37). Authorities from Antiquity: Pythagoras, 
Democritus, Epicurus (p. 18); Hippocrates (p. 24-7); Aristotle (p. 29). All from 
Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, Lecture 1. 
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[…]’ [It is therefore not very accurate to say, as Condillac does]: we see 
how these criticisms when stitched together begin to look like repeated 
resistance.34 His Dissertation sur quelques questions d’idéologie, given as 
a lecture to the Institut national on 7 Prairial an VIII (27 May 1800) 
and published the following year, and ostensibly an occasion to praise 
Condillac on the occasion of the publication of his Œuvres in 1798 (a 
complete set of which Garat presented to the Convention), is a thorough-
going critique of his work, as he himself notes: ‘j’eus beaucoup moins 
l’air de commenter Condillac que de le combattre’ [it looked much 
more as if I was disagreeing with Condillac than explaining his work]; 
drawing attention to contradiction even as he asserts the opposite: ‘En 
disant cela je crois fermement ne faire que continuer Condillac, et non 
le contredire’ [When I say this, I firmly believe that I am doing nothing 
other than continuing his work and not contradicting him]; is pleased to 
find some key shared ground (the implication being that this is rather 
rare): ‘j’ai le bonheur de me rencontrer avec Condillac dans ces trois 
articles fondamentaux’ [I am lucky enough to find myself in agreement 
with Condillac on these three fundamental articles] only to discover 
a further disagreement: ‘je diffère essentiellement de Condillac’ [I 
profoundly differ from Condillac], concluding that, if he is right, ‘on 
doit m’accorder que […] la première partie de son Traité des sensations 
tombe toute entière’ [one must agree with me that (…) the first part of 
his Treatise on sensations falls away completely].35 The Idéologie proprement 
dite continues in the same vein: Locke and Condillac are not ‘exempts 
d’erreurs’ [free of errors]; what is useful when tracking such errors in 
Condillac, ‘c’est de voir ce qui a pu égarer cet homme habile’ [is to see 
what misled this clever man]; later, we find this quite thorough-going 
statement: ‘Je persiste donc à penser que la manière dont Condillac a 
composé notre intelligence est vicieuse; et que plus on y reflechira, plus 
on se convaincra que la pensée de l’homme ne consiste jamais qu’à sentir 
des sensations, des souvenirs, des jugements et des désirs’ [I persist in 
thinking that the way in which Condillac constructed our intelligence is 
34  Destutt de Tracy in order of appearance: Mémoire sur la faculté de penser: part 1 
(lecture 1), pp. 43, 44, 45; part 2 (lectures 2 and 3), pp. 96, 124; part 3 (lecture 5), p. 
169.
35  Destutt de Tracy, Dissertation sur quelques questions d’idéologie in Mémoire sur la faculté 
de penser, De la métaphysique de Kant, et autres textes, ed. by Anne Deneys and Henry 
Deneys (Paris: Fayard, 1992), pp. 181–201 (187, 189, 192, 193, 199).
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defective, and that the more one thinks about it, the more one realizes 
that human thought never consists of anything other than feeling 
sensations, memories, judgements, and desires], and finally, as quoted 
before, ‘Penser, sentir et exister ne sont pour nous qu’une seule et même 
chose. J’ai cru fermement ne l’avoir pas appris de Condillac’ [To think, 
to feel, and to exist are in our eyes nothing other than the same thing. I 
firmly believe that I did not learn this from Condillac].36 These are far 
from the only moments in the text when Destutt de Tracy criticises one 
aspect or another of Condillac’s theory. It happens so frequently that 
it draws commentary from Tracy scholar and editor Claude Jolly: ‘Par 
cette note, Tracy s’oppose une fois de plus à Condillac’ [with this note, 
Tracy opposes Condillac yet again].37
Should we really understand this resolute and continuous countering 
of Condillac uniquely as the further substantiation of his theories 
through the critical attention brought to them by his philosophical 
offspring, whose contestation is actually evidence of their respect, 
and of their working within his frameworks to further develop them? 
It seems a bit of a weak justification for such extensive disagreement. 
And then of course we do have the Diderotian shadow hovering quite 
close by, however absent the name Diderot is. 1798 was not only the 
year in which Condillac’s Œuvres were published and so ostentaciously 
presented to the Convention, but also the year Naigeon finally brought 
out his edition of Diderot’s Œuvres. What was in them and how 
Naigeon framed them will be discussed in the next section, but in any 
case no one offered them to the Convention with a special speech. We 
have already noted how in one instance, when Destutt de Tracy says 
he is not following Condillac, there may be reason to believe that he 
is evoking Diderot in silent contrast. Just a few pages earlier than that 
passage, in a note he adds to the 1817 edition of the Idéologie proprement 
dite, Destutt de Tracy (again) both praises and criticises Condillac: he 
praises him for inventing the field, and he criticises him for not bringing 
his insights together into ‘un traité unique qui contînt son système tout 
entier’ [a single treatise which brought together his whole system].38 
On another page, he also wrote about how ‘ce célèbre métaphysicien a 
36  Destutt de Tracy, Idéologie proprement dite, pp. 76, 157n, 190, 191.
37  Destutt de Tracy, Idéologie proprement dite, p. 181n.
38  Destutt de Tracy, Idéologie proprement dite, p. 187n.
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eu si peu d’émules dans la carrière qu’il a parcourue, que l’histoire de 
ses pensées est pour ainsi dire l’histoire de la science pendant ce long 
intervalle de temps’ [this famous metaphysician had so few emulating 
him in the career he followed that the history of his thoughts is, so 
to say, the history of knowledge during this long period].39 When we 
know that Diderot had brought all his insights in this area into ‘un traité 
unique’ and that he had also been writing and thinking about the same 
questions as Condillac over the same time span, from the Lettre sur les 
aveugles to the Éléments de physiologie, that he is a better candidate, as 
editor of the Encyclopédie, for the person whose thoughts are the history 
of knowledge at that time, and when we have some grounds already to 
think that Tracy did know that work, are we wrong to wonder whether 
that criticism of Condillac might be a shield here for discussion of that 
same work, or even a signal that it is being alluded to? These are the 
questions that we must now investigate further, through more detailed 
comparative inspection of the works of Diderot, Cabanis, and Destutt 
de Tracy.
In what follows, I will consider passages from Cabanis, first, and 
Destutt de Tracy, second, that seem to bear some striking resemblance 
to a similar passage in the Éléments de physiologie (although on one 
occasion I also refer to the Rêve de d’Alembert, also unpublished other 
than in the élite manuscript journal the Correspondance littéraire, where 
it had appeared in installments between August and November 1782). 
My underpinning enquiry is to establish whether the textual evidence 
allows us to assert that Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy knew the Éléments 
de physiologie. My aim is not necessarily to assert that they are parroting 
it or that they see their work as disseminating its theories, although they 
might be. It is also not to consider their theories as a whole, nor the 
extent to which these theories may or may not have been influenced by 
Diderot. These are all interesting and important questions, but they go 
beyond the purview of this study. Furthermore, because I have chosen 
not to discuss general parallels but only to put forward the most visible 
textual similarities, those which seem to be referring to specific passages 
in the Éléments, I am also not presenting the work of either Cabanis or 
Destutt de Tracy in a particularly coherent way—I am obliged to dart 
39  Destutt de Tracy, Dissertation sur quelques questions d’idéologie, p. 184.
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about from one passage to another without there necessarily being any 
connection between them, nor do I have space to supply much theoretical 
contextualisation. This is regrettable but I think unavoidable, given that 
this section is subservient to our larger investigation into whether the 
Éléments de physiologie was being read and drawn on in the 1790s. 
Cabanis and the Éléments de physiologie
There seem to be perceptible similarities between passages in the 
Rapports sur le physique et le moral and the Éléments de physiologie 
particularly in Cabanis’s discussion of attention, of dream-thinking 
(although here we refer to D’Alembert’s Dream), of the notion of the brain 
as a thought-secreting organ, in his presentation of the senses as having 
their separate memories, in his examples of exceptional strength, and in 
his consideration of drowned people. We will take them in that order, 
with Cabanis first, and Diderot after for ease of comparison, as we did 
in the section on Garat.
We start with the idea that attention and absorption come hand in 
hand with obliviousness to other things:
[Cabanis] […] l’être sensitif n’étant capable que d’une certaine somme 
d’attention, qui cesse de se diriger d’un côté, quand elle est absorbée de 
l’autre.40 
Given that the sensitive being is incapable of more than a certain amount 
of attention, it stops being directed on one side when it is absorbed on 
the other.
[Diderot] Toutes sortes d’impressions se font, mais nous ne sommes 
jamais qu’à une. L’âme est au milieu de ses sensations comme un convive, 
à une table tumultueuse, qui cause avec son voisin, il n’entend pas les 
autres.41 
40  Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, p. 134 (lecture 2).
41  DPV 467/PQ 294/MT 283. See also: ‘Dans l’état parfait de santé, où il n’y a aucune 
sensation prédominante qui fasse discerner une partie du corps, état que tout 
homme a quelquefois éprouvé, l’homme n’existe qu’en un point du cerveau: il est 
tout au lieu de la pensée’ [In a perfect state of health, when no single dominant 
sensation draws attention to any particular part of the body, a state which everyone 
has experienced sometimes, then a person exists only in one point in their brain 
and is completely absorbed in the thought] (DPV 330/PQ 146/MT 151) and here in 
Cabanis: ‘Quand tous ses organes jouissent d’une activité moyenne, et en quelque 
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All sorts of impressions are being made, but we only ever focus on one. 
The soul in the midst of its sensations is like a guest at a boisterous dinner 
table. He’s conversing with his neighbour, and he can’t hear anyone else.
Cabanis asserts that ‘the sensitive being’ is only capable of a certain 
amount of attention, and that if it is all absorbed on one side, it will 
not notice what is happening on the other. This idea, in Diderot’s 
version, had been illustrated with reference to a person at a noisy dinner 
table, literally absorbed on one side in a conversation and oblivious to 
everything else. If the idea is similar and the motif of being absorbed on 
one side and oblivious to the other relatively similar, how striking the 
difference in style is! Poor Cabanis. His statement looks almost lifeless 
next to the busy word picture in Diderot’s illustration of the mind having 
a great chat at a dinner party. Interestingly, Cabanis comments directly 
on his flat style, also in connection with the question of attention:
Notre intention n’est point de retracer des tableaux faits pour plaire à 
l’imagination; rien assurément ne seroit ici plus facile. Dans les sujets 
de cette nature, le physiologiste est sans cesse entouré d’images qui 
peuvent le captiver et le fasciner lui-même […]. Nous voulons éloigner, 
au contraire, tout ce qui pourroit s’écarter de la plus froide observation: 
nous sommes, en effet, des observateurs, non des poètes; et dans la crainte 
de détourner l’attention que cet examen demande, par des impressions 
entièrement étrangères à notre but, nous aimons mieux n’offrir que le 
plus simple énoncé des opérations de la nature, et nous renfermer dans 
les bornes de la plus aride et de la plus froide exposition.42
Our intention is not to paint pictures that the imagination will find 
attractive; certainly nothing would be easier here. In connection with 
subjects of this sort, the physiologist himself is constantly surrounded 
by images which are likely to captivate and fascinate him […]. We wish, 
on the contrary, to set aside anything which might depart from the 
coldest observation: we are, in fact, observers and not poets; and for fear 
of distracting the attention that this enquiry requires with impressions 
which are entirely alien to our aim, we prefer to make nothing but 
sorte proportionnelle, aucun ordre d’impressions ne domine; toutes se compensent 
et se confondent’ [when all a person’s organs are enjoying a moderate level of 
activity, no particular order of impressions dominates  ; they all balance out and 
merge with one another] (Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, p. 134: 
lecture 2).
42  Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, pp. 312–13 (lecture 5).
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the simplest assertions about the operations of nature, and to confine 
ourselves to the driest and coldest exposition.
He sets the imagination aside, he asserts his identity as an observer and 
not a poet, he embraces the statement and the cold aridity of exposition.43 
He is also, we note, rather verbose; because of this aspect of his style 
(which we will return to), we are often obliged to cut his sentences out 
of sheer practicality. The particular passage we have just looked at is 
only slightly cut, and it is interesting to contrast it with the following 
rather famous (and pithier) statement by Diderot, already quoted in 
connection to Garat:
L’homme à imagination se promène, dans sa tête, comme un curieux 
dans un palais, où ses pas sont à chaque instant détournés par des objets 
intéressants.44
The imaginative man walks about in his head like a curious person in a 
palace, his steps constantly drawn by interesting objects.
How curious to see not so much the similarity between these two 
passages—they are rather different—but the common reference point, 
that of the person with an imagination being attracted to first one thing 
and then another. When Cabanis says he will set aside imaginative 
tableaux—which he informs us all physiologists are ceaselessly 
surrounded with—he first evokes it and then rejects it; he evokes writing 
like a poet and then rejects that approach; he evokes the attention being 
distracted (détournée), only to reject distraction. He is doing a lot of 
rejecting, but he is also doing a lot of evoking, so much so, that one 
wonders whether he is in fact alluding to Diderot in this insistence on/
rejection of imaginative style, an evocation which is also a resolve not 
to get distracted ‘par des impressions entièrement étrangères à notre 
but’ [with impressions which are entirely alien to our aim]: is this also 
a warning that he will not be diverted from his aim to establish the 
connections between ‘le physique’ and ‘le moral’, whatever sensitivity 
there is around the subject or around others who happen also to have 
treated it, possibly those who have treated it more poetically? If this is 
43  Cabanis had in fact started his writing life under the aegis of the poet Antoine 
Roucher as a translator of the Iliad and poet himself.
44  DPV 475/PQ 303/MT 290.
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so, then the allusion cannot be to any writer other than Diderot, and 
certainly not to Condillac, whose ‘sécheresse’ Garat had criticised, as we 
quoted above?45 This may be a reach too far. Yet, we note his assertion 
that he will not be a poet, and in the first textual comparison we offered, 
looking at the workings and blind spots of attention, we can see that the 
contrast between Cabanis’s and Diderot’s versions is that of the bald 
statement to the poetical one.46
In this context therefore it seems relevant to ask whether the 
following passage, presenting the notion that the mind, with the aid of 
the imagination, can process ideas overnight, is a non-poetical treatment 
or re-writing of the same subject as addressed in the intensely poetical 
Rêve de d’Alembert: 
En effet, l’esprit peut continuer ses recherches* dans les songes; il peut 
être conduit par une certaine suite de raisonnemens, à des idées qu’il 
n’avoit pas […]. Enfin, certaines séries d’impressions internes, qui se 
coordonnent avec des idées antérieures, peuvent mettre en jeu toutes les 
puissances de l’imagination, et même présenter à l’individu une suite 
d’événemens, dont il croira quelquefois, entendre dans une conversation 
régulière, le récit et les détails.47
In fact, the mind can continue its research in dreams; it may be led by 
a certain series of reasons to ideas which it did not have before […]. In 
short, a given series of internal impressions, in coordination with existing 
ideas, can get all the powers of the imagination going, and even present 
to an individual a series of events in which he will sometimes believe he 
is hearing a regular conversation with narration and details.
45  See above: ‘la sécheresse de ses narrations dépouillées de toute imagination et de 
toute beauté de style’ [the dryness of his accounts devoid of any imagination or 
stylistic beauty] (Première leçon, p. 75).
46  See also: ‘une attention forte, une méditation profonde, peut suspendre l’action des 
organes sentans externes’ [concentrated attention or deep meditation can suspend 
the action of the external sensory organs] (Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du 
moral de l’homme, vol. 1, p. 166); Diderot had discussed attention and distraction in 
Éléments de physiologie DPV 485/PQ 315–16/MT 300 and DPV 499–500/PQ 336–67/ 
MT 313–14. Destutt de Tracy also engages with the question: ‘Mais, dit-on, quand je 
fais attention à une sensation, j’en ai la conscience, et toutes les autres disparaissent. 
Hé bien! Les autres sont nulles; et vous avez une sensation: voilà tout’ [But, it is 
said, when I pay attention to a sensation, I am conscious of it, and all the others 
disappear. Well then! The others are nothing, and you are having a sensation: that’s 
all], Idéologie proprement dite, p. 189 (original italics).
47  Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 2, pp. 547–48 (Part 10 of the 
1802 edition).
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This description of the dreaming working mind, with all the powers of 
the imagination at play, including a regular conversation, a sustained 
narrative and local details, is not a bad description of the Rêve de 
d’Alembert. It is therefore almost funny to see that the asterisk following 
‘recherches’ leads us to a footnote discussing guess who? It’s Condillac:
* Condillac m’a dit, qu’en travaillant à son cours d’études, il étoit souvent 
forcé de quitter, pour dormir, un travail déjà tout préparé, mais incomplet, 
et qu’à son réveil il l’avoit trouvé plus d’une fois terminé dans sa tête.
* Condillac once told me that when working on his course of study [a 
sort of educational manual], he was often forced to interrupt, at bed 
time, some work that he had got completely ready but hadn’t completed, 
and that when he woke up he more than once found it finished off in his 
head.
There is no reason this anecdote should not be perfectly true. It is just 
interesting to find it right here, appended to what sounds very much 
like a description of the Rêve de d’Alembert, sitting in a footnote that 
blocks that association by presenting an alternative and much more 
respectable source.
We see how speculative and associative this process of textual 
comparison and allusion is obliged to be. In the following passage, 
however, it is more straightforward. Cabanis presents the brain as an 
organ which produces or even secretes thought. We find this exact idea 
in the Éléments de physiologie. Here is Cabanis first, and Diderot second, 
as usual:
[Cabanis] Pour se faire une idée juste des opérations de la pensée, il faut 
considérer le cerveau comme un organe particulier, destiné spécialement 
à la produire […].48
In order to gain an accurate idea of the operations of thought, it is 
necessary to consider the brain as a particular organ, specifically destined 
to produce it.
[Cabanis] […] le cerveau digère en quelque sorte les impressions; […] il 
fait organiquement la sécrétion de la pensée.49
48  Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, p. 151 (lecture 2).
49  Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, p. 152 (lecture 2).
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The brain digests impressions in a sort of way […] it organically produces 
the secretion that is thought.
[Diderot] Le cerveau n’est qu’un organe secrétoire.50 
The brain is nothing other than a secretory organ.
Serge Nicolas, editor of the facsimile 1802 edition Rapports du physique 
et du moral de l’homme (2005), draws particular attention to this notion 
of Cabanis’s that the brain secretes thought, presenting it as a perfect 
case of Cabanis’s anti-Cartesianism and prominent role as ‘le plus 
illustre apologiste’ [the most illustrious apologist] of materialism, the 
writer who will provide nineteenth-century materialists with ‘leurs 
meilleurs arguments’ [their best arguments].51 He cites other ‘esprits 
illustres’ [illustrious minds] of the materialist camp—d’Holbach, La 
Mettrie and Helvétius. No Diderot mentioned. And in fact, no Buffon 
either; the idea was not original to Diderot, as Paolo Quintili points out 
when commenting on this statement in his edition of the Éléments de 
physiologie; it was Buffon’s. Motoichi Terada adds a further three sources 
in Daniel de Laroche, Antoine Le Camus, and Jean-Paul Marat. Let’s 
start with what Buffon had written:
Le cerveau, au lieu d’être le siège des sensations, le principe du sentiment, 
ne sera donc qu’un organe de sécrétion et de nutrition.52
The brain, instead of being the seat of sensation, the source of sensation, 
is therefore nothing other than an organ of secretion and nourishment.
It is interesting to see that when it comes to presenting an 
uncompromisingly materialist statement such as this idea of thought as 
a bodily secretion, both Buffon and Cabanis choose to wrap it up nicely 
in introductory clauses and qualifications; Diderot, however, strips this 
all away to its baldest version. No poetry here. Returning to the question 
of the genealogical transmission of this idea, however, we can see that 
50  DPV 353/PQ 172/MT 172.
51  Serge Nicolas, ‘Introduction’, in Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, 
vol. 1, p. xi, n. 13. In his study on Cabanis, Yves Pouliquen also draws attention 
to the importance and originality of this feature of Cabanis’s thought: Cabanis, 
un idéologue: de Mirabeau à Bonaparte (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2013), p. 175. Saad  also 
underscores this point, in her Cabanis, comprendre l’homme, pp. 30, 149–50.
52  Buffon, Histoire naturelle, vol. 7 (1758), p. 122 (‘Les animaux carnassiers’); reference 
given by Quintili in Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Quintili, p. 172, n. 20.
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Diderot receives the idea either from Buffon or Marat (or both). Marat 
had written this:
Le cerveau n’est qu’un organe secrétoire, & n’a aucun rapport à l’Ame, 
qu’en tant qu’il filtre plus ou moins de fluide & que ce fluide est plus ou 
moins élaboré: c’est à cet égard aussi qu’il influe sur l’intelligence.53
The brain is nothing other than a secretory organ, and has no connection 
to the soul other than insofar as it filters more or less fluid, and that this 
fluid is more or less developed: it is in this respect also that it influences 
the intelligence.
Diderot’s ‘ne… que’ is a direct repetition of Buffon’s, and Marat seems 
also to repeat Buffon. Cabanis may have in mind Buffon, Diderot, Le 
Camus, Laroche, or Marat, singly or plurally: as Terada points out, ‘c’est 
une opinion très répandue à l’époque’ [this opinion was widely shared 
at the time].54 Notice, however, that Diderot drops the nutritional aspect 
that Buffon includes as an equal part of his formula: for Buffon, the 
brain is nothing but an organ of secretion and nutrition. Diderot drops 
the Buffonian nutrition as he also drops Marat’s inclusion of filters 
and fluid. In Cabanis, the notions of nutrition and filtered fluids are 
also absent, and although he does mention the associated process of 
digestion, it is in the form of an analogy to communicate the idea of 
thought as a secreted product of the brain, and not as a direct function 
of the brain itself. The more likely hypothesis therefore is that Cabanis is 
following Diderot and not Buffon or Marat, even if his style is somewhat 
more cautious.
***
We also find similarity in their views about sensory memory. Cabanis 
writes that:
[…] je ne serois pas éloigné de penser que les sens, pris chacun à part, ont 
leur mémoire propre.55
53  Marat, De l’homme, 1775, vol. 2, p. 337, source given and partially cited by Terada, 
MT 360–61 n. xxi.
54  Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Terada, p. 172, n. 78.
55  Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, p. 229 (lecture 3).
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I am not far from thinking that the senses, taken separately, have their 
own memory.
He goes on to illustrate this idea by talking about standing in front of a 
sun-lit window, closing his eyes, and continuing to see the image of the 
window frame and glass panes.
In the Éléments de physiologie, we read this:
Mémoire de la vue, mémoire de l’oreille, mémoire du goût, habitudes 
qui lient une longue suite de sensations et de mots, et de mouvements 
successifs et enchaînés d’organes.56
Memory of sight, memory of the ear, memory of taste, habits which 
link a long series of sensations and words and also link successive and 
connected movements within the [sensory] organs.
He goes on to evoke visual memory when the eyes are shut (although 
he gives no example): ‘les yeux fermés nous réveillent une longue 
succession de couleurs’ [the eyes when closed waken a long string of 
colours], concluding that ‘la mémoire peut donc être regardée comme 
un enchaînement fidèle de sensations, qui se réveillent successivement 
comme elles ont été reçues’ [the memory can therefore be regarded as 
a faithful chain of sensations, which are successively aroused in the 
order in which they were received].57 We can see that both Diderot 
and Cabanis are thinking explicitly about sensory memory, although 
Cabanis’s admission that he is not far from thinking that each sense has 
its own memory is less affirmative than Diderot’s formulation, while his 
rather concrete and undeveloped example of seeing an image remaining 
imprinted on his eyelids on closing his eyes is more tentative than 
Diderot’s confident ‘longue succession de couleurs’. Cabanis goes on to 
allude to auditory memory, to interruptions, and to sensory memories 
featuring in dreams or in the ‘silence et l’obscurité de la nuit’ [silence 
and darkness of the night], all topics which Diderot also discusses.58 
So these passages do bear out the notion that Cabanis is following the 
earlier text, grappling with its assertions, trying to think them through, 
56  DPV 472/PQ 299/MT 287.
57  DPV 472/PQ 299/MT 287.
58  Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, p. 230 (lecture 3).
296 The Atheist’s Bible
and that his Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme bears the traces 
of this process.
We will just look at two more of these potential traces before turning 
to Destutt de Tracy. In the first, we see Cabanis arguing that ‘the energetic 
passions’ are capable of calling up unsuspected amounts of strength:
[…] dans toutes les passions énergiques, chaque homme trouve en 
lui-même une vigueur qu’il ne soupçonnoit pas, et devient capable 
d’exécuter des mouvements dont l’idée seule l’eût effrayé dans des 
temps plus calmes.59
In all the energetic passions, each person finds within themselves a 
vigour that they had not suspected, and becomes capable of executing 
movements the very idea of which would have frightened them in calmer 
times.
In the Éléments de physiologie, we find this:
L’homme sain ne connaît pas toute sa force; j’en dis autant de l’homme 
tranquille.*
* Mr de Buffon voit la flamme s’échapper avec de la fumée à travers 
les fentes d’un lambris; il arrache le lambris; il prend entre ses bras 
les planches à demi brûlées et les porte dans sa cour et il se trouve 
qu’un cheval n’ébranlerait pas le fardeau qu’il a porté. Une femme 
délicate est attaquée de vapeurs hystériques, de fureur utérine et 
trois hommes ne peuvent contenir celle qu’un seul d’entre eux aurait 
renversée, liée dans son état de santé. Le feu prend à la maison d’un 
avare, il prend son coffre-fort et le porte dans son jardin, d’où il ne 
l’aurait pas remué pour dix fois la somme qu’il contenait.60 
The healthy man does not know the extent of his strength; I say the same 
applies to a tranquil man.*
*Mr de Buffon sees flames and smoke escaping through the slits of a 
piece of wooden pannelling; he tears it off; he carries the half-burnt 
planks in his arms out into the courtyard and it emerges that a horse 
would not have been able to move the load he carried. A delicate 
woman is attacked by hysterical vapours and uterine fury and three 
men are unable to restrain someone whom one of them could have 
knocked over and tied up unaided had she been in a state of health. 
The house of a miser catches light, he picks up his strong box and 
59  Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, p. 200 (lecture 3).
60  DPV 327/PQ 143/MT 149.
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carries it into his garden, and then wouldn’t have been able to move it 
for ten times the sum it contained. 
This is a passage we have looked at before.61 There, we noted how it 
picks up a theme also treated by Condillac. Who’s to say which one 
(or who else) Cabanis is engaging with? We cannot be sure. And yet, 
Condillac’s version is neither particularly plausible nor physiologically-
based, despite the mention of gout. Diderot focuses very specifically 
on extreme circumstances either of threat (to self or to something held 
precious) or illness, specifically hysteria. This is also what Cabanis looks 
at: a hysterical woman being stronger than a group of men trying to 
restrain her; sufferers from ‘maladies maniaques’ [manic illnesses] being 
able to break chains asunder, and finally, how the ‘forces vivantes’ [living 
forces] can suddenly, in ‘toutes les passions énergiques’, as quoted, 
bestow on every man (‘homme’) ‘une vigueur qu’il ne soupçonnait 
pas’.62 There is a clear parallel between the passages, supported by 
the appearance of the exceptionally strong hysterical woman in both, 
even though in Cabanis we find no specific anecdotes, and therefore 
no mention of Buffon saving his precious wood panels or the miser his 
strong box from fire.63
The last passage I wish to look at in this section is about the persistence 
of life, or specifically, sensibility, in the absence of any perceptible signs 
of it, specifically in the case of drowned persons.
Here is what Cabanis writes. He has been dealing with the sensibility 
irritability polemic, and in the following extract evokes ‘others’ who 
hold a particular position on the matter:
Les autres, et l’on peut compter parmi eux plusieurs hommes de génie, 
objectent que la sensibilité subsiste dans les asphyxies, les léthargies, les 
apoplexies, en un mot dans les syncopes de tout genre, quoiqu’elle ne 
se manifeste alors par aucun acte précis qui la constate, quoiqu’elle ne 
laisse après elle aucune trace, aucun souvenir qui la confirme. Ils ajoutent 
qu’entre l’état d’un noyé qui revient à la vie, et l’état de celui dont la mort 
est irrévocable, la différence sera difficile à bien établir.64 
61  See Chapter 3 in the section titled ‘The Gouty Man and the Fire’.
62  Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, pp. 199–200 (lecture 3).
63  For the history of hysteria, see Sabine Arnaud, On Hysteria: The Invention of a Medical 
Category between 1670 & 1820 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2015), https://
doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226275680.001.0001. 
64  Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, pp. 86–87 (lecture 2).
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Others, and amongst them can be counted many men of genius, object 
that sensibility persists in different sorts of asphyxia, lethargy, and 
apoplexy, in a word in swoons of all sorts, although it is not evident 
in any precise action which might prove it, although it leaves no trace 
behind it, no memory to confirm it. They add that between the state of 
a drowned person who returns to life and the state of someone whose 
death is irrevocable, the difference is difficult to establish properly. 
In the Éléments de physiologie, Diderot specifically looks at these 
questions, and we have quoted the following passage before.65 He has 
evoked melancholic lethargy and catalepsy, and here he thinking about 
a drowned person:
Où est-elle [l’âme] dans le noyé, qu’on rappelle à la vie de l’état de 
mort, ou d’un état qui lui ressemble tellement, que si le noyé n’avait 
point été secouru, il aurait persévéré dans cet état sans éprouver d’autre 
changement qu’une torpeur plus profonde.66
Where is it [the soul] in the drowned man, who can be recalled to life 
from the state of death, or from a state which resembles it so closely, that 
if the drowned man had not been treated, he would have continued in 
that same state without experiencing any change other than a deeper 
torpor.
It is difficult to read Cabanis’s allusion to ‘plusieurs hommes de génie’ 
[many men of genius] arguing about the persistence of sensibility, and 
see him record that ‘they add’ this further point about establishing life 
or death after drowning, without thinking about these precise pages 
from the Éléments de physiologie, where these specific subjects are treated 
in exactly this order. Furthermore, how interesting to see Cabanis 
anonymise this group of thinkers at the same time as asserting their 
status as men of genius. In the course of his presentation of the different 
arguments and views about sensibility and irritability, he has named 
Locke, Bonnet, Condillac, Helvétius, and Xavier Bichat, as well as 
Albrecht von Haller, the Stahlians, and the medical schools of Edinburgh 
and Montpellier.67 So it is not as if he is averse to naming in general, 
65  DPV 333–34/PQ 150–51/MT 154, discussed in Chapter 3, in the section titled ‘The 
Natural Processes of Material Transformation’.
66  DPV 333/PQ 151/MT 154.
67  Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, pp. 84–88 (lecture 2). As 
mentioned earlier, Jean-Luc Chappey analyses the phenomenon and politics of the 
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although, as mentioned earlier, Diderot is not once named. In this 
context, therefore, it is striking to see Cabanis not only alluding to and 
semi-identifying (as geniuses) this new group, but also conveying to his 
reader that he aligns his own view with theirs.68 We have to suppose—
given the similarity of the texts—that he is referring ever so carefully to 
Diderot, and that he must be using the Éléments de physiologie.69 Is there 
any other conclusion we can draw?
Destutt de Tracy and the Éléments de physiologie
Destutt de Tracy’s connection to Diderot and the Éléments de physiologie 
is not quite so clear. This is because he remains strictly within the 
‘rational’ part of what, from his second lecture onwards, he calls 
‘l’idéologie rationelle’;70 we will turn to his coining of this influential 
neologism in a few pages. He distinguishes ‘l’idéologie rationelle’ from 
‘l’idéologie physiologique’, stating that ‘Idéologie’ has two parts, the 
physiological and the rational, and that ‘En parlant de la sensibilité et 
des facultés qui en dérivent, je n’ai point osé rechercher leurs causes 
physiologiques’ [when talking about sensibility and the faculties which 
derive from it, I have not dared to research their physiological causes].71 
He is too modest to talk about what he does not master, so he does not 
talk physiology. This obviously makes it harder work to find any traces 
list in his Ordres et désordres biographiques: dictionnaires, listes de noms, réputation des 
Lumières à Wikipédia (Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 2013), p. 176, quoted above.
68  This is not the only time Cabanis does this. He also talks about ‘les écrivains qui se 
sont occupés avec quelque profondeur, de l’analyse des idées, de celle du langage 
[…] et des principes de la morale privée ou publique’ physique’ [the writers who 
have thought deeply about the analysis of ideas and of language (…) and about the 
principles of private and public morality], further specifying that these writers had 
all ‘senti cette nécessité de se diriger, dans leurs recherches, d’après la connoissance 
de la nature humaine’ [felt the need to orientate their research according to what 
we know about human nature] Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, 
vol. 1, p. vii (Préface)—this last qualification tells us that we are not talking about 
Condillac; Diderot seems alluded to, again.
69  I explore the question of non-naming as an allusive way of naming in my article: 
Caroline Warman, ‘Caught between Neologism and the Unmentionable: The 
Politics of Naming and Non-naming in 1790s France’, Romance Studies, 31 (2013), 
264–76 (esp. pp. 266–67), https://doi.org/10.1179/0263990413Z.00000000051. 
70  Destutt de Tracy, Mémoire sur la faculté de penser, p. 89 (Part II, §iv, probably lecture 
3).
71  Ibid. 
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of Diderot’s Éléments de physiologie, even supposing there were any in 
the first place. However, if he focuses on presenting a model of the mind 
and its functions in philosophically logical (and thus Condillacian) 
terms, he consistently refers to its physiological bases and relation to the 
body in general (he also continuously criticises Condillac, as we saw). 
His view of the mind and thought as fundamentally physiological is 
made even more explicit when he states, in the preface to the first stand-
alone edition of the Idéologie proprement dite (a lightly reworked version 
of the Mémoire sur la faculté de penser) that ideology is a subsection of 
zoology: ‘L’idéologie est une partie de la zoologie’ [ideology is part of 
zoology].72 Statements of thorough-going physiological determinism are 
ubiquitous. For example, having disputed the accuracy of the definition 
of need/s which Condillac gives in the Traité des sensations, he states that:
je pense que nos premiers besoins […] résultent directement de notre 
organisation [et qu’ils] sont des perceptions simples, de purs sentimens 
[…].73 
I think that our primary needs […] are the direct result of our organization 
[and that they] are simple perceptions, pure feelings […]
A few pages later (but within the same lecture chapter), he further 
states that:
tout plaisir ou peine est un besoin, et toute sensation perçue est en elle-
même un besoin.74
every pain and pleasure is a need, and every perceived sensation is in 
itself a need.
In the third lecture chapter, he returns to the same theme, even more 
explicitly:
[…] tout ce que nous pensons, tout ce que nous sommes, dérive de nos 
besoins physiques dans toute leur simplicité, de notre seule organisation.75 
everything that we think, everything that we are, derives from our 
physical needs in all their simplicity, from our organization alone.
72  Destutt de Tracy, Idéologie proprement dite, p. 75. 
73  Destutt de Tracy, Mémoire sur la faculté de penser, p. 97 (Part II, §v, lecture 3 or 4).
74  Destutt de Tracy, Mémoire sur la faculté de penser, p. 99 (Part II, §v, lecture 3 or 4).
75  Destutt de Tracy, Mémoire sur la faculté de penser, p. 140 (Part III, §iv, lecture 4 or 5). 
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This view manifestly goes much further than anything Condillac 
said, while being very close to the sort of materialist physiological 
determinism which saturates the Éléments de physiologie from one end to 
the other. ‘Organization’ is a rather specific term, relating to particular 
eighteenth-century theories of the body, and should be understood as a 
sort of synonym for it, for the sort of body a person has, how it works, 
what its particular characteristics are. (We touched on ‘organisation’ 
in Chapter 4.) It is a crucial conceptual term for Diderot. Thus, in the 
chapter on la volonté, the will, we read this:
Le désir est fils de l’organisation, le bonheur et le malheur, fils du bien-
être ou du mal-être.76
Desire is the child of the body’s organization, while happiness and 
unhappiness are the children of well-being or the lack thereof.
One’s whole being—one’s health and happiness—derives from one’s 
‘organisation’. Meanwhile, in the chapter on muscles we read this about 
pleasure and pain and their influence on all animal parts and functions:
Le plaisir et la douleur ont été les premiers maîtres de l’animal: ce sont 
eux qui ont appris peut-être à toutes les parties leurs fonctions et les ont 
rendues habituelles et héréditaires.77
Pleasure and pain were the animal’s first teachers: it may be they who 
taught all its parts their functions and made them habitual and hereditary.
Sensibility—fundamentally either pleasurable or painful—is made 
responsible in this statement for developing not just muscle function, 
but all parts of the body and all its functions.
These assembled passages combine to make a different sort of 
argument from the earlier one about the proximity between Cabanis 
and Diderot; there it seems that there is a case for claiming specific 
connections or influence. Here, it is rather more diffuse. Nonetheless, 
the philosophical position Destutt de Tracy takes with respect to the 
body and mind, and the physiological bases of thought, feeling, and 
being, is measurably close to Diderot’s. However, there are moments 
when the texts themselves seem very close, despite Destutt de Tracy’s 
76  DPV 486/PQ 317/MT 301.
77  DPV 366/PQ 186/MT 186–87.
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general avoidance of physiological description and discussion. Here, for 
example, returning to the question of the will, the chapter dedicated to 
which we alluded to very briefly a few paragraphs ago, we read this. 
Here Diderot comes first:
Je veux, n’est qu’un mot, examinez-le bien et vous ne trouverez jamais 
qu’impulsion, conscience et acquiescement: impulsion volontaire, 
conscience ou aséité, acquiescement ou attrait senti.78
I want is nothing more than a phrase, examine it carefully and you 
will never find anything other than impulsion, consciousness and 
acquiescence: voluntary impulsion, consciousness or aseity, acquiescence 
or felt attraction.
Diderot reduces the expression of the will, I want, to desire, impulse or 
need, whether conscious or not: he says that I want is nothing more than 
a word. Destutt de Tracy has something similar to say about the word 
freedom:
Plus j’y ai réfléchi, plus je me suis persuadé qu’être libre consiste 
à pouvoir agir en conséquence de sa volonté, et que le mot liberté, de 
quelque manière qu’on l’emploie, ne signifie rien, ou signifie la puissance 
de satisfaire ses désirs.79
The more I thought about it, the more I became convinced that being free 
consists in being able to act in accordance with one’s will, and that the 
word freedom, however it is used, signifies nothing, or signifies the power 
to satisfy one’s desires. 
He says that the word freedom is meaningless, or simply designates the 
power or ability to satisfy one’s desires. There is a palpable parallelism 
between the texts here beyond the similarity of their positions on free 
will (i.e., that there is none); they both assert the emptiness of the words 
themselves, with, on the other hand, the identification of the will with 
the drive to fulfill desires.
On a separate note, it seems worth remarking Tracy’s insistence on 
the word ‘liberté’ here. In the context of the French Revolution and its 
clarion call motif of ‘liberté égalité fraternité’ it is startling to see one of 
78  DPV 484/PQ 314/MT 298.
79  Destutt de Tracy, Mémoire sur la faculté de penser, p. 104 (Part II, §v, lecture 3 or 4; 
original italics).
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the Revolutionary government’s official philosophers brush the notion 
of liberty aside in such a cursory fashion.80 He immediately softens his 
sharpness by following up with an argument about how ‘les vérités 
politiques’ require ‘us’ to try to ensure that each other’s desires harm 
others as little as possible and are directed to the fulfilment of the desires 
of all. Despite this political caveat, it remains a rather striking statement. 
Thus, as well as expressing philosophical and physiological views 
which, as we have shown, are tightly allied to similar views expressed 
by Diderot, Destutt de Tracy may well also be signalling a shift in the 
political weather of the Directorate, away from unconditional espousal 
of the notion of liberty, towards something more qualified.81 Garat would 
soon publish his article in favour of coups d’état in Le conservateur.82
***
When we review the very real proximity between the Éléments de 
physiologie and these lectures given in 1796–98 by Cabanis and Destutt 
de Tracy at the Institut national, and subsequently published, not only 
in the Mémoires de l’Institut (1798–1801) but then in their own separate 
editions (and re-editions), we cannot but be struck by their success. The 
institution protected, framed, and authorised their efforts, in a way that 
the fraught structures of the École normale had completely failed to do 
in the case of Garat. Their lectures were given the status of ‘[des] travaux 
scientifiques et littéraires qui auront pour objet l’utilité générale et la 
gloire de la république’ [scientific and literary work whose purpose is 
the general utility of all and the glory of the republic] as quoted above, 
and decreed in the Loi Daunou of 3 Brumaire an IV (25 October 1795), 
Section Four, Article One.83 Cabanis influenced the thinking of medical 
80  See also Mona Ozouf’s entry: ‘Liberté’, in  Dictionnaire critique de la Révolution 
française  : Idées, ed. by François Furet, Mona Ozouf, Bronislaw Baczko (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1992), pp. 253-73. (Idées was volume 4 of the initial Dictionnaire critique 
de la Révolution française, here published separately). 
81  Destutt de Tracy, Mémoire sur la faculté de penser, pp. 104–05 (Part II, §v, lecture 3 or 
4).
82  Garat, ‘Considérations sur la dictature et les dictateurs’ in Le conservateur, Nivôse/
Pluviôse an VI (January 1798). Garat set up and edited this journal with Daunou 
and Marie-Joseph Chénier (Le Conservateur  ‘journal politique, philosophique et 
littéraire’, an V-VI, Garat, Daunou et (Marie-Joseph) Chénier, http://dictionnaire-
journalistes.gazettes18e.fr/journaliste/329-dominique-garat.
83  See above.
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luminaries such as Bichat (1771–1802), the ground-breaking anatomist 
and founder of histology (the study of human tissue).84 Cabanis was also 
thought to be an authority by the physician Anthelme Richerand, who 
helped him turn the lectures into a book, and who dedicated the fifth 
edition of his own extremely successful Nouveaux élémens de physiologie, 
first published in 1801, to the memory of Cabanis.85 (Richerand has 
already had a walk-on part in the chapter on physiology, and would 
later edit the medical writings of Diderot’s friend, the Montpellier 
vitalist Théophile de Bordeu.)86 And, as Jean Starobinski points out, 
Cabanis will remain a reference point up to and including Sigmund 
Freud, who refers to him in connection with dreams and mental illness 
in the Interpretation of Dreams.87 The point, however, is not to discuss 
the reception of Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy (who also had great 
impact) in any depth, but simply to indicate that their work, whether 
considered separately or under their joint banner of ‘Idéologie’, had 
official status, was recognised as important, and did feed without delay 
into contemporaneous discussions of the brain-mind as an organ of the 
body. As Cabanis put it, or rather, as Destutt de Tracy made explicit, ‘le 
moment est favorable’.88 And in this case, unlike Naigeon, who, as we 
saw, also thought times were propitious, they were both right.89 And 
84  Xavier Bichat is discussed in Chapter 4; he seems to be alluding to Cabanis in his 
Traité d’anatomie descriptive, 5 vols (Paris: Brosson, Babon, 1801–03), vol. 1, p. xxiv); 
Cabanis complains about those who use his work without acknowledging him, and 
refers to Bichat, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, pp. xxii–xxiii 
(Preface; the reference tying these remarks to Bichat is in the footnote [p. xxiii] 
recording his death). Martin Staum considers that Bichat distanced himself from 
Cabanis to some extent (Cabanis: Enlightenment and Medical Philosophy in the French 
Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 256).
85  Anthelme Richerand, Nouveaux élémens de physiologie, 5th edn (Paris: Caille et 
Ravier, 1811), opening page. (He also dedicates this edition to the memory of 
Fourcroy, who has also died since the fourth edition of 1807; Cabanis in 1808 and 
Fourcroy in 1810. The fourth edition had been dedicated just to Fourcroy.) Cabanis 
had acknowledged their relationship, thanking Richerand for his precious help, 
Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, p. xxxix (Preface).
86  See Chapter 4.
87  Jean Starobinski, Action et réaction: vie et aventures d’un couple (Paris: Seuil, 1999), p. 
151.
88  Destutt de Tracy, ‘Table analytique’, in Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de 
l’homme, vol. 1, pp. xxxii–liv (p. xxxii).
89  As discussed in Chapter 5 (Naigeon chastises Helvétius for choosing the wrong 
moment, and praises himself for knowing that the right time has come, wrongly as 
it emerges).
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yet, as we see from the time lag between Cabanis’s first printed preface 
in 1802 and its second outing in 1805, by which time it has acquired 
Destutt de Tracy’s concise summary along with its terse expression that 
‘le moment est favorable’, they proceed with caution. In 1796, when 
giving the first in the series of lectures which will find their way into 
print in the Mémoires de l’Institut, there is no preface, and no statement, 
however verbose, convoluted or in need of translation by his friend, 
that ‘le moment est favorable’. At that point neither he nor Destutt de 
Tracy were quite sure whether the time was right or not, and there are 
many indications of nervy caution, of which the slow emergence into 
publication is only one.
They are very both careful to situate their lectures within the space 
from which they speak—‘le lieu d’où l’on parle’, as Starobinski put 
it—and those references to the space and to the original orality of their 
texts are retained through the various iterations.90 Thus, Cabanis evokes 
the saying ‘know thyself’, quoting it in the original Greek and thereby 
establishing his own credentials as a learned person, stating that it ‘est 
très-digne de servir d’inscription à cette salle, aussi bien qu’au temple 
de Delphes’ [entirely worthy to serve as an inscription for this room, as 
well as for the temple in Delphi].91 This is a neat piece of echo-chamber 
flattery, whereby Cabanis flatters his own venue while also making 
Antiquity relevant and current, and annexing the authority of both for 
himself. Furthermore, his insistence on where exactly he is speaking 
from is made explicit in his own footnote, asterisked to ‘cette salle’: 
‘Celle de l’institut national’ [Institut national’s meeting room].92 Destutt 
de Tracy, for his part, alludes to critics, ‘hors de cette enceinte’ [beyond 
the enclosure of these walls] and how to prevent them blocking his 
progress, thereby turning the Institut national into a sort of protected 
circle.93 He further evokes place and audience when, one page later, he 
approvingly quotes ‘un membre de cette assemblée’ [a member of this 
90  Jean Starobinski, ‘La Chaire, la tribune, le barreau’, p. 481, quoted above.
91  Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, p. 159 (lecture 2).
92  Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, p. 159n (lecture 2: lower-
case original).
93  Destutt de Tracy, Mémoire sur la faculté de penser, p. 65 (Introduction to part 2, i.e. 
lecture 2). 
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assembly].94 Both ceremoniously address the ‘citoyens’ who listen to 
them in an allusion to and invocation of the desired listener, one who 
follows the etiquette of courteous Republican reciprocity and attention.95 
Destutt de Tracy explicitly tells his listeners/readers that he is doing 
what they asked him to do, binding both sides in a contract which he 
claims his lecture fulfills.96 This of course is a way of diverting criticism, 
and perhaps we would not draw attention to this feature, brushing it 
aside as a piece of rhetoric, both habitual and innocuous, were it not for a 
context which we already know to be hostile to materialist thinking, and 
for other markers of anxiety within these texts. Both allude to the danger 
or difficulty specifically of navigating around these fraught subjects. 
Cabanis evokes his efforts to bring together anatomy and physiology on 
the one hand, and ‘l’analyse philosophique’ on the other, appealing to 
his audience in exactly the way alluded to above, while advertising his 
severe self-imposed discipline:
[…] je vais surtout m’efforcer de remplir les lacunes qui séparent encore 
les observations de l’anatomie ou de la physiologie, et les résultats 
incontestables de l’analyse philosophique. Vous sentez, citoyens, que 
dans des matières si nouvelles, où le plus léger faux-pas peut conduire 
aux conséquences les plus erronées, il faut s’imposer une grande 
précision, une grande sévérité de language […]97
I will make a particular effort to fill in the gaps that separate the 
observations of anatomy or physiology from the incontestable results 
of philosophical analysis. You will realise, citizens, that in the case of 
subjects which are so new, the slightest mis-step may lead to the most 
94  Destutt de Tracy, Mémoire sur la faculté de penser, p. 66 (Introduction to part 2, i.e. 
lecture 2).
95  Destutt de Tracy, Mémoire sur la faculté de penser, pp. 37, 49, 133; Dissertation sur 
quelques questions d’idéologie, p. 183; Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral 
de l’homme, vol. 1, pp. 6, 22, 82, 113, 121, 159, etc. In the Idéologie proprement dite, 
on the other hand, Destutt  addresses readers rather than listeners, and they are 
conceptualised as ‘jeunes gens’ [young people] or ‘mes jeunes amis’ [my young 
friends], see pp. 77, 83, 176, 185, 193, 249.
96  He writes: ‘Mais une preuve que vous voulez examiner ces mêmes facultés [de 
l’entendement de l’homme] sous tous les aspects, c’est que vous avez composé 
votre première section d’analystes et de physiologistes’ [but one proof that you do 
want to examine these same faculties (of human understanding) in all their aspects 
is that you have filled your first section with analysts and physiologists] (Destutt de 
Tracy, Mémoire sur la faculté de penser, pp. 72–73, part 2, i.e. lecture 2).
97  Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, pp. 83–84 (lecture 2).
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erroneous consequences, and that we must impose the greatest precision 
on ourselves and be as severe as possible in our use of language.
These allusions, on the one hand to the efforts he will be making to connect 
physiology and philosophical analysis, and on the other to the ‘totally 
erroneous consequences’ that might ensue from making ‘the slightest 
mis-step’, with the appeal he makes to his audience of ‘citizens’ who feel, 
he claims, the importance of getting it right, given this very new subject, 
display the writer’s anxiety and caution very clearly. He will make the 
same sort of moves when evoking how ‘l’analyse philosophique’ had 
previously separated off ‘les observations embarrassantes qui regardent 
l’instinct’ [troublesome observations about instinct], given that instinct 
has not been viewed as arising directly from sensation as such, and how 
these observations had been therefore regarded as ‘comme erronées 
ou dangereuses dans leurs conséquences’ [as erroneous or dangerous 
in their consequences].98 Troublesome, erroneous, and dangerous are 
strong words. He does not explain why these observations were held to 
be all these things, and perhaps he does not need to, or rather, perhaps he 
needs not to. Cabanis carefully goes so far as to say that ‘it is something 
perhaps’ to have been able to show that the instinct is properly part 
of the ‘l’analyse philosophique’. Destutt de Tracy says it is no wonder 
that knowledge of and opinions about human understanding vary so 
much, as ‘il y a eu jusqu’à présent si peu de discussions libres sur ces 
sujets’ [there have been so few free discussions on these subjects until 
now].99 This is an interesting admission, given the ubiquitous allusions 
to the influence of the eminent and mostly unproblematic Condillac. 
Tracy’s remark suggests that, counter to the much-repeated view that 
Condillac provides the modern impetus to advances in knowledge of 
the processes of human understanding, in fact, there have been very few 
free discussions about it; Condillac is what is left after the censorship. 
In the Idéologie proprement dite, where, as we have suggested, Destutt de 
Tracy is a little less tentative, he begins to discuss the ‘natural state of 
matter’ which, he says, is ‘movement’, and he goes on to elaborate:
98  Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, pp. 137–38 (lecture 2).
99  Destutt de Tracy, Mémoire sur la faculté de penser, p. 131 (II.6, i.e. lecture 4 or 5).
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[…] si je n’avais craint de trop choquer les idées reçues, j’aurais mis 
l’activité à la tête des propriétés des corps.100
if I were not afraid to offend received ideas, I would have put activity at 
the head of the properties of bodies.
Of course, in stating his fears, he is also stating what he states he is 
afraid to say, that is, that activity is the most fundamental property of 
particles of matter (‘corps’ should be understood in this way, rather 
than as specifying human bodies). So, while he is not too afraid to make 
such a claim about the properties of matter, he still frames it tentatively, 
conditionally, and in connection to fear. And we know enough now 
to see that the seemingly simply polite formula of fearing to offend 
received opinion is not just a form of words: as Cabanis had put it, 
these ‘observations embarrassantes’ might be ‘erronées ou dangereuses 
dans leurs conséquences’; they could ‘tout brouiller de nouveau’ [mess 
everything up again].101 For all their care, their ceremonious verbiage, 
and the protection of their elevated and official position, it would not 
take much to bring them down.
***
In these years of 1796, 1797, and 1798, when Cabanis and Destutt de 
Tracy were giving the first versions or first parts of what would later be 
published in separate editions, neither materialism nor Diderot’s name 
were becoming any less polemical.102 This is owing at least in part to 
the publications of the highly visible Jacobin Gracchus Babeuf, arrested 
for supposedly plotting to overthrow the state in May 1796, and whose 
100  Destutt de Tracy, Idéologie proprement dite, p. 167.
101  Quoted above, Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, vol. 1, p. 138 
(lecture 2).
102  Diderot’s poem ‘Les Eleuthéromanes’, with its incendiary reference to strangling 
kings with the guts of priests, was first published and then rapidly re-published 
in September and November 1796; as we discussed before, this image is lifted 
from Meslier in Voltaire’s version and was not original to Diderot. This did not 
stop it causing damage, and it was already associated with him thanks to Mercier, 
see above, and Naigeon had quoted snippets from it in his Adresse à l’Assemblée 
nationale of 1790. It was published in the Décade philosophique on 30 Fructidor an IV 
(16 September 1796) and in Roederer’s Journal d’économie politique on 20 Brumaire 
an V (10 November 1796). Why these two journals, both friendly to Diderot and 
the cause of the ‘philosophes’, chose to publish it at this time, given its political 
sensitivity, and the fact that the Babeuf affair was already underway, is not clear.
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trial, lasting from February to May 1797, would, as René Tarin puts it, 
place ‘Diderot sous les feux de l’actualité’ [in the firing line of current 
events].103 As such, it affects our story directly. We now turn to Babeuf in 
order to understand what was at stake, what happened, and how Diderot 
was involved, not least because there are some grounds for thinking that 
this renewed negative publicity may have triggered Destutt’s decision to 
create a new name for their school of thought. 
Babeuf was not cautious, and he antagonised the government 
directly by using his journal the Tribun du peuple to campaign for 
the enactment of the never-enacted constitution of 1793.104 This 
constitution, ratified but suspended for the duration of the Terror 
and now replaced by Daunou’s new drafting of 1795 establishing 
the Directorate, had legislated for greater equality and redistribution 
of wealth. Babeuf was particularly virulent about the great evil of 
property, and he systematically, approvingly and lengthily quotes 
a work called the Code de la nature written by the now little-known 
philosopher Étienne-Gabriel Morelly (1717–78) which had initially 
been published in 1755 and which proposes that human laws should 
be modelled on nature. Here’s the rub: Babeuf did not know that it was 
written by Morelly; he thought it had been written by Diderot, and he 
thought this because it had appeared in an unauthorised edition of 
Diderot’s works in 1772.105 In fact, Diderot had nothing to do with it. 
Unaware, Babeuf firmly annexes Diderot to his cause, exhorting his 
readers to ‘écoute[r] Diderot, il ne vous laissera pas plus d’équivoque 
sur le secret du véritable et seul système de sociabilité conforme à 
la justice’ [listen to Diderot, he will leave you in no doubt as to the 
103  René Tarin, Diderot et la Révolution française: controverses et polémique autour d’un 
philosophe (Paris: Champion, 2001), p. 107.
104  Laura Mason considers Babeuf’s inability to follow a cautious line in her brilliant 
analysis of the trial, see The Last Revolutionaries: The Trial of Gracchus Babeuf and the 
Equals, ch. 9, pp. 191–93 (of Mason’s typescript: submitted for publication; details 
forthcoming). With grateful thanks to Laura Mason for so generously sharing her 
work.
105  Diderot, Œuvres philosophiques de Mr D***, 6 vols (Amsterdam: Marc-Michel Rey, 
1772). The Code de la nature appears in volume 1. See Adams, Bibliographie des œuvres 
de Diderot, 1739–1900, 2 vols (Ferney-Voltaire: Centre international d’étude du 
XVIIIe siècle, 2000), vol. 1, p. 85. Adams explains that the claim that the famous 
publisher Marc-Michel Rey had anything to do with it was also false, p. 90.
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secret of the true and only just system for society].106 In March–April 
1796, Babeuf stepped up the pressure on the government, writing a 
summary of his doctrine in fifteen principles and flyposting it around 
Paris. Here, he invoked nature (articles 1–3), stated that the Revolution 
was unfinished (article 11), and that the constitution of 1793 was the 
true law of the French (article 12), and that ‘every citizen is expected 
to re-establish and defend in the Constitution of 1793 the wishes and 
the happiness of the people’ (article 13). This went down badly with 
the authorities, and the Directoire responded with the laws of 27–28 
Germinal an IV (16–17 April 1796) which decreed the death penalty 
for attempting by word or in writing to overthrow the established 
authority or re-establish the constitution of 1793.107 Babeuf riposted on 
5 Floréal (just three days after Tracy had given his first lecture on the 
‘faculté de penser’), stating that ‘il n’est plus permis de se parler; il n’est 
plus permis de lire; il n’est plus permis de penser’ [we are no longer 
permitted to speak to each other; we are no longer permitted to read; 
we are no longer permitted to think].108 Just over a fortnight later, on 
21 Floréal an IV (10 May), Babeuf and ‘les Egaux’ (the Equals), as they 
were known, were pre-emptively arrested on the basis of preventing 
an alleged coup d’état; renewed anti-Jacobin repression followed.
 Now, Destutt de Tracy announced his new name for ‘la science de la 
pensée’ not in the first installment of his lectures on la faculté de penser 
but in the second. One might have expected a new investigation into 
the faculty of thought that was going to introduce a new name for itself 
to do so at the beginning. Tracy did not even allude to this issue in his 
first ‘Mémoire’ which took place on the 2 Floréal an IV (21 April 1796), 
the second being given on 2 Messidor an IV (20 June 1796). In between 
106  Gracchus Babeuf, Le Tribun du Peuple, ou le défenseur des droits de l’homme. An III–An 
IV (Paris: Éditions d’Histoire Sociale, 1966), p. 93 (numéro 35, 9 Frimaire an IV/19 
November 1795). Didier analyses Babeuf’s debt to Diderot/Morelly in her essay 
‘Statut de l’Utopie chez Gracchus Babeuf’, in Présence de Babeuf: Lumières, Révolution, 
Communisme, ed. by A. Maillard, Cl. Mazauric, and E. Walter (Paris: Publications de 
la Sorbonne, 1994), pp. 29–48 (p. 31), and Ian Birchall gives a good overview of his 
intellectual debts (Birchall, The Spectre of Babeuf (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), p. 
50).
107  John Anthony Scott, ed. and trans., The Defense of Gracchus  Babeuf  before the High 
Court of Vendôme with an Essay by Herbert Marcuse and Illustrations by Thomas Cornell 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1967), p. 11.
108  Babeuf, Le Tribun du peuple, pp. 297–98 (numéro 43).
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those two sessions, Babeuf and associates were arrested. As we have 
seen, Babeuf’s support for Diderot was very public, irrespective of the 
fact that he was really talking about Morelly. Destutt de Tracy would 
have known that this was a false attribution (Naigeon dealt with it with 
his usual outraged ferocity in the introduction to his Œuvres de Diderot 
of 1798), but it was very damaging nonetheless, and we can see why 
it might have been crucial for the continuation of the project on the 
analysis of sensations and ideas—an area which was strongly associated 
with Diderot however little his name ever appeared in connection to it—
to maintain and indeed increase distance from the newly disreputable 
thinker, now tightly associated with someone designated as a traitor. This 
gives a new context to how Destutt de Tracy introduces his neologism, 
ideology. Here is the passage in full:
Reste donc que la science de la pensée n’a point encore de nom. On 
pourroit lui donner celui de psychologie. Condillac y paroissoit disposé. 
Mais ce mot, qui veut dire science de l’âme, paroît suposer une connoissance 
de cet être que sûrement vous ne vous flattez pas de posséder; et il 
auroit encore l’inconvénient de faire croire que vous vous occupez de 
la recherche vague des causes premières, tandis que le but de tous vos 
travaux est la connoissance des effets et de leurs conséquences pratiques. 
Je préférerois donc de beaucoup que l’on adoptât le nom d’idéologie, ou 
science des idées.
Il est très-sage, car il ne suppose rien de ce qui est douteux ou inconnu; il 
ne rappelle à l’esprit aucune idée de cause. 
Son sens est très-clair pour tout le monde, si l’on ne considère que celui 
du mot français idée; car chacun sait ce qu’il entend par une idée, quoique 
peu de gens sachent bien ce que c’est. 
Il est rigoureusement exact dans cette hypothèse; car idéologie est la 
traduction littérale de science des idées.109
It remains the case that the science of thought does not yet have a name. 
We could perhaps call it psychology. Condillac seemed willing to do that. 
But this word, which means science of the soul, seems to require knowledge 
of this being which you surely do not claim to possess; and it would 
also have the disadvantage of making it seem that you are occupied with 
vague research on primary causes, when the aim of your work is the 
knowledge of effects and their practical consequences. 
109  Destutt de Tracy, Mémoire sur la faculté de penser, p. 71 (Part II, ch. 1, i.e. lecture 2, 
author’s own italics).
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I would much prefer therefore that we adopted the term ideology, or 
science of ideas. 
It is very judicious, as it does not imply anything doubtful or unknown; it 
does not carry any reminder of any idea to do with causes. 
Its sense is very clear for everyone, if one just thinks about the French 
word idea, as everyone knows what they mean by an idea, although few 
people really know what it is.
Everyone would be absolutely accurate in their hypothesis, for ideology is 
the literal translation science of ideas.
Très-sage: very wise or very sensible? Both! Tracy’s explicit aim is to 
distance himself from discussions of the soul, but we can see that he 
also wants to avoid any association with doubt or with the past: he 
wants this science to look forward, to come from nowhere, to have 
‘aucune idée de cause’, and not to incite doubt. Attempting to avoid 
association either with discourses of the soul or with philosophical 
doubt, Tracy has a tricky path to tread. ‘Douteux’: we have already 
seen the baggage that doubt carries: it is the term Louis-Claude de 
Saint-Martin used to attack Garat with. ‘Aucune idée de cause’ is also 
interesting: it avoids the issue of creation and God of course, and it 
also avoids nearer causes or influences. It cuts ties with Diderot very 
efficiently. And, as we know, Destutt de Tracy’s Mémoire sur la faculté 
de penser would later be republished with the grander title, Idéologie 
proprement dite. To found a branch of knowledge is indeed to erase the 
idea that this knowledge pre-existed its foundation. What a brilliant 
strategy! And thus work that we know Diderot had been engaged in 
and which we have some compelling evidence for saying was directly 
influential for these philosophers henceforth known as ‘idéologues’ or 
‘idéologistes’ after their newly-identified field, is taken further, and in 
fact the virtuous halls of learning of the new Republic gain credit for 
encouraging this new science or branch of learning, while the danger or 
repression that lies behind is completely hidden as is any affiliation 
with Diderot. Très-sage indeed.
Just how wise a move it was, whether strategic or strangely 
fortuitous, to create this distance between the ‘idéologues’ and Diderot, 
becomes even clearer when we consider Babeuf’s trial. It lasted from 
February to May 1797, was a cause célèbre, much reported, and indeed 
the state itself anxiously published stenographed proceedings which 
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were immediately disputed and rival proceedings published.110 Babeuf’s 
defence speech was very lengthy and detailed, and it started with a 
thorough consideration of his intellectual debts. The longest, most 
detailed, and most enthusiastic tribute is to ‘Diderot’ (that is, Morelly). 
There are seven pages of ‘Diderot’ tribute of which this is a typical 
sample:
Il me reste à citer une grande autorité en garantie contre l’accusation 
de provocation […]. Cette garantie imposante, c’est Diderot. C’est bien 
le plus déterminé, le plus intrépide, j’ai presque dit le plus fougueux 
athléte [sic] du système.111
It still remains for me to cite a great authority as protection against the 
charge of provocation […]. This imposing protector is Diderot. He is 
the most determined, the most intrepid, I am tempted to say the most 
passionate athlete of this system.
 So, Diderot’s reputation as a ferocious extremist will not be in any 
way toned down by being called ‘a determined intrepid fiery athlete of 
anti-propertarianism’ and by being called that approvingly by someone 
on trial for plotting to overthrow the state. Babeuf even claims that his 
plans are softened versions of Diderot’s more hardcore texts, and seems 
to think that if he shows the court that who they are really accusing is 
Diderot, then they will yield to Diderot’s intellectual authority, and also 
see that Babeuf is not really at fault himself.112 He was wrong on both 
counts. Babeuf was sentenced to death on 26 May 1797 and guillotined the 
following day. Diderot was not in favour. As Tarin describes, ‘La réaction 
s’acharne alors sur ce philosophe. Jugé responsable de tous les excès de 
110  The official record: Débats du procès, instruit par la Haute-Cour de Justice, contre Drouet, 
Babeuf et autres, 6 vols (Paris: Baudouin, 1797). The rival record: Journal de la Haute-
Cour de Justice, ou L’écho des hommes libres, vrais et sensibles (facsimile reprint: Paris: 
Edhis, 1966), edited by Pierre-Nicolas Hésine and his wife, Marie-Agathe Hénault. 
Laura Mason discusses the official versus rival set-up in her fascinating article, ‘The 
“Bosom of Proof”: Criminal Justice and the Renewal of Oral Culture during the 
French Revolution’, The Journal of Modern History, 76.1 (March 2004), 29–61 (p. 50), 
https://doi.org/10.1086/421184. 
111  Victor Advielle, Histoire de Gracchus Babeuf et du babouvisme d’après de nombreux 
documents inédits, 2 vols (Paris: chez l’auteur, 1884), vol. 2, pp. 52–59 (p. 52). 
112  In the course of his defence, Babeuf says: ‘Aux yeux des mêmes accusateurs, Diderot 
doit paraître le chef suprême de tous les conjurés’ [In the eyes of these same 
accusers, Diderot must seem like the leader in chief of all the plotters] (Advielle, 
Histoire de Gracchus Babeuf et du babouvisme, vol. 2, p. 59).
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la Révolution, le “héros des athées” sera présenté comme l’apôtre de la 
subversion’ [reactionary factions then set upon the philosopher. Judged 
responsible for all the excesses of the Revolution, the ‘atheists’ hero’ was 
represented as the apostle of subversion].113 Jean-François de La Harpe 
(lecturer at the Institut like the Idéologues and l’Abbé Augustin Barruel 
are just two of those whose fanatical excoriation of Diderot Tarin cites.114
And who else was lending themselves to the cause of materialism in 
these years? Shall we mention Donatien Alphonse François, Marquis de 
Sade? I think we should. Sade’s was a powerful voice, and it did not go 
unheard. His Justine, ou les malheurs de la vertu (published anonymously 
in 1791) was well-known, and (unsurprisingly) caused apoplexy. The 
seemingly pious Aline et Valcour and the utterly brazen Philosophie dans 
le boudoir both come out in 1795 (the former under Sade’s name; the 
latter, anonymously). And then out come La Nouvelle Justine (1799) and 
L’Histoire de Juliette (1801).115 They each contained long disquisitions 
on materialism.116 These works were extremely popular and sold out 
rapidly. A luxury illustrated edition in preparation when Sade was 
arrested on 6 March 1801 was impounded and destroyed. Sade’s 
extremely transgressive writings certainly contributed to the sensitivity 
around materialism and its alleged indecency, even if he probably 
also wrote them in reaction to that same sensitivity and with a view 
to provoking it. In 1805, famed astronomer (and founder of the Loge 
des Neuf Sœurs), Jérôme Lalande, publishing his supplement to Sylvain 
Maréchal’s Dictionnaire des athées anciens et modernes (1800), will wistfully 
say: ‘Je voudrais bien pouvoir citer M. de Sade; il a bien assez d’esprit, 
de raisonnement, d’érudition; mais ses infâmes romans de Justine et 
de Juliette, le font rejeter d’une secte où l’on ne parle que de vertu’ [I 
113  Tarin, Diderot et la Révolution française, p. 107; his footnote tells us that ‘le héros des 
athées’ [the atheists’ hero] was one of the sarcastic terms used by l’abbé Augustin 
Barruel to lambast Diderot in his Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire du Jacobinisme 
(Hamburg: Fauche, 1798–99), t. 1, ch. 16, p. 335.
114  Tarin, Diderot et la Révolution française, pp. 107, 143 (La Harpe also lambasts Babeuf, 
p. 115).
115  The dating is complex because of false dates being published on the title pages. 
L’Histoire de Juliette was falsely dated to 1797, but in fact came out in 1801. See Michel 
Delon, ‘Note sur le texte [de la Nouvelle Justine]’, in Donatien Alphonse François, 
Marquis de Sade, Œuvres, ed. by Michel Delon (Paris: Gallimard Pléiade, 1995), vol. 
2, p. 1271.
116  See Caroline Warman, Sade: From Materialism to Pornography (Oxford: Voltaire 
Foundation, 2002).
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would very much like to include M. de Sade; he has more than enough 
intelligence, reason and erudition; but his disgraceful novels, Justine 
and Juliette, mean he must be excluded from a sect in which virtue is the 
only topic of discussion].117 So Sade’s simultaneous membership (how 
qualified he is! and Lalande says so from the vantage point of being one 
of the pre-eminent scientists in the land) and exclusion (how infamous 
his novels are!) give a sense of what an embarrassing case he was. Even 
more embarrassing, it seems as if Sade may have been affiliated in some 
way to the Loge des Neuf Sœurs that Lalande himself had founded, and 
of which Garat, Cabanis, and Destutt de Tracy were all members.118 So 
there is some quite dangerous proximity here.119 Thus, Sade was no help 
at all to anyone wishing to pursue materialist research from within the 
authorised spaces of the government. He only further confirmed the 
view that materialist tracts were immoral, obscene, and deranged.120 
With Babeuf on one side, trumpeting the wonders of ‘Diderot’s’ ideas on 
social revolution, and Sade on the other, giving extended monologues on 
materialist theory to his most vicious characters, it is really no surprise 
that Destutt de Tracy evokes the safe space of the Institut national, ‘cette 
enceinte’ outside which critical voices persist and must be ignored. His 
coining of the neologism ‘idéologie’ establishes, in my view, a further 
layer of protection.
We have said that Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy were successful in 
their distancing and publication strategies (which include the reinforcing 
effect of their duet), and also in seeing their view of the inter-relation of 
117  Sylvain Maréchal, Dictionnaire des athées anciens et modernes, deuxième édition, 
augmentée des supplémens de J. Lalande, de plusieurs articles inédits, et d’une notice 
nouvelle sur Maréchal et ses ouvrages, par J.-B.-L. Germond (Bruxelles: chez l’éditeur, 
1833), p. 84, https://doi.org/10.1522/25051474.  
118  Daniel Kerjan, in his entry on this Loge, states that ‘Il est désormais établi que 
Mirabeau et Sade y furent affiliés’ [it is henceforth accepted that Mirabeau and Sade 
were affiliated to it]: Dictionnaire du grand orient de France au XVIIIe siècle: les cadres 
et les loges, ed. by Daniel Kerjan, Alain le Bihan, and Pierre Mollier (Rennes: Presses 
Universitaires de Rennes, 2012), [p. x]. I have not been able to establish what the 
evidence for this claim is.
119  I explore what seem to be allusions to Sade in Garat’s Mémoires sur Suard in my 
article: Caroline Warman, ‘“A Little Short Fat Man, Thirty-five Years of Age, 
Inconceivably Vigorous, and Hairy as a Bear”: The Figure of the Philosopher in 
Sade’, in Sade’s Sensibilities, ed. by Kate Parker and Norbert Sclippa (Lewisburg: 
Bucknell University Press, 2015), pp. 103–17 (pp. 112–14).
120  Sade, imprisoned (again) in 1801, was interned in Charenton mental asylum in 1803 
and died there in 1814.
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body and mind influence the thinking of others. But they were not so 
successful as to avoid their section of the Institut national being closed 
down on the orders of Napoleon on 23 Jan 1803/3 pluviôse an XI, on the 
basis of his dislike for their criticism of his régime.121 In fact, they had 
been key supporters of his in the Coup du 18 Brumaire (9 November 
1799) which raised Napoleon to Consul; Cabanis had presented Projet 
d’adresse au peuple français to the Conseil des cinq-cents, printed at 
Saint-Cloud on 19 Brumaire (10 November), and on 25 frimaire an 
VIII (15 December 1799), he published his pro-Napoleonic Quelques 
considérations sur l’organisation sociale et particulièrement sur la nouvelle 
constitution.122 He, Garat, and Destutt de Tracy were all made senators, 
which gave them an annual income of 25,000 Francs, and therefore 
brought financial security and ease.123 However, the ‘dictature sans 
dictateur’ [dictatorship without a dictator]124 that Cabanis had praised 
and argued for in his Quelques considérations did not, of course, prove 
to be quite so dictator-free as he had supposed, and they fell under the 
displeasure of the Premier Consul, who, with his dynastic then religious 
and imperial ambitions was inevitably moving away from those who 
might have reminded him of how he came to power, and furthermore, 
might have held him to account. His irritation with them even when 
they were trying to please him is evident in his alleged remark after a 
three-hour speech Garat had given in praise of his victory at Marengo: 
‘conçois-tu un animal comme Garat? Quelle enfilade de mots! J’ai été 
obligé de l’écouter pendant trois heures’ [have you ever seen an animal 
like Garat? What a string of words! I was forced to listen to him for three 
hours straight].125 Whether Napoleon did say this or not, it is attested 
(by the Oxford English Dictionary, no less) that it was he who started 
the re-definition of ‘idéologie’, which the OED describes as ‘abstract 
speculation; impractical or visionary theorizing’. As we saw, Tracy 
himself had gone to some pains to establish that his neologism was 
not abstract or impractical. Politically therefore, from 1803 if not earlier, 
121  Emmet Kennedy, ‘“Ideology” from Destutt de Tracy to Marx’, Journal of the History 
of Ideas, 40.3 (1979), 353–68 (pp. 354–55), https://doi.org/10.2307/2709242. 
122  Yves Pouliquen discusses the role of the Ideologues in the Coup du 18 Brumaire in 
some detail. Pouliquen, Cabanis, un idéologue, pp. 152–56.
123  Pouliquen, Cabanis, un idéologue, p. 163.
124  Quoted in Pouliquen, Cabanis, un idéologue, p. 152.
125  Pouliquen, Cabanis, un idéologue, p. 202 (14 juillet 1800/25 Messidor an VIII).
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their influence was much reduced. However, maybe even in Napoleon’s 
derisive redefinition of ‘idéologie’ as abstract theorising, we can see a 
mark of their success. If it is abstract theorising, then there is nothing for 
the censors to worry about, and indeed there is no sense that Cabanis’s or 
Destutt de Tracy’s publication plans met with any obstacles, unlike Sade 
(the luxury illustrated edition of whose Nouvelle Justine and Histoire de 
Juliette being destroyed down to the very last copy) or indeed Naigeon, 
whose introduction to his edition of the Bordeaux copy of Montaigne’s 
Essais would be suppressed (by its own publisher, Pierre Didot) because 
of the direct appeal it contained to Napoleon to continue to control priests, 
this introduction being dated 15 Germinal, an X (5 April 1802), and thus 
due to appear three days before the ratification of the Concordat between 
Napoleon and the Pope on Easter Sunday 1802 (8 April 1802).126 So we 
can see that there was active censorship and real political sensitivities to 
negotiate, and therefore measure the extent of Cabanis and Destutt de 
Tracy‘s success. The one possibly problematic text that Cabanis wrote, 
his Lettre à Fauriel, would not be published until 1824, sixteen years after 
his death, despite it having supposedly circulated in manuscript very 
freely.127 It contains a more concise and more forthright statement of his 
materialist thinking than the Rapports, but is otherwise rather similar 
to it.128 And nonetheless it attracted accusations of militant atheism, so 
much so that Cabanis’s widow protested that the edition was inaccurate 
126  As we discuss below. Philippe Desan, ‘“Cette espèce de manuscrit des Essais”: 
l’édition Naigeon de 1802 et son “Avertissement” censuré’, Montaigne Studies, 10 
(Oct 1998), 7–34 (pp. 19, 33n). See also H. Mazel, ‘La Fameuse Préface de Naigeon’, 
Bulletin de la société des amis de Montaigne, 2.4 (1938), 28–29. Mazel states that, ‘il ne 
reste de cette édition 1802 avec préface que huit exemplaires, ayant appartenu au 
Premier Consul, à ses hauts fonctionnaires, et à Didot’ [of this 1802 edition with 
preface there are only eight copies left, having belonged to the First Consul, his 
high-ranking functionaries, and to the publisher, Didot], p. 29.
127  Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis, ‘Lettre à M.F. sur les causes premières’, in Œuvres 
philosophiques, ed. by Claude Lehec and Jean Cazeneuve (Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1956), vol. 2, pp. 255–98 (p. 256, n. 1). The ‘Lettre’ was written in 1806–07, 
and published in 1824 by J. F. Bérard, with notes. Bérard writes: ‘Une foule de copies 
manuscrites de cette lettre sont répandues dans le public depuis la mort de Cabanis 
[en 1808]’ [many manuscript copies of this letter spread amongst the public after 
Cabanis’s death in 1808] (Cabanis, Lettre, posthume et inédite de Cabanis à M. F*** sur 
les causes premières, avec des notes par F. Bérard (Paris: Gabon, 1824).
128  See for example his discussion of the: ‘Connaissance approfondie de l’organisation 
humaine’, ‘[ses] besoins’ (p. 260); ‘l’être sensible doué d’imagination’ (p. 265); ‘la 
sensibilité’ (p. 266); ‘l’ouvrage du jeu des organes’ (p. 267); ‘les organes de l’homme’ 
(p. 272); memory (p. 272); ‘la percussion’ or ‘collision mutuelle des corps’ (pp. 
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and that it traduced the image of her virtuous husband.129 It was not 
inaccurate, it was just that atheism and materialism were still tightly 
associated, still publicly unavowable, and still subject to censorship. We 
alluded to Naigeon coming a-cropper in 1802; earlier we mentioned his 
outraged denial of Diderot’s authorship of Morelly’s Code de la nature in 
the introduction to his edition of Diderot’s Œuvres of 1798. It is time to 
return to Naigeon and to these two introductions, each embattled for 
different reasons, before we reach the final installment of this story with 
Garat’s Mémoires sur le XVIIIe siècle et sur M. Suard (1820) and Naigeon’s 
Mémoires sur la vie et les ouvrages de M. Diderot, whose publication date is 
advertised on the title page as 1821, but which in fact came out in 1823 
(and was banned in December of that year).130 
Let us however close this chapter by returning to Cabanis and 
Destutt de Tracy to state that, without there being a signed and sworn 
affidavit as to their knowledge of Diderot’s Éléments de physiologie, 
there is nonetheless considerable cumulative textual evidence that 
they did indeed know it, and furthermore, that they were influenced 
by its hypotheses and are attempting to pursue the lines of research it 
lays out. The strength of the argument is perhaps best shown when we 
turn it round: is it plausible, given their general position with respect 
to physiological determinism, and the multiple moments of textual 
synchronicity, that they had never read it and were not using it?
274, 280); ‘le perfectionnement’ (p. 295); materialist tableau (pp. 276–77); advice to 
avoid words ‘athéisme’ and ‘matérialisme’ (pp. 268, 271).
129  Cabanis, ‘Lettre à M.F. sur les causes premières’, p. 256, n. 1.
130  Adams, Bibliographie des œuvres de Diderot, 1739–1900, vol. 2, p. 141.
10. 1798, 1802: Naigeon, the 
Œuvres de Diderot, and the 
Censored Preface to Montaigne 
We return now to Jacques-André Naigeon, member, like Dominique-
Joseph Garat, Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis, and Antoine Louis Claude 
Destutt de Tracy, of the Institut national’s Sciences morales et politiques 
class, although his section was ‘Morale’, as we may remember. No lecture 
of his finds its way into the Mémoires de l’Institut national, although he 
is recorded as having sat on a committee charged with determining the 
appropriate way of acknowledging the death of one of its members.1 
In 1798, however, he brought out Diderot’s Œuvres in fifteen volumes, 
with an angry preface, explaining that he had had to defer his Mémoires 
historiques et philosophiques sur la vie et les ouvrages de Denis Diderot yet 
again because of the outrageous claims made about Diderot’s authorship 
of the Code de la nature, and because other publishers were planning 
to bring out Diderot’s works, replete with texts wrongly attributed to 
him, based on truncated versions of the texts; he is eloquent and multi-
clausal in his ire.2 And so out the Œuvres reluctantly come, with yet 
another headline allusion to the Mémoires whose composition he has 
1  Mémoires de l’Institut national des sciences et des arts: sciences morales et politiques 
(Paris: Baudouin, Imprimeur de l’Institut national, an VII (Fructidor an VII/Aug-
Sept 1799)), vol. 2, pp. 681–94. 
2  Jacques-André Naigeon, ‘Préface de l’éditeur’, in Denis Diderot, Œuvres (Paris: 
Desray et Déterville, 1798), vol. 1, pp. v–xxxiii. ‘Babœuf’ is lambasted on pp. v–vi; 
other editions of Diderot’s supposed Œuvres are lambasted on p. viii; Bouillon’s 
faulty edition of his philosophy articles from the Encyclopédie are lambasted 
© Caroline Warman, CC BY 4.0 https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0199.10
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unfortunately had to interrupt, on the first page of the ‘Préface de 
l’éditeur’ in the first volume, complete with supporting footnote; both 
allusion and supporting footnote are repeated only a few pages later.3 
This culminates in the following virtuous declaration (which follows on 
from further rebuttal of Diderot’s authorship of the Code de la nature and 
its false principles):
[…] je ne crus pas devoir balancer un moment à différer encore de 
quelques mois l’impression d’un ouvrage souvent annoncé, trop attendu 
peut-être, mais qui du moins ne sera pas sans quelque intérêt pour 
la famille et les amis de Diderot. Rassuré par cette idée consolante, je 
m’occupais aussi-tôt à mettre en ordre les matériaux que j’avois déjà 
recueillis pour l’édition que je projetois.4
I thought it right not to hesitate about deferring for a further few months 
the publication of a work which had often been announced, and for which 
people had been waiting too long perhaps, but which at least will not be 
without some interest for the family and friends of Diderot. Reassured 
by this consoling idea, I turned straightaway to the materials that I had 
already gathered for the edition that I was planning and started putting 
them in order.
The order in which Naigeon presents his ‘ouvrage’ and the ‘matériaux’ 
is very telling, as are the words he chooses respectively for, on the one 
hand, the ‘work’ and on the other, the ‘materials’. Even the syntax is 
a bit odd: his preceding criticism of the threat posed by these other 
projected Œuvres de Diderot with their erroneous and dangerous 
inclusion of the Code de la nature, leads one to suppose that he is saying 
he should not hesitate for a second to get on with his own planned (and 
authorised) Œuvres de Diderot, but no: it is that he should not hesitate 
for one second to put the Mémoires on the back-burner, despite the fact 
that it has frequently been announced and has perhaps been too long 
awaited. He does not turn to the edition of which this is supposed to be 
the preface until the following sentence. Everything he is saying tells 
us how important the Mémoires is, more important in his eyes than the 
Œuvres themselves. As we have already seen in relation to the article on 
on pp. xxiv–xxvi. He also attacks Grimm as an editor of Diderot’s work in the 
Correspondance littéraire in vol. 13, pp. vi–viii.
3  Naigeon, ‘Préface de l’éditeur’, in Diderot, Œuvres (1798), vol. 1, pp. v, vii.
4  Naigeon, ‘Préface de l’éditeur’, in Diderot, Œuvres (1798), vol. 1, p. ix.
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Diderot he wrote for the Encyclopédie méthodique, he repeatedly, urgently, 
draws our attention to them.5 In an ‘avertissement de l’éditeur’ which 
we find in volume 12 of these Œuvres, sandwiched between the main 
text of La Religieuse and what we now know as the Préface-annexe, but 
which Naigeon entitles Extrait de la Correspondance littéraire de M***, 
année 1770, he mentions them again, again with a supporting footnote, 
declaring that this volume ‘sera très-incessamment sous presse’ [will be 
published imminently].6 He is also telling us when he was composing 
the Mémoires, or at least when he claimed to be writing them. His written 
statements, from the ‘Diderot’ article of 1792 to the preface to Diderot’s 
Œuvres, tell us that he started work on it in the six months after Diderot’s 
death, was busily engaged with it when writing the dictionary article, 
and was again busy with it in 1798, having not quite finished it (he had 
had to set it aside to bring out the edition, as he says in the preface), but 
very nearly (as he says in vol. 12). What is actually in it, of course he 
does not say, other than that it will deal with ‘celui de ces ouvrages qui 
m’a paru le plus profond’ [the particular work of his that I thought most 
profound].7 No doubt this is why he attaches so much importance to it, 
and spends so much time over it. Why he did not publish it soon after 
the edition came out as he seems to have expected does not perhaps 
need much commentary, given what has already been said about the 
unabated (or perhaps renewed) hostility of the authorities towards 
materialism and Diderot during these years. Yet there is something 
more to be said about the way Naigeon presents Diderot’s works and 
how he perceives his connection to them, and his role as editor and even 
censor.
As is already abundantly clear, Naigeon’s commitment to Diderot 
is total, and yet it has a certain profile: it is morally pure, frequently 
evocative of the tight-knit circle of family and friends, and it likes a 
certain sort of seriousness. Thus, Naigeon evokes (in relation to writing 
the Mémoires) ‘ce plaisir si doux, et si pur qu’on éprouve à faire une 
bonne action’ [this very sweet and pure pleasure that we feel when we 
5  See also Naigeon, ‘Préface de l’éditeur’, in Diderot, Œuvres (1798), vol. 1, p. xxiii.
6  Denis Diderot, Œuvres (Paris: Desray et Déterville, 1798), vol. 12, p. 261n.
7  Naigeon, ‘Diderot’, in Encyclopédie méthodique: Philosophie ancienne et moderne, 3 vols 
(Paris: Panckoucke, 1791–94), vol. 2 (1792), p. 228, quoted above in Chapter 2.
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do something good],8 about how (again in relation to the Mémoires) it 
would not be ‘sans quelque intérêt pour la famille et les amis de Diderot’ 
[without some interest for the family and friends of Diderot],9 while also 
declaring that he is ‘pour plusieurs ouvrages de Diderot, un censeur 
plus rigoureux que le public’ [in the case of many of Diderot’s works, 
a harsher censor than the public],10 which is, in fact, the rather odd 
and not merely defensive statement with which he closes his preface. 
This is a curiously intense combination of attitudes, the key to which is 
perhaps given on the penultimate page of the preface; this is the letter 
containing Diderot’s instructions regarding his manuscripts, written in 
1773 as Diderot prepared to depart for St Petersburg, and which Naigeon 
describes as follows: it is ‘un écrit qui ne s’est jamais offert à mes yeux, 
sans me causer la plus tendre emotion’ [a piece of writing that I was 
never able to look at without feeling the most tender emotion].11 The 
mention of his eyes evokes first intellect and then tears. Giving this 
‘écrit’ in full in a footnote, he states that he cannot deny himself the 
pleasure of copying out the note, the precious original of which he keeps 
safe, and which will transmit his name to posterity, to the ‘vrais amis des 
lettres, et aux jeunes gens qui s’appliquent à l’étude de la philosophie 
rationnelle’ [the true friends of letters and to those young people who 
apply themselves to the study of rational philosophy].12 When we 
weigh up the respective gravitas of the true friends of letters and the 
young people who apply themselves to rational philosophy, it is clear 
that the prize goes to the youthful hard workers. Yet his own friendship 
for Diderot does not, he says, imply a lack of judgement: ‘l’amitié ne 
m’a point fait illusion: peut-être même trouvera-t-on qu’elle m’a rendu 
quelquefois trop sévère’ [friendship has not blinded me: perhaps people 
will even think that it has made me too harsh at times]; this is the 
statement that leads to his saying he has been a harsher censor even than 
the public. Clearly, then, he sees his role as one involving the exercise of 
judgement, understood as involving disapproval and censorship where 
8  Naigeon, ‘Préface de l’éditeur’, in Diderot, Œuvres (1798), vol. 1, pp. vii–viii.
9  Naigeon, ‘Préface de l’éditeur’, in Diderot, Œuvres (1798), vol. 1, p. ix.
10  Naigeon, ‘Préface de l’éditeur’, in Diderot, Œuvres (1798), vol. 1, p. xxxiii.
11  Naigeon, ‘Préface de l’éditeur’, in Diderot, Œuvres (1798), vol. 1, p. xxxii.
12  Naigeon, ‘Préface de l’éditeur’, in Diderot, Œuvres (1798), vol. 1, p. xxxiin.
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necessary. This interpretation does indeed seem to be supported by 
Diderot’s instructions: 
Comme je fais un long voyage, et que j’ignore ce que le sort me prépare, 
s’il arrivoit qu’il disposât de ma vie, je recommande à ma femme et à mes 
enfants de remettre tous mes manuscrits à monsieur Naigeon, qui aura 
pour un homme qu’il a tendrement aimé, et qui l’a bien payé de retour, le 
soin d’arranger, de revoir et de publier tout ce qui lui paroîtra ne devoir 
nuire ni à ma mémoire, ni à la tranquillité de personne. C’est ma volonté, 
et j’espère qu’elle ne trouvera aucune contradiction. A Paris, ce juin 1773. 
Diderot.13
As I am going on a long journey and do not know what fate may have in 
store for me, were it to happen that it took my life, I request my wife and 
children to hand over all my manuscripts to Mr Naigeon, who will have 
for a man whom he has tenderly loved, and who has amply repaid him, 
the task of organising, reviewing, and publishing anything which he 
considers will not do any damage to my memory or to anyone’s security. 
This is my will, and I hope no one will contradict it. Paris, June 1773, 
Diderot
We see that the bond of love precedes (and sanctions) the bond of 
duty, and that Diderot does not prescribe complete publication, but 
only ‘tout ce qui lui paroîtra ne devoir nuire ni à ma mémoire, ni à la 
tranquillité de personne’ [anything which he considers will not do any 
damage to my memory or to anyone’s security]. That the ‘tranquillity’ of 
Diderot’s family or even Naigeon himself was in question, at whatever 
level of intensity, is indisputable; Diderot’s reputation was already 
damaged, as we have seen. This edition is therefore an interpretation 
of Diderot’s wishes that is also, one assumes, an attempt to repair 
that damage, restore his reputation, and ensure the tranquillity of all 
concerned. Certainly, Naigeon’s predilection was for philosophy, as 
the works which he edited or co-wrote for the baron d’Holbach and 
during Diderot’s lifetime attest. But that aspect is in any case the one 
he chooses to emphasise, given Diderot’s instructions. And thus the 
fifteen-volume Œuvres present three volumes of philosophy, followed 
by one of (and on) drama, three volumes of philosophical articles 
13  Naigeon, ‘Préface de l’éditeur’, in Diderot, Œuvres (1798), vol. 1, p. xxxiin; Denis 
Diderot, Correspondance, ed. by Georges Roth and Jean Varloot (Paris: Minuit, 1965), 
vol. 12, p. 231 (3 June 1773).
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from the Encyclopédie, two about Antiquity (the work on Seneca and 
the reigns of Claudius and Nero), three of fiction, the final three with 
the art criticism of the Salons of 1765 and 1767. The three volumes of 
fiction, we note, are sandwiched in towards the end. Naigeon’s Diderot 
is the mighty philosopher, the tireless servant of the Encyclopédie, the 
dramatist, the critic. And also, as it happens, the writer of some rather 
tasteless fiction, which Naigeon, as his true friend and censor, would 
have been very happy to have repressed, as he indicates on the final 
page and in the final note of the ‘Préface’: the word ‘censeur’ is followed 
by a footnote call, referring readers to the twelfth volume: 
Voyez, entre autres, tome XII de cette édition, l’Avertissement de l’Editeur, 
imprimé à la suite de la Religieuse, et les notes que j’ai jointes à l’écrit qui 
a pour titre: Principes de politique des souverains. 
See, amongst others, the Editor’s Announcement, in volume 12 of this 
edition, published at the end of The Nun, and the notes that I have 
attached to the piece of writing entitled Political Principles for Sovereigns.
When we follow up this emphatically visible cross-reference, we find 
eleven pages of emphatic excoriation of the entirety of this Extrait de 
la Correspondance littéraire de M***, année 1770 (or ‘Préface-annexe’), the 
letters of which, he declares, he would have ‘certainement retranchées, si 
j’avois été le premier éditeur de ce roman’ [have certainly cut, had I been 
the first editor of this novel],14 because they are in bad taste and weaken 
the effect. Fortified by a witticism of Voltaire’s, comparing publishers 
to sacristans who collect old rags and then get people to worship them, 
Naigeon sets out his own more discerning stall:
‘Tous, dit [Voltaire], rassemblent des guenilles qu’ils veulent faire 
révérer. Mais on ne doit imprimer d’un auteur que ce qu’il a écrit de 
digne d’être lu. Avec cette règle honnête, il y auroit moins de livres et 
plus de goût dans le public.’ Convaincu depuis long-tems de la vérité de 
cette observation, je n’ai pu voir sans peine qu’on imprimât la Religieuse 
et Jacques le fataliste avec tous les défauts qui les déparent plus ou moins 
aux yeux des lecteurs d’un goût sévère et délicat. Un éditeur qui […] 
n’auroit eu pour chérir, pour respecter sa mémoire, d’autres motifs que 
les progrès qu’il a fait faire à la raison, à l’esprit philosophique, et la forte 
14  Naigeon, in Diderot, Œuvres (1798), vol. 12, p. 255.
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impulsion qu’il a donnée à son siècle […] auroit réduit Jacques le Fataliste 
à cent pages, ou peut-être même il ne l’eût jamais publié.15
As Voltaire puts it, ‘They just assemble any old bits and pieces they want 
people to revere. But of any given author, only what is worthy of being 
read should be published. If this honest rule were followed, there would 
be fewer books and the public would have more taste.’ Long convinced of 
the truth of this observation, I was pained to see that The Nun and Jacques 
the Fatalist were being published with all the defects which tarnish them 
more or less in the eyes of those readers with a severe and delicate 
taste. An editor whose [….] only reason to hold an author dear and to 
respect his memory was because of the advances he made in thought 
and philosophical thinking and the way he pushed the whole century 
forward […] would have reduced Jacques the Fatalist to a hundred pages, 
or he might not have published it at all.
However, as he grumpily points out, ‘ces retranchements, que Jacques 
le Fataliste et la Religieuse semblent exiger’ [these cuts, which Jacques the 
Fatalist and The Nun seem to require] are now pointless: ‘la première 
impression, toujours si difficile à effacer, est faite’ [the first impression, 
always so difficult to eradicate, is made].16 Interesting, here, to see the 
two meanings of ‘impression’, that is, printing and impression, both being 
evoked and presented in complete alignment. One may wish to suggest 
that Naigeon’s statements about the bad taste of Diderot’s fiction and the 
desirability of cutting the bad parts are straightforwardly strategic on 
Naigeon’s part, made with a view to preempting any attack on Diderot’s 
virtue, and therefore that we should not take them at face value. After 
all, he does actually publish Jacques le fataliste and La Religieuse in the 
Œuvres, and he publishes the more straightforwardly obscene Bijoux 
indiscrets too. This ‘Avertissement’ and the remarks he makes in the 
‘Préface’, from this point of view, would simply be false protestations of 
virtuous restraint, which actually make it possible for him to go ahead 
and publish the offending works in full, works which he himself does not 
approve of and would never have published, works which Diderot (he 
says) entirely recognised were unacceptable, but works which happen 
already to have been published, so he might as well go ahead and give 
them in corrected editions anyway. It would certainly be true to say that 
15  Naigeon, in Diderot, Œuvres (1798), vol. 12, p. 260.
16  Naigeon, in Diderot, Œuvres (1798), vol. 12, p. 264.
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it is strategic of Naigeon to present the novels in this way, but his being 
strategic does not necessarily preclude his agreeing with the position 
he articulates, that is, that both novels are weakened by the obscenity 
(he objects to the mother superior’s orgasm) and the lack of nobility 
(he disapproves of Jacques’s low station and low way of speaking). Of 
course, we cannot know what Naigeon really thought, but we can read 
what he says and look at what he does. And in this context, some of the 
things he says, in particular about Jacques le fataliste, seem to indicate 
a certain view about what would have been a more effective way for 
Diderot to write, one which may prove helpful when considering the 
Mémoires, and we meet again the reference to the ‘lecteurs d’un goût 
sévère et délicat’ [readers with a severe and delicate taste]. He writes 
that it is not that we do not find here and there ‘des réflexions très-fines, 
souvent profondes, telles enfin qu’on les peut attendre d’un esprit ferme, 
étendu, hardi, et qui sait généraliser ses idées’ [very subtle and often 
profound thoughts, such as we might expect to find in a firm, expansive, 
and bold mind, one which knows how to generalize its ideas] and he 
goes on to say:
Mais ces réflexions si philosophiques, placées dans la bouche d’un 
valet, tel qu’il n’en exista jamais; amenées d’ailleurs peu naturellement, 
et n’étant point liées à un sujet grave, dont toutes les parties fortement 
enchaînées entre elles s’éclaircissent, se fortifient réciproquement, et 
forment un tout, un système UN, n’ont fait aucune sensation. Ce sont 
quelques paillettes d’or éparses, enfouies dans un fumier où personne 
assurément ne sera tenté de les chercher; et, par cela même, des idées 
isolées, stériles et perdues.17 
But these very philosophical thoughts, being placed in the mouth 
of a servant such as never did exist, introduced moreover in a highly 
unnatural way, entirely unconnected to any serious subject in which 
all the parts are strongly linked together and thereby illuminate and 
strengthen each other to construct a whole, one system AS ONE, made 
no sensation of any sort. They are merely a few scattered flecks of gold 
buried in a midden where for sure no one will feel any temptation to go 
and find them, and for this reason, they are ideas which are isolated, 
sterile, and lost. 
17  Naigeon, in Diderot, Œuvres (1798), vol. 12, pp. 261–62.
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What he criticises is the way in which the ‘very subtle and often profound 
thoughts’ are scattered about, not brought together or interlinked, and 
therefore fail to mutually illuminate and strengthen each other or to 
form a whole, and so go unnoticed. These thoughts are flecks of gold 
buried in a midden, no one will want to go and look for them, and thus 
the ideas remain isolated, sterile and lost. This view, in conjunction with 
his explicit statement about getting rid of three quarters of Jacques le 
fataliste, suggest that Naigeon has a particular technique in mind; the 
identification and collecting of these flecks of gold or ideas, freeing 
them from the muck, joining them together into a clearly connected, 
consistently serious whole so that they stop languishing in isolation and 
start being productive. The mind that can do this work, the firm, far-
reaching, and audacious mind, is specifically one which knows how to 
generalise its ideas. If generalisation and seriousness is what Naigeon 
prizes, no wonder he does not like the all-too-specific, class-located, and 
generally ungeneralisable Jacques! 
The rather striking repetition and typography in the phrase ‘un 
système UN’, which I have translated as one system AS ONE, is instructive 
in this respect: Naigeon wants something emphatically unified and 
generally applicable, probably something abstract. Interestingly, this 
phrase is also an allusion to and an echo of a formula we find in Jacques le 
fataliste. Diderot’s phrase is in fact ‘une cause une’ (he does not appear to 
capitalise the second indefinite article). This same phrase also appears 
in the Rêve de d’Alembert, in the Observations sur Hemsterhuis, and in 
the Réfutation d’Helvétius.18 We find something similar in the Éléments de 
physiologie: ‘Sans la sensibilité et la loi de continuité dans la contexture 
animale, sans ces deux qualités l’animal ne peut être un’ [Without 
sensibility and the law of continuity in the intermixture of animal parts, 
without these two qualities the animal cannot be one].19 Here, as we 
see, the connected wholeness, the oneness, of the animal is emphasised 
typographically, via italicisation. Clearly, in any case, the notion of the 
18  With thanks to Ruggero Sciuto for sending me these details, private correspondence, 
23 August 2017.
19  Denis Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Jean Mayer, Œuvres complètes, DPV 
(Paris: Hermann, 1987), vol. 17, pp. 261–574 (p. 307) [hereafter DPV]/Diderot, 
Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Paolo Quintili (Paris: Champion, 2004), p. 122 
[hereafter PQ]/Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Motoichi Terada (Paris: 
Éditions Matériologiques, 2019), p. 131 [hereafter MT].
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connected whole is a recurrent one, and almost certainly a very subtle 
and profound thought of the variety Naigeon approves of, a ‘paillette 
d’or’ or fleck of gold. He uses the same syntactical emphasis when he 
talks elsewhere about Michel de Montaigne being ‘un homme UN’ [a 
man AS ONE].20
This ‘elsewhere’ in which he mentions Montaigne in fact comes 
from the editing project he was undertaking in parallel with the Œuvres 
de Diderot, the first appearance in print of the Essais in what is known 
as the ‘Exemplaire de Bordeaux’, in which Montaigne added copious 
annotations to the 1588 edition of his Essais, thereby extending the text 
by about a third.21 Philippe Desan tells the story of how François de 
Neufchâteau (1750–1828), man of letters and politician, found out about 
this annotated copy in the 1770s and never forgot about it; as Minister 
of the Interior in 1798–99, he commanded that it be sent to Paris from 
the Bibliothèque publique de Bordeaux in preparation for a new edition, 
and it was Naigeon to whom he gave the task.22 Naigeon, like him, was 
also a member of the Institut national, although Neufchâteau was in the 
‘classe des Lettres’; unlike Naigeon, but like Garat, Cabanis, and Destutt 
de Tracy, Neufchâteau was also a member of the Loge des Neuf Sœurs, 
and had been, from its creation. So, as we keep on finding, there are a 
good number of connections and overlapping relationships. Naigeon’s 
edition was ready to come out in 1802, with an extensive preface 
including the usual anti-clerical rants and dated ‘Paris, 15 Germinal, an 
X’ (5 April 1802), just three days before the ratification, on Easter Day (18 
Germinal/8 April) of the Concordat between Napoleon Bonaparte and 
the Pope in which Roman Catholicism was re-established as the principal 
religion of France. Naigeon’s preface was not merely anti-clerical, it 
directly exhorted Napoleon to keep the priesthood under control.23 And 
20  Jacques-André Naigeon, ‘Avertissement de l’éditeur’, ed. by Philippe Desan, 
Montaigne Studies, 10 (Oct 1998), 35–78 (p. 36).
21  https://montaignestudies.uchicago.edu/h/bordeaux_copy/ (information in 
English); Nicolas Barbey, ‘Comment Montaigne écrivait ses Essais : l’Exemplaire 
de Bordeaux’, Le Blog Gallica, 6 July 2016, https://gallica.bnf.fr/blog/06072016/
comment-montaigne-ecrivait-ses-essais-lexemplaire-de-bordeaux (information in 
French, and the digitised version).
22  Philippe Desan, ‘Naigeon et l’“avertissement” censuré de l’édition des Essais de 
1802’, Montaigne Studies, 10 (1998), 7–33 (pp. 7–13).
23  Naigeon, ‘Avertissement de l’éditeur’, ed. by Desan, 72. (via Voltaire: ‘Qui conduit 
des soldats, peut gouverner des prêtres’ [who leads soldiers can govern priests]); 
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thus the preface was suppressed, by the publisher Didot himself; of the 
initial preface only a few pages were kept, and of the original print-run 
only eight copies survived, owned by Didot, Napoleon, and some of his 
top officials.24 Meanwhile, the new edition of Montaigne duly came out, 
with its much briefer and politer preface. When we consult the original, 
however, which we now can, thanks to Desan’s critical edition, we find 
an absolute gold mine (rather than just a few gold flecks interspersed 
in a giant midden) of curious and impassioned statements about what 
it means to be an editor, which help prepare us for the much longer 
curiosity that is the Mémoires.
Firstly, then, Naigeon claims that his edition is ‘une copie 
rigoureusement exacte […] Je ne crois pas avoir oublié un mot, une 
syllabe, une lettre’ [a strictly accurate copy […] I do not think I missed a 
word, a syllable or a letter].25 This is a firm statement of total adherence 
to the autograph, and it is absolutely false: all the way through, Naigeon 
altered the spelling to make it more archaic. Thus ‘aucteur’ for ‘auteur’, 
‘doulce’ for ‘douce’ and so on. Philippe Desan analyses the process of 
archaization in some detail, speculating with Pierre Bonnet that Naigeon 
did this in order to intensify ‘l’apparence de sincérité’ [appearance of 
sincerity].26 From our point of view, in any case, the important thing is 
that Naigeon utterly denies having changed even a letter, while having 
in fact altered the spelling in a very thorough-going way. In fact, he has 
quite a curious idea of what it is to be a scholar and an editor: in his view, 
it is not an occupation or a service so much as a life or death passion, as 
we see in the following portrait, which first outlines the limitations of 
the scholar, and then, unexpectedly, starts to describe something more 
imperious:
further anti-clerical rants: p. 44 (this is also a rant against women), 65, 71 (on p. 73 
he turns against the newspapers).
24  Desan details what happened, Desan, ‘Naigeon et l’“avertissement” censuré de 
l’édition des Essais de 1802’, 31–33, quoting in particular Gabriel Peignot (Gabriel 
Peignot, Répertoire des bibliographies spéciales, curieuses et instructives, 1810, Paris 
Renouard p. 92) and H. Mazel (H. Mazel, ‘La Fameuse Préface de Naigeon’, Bulletin 
de la société des amis de Montaigne, 2.4 (1938), 28–29).
25  Naigeon, ‘Avertissement de l’éditeur’, ed. by Desan, 44.
26  Desan, ‘Naigeon et l’“avertissement” censuré de l’édition des Essais de 1802’, 27. 
He is quoting Pierre Bonnet, ‘Évolution et structure du texte des Essais’, in Pour une 
édition critique des Essais, ed. by Marcel Françon (Cambridge: Schoenhof’s Foreign 
Books, 1965), p. 16.
330 The Atheist’s Bible
L’érudit a dans la tête plus de mots que d’idées; il est sur-tout incapable 
de cette attention forte et continue, qui ne suffit pas sans doute pour 
reculer la limite d’une science ou d’un art, mais sans laquelle on ne fait 
guere de découvertes ni dans l’une ni dans l’autre. Il est même assez 
difficile que la culture des sciences exactes et expérimentales, ou celle 
de la philosophie rationnelle ait pour lui un grand attrait: une passion 
plus impérieuse le domine et l’entraîne; il faut qu’il y cède; sa raison, sa 
vie même en dépend; il faut qu’il corrige, qu’il restitue des textes, qu’il 
collationne des manuscrits, qu’il recueille des variantes, qu’il compile, 
ou qu’il meure.27
The man of learning has more words than ideas in his head; above all, 
he is incapable of that intense and continued attention which is probably 
not enough in itself to push at the boundaries of the sciences or arts, 
but without which no discovery of any sort can be made in either. Even 
cultivating the exact and experimental sciences is quite difficult for 
him, and nor does rational philosophy have any great attraction: a more 
imperious passion dominates and drives him; he has to yield to it; his 
reason, even his life depends upon it; he has to correct and restore texts, 
compare manuscripts, gather variants, compile, or die.
This description of the desultory scholar with more words than ideas 
and not a lot of concentration or even that much interest transmutes 
in the most surprising way into the portrait of a person who is driven 
and obsessed by his editorial work, utterly unable to withstand the 
compulsion to correct and restore texts, collate manuscripts, list variants, 
and just simply compile—in the case of this last verb, there is not even 
an object; the activity itself is the driver. And without it, he will die. 
Why is Naigeon saying this? Has editorial work ever been described, 
before or since, with such fervour? In its intensity and strangeness, this 
passage sticks out of its context—a discussion of Pierre Coste’s edition 
of the Essais—and it cannot be simply a description (either appreciative 
or mocking) of Coste as an editor, as Naigeon immediately follows 
on with a description of his own editorial conscientiousness.28 Nor 
does he appear to be satirising himself, although a certain ironic self-
consciousness is clearly on display. It sounds like nothing so much as a 
27  Naigeon, ‘Avertissement de l’éditeur’, ed. by Desan, 49–50.
28  ‘J’ai vérifié sur le texte des meilleures éditions des auteurs classiques tous les 
passages cités par Montaigne’ [I cross-checked in the best editions all the passages 
Montaigne quotes from classic authors] (Naigeon, ‘Avertissement de l’éditeur’, ed. 
by Desan, 50).
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personal avowal—a confession, perhaps—of an overmastering passion, 
which in revealing itself also describes itself and details its activities. First 
in the list of activities are correcting and restoring texts, and as we see 
from what he did with the hitherto unpublished Exemplaire de Bordeaux 
of Montaigne’s Essais, correcting and restoring do not necessarily involve 
following the autograph exactly; they might involve restoring the text to 
an invented idealised archaic version. When we consider this in parallel 
with Naigeon’s remarks about an improved version of Jacques le fataliste, 
that is, one reduced by 75%, shorn of characterisation, and retaining 
only the golden flecks of the ‘réflexions très-fines, souvent profondes’, 
we begin to see that he had a very specific idea of editing, one that is 
indeed subservient to the text in production, but whereby that text is 
an ideal or idealised one, not necessarily the one that the author had 
produced. If Naigeon decides not to amend (‘restore’) texts which have 
already been published, it is because there is no point, as ‘la première 
impression, toujours si difficile à effacer, est faite’ [the first impression, 
always so difficult to eradicate, is made], but in the case of texts which 
have never been published, as with the Exemplaire de Bordeaux, there is 
more room for manoeuvre. In fact, with Montaigne’s Essais, he contented 
himself with the archaising of the spelling and some reworking of the 
punctuation.29 But from what we have seen before, and from what he 
says in the following passage, we can see that he envisages more far-
reaching ‘corrections’, ones which, he alleges, secretly delight the author 
of real taste:
Ces petites nettetés du style qui consistent, tantôt dans un simple choix 
d’expressions plus sonores, plus musicales, plus douces à l’oreille, ce 
juge si dédaigneux et superbe; tantôt dans la suppression de quelques 
ornements ambitieux; ici dans le soin d’eviter certaines formules dont le 
retour trop fréquent manière le style; là dans l’art d’éteindre à propos des 
lumieres trop brillantes qui nuisent à l’harmonie, à l’effet de l’ensemble, 
en multipliant les effets particuliers et secondaires: toutes ces diverses 
corrections, plus ou moins importantes, échappent sans doute aux gens 
du monde, la plupart peu instruits […]: mais un écrivain de grand goût, 
un auteur qui se contente, comme Horace, d’un petit nombre de lecteurs, 
[…] s’applaudit en secret de ces corrections très légeres, minutieuses 
même en apparence, mais qui ajoutent d’autant plus de prix à un 
29  On the question of punctuation, see Desan, ‘Naigeon et l’“avertissement” censuré 
de l’édition des Essais de 1802’, 26.
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ouvrage, que les défauts qu’elles font disparoître étoient peu sensibles, et 
exigeoient, par cela même, pour être apperçus, un tact plus fin, plus sûr, 
et un sentiment plus exquis du beau et des convenances.30
Those little stylistic touches which consist sometimes in simply choosing 
expressions which are more sonorous, more musical, sweeter to the ear – 
that proud judge who is so hard to please – sometimes in suppressing a 
few ambitious ornaments, here in taking care to avoid certain expressions 
whose over-frequent appearance manners the style, there in the art of 
purposely dimming some of the illuminations which shine too bright 
and disrupt the harmony and effect of the whole, by multiplying some 
of the specific and secondary effects: all these diverse and more or less 
significant corrections no doubt escape the notice of people of the world, 
most of whom have very little education […]: but a writer of great taste, 
an author who, like Horace, is happy with just a few readers,[…] secretly 
applauds these very slight corrections, minuscule in appearance, but 
which add all the more value to a work, the defects they remove having 
been barely perceptible in the first place and for that very reason having 
required a finer and more skilful touch and a more exquisite sentiment 
of beauty and of what is proper.
This lyrical flight in praise of the correction of texts is just one sentence, 
lightly abridged for the sake of length. Yet how full it still is! How much 
Naigeon has to say about the aesthetically enhancing capacities of 
correction! What a pile-up of carefully balanced clauses! This is a paean 
to the corrector, not to the writer, and also, not to the re-writer; this is 
not a description of Montaigne re-writing his own work, and in any case, 
as we know, Montaigne did not rewrite existing sentences so much as 
add to them. So this is not about Montaigne’s amplificatory work on 
the Essais or about Naigeon’s editing of them, given that his alterations 
were limited to the archaization of the spelling and the changing of 
the punctuation. This is very specifically about the corrector who 
does not himself (definitely a him; Naigeon sees the world he values 
as masculine)31 generate a text but who comes along subsequently, 
and improves it in many ways, the corrections being ‘plus ou moins 
importantes’ [more or less significant] while remaining invisible to the 
30  Naigeon, ‘Avertissement de l’éditeur’, ed. by Desan, 70–71.
31  We referenced his outbursts against women as well as priests above (Naigeon, 
‘Avertissement de l’éditeur’, ed. by Desan, 44); he has some trouble managing 
what he thinks about Marie de Gournay, see Desan, ‘Naigeon et l’“avertissement” 
censuré de l’édition des Essais de 1802’, 28–29. 
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largely uneducated ‘gens du monde’ [people of the world]; they are 
also ‘très légères’ [very slight] and yet add great value to a work. There 
is a sort of see-saw of opposing negating statements in operation here: 
corrections might be quite extensive but they are invisible; they are very 
light yet they add a great deal. The corrector matches the writer in terms 
of taste: the writer ‘of great taste’ is highly appreciative of the work the 
corrector does; the corrector himself needs the most perfect and sure 
touch, the most exquisite feeling for beauty and propriety to be able 
to do the work he does. The writer writes; the corrector perfects, and 
brings the text to the highest pitch of beauty, a beauty which is defined, 
at least in part, by its propriety. The work of the corrector seems to take 
place at a higher level than the work of the writer; it takes priority.
So, we know what Naigeon thinks about editing and we know how 
he thinks Diderot should be edited. The preface he wrote to the Œuvres 
de Diderot, in combination with the self-exculpatory ‘Avertissement 
de l’Editeur, imprimé à la suite de la Religieuse’ and the original 
‘Avertissement de l’Editeur’ for Montaigne’s Essais, all of which are dated 
within four years of each other (1798–1802), provide us with statements 
which become increasingly revealing and idiosyncratic, whether that be 
in relation to the judgements that they make of what a writer gets wrong 
(in the first two texts, the writer is explicitly Diderot) and should change 
(or allow to be changed), or about the overwhelming passion that is 
editing for Naigeon, about how far-reaching he conceives the editing 
role as being in the case of hitherto unpublished texts, and finally, of 
the great status he attributes to the editor, greater it seems even than the 
writer, at least in terms of taste. This truly is an odd series of statements, 
and the closer we look at them, the odder they seem. They will be very 
helpful, though, when we come to look at the Mémoires sur la vie et les 
ouvrages de Denis Diderot, so often mentioned as imminent by Naigeon, 
and yet unpublished until 1823. This we soon will; it is the final text 
to consider, and the second of our final pair. Firstly, though, to Garat, 
whom we last heard of keeping his counsel at the Institut national.

11. 1820: Garat’s Mémoires historiques 
sur la vie de M. Suard, sur ses écrits, et 
sur le XVIIIe siècle
We now jump forward in time, to two memoir pieces, Dominique-Joseph 
Garat’s composed just prior to publication, and Jacques-André Naigeon’s 
published posthumously. They are, to give them their full titles, Garat’s 
Mémoires historiques sur la vie de M. Suard, sur ses écrits, et sur le XVIIIe 
siècle of 1820, and Naigeon’s Mémoires historiques et philosophiques sur la 
vie et les ouvrages de Denis Diderot, with its advertised publication date of 
1821, and its actual date of 1823. We take them in chronological order of 
publication according to our usual pattern, and it seems satisfying to do 
so in this particular case, given that Garat seems to nod to the imminent 
appearance of Naigeon’s Mémoires, and that the Mémoires themselves are 
a fitting end to the book, offering what I will argue is the first publication 
of Denis Diderot’s Éléments de physiologie, presented in a rearranged and 
abridged mesh with the Rêve de d’Alembert as it is.
Garat’s Mémoires historiques sur la vie de M. Suard, sur ses écrits, et sur le 
XVIIIe siècle, or Mémoires sur Suard for short, is a curious work, alternately 
hyperbolic and guarded. The object of this biographical memoir, Jean-
Baptiste-Antoine Suard (1732–1817), was a minor man of letters, 
editor and journalist; he was part of the world of the ‘philosophes’ and 
knew many of them, yet sometimes he represented the authorities (as 
‘Censeur des théâtres’, he was responsible for banning Beaumarchais’s 
Mariage de Figaro). Garat’s Mémoires sur Suard are 900 pages long, split 
into two volumes, the first of which relates the history of French culture 
© Caroline Warman, CC BY 4.0 https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0199.11
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through the lens of conversation, the second offering a panorama of 
European literature, language by language.1 This is all framed by and 
interspersed with information, anecdotes, and comments about Suard’s 
life which are remarkable for their lack of enthusiasm. He is variously 
described as being lazy (1.221, 2.215), somnolent (2.213-214), writing 
less than his contemporaries and being less passionate (1.220), being 
timid (1.232), not being a very impressive speaker because of his weak 
voice and nervous tone (1.332), having a poor memory (2.129) and as 
having not written as much as he should have done (1.328). One of the 
most complimentary passages describes him as being capable of writing 
the history of France via conversation, but as not having done it (Garat is 
doing it instead, 1.171). Another goes so far as to say that if the hundred 
pieces he wrote, each separately excellent, were brought together, they 
would make a ‘volume digne d’une haute considération et de toutes les 
places académiques’ [a volume worthy of high consideration and of any 
academic post] (1.331). There are many other such weak compliments 
and barbed comments. It is understandable therefore that Suard’s 
widow (Amélie Panckoucke) wrote her own briefer, more focused, and 
more amorously subservient version to counter Garat’s, and brought it 
out in virtuous outrage the same year.2 In sum, Suard seems to provide 
1  Dominique-Joseph Garat, Mémoires historiques sur la vie de M. Suard, sur ses écrits, et 
sur le XVIIIe siècle; par Dominique-Joseph Garat, 2 vols (Paris: A. Belin, 1820). See the 
‘Table analytique’, vol. 1, pp. i–xliv (p. vii): ‘Nécessité de connaître l’histoire des 
conversations en France depuis le dixième siècle qu’elles ont commencé pour bien 
apprécier celles du dix-huitième’ [Necessity of knowing the history of conversations 
in France from their commencement in the tenth century and onwards, in order 
properly to appreciate the conversations of the eighteenth]. See also 1.176 onwards.
2  ‘Une plume beaucoup plus habile avoit désiré se charger de ce soin; la connoissance 
parfaite que cet écrivain avoit du caractère et des vertus de M. Suard, les larmes 
abondantes qu’il répandoit sur sa tombe, m’ont fait céder à ses voeux. Mais ni mes 
intentions, ni celles que je lisois dans les dernières volontés de M. Suard n’ayant été 
remplies par cet écrit, dont à peine quelques fragments m’ont été communiqués, 
des considérations tres puissantes à mes yeux et dont je ne dois compte à personne, 
me décident à le désavouer auprès de mes amis’ [a more skilful pen than mine had 
requested this task for himself  ; the perfect knowledge that this writer had of Mr 
Suard’s character and virtues, the abundant tears he shed over his tomb, made me 
grant his request. But neither my intentions nor those I read in the last wishes of Mr 
Suard having been fulfilled by this piece of writing, of which barely a few fragments 
have been shown to me, and owing to considerations which are very important 
to me, and which I need justify to no one, I have decided to tell my friends that I 
disavow his memoir]. Amélie Suard, Essais de mémoires sur M. Suard (Paris: Didot, 
1820), pp. 2–3.
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a rather desultory excuse for Garat to give an account of something, 900 
pages-worth of it, that he finds more important, this something being 
to do, no doubt, with the other part of the title, ‘le XVIIIe siècle’ [the 
eighteenth century]. 
By the time Garat wrote the Mémoires sur Suard, he was no longer 
in the epicentre of power. The restoration of the Bourbon monarchy 
triggered his expulsion from the post-Revolutionary reinstated 
Académie française, and he returned to his native Basque country 
where he died in 1833, having refused an official invitation to rejoin 
the Académie française in 1829, although agreeing, when the Académie 
des sciences morales et politiques was set up in 1832 (or rather set back 
up, its ancestor, the ‘Classe des sciences morales et politiques’, having 
been closed down by Napoleon Bonaparte, as we saw in a previous 
chapter), to his election as member of the section ‘Morale’ (Destutt 
de Tracy was part of the section ‘Philosophie’).3 Garat never took up 
this seat. Suard, in fact, had been one of the key movers in determining 
who should be expelled from the Académie française, its own entry on 
Suard stating that he ‘prit une part regrettable à la réorganisation de 
1816’ [he played a regrettable role in the 1816 reorganisation].4 Here, 
then, would be one reason for Garat’s inability to praise Suard whole-
heartedly: personal resentment towards the instigator of his expulsion. 
This, however, he denies, both at the opening of the two volumes and 
at their close.5 Indeed, he may be hoping that these magnanimous 
Mémoires will contribute to his reinstatement; his statements about how 
much he misses his erstwhile colleagues and his declaration that his only 
remaining wish is to converse with them once more would seem to tend 
in that direction.6 Also, as suggested above, he may wish his Mémoires 
sur Suard to be associated with other forthcoming Mémoires, possibly 
even Naigeon’s on Diderot. As he says, ‘beaucoup de mémoires restent 
encore à paraître’ [many memoirs are yet to be published]. The passage 
that this snippet comes from is worth quoting in its entirety for the hints 
3  Who held what seat (‘fauteuil’) and when is carefully recorded on the 
website of the Académie, see https://academiesciencesmoralesetpolitiques.fr/
les-academiciens-de-1832-a-nos-jours/.
4  See http://www.academie-francaise.fr/les-immortels/jean-baptiste-antoine-suard.
5  Dominique-Joseph Garat, Mémoires sur Suard, vol. 1 (‘Avertissement’), p. 5 
(unnumbered); vol. 2, p. 444.
6  Garat, Mémoires sur Suard, vol. 1, pp. 5–6 (unnumbered).
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that it gives of a hinterland of as-yet unknown truth. It describes Suard’s 
conversation, Suard who chatted much more than he wrote (‘M. Suard 
a beaucoup plus causé qu’il n’a écrit’ [Mr Suard conversed very much 
more than he wrote], 1.173):
Mais c’est dans les cercles, dans les cabinets, dans les entretiens, qu’il 
[Suard] les [des choses précieuses] a comme jetées; pour en apprécier le 
mérite et l’influence, il faudrait connaître parfaitement ce dix-huitième 
siècle sur lequel beaucoup de mémoires restent encore à paraître; il 
faudrait en comparer les conversations aux conversations des siècles qui 
l’ont précédé. On peut et on doit indiquer ici ces parallèles nécessaires 
et piquans; on ne peut les instituer; ils seraient trop longs et ne seraient 
pas complets; les matériaux ne manquent pas seulement; ceux que nous 
avons sont rarement assez sûrs.7
But it’s in small groups, in private studies, in conversations, that Suard 
scattered, as it were, these precious things; to appreciate their merit 
and influence, one would need to perfectly understand the eighteenth 
century, about which many memoirs are yet to be published; one would 
need to compare the conversations to the conversations of preceding 
centuries. One can and one must signal these necessary and illuminating 
parallels; one cannot undertake them oneself; they would be too long 
and would not be complete; it’s not only the materials that are missing; 
those we do have are rarely trustworthy enough. 
How curious, this imperative to indicate parallels with other 
conversationalists, to compare across the eighteenth century (which 
one would need to know perfectly), and with previous centuries.8 
How curious that these parallels are described as both necessary and 
‘piquant’—a difficult term to translate—Chambaud’s French-English 
Dictionary in its 1815 edition suggests variously pungent, keen, sharp, 
biting. In modern parlance, one might perhaps say about a parallel that 
it was suggestive, meaningful, or revelatory. In any case, Garat declares 
that these parallels must be signalled but must not be spelled out. For 
7  Garat, Mémoires sur Suard, vol. 1, pp. 173–74.
8  Benedetta Craveri has answered Garat’s call, see The Age of Conversation, trans. 
by Teresa Waugh (New York: New York Review of Books, 2005). Craveri does 
not in fact mention Garat, but she does discuss Diderot, a famed talker, quoting 
Marmontel’s engaging account (The Age of Conversation, pp. 360–62). Jon Mee 
explores this topic in the British context and specifically from the point of view 
of dissent and disagreement in his Conversable Worlds: Literature, Contention, & 
Community 1762–1830 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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this, he gives various weak excuses, saying it would take too long and 
there is not enough material, and it is not reliable enough anyway. Or 
perhaps he really means that it is not safe enough. There seems to be 
a certain measure of wary caution in evidence here, and as we know 
anyway, Garat was out of favour, and probably seeking to return to it. 
But, as we also see, Garat is not only being prudent, he is also planting 
some signs here. There are quite a lot of these throughout the book. 
He talks about ‘[l’art de] cacher une partie de son idée’ [the art 
of hiding part of one’s idea] (I.212), taught primarily by Fontenelle, 
about how to ‘exciter de ces surprises que la logique même est sûre 
de produire’ [provoke some of those surprises that logic itself is sure 
to produce] (I.212), about how ellipses (or gaps for that which is not 
made explicit) are ‘pour ainsi dire, l’algèbre moral des langues’ [the 
moral algebra of languages, so to say] (II.184), about how a pamphlet 
written by Jean-François Marmontel against Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
evoked him without naming him once (‘moins il le nommait, plus il 
le rappelait’ [the less he named him, the more he brought him to 
mind] (II.239)), and of the ‘travail lent et secret du dictionnaire’ [slow 
secret work of the dictionary], which, by ‘détermin[ant] les acceptions 
des mots’ [determining the meanings of words] would later come to 
influence ‘le cours de morale et de politique’ [the course of moral and 
political life] (II.421). Elsewhere, when relaying discussions that Suard 
had with Laurence Sterne, author of Tristam Shandy, Sterne purportedly 
gives ‘l’étude de Locke’ [the study of Locke] as one of his three main 
influences (along with his ‘sensibility’ and also a daily portion of the 
Bible). John Locke is the trigger for an outburst of praise about Locke’s 
contribution to developing human understanding:
[…] cette philosophie que ceux qui savent la reconnaître où elle est, et 
où elle dirige tout secrètement, retrouvent et sentent dans toutes les 
pages, dans toutes les lignes, dans le choix de toutes les expressions; 
[…] cette philosophie trop religieuse pour vouloir expliquer le miracle 
des sensations, mais qui, avec ce miracle dont elle n’a pas la témérité 
de demander raison et compte à Dieu, développe tous les secrets de 
l’entendement […].9
9  Garat, Mémoires sur Suard, vol. 2, p. 149. 
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This philosophy which those who can see it and know where it is, a 
place moreover from which it directs everything in secret, can find and 
sense in every page, in every line, in the choice of every expression; […] 
this philosophy which is too religious to wish to explain the miracle of 
sensation, but which, by means of that miracle which it does not have the 
effrontery to demand a reason or explanation of from God, develops all 
the secrets of the human understanding […].
This is not merely praise of Locke, it is praise of ‘cette philosophie’, 
and a statement of its ubiquity and its secret presence and power: ‘elle 
dirige tout secrètement’ [it directs everything in secret]. Garat partly 
wraps this up in various imported sacred terms; thus the philosophy is 
religious, the sensations are a miracle which it (the philosophy) does not 
dare ask God about. Presumably these verbal fig leaves make it possible 
for him to deny any accusation of irreligion. But they do not hide what 
he is actually saying, which is that Lockean philosophy is everywhere 
for those readers who know how to see it, and furthermore, that it is 
secretly in charge. He goes on to discuss Buffon and Diderot. This book 
repeatedly references the great advances made in the knowledge of 
human understanding in the eighteenth century. And this is what the 
book is primarily about, where its centre of gravity is, partly because he 
says so, and partly because it is what he repeatedly returns to.10 
Fontenelle (1657–1757), perpetual secretary of the French Académie 
royale des sciences (1699–1740), is frequently alluded to as a sort of 
uncontentious great man of French science.11 Fontenelle had, of course, 
been the object of Garat’s prize-winning Éloge  de Fontenelle (1784), so 
he is familiar stamping-ground for Garat.12 And of all the things that 
10  Works on human understanding are repeatedly mentioned (sometimes Garat only 
gives the author or the title): Fontenelle, Traité sur l’entendement humain: 1.117–18, 
La Romiguière, Leçons sur la pensée: 2.36; Stewart: 1.185–86; Moses Mendelssohn’s 
Recherches sur les sentimens moraux, I.58; Gatti: 2.198; Bonnet: 2.31; Bichat: 2.34; 
Condillac: 1.160–61; Helvetius: 1.125; d’Holbach: 1.207–14; Charles Georges Leroy, 
Lettres philosophiques sur l’intelligence et la perfectibilité des animaux: 1.155; Hume, 
Traité de la nature humaine and Recherches sur l’entendement humain: 2.153; Lavoisier 
(who laid out the ‘principes de l’entendement’ in his ‘plan d’instruction publique’ 
as skilfully as the ‘principes chimiques’): 2.327. Garat, Mémoires sur Suard.
11  A non-exhaustive list of allusions to Fontenelle in the Mémoires sur Suard includes: 
vol. 1: 80–82; 117–22; 124–25; 212; 231.
12  Garat, Éloge  de Bernard de Fontenelle. Discours qui a remporté le prix de l’Académie 
Françoise, en 1784 (Paris: Démonville, Libraire-Imprimeur de l’Académie Françoise, 
1784).
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Fontenelle was interested in, says Garat, the thing that was ‘the most 
intense passion of his life’ was a theory of the faculties of the human 
mind. Here is the passage in full where he writes about it:
Les théories de l’entendement, qui, depuis Bacon et Descartes, avaient 
pris dans les connaissances humaines une si grande place, et peut-être 
la première, avaient beaucoup occupé la jeunesse de Fontenelle; il parut 
long-temps y renoncer; mais la plus forte passion de sa vie, il l’eut à près 
de cent ans, et ce fut encore pour la métaphysique. Elle le faisait sortir 
de ce style fin et familier, auquel la nature probablement l’avait destiné, 
mais dont il se faisait aussi comme un principe du culte de la vérité. 
A cet âge, où toute imagination est éteinte, même dans ceux qu’elles a 
dominés, il peignait, par une grande image, la puissance qu’exercerait 
une théorie des facultés de l’esprit humain, tirée à la fois et de l’organisation 
humaine, et des chefs-d’œuvre créés déjà par la raison, déjà consacrés 
par cet assentiment universel qui ne s’accorde qu’à l’évidence. Elle sera, 
disait-il, le grand luminaire suspendu entre le bon sens, commun à tous les 
hommes, le génie des beaux-arts et le génie des sciences; elle les rapprochera, elle 
les unira, en leur faisant voir comment ils sortent des mêmes sources. 
Des fragments assez considérables, et très-importans, d’un Traité de la 
raison humaine, ont été trouves dans les papiers de Fontenelle; ils ont 
été publiés par l’abbé Trublet. […] C’est dans ces fragmens qu’une main 
centenaire a déposé, la première fois, les germes de beaucoup d’idées 
très-lumineuses, développées depuis par les meilleurs métaphysiciens 
de l’Europe.13
The theories about [human] understanding which had, since Bacon and 
Descartes, become such an important, perhaps even the most important, 
part of human knowledge, had absorbed a great deal of Fontenelle’s 
youth; he gave up on them for a long period, but the strongest passion 
of his life came upon him when he was nearly one hundred years old, 
and it was again for metaphysics. It propelled him out of that subtle 
and familiar style that nature had probably destined him to have and 
which was also for him a sort of guiding principle in his worship of the 
truth. At that age, when all imagination has faded even in those whom 
it has dominated, he painted a great image of the power that a theory of 
the faculties of the human mind would have, one which would be drawn 
both from the human [bodily] organization and from the masterpieces 
already created by the human mind [la raison], and consecrated by that 
universal assent which only occurs in response to evidence. It will be, said 
he, a great chandelier hung between the good sense every man has, the genius 
13  Garat, Mémoires sur Suard, vol. 1, pp. 117–18. Italics in the original.
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of the fine arts and the genius of the sciences; it will bring them together, it will 
unite them by showing them how they share common sources.
Quite lengthy and very important fragments of a Treatise of human reason 
were found amongst Fontenelle’s papers; they were published by the 
Reverend Trublet. […] It is in these fragments that a hundred-year-old 
hand deposited the seeds of many deeply illuminating ideas, and which 
have since been taken forward by the best metaphysicians of Europe.
Here, in summary, are the claims Garat makes in this passage: the 
theories of human understanding may be the most important area of 
recent knowledge; Fontenelle thought about this topic a great deal when 
a young man; he returned to it in extreme old age; it was the strongest 
passion of his life; he wrote it in a less familiar (‘familiar’ as in ‘common’ 
or ‘low’ or ‘oral’) style than he habitually used, while still using striking 
imagery at an age when all imagination is extinguished even in those 
people whom it has dominated; important and extensive extracts of his 
treatise on this subject were found in his papers after his death, and have 
since been published; an old man wrote them; he planted in them the 
seeds of his luminous ideas which have since been developed by the best 
minds in Europe. Well now. Is Garat talking primarily about Fontenelle 
here? 
Fontenelle did indeed write fragments on the human mind, which 
Nicolas-Charles-Joseph Trublet published in his grand edition of 
Fontenelle in ten volumes (1757–58). We find them in the seventh 
volume of Alain Niderst’s modern edition. They consist of remarks, 
sketches, responses. There is a ‘Fragments d’un traité de la raison 
humaine’ [Fragments of a treatise on human reason], some pages ‘Sur 
l’instinct’ [On instinct], an ‘autre fragment, la ‘loi de la pensée’ [Law of 
thought] et ‘De la connoissance de l’esprit humain’ [On the knowledge 
of the human mind], which is sub-divided into short chapters entitled 
‘Fragment’, ‘Première partie: de l’origine des idées’ [First part: on the 
origin of ideas], and ‘Analogie de la matière et de l’esprit’ [Analogy 
of matter and spirit]. In all, they amount to 48 pages, of which the 
‘Fragments d’un traité de la raison humaine’ make up 23 pages. In ‘De 
l’instinct’, Fontenelle considers the acts of thinking and walking, that is 
to say, he muses on actions of which we have no consciousness (and in 
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fact we quoted from it in an earlier chapter).14 In the ‘Fragments d’un 
traité de la raison humaine’, he explores why it is that not all ideas are 
conscious; in the ‘Loi de la pensée’, he differentiates the mathematical 
being from the physical being; he quite often seems to be replying to 
Leibniz. This is all serious and important work, part of and contributing 
to what we have described as the on-going conversation on these matters, 
but it does not quite live up to Garat’s write-up. It feels very much more 
as if Garat’s description of Fontenelle’s work is a way of signalling 
Diderot’s Éléments de physiologie, with its similar framing narrative of 
fragmentation and posthumous papers. What he says could certainly be 
applied to both Fontenelle and Diderot, with the main difference being 
that they apply better to Diderot than to Fontenelle. Perhaps this is the 
sort of passage where we are expected to see the hidden message that 
Garat said—in relation to Lockean philosophy—was so visible for those 
who knew how to see it. Of course, we cannot really pin Garat down, 
and that is no doubt the point. 
In the following passage from the second volume of his Mémoires sur 
Suard, he again both signals and veils what he is talking about, suffusing 
it all with grandiose and declamatory virtue-signalling:
Ainsi, en Angleterre et en France, et dans d’autres parties de l’Europe, 
la philosophie du dix-huitième siècle, c’est-à-dire, un petit nombre 
d’hommes qui n’avaient pour toute puissance que beaucoup de goût 
pour la méditation et beaucoup d’amour pour l’humanité, aspiraient à 
faire servir le passé, le présent, l’avenir, les tombeaux, les débris des vieux 
empires, les forêts et les sauvages, au perfectionnement des facultés et 
des destinées humaines; à fonder la raison universelle sur l’analyse, la 
morale sur la raison, les lois sur la morale, et le suprême bonheur de tous 
les êtres vivans et pensans, sur la parfaite harmonie de leurs interêts, de 
leurs vœux, de leurs principes d’ordre social, sur les affections et sur les 
actions qui rendent le plus les âmes dignes d’une immortelle félicité.15
Thus, in England and France, and in some other parts of Europe, the 
philosophy of the eighteenth century, that is, a small number of men 
whose only power was in having a great deal of taste for meditation and 
a great deal of love for humanity, aspired to harness the past, the present, 
the future, tombs, the ruins of old empires, forests and savages for the 
improvement of human faculties and destinies, to found universal reason 
14  See Chapter 3.
15  Garat, Mémoires sur Suard, vol. 2, pp. 79–80.
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on analysis, morality on reason, laws on morality, and the supreme 
happiness of all living and thinking beings on the perfect harmonisation 
of their interests, their wishes, and their principles for social order, on 
the affections and on the actions most likely to make souls worthy of 
immortal felicity.
He is alternately very generalising and very precise (as well as quite 
difficult to quote succinctly). On the one hand, England, France, and 
other parts of Europe hardly limit his focus. On the other, ‘un petit 
nombre d’hommes’ [a small number of men] does, although he does 
not name whom he is referring to. Yet the list of what this small group 
of men wish to deploy for the improvement of the mind and human 
happiness would seem to exclude most writers and thinkers, leaving 
only such luminaries as Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, and Diderot; 
not many others have this encyclopedic range; Condillac does not, 
despite the Condillacian trigger word of ‘analyse’. Arguably, Diderot 
fits the bill best as the person who did indeed write about every one 
of these aspects, from the Essai sur les règnes de Claude et de Néron to 
the Supplément au voyage de Bougainville, the Éléments de physiologie, and 
so on, not omitting his contributions to Raynal’s Histoire des deux Indes. 
Interestingly, the passage we have been looking at immediately leads 
into this discussion of dissimulating meaning or declaring it openly:
Ce but, tantôt ils le signalent avec la fermeté et la hauteur qui conviennent 
à peine à l’evidence; tantôt ils le voilent avec la défiance bien naturelle 
à sa grandeur et à ses difficultés; quelquefois ils l’enveloppent et le 
dissimulent comme si le voeu et l’espérance du bonheur du monde 
était une usurpation sur les puissances; mais qu’ils l’affichent ou qu’ils 
le cachent, jamais ils ne l’abandonnent; ils le conservent sous la hache 
des bourreaux, sous les traits meme du ridicule.16 
Sometimes they signal this goal with that resolution and authority 
which scarcely even do justice to what is evidently true; sometimes 
they veil it with that diffidence so natural given its importance and 
the difficulties surrounding it; sometimes they conceal and disguise it 
as if to wish and hope for the world’s happiness were in some way to 
encroach on the powers that be; but whether they advertise it or hide 
it, they never abandon it; they keep it still when confronted with the 
executioner’s blade, even in the face of ridicule. 
16  Garat, Mémoires sur Suard, vol. 2, p. 80.
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This description of how ‘la philosophie du dix-huitième siècle, c’est-
à-dire, un petit nombre d’hommes’ [the philosophy of the eighteenth 
century, that is, a small number of men] alternates between open 
avowal and careful masking of their meaning, yet resolves into a noble 
declaration that whatever they do, they never abandon their purpose 
or commitment, be they threatened by execution or even covered 
in ridicule. One may wonder whether this last part refers to himself, 
arrested as he had been (and threatened with execution as he mentions 
in the fervent salvo of his opening lecture at the École normale),17 and 
much vilified and ridiculed as he had also been. We will quote one such 
satirical poem towards the end of this section.
We can see, in any case, that whether Garat is talking about Suard, 
who was imprisoned in the 1740s, one of the few who could understand 
English, and whose most precious utterances never made it into print,18 
or Fontenelle, whose conversation was also very special, and who was 
interested in human understanding and worked on it at the beginning 
and the end of his career, leaving behind fragments of inestimable value, 
and whose style was full of surprises,19 there seems to be a Diderot-
shaped shadow in the background. That said, he is not only a shadow 
whose presence we seem to feel; Garat also discusses him explicitly, 
extensively, and repeatedly.20 However, when it comes to discussing 
atheism, mentioning the Interprétation de la nature, and alluding to the 
Lettre sur les aveugles and the Lettre sur les sourds et muets, Diderot’s 
name is not given, a signal of the continuing sensitivity of this topic, at 
least insofar as Garat is concerned.21 At points Garat compares Suard 
17  Garat, Leçons d’analyse et d’entendement [1796], ed. by G. Gengembre et al., in L’École 
normale de l’an III, ed. by J. Dhombres (Paris: Éditions ENS, 2008), vol. 4, pp. 43–160 
(p. 76) (Première leçon), https://doi.org/10.4000/books.editionsulm.1445, see 
above.
18  On Suard in prison, see Garat, Mémoires sur Suard, vol. 1, p. 47 (Garat in fact makes 
the Diderot parallel explicit by stating that Suard wished his prison companion 
had been Diderot rather than the mysterious Chevalier de L***); on the English-
speaking, see the ‘Table analytique’, vol. 1, pp. i–xliv (p. iii); conversation: 1.173; 
243.
19  Fontenelle: conversation: 1.113–14; 116; 118; human understanding (see previous 
paragraphs): 1.117–18; style: 1.212. In Garat, Mémoires sur Suard.
20  Diderot is named here (probably not an exhaustive list): vol. 1: 47; 164; 207–9; 211; 
213; 218; 225; 227; 235–38 (Diderot quoted on imagination); 244–45; 324; 346; vol. 2: 
13–23; 157–73; 177, 197, 240; 251; 447. Garat, Mémoires sur Suard.
21  Diderot’s Interprétation de la nature is discussed but Diderot’s authorship is not 
mentioned (Garat, Mémoires sur Suard, 1:203).
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and Diderot directly, such as when they each orate about imagination; 
Diderot’s reported speech closes with the statement that ‘Quand un 
philosophe a de l’imagination, je veux que l’imagination soit un peu 
ÉBOURIFFÉE’ [When a philosopher has imagination, I want that 
imagination to be a bit WINDSWEPT].22 Suard goes on to criticise 
Diderot for disliking order, and Garat concludes that ‘M. Suard fut 
moins applaudi; ses idées étaient moins originales; il fut plus approuvé; 
elles étaient plus conformes aux oracles du goût et de la raison dans 
tous les siècles’ [Mr Suard received less applause; his ideas were less 
original, but he received greater approval, because his ideas conformed 
more to the enduring oracles of taste and reason over the centuries].23 
Suard gets less applause; the judgement is that he is less original, and 
more of a conformist. Poor Suard! Elsewhere also, attention is drawn 
to what he does not like about Diderot; internal contrasts show Garat 
using Suard’s lack of appreciation to highlight something particularly 
distinctive about Diderot. Thus, what is described as Suard’s typically 
French taste means that he ‘ne pouvait aimer ni dans Diderot, ni dans 
les Allemands, ces brusques voisinages d’un familier trivial et d’une 
inspiration trop emphatique pour être celle de la nature et des passions’ 
[could not appreciate either in Diderot or in the Germans those abrupt 
juxtapositions of the over-familiar and trivial alongside passages of 
inspiration which are too emphatic to belong to nature or natural 
passions] (2.19); the description Garat then proceeds to give of this 
new German literature is intensely positive, and all about how well it 
does describe nature and passions. Furthermore, Garat later contrasts 
Bacon and Montaigne; Montaigne, Garat says, ‘va au but par ricochets; 
l’autre va sans bonds et sans détours’ [reaches his aim via skips and 
jumps; the former gets there smoothly and without detours] (2.45); the 
contrast between the bumpy disconcerting writer and the smooth and 
moderate one is similar, and although in this second comparison, the 
smooth thinker and the bumpy one are equally lauded, the terms in 
which Montaigne is described are very similar to the those used earlier 
about Diderot. The passage in which Diderot’s ‘brusques voisinages’ 
22  Garat, Mémoires sur Suard, vol. 1, p. 238 (italics and capitals in the original). There 
doesn’t appear to be a separate Diderot text to confirm that he did say this, so Garat 
is the source for this anecdote. 
23  Garat, Mémoires sur Suard, vol. 1, p. 242.
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[abrupt juxtapositions] are evoked moves into a discussion of what 
Suard thought of Diderot’s plays, which in turn becomes a discussion 
of Suard and Rousseau’s opposing views of whether Diderot excelled 
more as a dramatist (Suard) or as a philosopher (Rousseau). This is 
interestingly framed, in that both Suard and Rousseau are presented as 
having reservations about Diderot (this is subsequent to Rousseau and 
Diderot’s split).24 So he is debated by two of his critics, who nonetheless 
praise him in strong terms. In this passage, Garat introduces, in eye-
catching italics, Suard’s opinion of Diderot:
Voici, et dans les mêmes termes, si ma mémoire ne me trompe, ce que 
Suard, qui n’aimait pas beaucoup la personne de Diderot, pensait et 
disait de ses talens:
Qui sait a quel rang aurait pu se placer Diderot, s’il eût concentré toutes les 
forces de son esprit original et fécond et celles de sa brillante imagination sur les 
seuls objets propres à en exercer toute l’énergie?25
Here, and in the same words, if my memory is not wrong, is what Suard, 
who did not much like Diderot as a person, thought and said about his 
talents:
Who knows what level Diderot would have reached had he concentrated all the 
forces of his original and fertile mind as well as those of his luminous imagination 
on the only objects capable of bringing into play the entirety of this energy?
Garat presents this as what Suard actually said, and claims to be 
recalling it from memory. We know already from a few pages earlier 
(and as quoted above) that Suard ‘ne pouvait aimer ni dans Diderot, 
ni dans les Allemands, ces brusques voisinages’ [could not appreciate 
either in Diderot or in the Germans those abrupt juxtapositions]; here, 
it is Diderot himself that he does not like much (we are not told why). 
Perhaps the idea of presenting Suard’s supposed reservations about 
Diderot is to gain the trust of readers who might also have reservations 
about him, and to show by contrast that the fair-minded moderate 
conformist person, despite disliking his style and his personality, will 
still concede that he is extraordinarily important. The do-I-remember-it-
correctly quotation, moreover, is a mixed compliment: how toweringly 
important he could have been had he only concentrated the forces of his 
24  Garat, Mémoires sur Suard, vol. 2, pp. 21–22.
25  Garat, Mémoires sur Suard, vol. 2, p. 21. Italics in the original. 
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original and fertile mind and brilliant imagination on the only objects 
capable of deploying all their energy. This is not the first time such a 
view of Diderot had been expressed.26 It is the wasted-opportunity 
Diderot. And yet it also promises a lot, even in the regret mode. What 
is especially interesting about this passage is that Garat repeats it 
verbatim in the closing pages. This is the only time (to my knowledge) 
that there is any such repetition in these two long volumes. Here the 
context is rather different. Garat is talking about Suard’s dying years, 
and how he took to writing down thoughts and ‘souvenirs éparpillés’ 
[scattered memories].27 Garat copies down in its entirety one rather 
longer meditation, entitled ‘Du meilleur usage de l’esprit’ [On the best 
use of the mind].28 It is from this fragment or short essay that the not-in-
fact-just-a-remembered-utterance comes. Here it is again, de-italicised 
this time:
Qui sait a quel rang aurait pu se placer Diderot, s’il eût concentré 
toutes les forces de son esprit original et fécond et celles de sa brillante 
imagination sur les seuls objets propres à en exercer toute l’énergie?29
Who knows what level Diderot would have reached if he had 
concentrated all the forces of his original and fertile mind as well as those 
of his luminous imagination on the only objects capable of bringing into 
play the entirety of this energy? 
The framing this short essay gives is quite different from the earlier 
one. Here, Suard is considering how unfortunate it is to try to master 
‘l’universalité des connaissances’ [the totality of knowledge], and the 
extent to which this tendency has prevented the truly great from truly 
realising their potential. Suard (supposing it is Suard) names four such 
26  Even Eusèbe Salverte’s brave encomium of Diderot’s contribution focuses more on 
the genius of his spontaneous and generous character than on his writings, see Éloge 
philosophique de Denys Diderot, lu a l’Institut National, le 7 thermidor an 8 (Paris: Chez 
Surosne, 1801 [an IX]), p. 67. By the time Jean-Philibert Damiron comes to write 
his influential assessments, Diderot has settled into being the philosophe who was 
very important and influential, but too lacking in self-discipline, too spontaneous 
(that is, too chatty), to be one of the greats, see Jean-Philibert Damiron, Mémoire 
sur Diderot (1852), reprinted in Mémoires sur les Encyclopédistes (Genève: Slatkine 
reprints, 1968), p. 2.
27  Garat, Mémoires sur Suard, vol. 2, p. 446. 
28  Garat, Mémoires sur Suard, vol. 2, pp. 446–48. 
29  Garat, Mémoires sur Suard, vol. 2, p. 447. 
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men who fell short: Leibniz, Pascal, d’Alembert, and Diderot.30 In a 
way, it is amusing to contemplate this roll-call of failures; the great men 
who might have been. But in any case, two points need to be made. 
Firstly, no other of these names is so lyrically described as Diderot, or 
even described at all. ‘Suard’ simply says Leibniz would have made 
greater progress in mathematics had he limited himself to its study; the 
same can be said with respect to Pascal about physics and mathematics 
(who instead plunged into theological controversy); while D’Alembert 
would have overtaken Leonhard Euler and Pierre-Simon Laplace as a 
mathematician if he had not allowed himself to get involved in literary 
works, in which he only succeeded to a very mediocre degree. With 
respect to Diderot, ‘Suard’ does not specify the area that Diderot would 
have shone in if only he had not done something else instead or in 
addition. Secondly, extrapolating from the other examples, we see that the 
study of the sciences is primordial, and any other activity or controversy 
or glory, be it theological or literary, is a waste of time and genius. We 
can be fairly sure, therefore, that it is Diderot the scientist that ‘Suard’ 
is regretting the loss of, and not Diderot the dramatist, as in the first 
appearance of this passage. Furthermore, the contributions of Leibniz, 
Pascal, and D’Alembert to the fields of mathematics and physics were 
in fact huge. And thus, by extension, so was Diderot’s, whatever area of 
the sciences it is that ‘Suard’ has in mind. We can probably assume it is 
something to do with the materialist investigations of nature, with the 
senses which Garat mentions (although without specifying Diderot’s 
authorship), and with the human understanding, that topic which he 
30  Mme Suard also mentions this fragment in her rival Mémoires, and it is interestingly 
similar and different. She lists Pascal, Leibtnitz [sic], and d’Alembert as the examples 
of men of genius who failed to focus exclusively on science and therefore the surer 
route to glory. There is no mention of Diderot. And she quotes an extensive passage 
which is (almost) identical to Garat’s quotation, apart from a crucial cut, which is 
precisely where Garat’s version of Suard mentions Leibniz, Pascal, D’Alembert, and 
Diderot. Instead, she moves straight to the confessional part, her cut transforming 
Suard’s fragment into a eulogy to the happiness of those who do not aspire to glory. 
Mme Suard, Essais, pp. 105–06. The fragment itself, whose existence is confirmed 
at least in some details by Garat and Mme Suard’s extracts, seems not ever to have 
been published. A later commentator and author of an Éloge  de Suard, François 
Pérennès, quotes the same chunk about Suard’s happy non-pursuit of glory that 
we find in both Garat and Mme Suard’s versions, calling it simply one of Suard’s 
‘souvenirs épars’ [scattered memories]. François Pérennès, Éloge  de Suard, secrétaire 
perpétuel de l’Académie Française (Besançon: Charles Deis, 1841), p. 57.
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repeatedly references and claims is possibly the area in which the most 
important advances have been made. Perhaps therefore, he is again, as 
we argued before, trying to signal the existence of Diderot’s unknown 
thought in this area, and in particular his texts the Rêve de d’Alembert and 
the Éléments de physiologie. 
Elsewhere, we see Garat closely associating ‘les noms renommés dans 
les lettres et dans les sciences’ [the famous names of letters and sciences] 
who attended, along with aristocratic landowners and rich men, the 
salon of Diderot’s friend, the financier and government administrator 
Jean Devaines (1735–1803);31 Garat goes on to list not the names of these 
famous men of letters and science, but the areas they worked in, that is, 
medecine and chemistry, and more specifically the physical mechanisms 
of thought, physiology, life and death. He then says this same group 
of names renowned in letters and science also include those who wear 
the laurels of eloquence and poetry, and who best upheld ‘la splendeur 
littéraire du siècle de Louis XIV’ [the literary splendour of the century 
of Louis XIV]. It looks as if he is bringing the two seemingly distinct 
areas of scientific research and literary glory together. One might wish 
to argue that the (unnamed) names of the illustrious scientists and the 
illustrious men of letters are kept separate here, and technically they are; 
however, there is also a simultaneous effect of osmosis and association. 
These names are renowned ‘dans les lettres et dans les sciences’, not in 
one or the other: the syntax brings these two areas together as attributes 
of the same illustrious names. And the list of areas does not follow 
the same order of first letters, then sciences; it inverts it. Thus, there 
is an almost imperceptible confusion or fusion of the two areas. Garat 
is suggesting that those whose rhetoric and poetry best maintained ‘la 
splendeur littéraire du siècle de Louis XIV’ were those who worked on 
‘le mécanisme non de la pensée qui est spirituelle, mais de ses organes 
extérieurs, qui sont physiques’ [the mechanism not of thought which is 
connected to the spirit, but to its external organs, which are physical], 
on ‘la nouvelle médecine’ [the new sort of medicine] which bears ‘le 
nom de physiologie’ [the name of physiology], and those ‘philosophes 
devenus chimistes pour approcher de plus près la nature, pour lui 
arracher, la flamme à la main, les lois de la vie et celles de la mort’ 
31  Garat, Mémoires sur Suard, vol. 2, pp. 264–65.
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[philosophers who became chemists in order to get closer to nature, to 
snatch from it, torch in hand, the laws of both life and death].32 This 
would be a huge claim about the importance of scientific writing, that 
it had inherited the mantle of Jean Racine and others. Furthermore, the 
specificity of Garat’s list would propel Diderot’s Éléments de physiologie 
to the front of the queue, seeing as it contains all these elements, with 
the Rêve de d’Alembert close behind, more poetic but less extensive in 
coverage. However, here as elsewhere, for all that Garat’s prose allows 
and encourages such a reading, it also contains elements that allow total 
deniability. He is simultaneously hyperbolic and nebulous. 
Whether Garat is using his Mémoires sur Suard to allude to Diderot’s 
Éléments de physiologie or not is impossible to prove, because Garat 
suggests and signals but also masks and conceals; he will not be pinned 
down. It is tempting at this point to quote the poet Joseph Despaze’s 
wicked satire of Garat in Les Quatre Satires, which went through five 
editions in two years (1799–1801). Here, he is of course referring to 
an earlier and more polemical stage of Garat’s career, probably when 
Garat was defending himself against the accusation of complicity in the 
September massacres, and yet for those who try to wrestle with his prose, 
the portrait is recognizable. Apologies in advance for the translation 
which totally fails to capture the snarky rhymes of the original:
Garat, toujours rempli de frayeur et d’espoir,
A toujours le secret de dire blanc et noir:
S’exprimer franchement lui semble trop bête:
En sauvant son pays, il veut sauver sa tête.33
Garat, always full of fear and hope,
Always knows how to explain things in both black and white:
To express himself frankly would be, he feels, too dumb:
While saving his country, he wants to save his head.
32  Garat, Mémoires sur Suard, vol. 2, p. 265.
33  Joseph Despaze, Les Quatre Satires, ou la fin du XVIIIe siècle, 3rd edn (Paris: Moller, 
1799), pp. 24–25. The fifth edition (available on Gallica) has quite a number of 
changes, including to the section about Garat, which is much shorter, and only 
includes the first quatrain. We give the longer passage from the earlier edition.
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Despaze waxes lyrical for another twenty-two lines on Garat’s 
tergiversation, impersonating Garat in a pretend legal speech:
Mais, quant à ce discours qui vous a tant déplu,
Je ne peux le juger, car je ne l’ai pas lu.
And as for this speech which you so disliked,
I am unable to judge it as I haven’t read it.
Whatever effect Garat hoped his Mémoires historiques sur la vie de M. 
Suard, sur ses écrits, et sur le XVIIIe siècle would have, it did not bring 
about his re-admission to the Académie française, it did not honour 
Suard, and it did not please Mme Suard. When François Pérennès wrote 
his Éloge de Suard in 1841, he did not spare Garat, criticising him for 
his ‘détails puérils’ [puerile details] and ‘prolixité fatigante’ [tiresome 
verbosity].34 The puerile detail that Pérennès uses to exemplify this 
opinion is a fascinating one. Garat, describing the cell in which Suard 
was emprisoned, had talked about how the only light source was an 
arrow-slit high up in the wall. He explains how Suard learnt how to use 
it like a tool, to extend its reach, to see in all directions, near and far.35 
This, we may remember, is the specific point that Garat had particularly 
insisted on in his lectures at the École normale, the need to perfect 
the use of the senses, to learn to see better, to internalise the telescope 
somehow.36 Yet here is this most ambitious aim of Garat’s, reduced by 
Pérennès to the status of a puerile detail! Further bathos is introduced 
when we read Garat’s account side by side with Mme Suard’s rival 
version. She simply says that in order to see the sky from his miserable 
cell, the young and imprisoned Suard had to stand on a chair because 
the tiny window was too high up to look out of otherwise.37 Ah! no 
34  Pérennès, Éloge  de Suard, p. 4.
35  ‘A force de tourner autour de la lucarne qu’il ne pouvait faire tourner, il apprit à 
la manier, commes les astrologues une lunette; il en étendit le champ; il parvint à 
regarder en tout sens, à voir, à distinguer au loin et dans toutes les dimensions’ [By 
dint of moving around the window since he couldn’t turn the thing itself, he learnt 
to use it, like astrologers use an eye piece; he extended its range; he learnt to look 
in all directions, to see, to focus on the far and near and in all dimensions] (Garat, 
Mémoires sur Suard, vol. 1, pp. 41–42).
36  See above.
37  ‘C’étoit un triste lieu – pour se rétablir qu’une chambre ou l’on n’apercevoit le ciel 
qu’à travers une lucarne élevée, encore ne pouvoit-il le voir qu’en montant sur des 
chaises’ [It was a miserable place – for his living space nothing more than a room 
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curious description of how to manipulate an arrow-slit like a telescope 
here, no perfecting of the senses! Garat seems to have succeeded so well 
in his attempts to veil his embedded meaning that his readers thought 
he was talking gibberish, exhausting the patience of even, as Pérennès 
puts it, ‘le lecteur le plus bienveillant’ [the best-disposed reader].38 And 
yet he has been an important figure in this story, and his bizarre mesh 
of reveals and conceals is not so much a judgement of his quality as a 
writer of confused intent, but of the ongoing inadmissibility of what it 
seems like he might have been trying to say. It is time, finally, to turn to 
Naigeon’s Mémoires historiques et philosophiques sur la vie et les ouvrages de 
Denis Diderot.
from which you could only espy the sky through a small window high up, and even 
then he had to get up on chairs to do so] (Mme Suard, Essais, p. 21).
38  Pérennès, Éloge  de Suard, p. 4.

12. 1823: Naigeon’s Mémoires 
historiques et philosophiques sur la vie et 
les ouvrages de Denis Diderot
With Jacques-André Naigeon’s Mémoires historiques et philosophiques 
sur la vie et les ouvrages de Denis Diderot, there is no need to make 
a case for the presence of the Éléments de physiologie, because he 
quotes about a thousand lines from it, completely reorganised and 
meshed in with about 420 lines from the Rêve de d’Alembert. This 
the interested reader will see when consulting the digital edition of 
Naigeon’s Mémoires historiques et philosophiques which accompanies 
this monograph.1 This is the book Naigeon had been working on so 
assiduously in 1792 when he wrote his article on ‘Diderot’, and then 
again in 1798 when preparing the Œuvres de Diderot, and each time, 
as we may remember, he repeatedly alludes to it, clearly planning its 
imminent publication, fervently advertising it, and alerting readers 
to its importance.2 Central to it is his ‘analyse raisonnée de celui de 
1  See https://naigeons-diderot.mml.ox.ac.uk/index.htm. In a piece of reinforcing 
synchronicity, Motoichi Terada has also reproduced these pages from Naigeon’s 
Mémoires historiques et philosophiques in his edition of the Éléments de physiogie, 
see ‘Annexe’ in Denis Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Motoichi Terada 
(Paris: Éditions Matériologiques, 2019), pp. 513–93 [hereafter MT]. His edition 
was published in June 2019, when plans for this monograph’s connected digital 
edition were already far advanced. Our digital edition allows the reader to interact 
with and visualise Naigeon’s mosaic rewriting in a rather different way, and also 
restores the passages which the Brière editors censored; this is on the basis of a 
comparison between the printed version and the original manuscript (ms cote 2127, 
Bibliothèque Carnegie de Reims). 
2  See above.
© Caroline Warman, CC BY 4.0 https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0199.12
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ces ouvrages qui m’a paru le plus profond’ [an analytical account of 
the particular work of his that I thought most profound].3 Given that 
one hundred pages of Naigeon’s Mémoires historiques et philosophiques 
are given over to the presentation of Diderot’s philosophy of the 
‘opérations de l’entendement humain’ [operations of the human 
understanding]4, and that of these one hundred pages no fewer than 
seventy-eight are made of an intricate mosaic of quotation from the 
Éléments de physiologie and the Rêve de d’Alembert, and that no other of 
Diderot’s works is treated in an even remotely similar manner, there is 
no room to question that this is indeed ‘celui de ces ouvrages qui m’a 
paru le plus profond’ [the particular work of his that I thought most 
profound]. Before examining what this intricate mosaic actually looks 
like, let alone why Naigeon presents it as a single work rather than 
two separate texts, though, a rapid sketch of the Mémoires historiques 
et philosophiques as a whole is required. 
Firstly, composition dates. 
In Naigeon’s article on ‘Diderot’ in the Encyclopédie méthodique, he 
states he gave over the six months following Diderot’s death to the 
composition of the Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, and early in 
the text itself he dates that particular moment of writing to October 
1784.5 So, he started in 1784, and he was still working on it in 1792 
and in 1798, when he was obliged to interrupt writing to bring out his 
edition (and selection) of the Œuvres de Diderot in order to counter 
both the damaging mis-attribution of Étienne-Gabriel Morelly’s Code 
de la nature and to correct the unauthorised editions of, amongst 
others, Jacques le fataliste, La Religieuse, and the Supplément au voyage de 
Bougainville, which all came out in 1796.6 This means it had an on-off 
3  Jacques-André Naigeon, ‘Diderot’, in Encyclopédie méthodique: philosophie ancienne et 
modern, 3 vols (Paris: Panckoucke, 1791–94), vol. 2 (1792), p. 228; see discussion 
above in Chapter 6.
4  Naigeon, Mémoires historiques et philosophiques sur la vie et les ouvrages de Denis Diderot 
(Paris: J. L. L. Brière, 1821 [1823]; repr. Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1970), p. 207, 
https://naigeons-diderot.mml.ox.ac.uk/files/main/mvod.htm#page207.
5  Naigeon, ‘Diderot’, Philosophie ancienne et moderne, vol. 2 (1792), p. 153; Naigeon, 
Mémoires historiques et philosophiques sur la vie et les ouvrages de Denis Diderot (Paris: J. 
L. L. Brière, 1821 [1823]; repr. Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1970), p. 41.
6  Naigeon lambasts the edition of the first two in the Œuvres, discussed above. 
He savages the editor of the Opuscules philosophiques et littéraires, l’abbé Bourlet 
de Vauxcelles, in which the Supplément au voyage de Bougainville appeared, in the 
Mémoires, calling him ‘un de ces écrivains obscurs, ignorés dans la république des 
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composition period of at least fourteen years, and almost certainly a 
bit more. Scholar Rudolf Brummer’s careful comparison of dates and 
mentions leads him to surmise that it was probably finished shortly 
before 1800, given that in the Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, 
Naigeon refers to the Œuvres that he had recently published.7 It has 
been suggested that the Mémoires historiques et philosophiques were in 
fact never finished, but the evidence of the text and its underlying 
manuscript does not support such a claim.8
lettres, et qui, sans goût, sans style, sans idées, y traînent publiquement un nom 
ridicule ou avili’ [one of those obscure and spurned writers of the republic of letters 
who, devoid of style or ideas, publicly flaunt their absurd or debased name around]. 
And he’s only just warming up to his theme (Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, 
p. 379).
7  Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, p. 414; Rudolf Brummer, Studien zur 
Französischen Auflärungsliteratur im Anschluss an J.-A. Naigeon, Romanische Philologie 
(Breslau: Priebatsch’s Buchandlung, 1932), p. 27. Interestingly, on this same page of 
the Mémoires, their publisher Brière provides a footnote (signed ‘B’) saying that the 
Mémoires were finished in 1795. This is contradicted by mention of the 1798 Œuvres 
only a few lines later, as well as discussion of Vauxcelles’s ‘Recueil’ of 1796, see the 
previous note, and Mémoires, p. 377. It’s not clear whether the editors have decided 
to fix on 1795 as the date of completion for some unknown reason or association, or 
whether this date is the result of an oversight.
8  It appears to be librarian and bibliographer (and the same person who was accused 
of atheism at the École normale, see above) Antoine-Alexandre Barbier’s entry 
on ‘Diderot’ in his Examen critique et complément des dictionnaires historiques les plus 
répandus (Paris: Rey et Gravier  ; Baudouin frères, 1820), t. 1, p. 256 which leads 
scholars Emmanuel Boussuge and Françoise Launay to think this. Barbier, who 
knew the whereabouts of the manuscript before it was published, does indeed say 
‘Il est bon d’observer que l’ouvrage de M. Naigeon n’est pas terminé’ [it is right to 
observe that Mr Naigeon’s work is not finished], although he doesn’t substantiate 
his ‘observation’. The preface of the Brière edition of the Mémoires does not state 
that is incomplete, but rather, that without it, the edition of Diderot’s works and 
knowledge of his life would be incomplete: ‘C’est cet ouvrage […] qui laissait 
incomplètes et les Œuvres et l’histoire de la vie de celui qui éleva le monument 
encyclopédique’ [it is this work (…) which left the Œuvres and the story of the 
life of the man who built the monument of the Encyclopedia incomplete] (p. v). 
The version that was published was, as Maurice Tourneux observed and we show 
in the digital edition [https://naigeons-diderot.mml.ox.ac.uk/files/main/msmvod.
htm], lightly censored by the editors of the Brière edition in order to avoid post-
publication difficulties (which came anyway) and was therefore itself not complete. 
The fact that a censored version was published does not mean that the work itself 
was left unfinished. The manuscript is, as Boussuge and Launay helpfully tell us, 
in the Bibliothèque Carnegie de Reims. See Emmanuel Boussuge and Françoise 
Launay, ‘Du nouveau sur Jacques André Naigeon (1735–1810) et sur ses livres et 
manuscrits’, RDE, 53.1 (2018), 145–92, https://doi.org/10.4000/rde.5698.
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Fig. 12.1 First page of the manuscript of Naigeon’s Mémoires, 
Bibliothèque Carnegie de Reims, MS 2127, f. 1., Jacques-André Naigeon 
(copyist probably his brother Charles-Claude), 1798-1800, Ink on paper, 
MS of Jacques-André Naigeon, Mémoires historiques et philosophiques 
sur la vie et les ouvrages de Denis Diderot, Bibliothèque Carnegie de 
Reims, CC-BY
Secondly, why was it not published during Naigeon’s lifetime? He 
appears to have planned to publish it on completion—he repeatedly 
refers the reader to it, as we have seen. However, as we know, he did not 
publish it, and he died in 1810 with it still unpublished. We probably do 
not have to search far for reasons: already by 1800, Napoleon Bonaparte’s 
censorship régime was firming up; in March 1801, the new illustrated 
edition of Sade’s novels Justine and Juliette would be entirely destroyed; 
in April 1802, Naigeon’s publisher Pierre Didot cut the anti-clerical 
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In 1802, as a ‘philosophe sans fortune’, he was given the sum of 1,200 
francs, in an order signed by Napoleon himself.13 He did not receive 
any more such grants, and sold his collection of precious books to the 
publisher Didot in 1808, who set aside half of this amount to provide 
Naigeon with an annual income.14 When Naigeon died in late February 
1810, he was living with his sister, Mme Dufour de Villeneuve, in a flat 
on the Rue du Bac.15 In sum, he could not afford to publish the Mémoires 
historiques et philosophiques; his financial situation was too precarious, 
13  Brummer, Studien, p. 12; Brummer references the Archives nationales, AF IV, plaquette 
389.
14  Boussuge and Launay, ‘Du nouveau sur Jacques André Naigeon’, pp. 166, 166 n. 73. 
15  Boussuge and Launay, ‘Du nouveau sur Jacques André Naigeon’, p. 167.
preface to his edition of the Bordeaux copy of Montaigne’s Essais; in 
1805, Napoleon commanded that eminent astronomer Jérôme Lalande 
should no longer be allowed to publish, his atheism having become too 
strident.9 Yet, it is not as if Naigeon’s Mémoires historiques et philosophiques 
were censored (or not at this point); to be subject to censorship it would 
have needed to be published, and it did not even get that far.10 Why 
would Naigeon not even try to publish something so important to him, 
something for which he had gone to such lengths to prepare an expectant 
space in the minds of those who read his utterances on Diderot? Rudolf 
Brummer, whose rather amazing research was published in 1932, shows 
us how indigent Naigeon was at this time. He was reliant on the French 
state for accommodation—granted to him as a member of the Institut 
national from its creation in 179511—and was provided with free rooms 
overlooking the Louvre in the ‘maison d’Angevilliers’ (probably the 
Hôtel d’Angivillier or Angiviller, knocked down in the 1850s).12 
9  For Lalande, see Boussuge and Launay, ‘Du nouveau sur Jacques André Naigeon’, 
p. 166. In 1805, Lalande published a supplement to Sylvain Maréchal’s Dictionnaire 
des athées which we have already had occasion to mention in connection to Sade, see 
above.
10  Of course, when they were finally published in 1823, they were immediately banned 
(David Adams, Bibliographie des œuvres de Diderot, 1739–1900, 2 vols (Ferney-Voltaire: 
Centre international d’étude du XVIIIe siècle, 2000), vol. 2, p. 141).
11  Naigeon was made a member of the Institut national, Classe des Sciences morales et 
politiques, but the section he was invited to be part of was ‘Morale’. See above. 
12  See https://bibliotheques-specialisees.paris.fr/ark:/73873/pf0001771897/0025. 
The Hôtel d’Angivill[i]er seems to have been on the now also non-existent Place 
de l’Oratoire, https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Place_de_l%27Oratoire_(Paris); 
Brummer, Studien, p. 12; Brummer references the Archives nationales, AF III, 582, 
3981, p. 64.
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Fig. 12.2 Place de l’Oratoire, where Naigeon lived in the early 1800s, by 
unknown, c. 1810, Lithograph, From Fedor Hoffbauer, Paris à travers les 
âges aspects successifs des monuments et quartiers historiques de Paris depuis 
le XIIIe siècle jusqu’à nos jours (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1875-1882). Entrée 




and he was personally indebted to Napoleon, as well as known by the 
Emperor to be a critic of his régime, Napoleon himself being one of 
the owners of the eight remaining copies of the censored Montaigne 
preface.16 How the Mémoires historiques et philosophiques actually emerged 
into the world of print thirteen years later, in 1823, as the last volume in 
the Brière edition, is another slightly anxiety-inducing story to which we 
will come in due course.
As the editors of the Brière edition themselves announce in their 
‘Avertissement des Éditeurs’, the Mémoires historiques et philosophiques sur 
16  See above.
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la vie et les ouvrages de Denis Diderot does two main things in the course of 
its 416 pages. Firstly, it gives ‘l’histoire des ouvrages connus pour être de 
Diderot’ [the history of the works known to be by Diderot] and secondly, 
it provides ‘une analyse exacte de tous les manuscrits non publiés’ [an 
accurate analysis of all his unpublished manuscripts]. In sum, it is a cross 
between an intellectual biography and an annotated bibliography, and 
its author repeatedly appeals to the ‘lecteur philosophe’ [philosopher 
reader] (pp.  164, 410), while lambasting the ‘lecteurs superficiels, 
inattentifs et paresseux’ [superficial, inattentive, and lazy readers] (p. 
43), as well as those persecutors of Diderot who are as stupid as they are 
malevolent (p. 165). This differentiation between the philosophical and 
the superficial reader is one we have seen Naigeon make consistently.17 
What he does not do very much is communicate personal details 
about Diderot the man, as the ‘Avertissement des éditeurs’ also points 
out, and they therefore append Jacques-Henri Meister’s short piece ‘A 
la mémoire de Diderot’ (1786).18 They do not mention that they also 
include a three-page note in tiny font ‘Extrait d’un manuscrit de M. de 
Vandeuil Diderot’ [sic] which contains various sentimental details about 
his imprisonment at Vincennes, his difficulties with the Encyclopédie, 
the support he received from Catherine II of Russia, his death, what his 
autopsy revealed, and how Langres wished to celebrate its most famous 
son. This information is presumably drawn from the memoir written by 
Angélique Diderot, Mme de Vandeul, not by her husband; nor does his 
surname, Vandeul, contain the word ‘deuil’, grief, mourning, even if, in 
the context, the mis-spelling has a certain symbolic resonance.19 
Naigeon, however, focuses on the writings, and discusses them 
chronologically, starting therefore with Diderot’s first translation 
commission, of L’Histoire de Grèce, de Temple Stanyan, on page 30, to end, 
four hundred pages later with an almost throwaway, almost arrogant 
17  See above.
18  ‘Avertissement des éditeurs’, in Naigeon, Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, pp. 
v–vi. Meister’s ‘A la mémoire de Diderot’ can be found on pp. 419–29.
19  Jules Assézat and Maurice Tourneux state that the Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire de 
la vie et des ouvrages de Diderot par Mme de Vandeul, sa fille were circulating from 1787. 
They were first published in 1830, in the Mémoires, correspondance et ouvrages inédites 
de Diderot, publiés d’après les manuscrits confiés en mourant par l’auteur à Grimm, also 
known as the Œuvres inédites de Diderot, 4 vols (Paris: Paulin, 1830), vol. 1, pp. 1–64. 
See Denis Diderot, Œuvres complètes, ed. by  Jules Assézat and Maurice Tourneux 
(Paris: Garnier Frères, 1875–77), vol. 1 (1875), p. xxvi.
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flourish: ‘Voilà, en général, ce que j’avais à dire des manuscrits 
de Diderot’ [That, in general, is what I had to say about Diderot’s 
manuscripts], regretting the lack of a Pierre Bayle to assess the value 
of the Œuvres de Diderot he has brought out, and closing with a line 
from Montaigne.20
The Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, then, appears to be the 
third part of Naigeon’s strategy for the publication of Diderot’s works. 
The first part consists of the dictionary article on Diderot from 1792, in 
which he discussed the Pensées philosophiques, the Lettre sur les aveugles 
and the Lettre sur les sourds et muets, the Pensées sur l’interprétation de la 
nature, all works which had been published long before and were known 
to be by Diderot, while also publishing the Principes philosophiques sur la 
matière et le mouvement for the first time.21 This is Diderot the philosopher, 
the emitter of wise aphorisms, the condensed and somewhat gnomic 
thinker. Secondly, in 1798, the Œuvres de Diderot in fifteen volumes, 
which presents the weighty and multi-faceted genius who is primarily 
a philosopher (vols 1–3), but also a dramatist (vol. 4), a historian of 
philosophy and encyclopedist (vols 5–6), an ancient historian and 
moralist (8–9), a novelist (vols 10–12), and a profound thinker about art 
(vols 13–15). As we see, the writer of fiction is sandwiched towards the 
back end of this panoply of production, detracting, so far as Naigeon is 
concerned, from the image he wishes to present to the (wary) public 
of Diderot as a serious philosopher, a virtuous moralist, someone who 
ponders the sublime, and is by no means the immoral monster or threat 
to the state whom Gracchus Babeuf and others (including Naigeon 
himself) had contributed to constructing.22 Part three, then, is what we 
find in the Mémoires. Here, within the framework of the chronological 
account of the more-or-less virtuous and serious works Naigeon 
has already edited, he ever so carefully weaves in some of Diderot’s 
unknown works and manuscripts. 
Here he brings into the fold works that he had not previously 
mentioned: the Promenade du Sceptique (not published until 1830), the 
Apologie de l’Abbé de Prades (published in 1752, but often supposed to 
20  Naigeon mentions Diderot’s manuscripts: Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, p. 
414; Bayle: p. 415; Montaigne: p. 416.
21  See above.
22  See above in Chapters 9 for Babeuf, and 10 for Naigeon’s emphasis on Diderot the 
philosopher.
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have been by the Abbé de Prades himself), the Plan d’une Université pour 
le gouvernement de Russie (first published, like Naigeon’s Mémoires, in 
the Brière edition of 1821–23). These all appear as separate entries, all 
capitalised, in the table of contents, as indeed are all the other known 
and previously published works that appear there. Of the twenty-five 
headings, however, five are given in a little lower-case clump, separated 
only by the ELOGE DE RICHARDSON, and together they make up 
126 pages, or more than a quarter of the book. Of these 126 pages, 100 
are given over to the mesh of the Éléments de physiologie (which is not 
named) and the Rêve de d’Alembert (which is). The given titles of these 
lower-case sections are as follows: the Suppression de l’Encyclopédie; 
Divers petits papiers; Danger imminent auquel Diderot se trouve exposé; 
Suite d’un entretien philosophique supposé, entre d’Alembert et Diderot; 
Le Rêve de d’Alembert. In the first and third of these sections, Naigeon 
discusses the suppression of the Encyclopédie and the risk Diderot 
ran by not leaving Paris after the chevalier de la Barre’s execution in 
1766 when tensions ran high.23 The second section, the ‘Divers petits 
papiers’ [various short papers], on which Naigeon bestows the grand 
total of three pages, refer to a trio of short pieces, the first two of which 
Naigeon had published in his Œuvres: ‘Les Réflexions sur Térence’ 
(now known as ‘De Térence’), ‘L’Histoire et le secret de la peinture en 
cire’ [History and secret of painting in wax] and a ‘Mémoire’ [Memo] 
which Diderot wrote to defend the publishers of the Encyclopédie from 
the accusation—brought by Pierre-Joseph Luneau de Boisjermain 
(1731–1801)—that they had not fulfilled the promises laid out in 
their original prospectus in a lawsuit.24 The final two of the modest 
lower-case headings, the Suite d’un entretien philosophique supposé, entre 
d’Alembert et Diderot and Le Rêve de d’Alembert, contain the core of the 
23  François-Jean de la Barre, aged twenty, had been accused and convicted of 
blasphemy, impiety, and sacrilege, for having allegedly profaned a crucifix, failed 
to take his hat off when a religious procession passed, and owned infamous books, 
including Voltaire’s Dictionnaire philosophique, a copy of which was nailed to his 
headless body and burned with him. Voltaire was safe in his château of Ferney on 
the Swiss border, but Diderot was within the instant grasp of the authorities, had 
they wished to seize him.
24  Naigeon, Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, pp. 194–95. For more on this suit, see 
Kate E. Tunstall, ‘La fabrique du Diderot-philosophe, 1765-1782’ , Les Dossiers du Grihl, 
2 (2017), https://doi.org/10.4000/dossiersgrihl.6793, especially paragraphs 25–26, 
as discussed above.
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book, and the titles would lead us to suppose that they discuss the 
first two parts of what we now know as Le Rêve de d’Alembert. Le Rêve 
would be published with all three parts in 1830.25 As I will argue, their 
appearance in Naigeon’s Mémoires constitutes the first print publication 
of both the Rêve de d’Alembert and the Éléments de physiologie, although 
as I will also show, both are considerably abridged and deformed. To 
consider why this is will also be my task, but no doubt the answer 
is partly that Naigeon is taking immense care to shepherd a very 
particular Diderot into the public arena, one that he hopes will survive 
unscathed, untainted by accusations of immorality. The anti-clerical 
atheist is not the Diderot Naigeon wishes to let go of; on the contrary. 
But he wishes to present his anti-clerical atheist as a virtuous hero of 
sublime nobility and seriousness. He can be atheist but not smutty 
or low, let alone debauched or immoral. Hence, presumably, his 
downplaying of Diderot the author of Jacques le fataliste.26 Hence, also, 
one assumes, his non-inclusion of the Neveu de Rameau, which he only 
mentions in passing in a couple of sub-clauses as ‘une excellente satire’ 
(and not as anything more problematic than that); the Paradoxe sur le 
comédien is only alluded to and not even named.27 Hence, furthermore, 
as we shall see, the removal from the Rêve de d’Alembert of all its racy 
aspects and its transformation into teacherly prose. 
Naigeon’s tripartite plan is consistent, so much so, that we should 
not be surprised to see a passage from the Adresse à l’Assemblée nationale 
we dwelt on at some length in an earlier section reappear at the very 
end of the Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, the part that says so 
forthrightly, ‘quand on a quelque chose de bon à dire, il faut se presser’ 
[when you have something good to say, you must hurry up and say it]: 
that entire passage is repeated here verbatim.28 Perhaps he wrote it for 
the Mémoires first, and then re-used it in the Adresse. We cannot know, 
and it probably does not matter; the point is that what he published in 
25  Denis Diderot, Œuvres inédites de Diderot, vol. 4, pp. 102–239. Followed by the 
Promenade du sceptique, pp. 241–382. The three parts are: L’Entretien entre d’Alembert; 
Le Rêve de d’Alembert; La Suite de l’Entretien.
26  See above.
27  Naigeon mentions the Le Neveu de Rameau in Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, p. 
316; Le Paradoxe sur le comédien and implicitly Neveu de Rameau also: pp. 173–74. 
28  See above; Adresse à l’Assemblée nationale sur la liberté des opinions, sur celle de la 
presse, etc. (Paris: Volland, 1790), pp. 9–10, re-used from Mémoires historiques et 
philosophiques, p. 413.
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1790 and what he writes in the Mémoires, whether before or after, is all 
part of the same thing, part of the same approach, with a consistent 
conceptualisation and constant broadcasting of Diderot as a weighty 
moral atheist. The repeated cross-references across his various Diderot 
texts, not just forward to the unpublished and much heralded Mémoires 
but also back from them to his edition of the Œuvres, underscore the fact 
that this is a single grand design, a single weave, however complex, with 
repeating patterns or motifs. 
Such a scheme is not surprising perhaps, given that Naigeon had 
been a contributor to the original Encyclopédie, with its extraordinary 
architecture of cross-references.29 And yet the impact and very presence 
of the French Revolution, and the concommitant scattering and 
deferral of the dates of composition, completion, and publication of 
these different texts and editions, have made Naigeon’s design rather 
hard to discern. However, the presence of the cross-references and the 
connections they make between the different parts shed some light, and 
in the various remarks Naigeon makes about editing in general and 
editing Diderot in particular, we find more. We have lifted these out for 
inspection wherever we have found them; it may be useful now to recall 
them.
In the censored Montaigne preface, Naigeon makes his most explicit 
statements about what an editor can and should do, perfecting the 
writing an author has produced, tidying the style, removing bumps that 
interrupt the harmony (literally harmonising it), and using his superior 
taste—his finer sense of beauty and of the proprieties—to add value to 
the resulting text. In his general preface to the Œuvres de Diderot and also 
in the individual introductions to Jacques le fataliste and La Religieuse, he 
explains what he would have removed from both of these novels, had 
he been the first to publish them and therefore had control over the text 
that appeared.30 He returns to this theme in the Mémoires, and reiterates 
that La Religieuse, although an important novel, should have been shorn 
of some revolting and potentially morally dangerous scenes before 
29  Naigeon contributed three articles to the Encyclopédie. They were: the opening 
section of ‘Liberté’, ‘Richesse’, and ‘Unitaires’. See Franz A. Kafker and Serena 
L. Kafker, The Encyclopedists as Individuals (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1988) 
reproduced in the online Encyclopédie, ed. by Robert Morrissey and Glenn Roe, 
https://artflsrv03.uchicago.edu/philologic4/kafker/navigate/1/97/.
30  See above.
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publication, and that Jacques le fataliste is too long by half, being digressive 
and affected, often licentious and therefore (supposedly) insipid and 
cold.31 It does not matter here whether Naigeon is demonstrating that 
he completely lacks any sense of humour or understanding of Diderot’s 
depiction of bodies driven by desire, or whether he simply considers 
that such depictions are unwise given the generally hostile climate, and 
therefore unlikely to facilitate the acceptance of Diderot’s works. His 
stated and restated view is that there are two Diderot tones, the sublime 
philosophical one which is excellent, and the low and informal one 
which is bad.32 His duty, as he states it with great pride and emotion 
when publishing Diderot’s letter to him, is to take on ‘le soin d’arranger, 
de revoir et de publier tout ce qui lui paroîtra ne devoir nuire ni à ma 
mémoire, ni à la tranquillité de personne’ [the duty to organize, review 
and publish anything which he considers will not do any damage to my 
memory or to anyone’s security].33 Thus, Naigeon presents himself as 
authorised to intervene as he sees fit, both by his general calling as an 
editor and also by Diderot’s expressed wishes. And we can see that the 
likelihood is that he will suppress anything he perceives as being in bad 
taste, and that he may make innumerable small changes to ‘harmonise’ 
it. This much we can infer, but when it comes to his ‘analyse raisonnée 
de celui de ces ouvrages qui m’a paru le plus profond’ we also have his 
specific comments and framing.
Taking the specific comments first, he tells us how impossible it 
is to publish the substantial portfolio of manuscripts Diderot was 
writing between 1765 and 1779 (p. 205). This is for reasons to do with 
circumstances that ‘il n’est point en [s]on pouvoir de changer’ [it is 
not in [his] power to change] and which mean that ‘l’épreuve pénible 
et dangereuse de l’impression’ [the painful and dangerous ordeal 
of printing] cannot be thought of (p. 205). And thus he warns ‘les 
dépositaires de ces manuscrits’ [those who hold the manuscripts] not 
to publish these works in their entirety, because, however pure their 
intentions, it would damage Diderot’s reputation to do so (p. 206).
31  Naigeon, Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, pp. 311–13.
32  Naigeon, Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, p. 206.
33  Naigeon, ‘Préface de l’éditeur’, in Diderot, Œuvres (Paris: Desray et Déterville, 
1798), vol. 1, p. xxxii (for full quote, see above); Denis Diderot, Correspondance, ed. 
by Georges Roth and Jean Varloot, 15 vols (Paris: Minuit, 1955–70), vol. 12, p. 231 (3 
June 1773).
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Fig. 12.3 Naigeon warns ‘those who hold’ Diderot’s manuscripts not 
to publish them, Bibliothèque Carnegie de Reims, MS 2127, f. 117, 
Jacques-André Naigeon (copyist probably his brother Charles-Claude), 
1798-1800, Ink and paper, MS of Jacques-André Naigeon, Mémoires 
historiques et philosophiques sur la vie et les ouvrages de Denis 
Diderot, Bibliothèque Carnegie de Reims, CC-BY
Here, of course, Naigeon is explicitly recalling the wording of 
Diderot’s letter. Instead, Naigeon proposes that what is needed is ‘éditeur 
qui joigne à des connaissances profondes sur divers objets, un esprit 
juste, et surtout un goût très-sévère’ [an editor who combines profound 
knowledge across diverse subjects, a clear and accurate mind, and above 
all taste of the most rigorous kind] (p. 205). This knowledgeable and 
judicious editor with very severe tastes is, we divine, Naigeon himself. 
We know already that he will amend and cut where he sees fit, and so 
he says: he will be giving the reader ‘une idée très-exacte’ [an entirely 
accurate idea] of these works (p. 205), excising wherever required 
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‘une expression, une ligne de mauvais goût’ [an expression or a line 
in bad taste] specifically, he explains, to avoid provoking the hostility 
of women and high-society people, who, while being completely 
unoriginal themselves, are very hard to please and very contemptuous 
(p. 206). The idea of women as critics or arbiters of anything provokes 
almost as much of a venomous reaction in Naigeon as do priests, as his 
censored preface to the Montaigne edition makes rantingly explicit.34 It 
is not therefore surprising that in the lines from the Rêve de d’Alembert in 
the following pages, the prominent role played by Julie de Lespinasse 
in the dialogue is removed, as is anything which fails to meet the ‘very 
severe’ standards of propriety whose necessity Naigeon has decreed.
These comments give us some general indication of what we can 
expect. Naigeon also frames the presentation of the texts quite carefully, 
clearly indicating start and finish, specifying what he will be focusing 
on at the beginning, and explaining how he has modified the texts 
at the end. Thus, he will particularly be looking at ‘la morale’ and ‘la 
philosophie rationnelle’ (p. 207).35 Under the heading ‘Suite d’un 
entretien philosophique supposé, entre d’Alembert et Diderot’, which 
is very close to the title of the first dialogue in what is now known as 
the Rêve de d’Alembert, Naigeon explains that Diderot considered Locke 
and Condillac’s writings on the workings of human understanding to 
be incomplete and often rather vague (p. 207). Diderot had therefore 
decided, Naigeon says, to:
traiter ce sujet avec plus de précision, de philosopher sur des principes 
très-différents de ceux qui sont communément reçus, et de donner en 
quelque sorte une formule générale pour résoudre facilement toutes les 
questions qui concernent le phénomène identique de la sensation et de 
la pensée.36
treat this subject with greater precision, to philosophise on the basis of 
principles which are completely different from those which are commonly 
accepted, and as it were to provide a sort of general formula for the 
easy resolution of all questions relating to the identical phenomenon of 
sensation and thought.
34  See above. See also Naigeon, Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, p. 410.
35  See https://naigeons-diderot.mml.ox.ac.uk/files/main/mvod.htm#page207.
36  Naigeon, Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, p. 207, and https://naigeons-diderot.
mml.ox.ac.uk/files/main/mvod.htm#page207.
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It seems worth drawing out how specific and yet wide-reaching this 
statement of Naigeon’s is, even at the risk of simply paraphrasing it: 
Diderot planned to base his philosophy on different principles, to 
be much more precise, and to give some sort of general formula; 
this formula would henceforth resolve all questions relating to the 
sensation and thought, which in any case are the same thing. Naigeon’s 
presentation of Diderot’s plan seems strategically rather prudent: Locke 
and Condillac with the gaps filled in, plus some new and different 
principles (unspecified) to work from. This will make sense to the 
general educated reader of the time as well as to the ‘lecteur philosophe’ 
[philosopher reader], and be more or less unproblematic, and although 
we remember Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin’s outrage that Condillac’s 
theories should be deemed acceptable, it is clear from the publications 
of the Revolutionary government (the École normale, the Institut 
national) that Locke and Condillac’s theories of thought were indeed 
widely accepted. What follows over the next three pages is not exactly 
what Naigeon will subsequently call ‘le précis analytique’ [analytical 
summary] of this imagined conversation between d’Alembert and 
Diderot, although with a few differences ‘dans l’ordre et l’enchaînement 
des idées’ [in the order and connection of the ideas] (p. 210). It is not a 
summary written by Naigeon. It is instead his selection of sentences and 
propositions from Diderot’s text imported into this one, along with a 
few connectives, as consultation of the connected digital edition of these 
pages will demonstrate.37 This is the first appearance of the opening 
section of the Rêve de d’Alembert in print, somewhere between a synopsis 
and a very harsh abridgement.38 Naigeon does not in fact re-write the 
original; he cuts and he reorders. In it we find a few brief lines on 
sensibility as a property of matter, but the greater part of the quotation 
fixes on the repeated motif of the human as a musical instrument, 
whether as a philosophical one, as a feeling harpsichord or, different 
again, as merely an animal, also presented as a sensitive instrument 
whose strings can also be played or plucked. 
He then starts working up to ‘le second Dialogue’, which he announces 
as being ‘beaucoup plus varié et plus profond que le premier’ [much 
37  See  https://naigeons-diderot.mml.ox.ac.uk/files/main/mvod.htm#page207.
38  Naigeon, Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, pp. 207–10. See https://naigeons-
diderot.mml.ox.ac.uk/files/main/mvod.htm#page207.
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more varied and more profound than the first] (p. 213); it is on this 
page, in a footnote, that he commences the quotation from the Éléments 
de physiologie. He continues to assert that the text is a dialogue, that it 
is called Le Rêve de d’Alembert (p. 213) and that what he is providing is 
‘une analyse’ that is more or less exact (p. 219). Seventy pages later, he 
signals the end of his analysis of the ‘second Dialogue’ with a paragraph 
detailing his techniques and the negative consequences they may have 
had on the original. This is worth quoting in full, given how accurately 
he describes his editing technique (while concealing or disguising other 
aspects):
Telle est, autant que ma mémoire et le secours de quelques extraits 
très-succincts faits autrefois sur l’original, pour ma propre utilité, 
peuvent m’en assurer, l’analyse de ce second Dialogue. Si n’ayant 
aucune copie de ces deux manuscrits de Diderot, il m’est arrivé 
quelquefois, comme cela est assez vraisemblable, de changer l’ordre 
et l’enchaînement des idées de l’auteur, c’est qu’indépendamment de 
cette raison qui explique et justifie assez ce renversement, cet ordre n’est 
pas le même pour celui qui compose, et pour celui qui veut, pour ainsi 
dire, embrasser d’un coup d’œil l’ensemble d’un ouvrage, et indiquer 
rapidement les grands anneaux de la chaîne, sans les lier entre eux 
par les idées intermédiaires. Je sens néanmoins que les raisonnements 
de Diderot, ainsi abrégés, transposés, détachés du système dont il font 
partie, et presque toujours séparés de leurs principes généraux, ou des 
faits qui les éclaircissent et qui les confirment, ne peuvent pas avoir 
pour ceux qui n’ont pas lu son Dialogue, le même degré de force et 
d’évidence qu’ils ont pour moi.39
That, insofar as my memory and the help of a few extremely short 
passages copied long ago from the original for my personal use confirm, 
is the analysis of this second Dialogue. If, having no copy of these two 
manuscripts of Diderot’s, it has sometimes occurred, as seems highly 
likely, that I changed the order and connections of the author’s ideas, 
this is because, independently from this reason which is explanation 
and justification enough, the order is not the same for the person who 
composes it as it is for the person who wishes, so to speak, to embrace 
in a single glance the work as a whole, and rapidly indicate the main 
links in the chain without providing the intermediary ones. I sense 
nonetheless that Diderot’s arguments, abridged, transposed, detached 
39  Naigeon, Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, pp. 290–91 (my emphasis). See 
https://naigeons-diderot.mml.ox.ac.uk/files/main/mvod.htm#page290.
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from the system they were part of, and almost always separated from 
the general principles and from the examples which illustrate and 
prove them, cannot have for those who have not read his Dialogue, the 
same degree of force and evidence that they have for me.
Taking these statements in order, let us start by dismissing the claim 
that ‘quelques extraits très-succincts’ could have supplied the range of 
quotation we find, either from the second part of the Rêve de d’Alembert 
or from the Éléments de physiologie. The 420 lines from the former and 
1000 lines from the latter are from all over each text, and intricately 
woven together. Although the mesh of the two texts together is 
indisputably shorter than the two in their separate entirety, it is not 
made from a few very short extracts, and even less so from memory. 
It is implausible that he could have done this work without access to 
both in their manuscript form whether these were copies he himself 
had made, ones from the Fonds Vandeul, or yet others. The likelihood 
is that it is this specific piece of work that took him so many years to 
complete, and the term that is accurate is the plural noun ‘extracts’, not 
the misleading qualifiers.
Calling it ‘ce second Dialogue’, and therefore, in context, referring 
specifically to the text of which he has given an ‘analysis’ from page 213 
to 290, he then claims to have no copy of either of the two manuscripts. 
This tells us that he is working not just with one source text but two, 
which is, as we know, the exact truth. 
The third crucial element of this passage regards the description of 
his technique, which is to change the order of the author’s ideas and 
the way they are linked together; he returns to this aspect to describe it 
again, stating that Diderot’s arguments had been ‘abrégés, transposés, 
détachés’ [abridged, transposed, detached], and from what? From the 
system of which they were part, from their general principles, and 
from the ‘facts’ (or examples) which explain and demonstrate them. 
All these statements appear to be substantiated by the reworked text he 
gives us, which indeed is devoid of the starker materialist explication 
we find in Diderot, does explain things in a different order, and does 
give many fewer examples and cases. This is true whether we are 
talking here about the Rêve de d’Alembert or the Éléments de physiologie. 
Naigeon is right to fear that he has weakened the impact of the source 
text (or texts), but really, this is not about judging (or condemning) 
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what he has done, but about noticing what he says: he states in perfect 
honesty that his version is less good than the source text (or texts), and 
in so doing signals the existence of the latter. Yet he also justifies his 
approach, thereby exemplifying his view of the editor’s contribution: 
‘the person who composes’ (the author) is not the same as ‘the person 
who wants to see at a glance the entirety of a work and rapidly explain 
the main links in the chain’ (the editor); we see also how ‘the person 
who composes’ is presented without any amplifying description, 
whereas the other (the editor) has a series of complex listed aims. 
The differentiation of authorial and editorial roles which we see in 
the censored Montaigne preface is therefore confirmed here, despite 
Naigeon’s apologetic remarks about his account having less impact 
and being less persuasive.
It is at this point in the Mémoires that Naigeon begins to talk about 
fragments and scattered materials; in Chapter 2, we looked at how this 
passage repeats the opening ‘Avertissement’ of the Éléments, and how 
this particular mystification about its fragmentary and incomplete 
nature has been turned into the received story about it. I will not 
therefore return to that issue, but instead attempt to describe the version 
he gives us. He himself suggests, as we saw above, that what he has 
done is to give an overview such that the reader can see the whole at 
a glance, while also grasping the main links. However, as we already 
indicated, this is not quite right: it is not a summary of the whole of the 
Éléments and the whole of the second part of the Rêve de d’Alembert, also 
called the ‘Rêve de d’Alembert’; it is a mosaic made from the two texts, 
and as a mosaic, it is not even very representative of its source texts. It 
focuses on various themes, broadly summarisable under the headings 
of sensation and human understanding, according to which it organises 
all the different Diderotian utterances. It is rather repetitive. 
Before going further into our description, we should at this point 
remind ourselves of the different manuscript variants of the Éléments de 
physiologie, of which there are two still in existence, and one (which may 
or may not differ from the others) which is now lost. These are, firstly, 
the early draft that went with the collection of Diderot’s manuscripts to 
Catherine II in Russia and is now in St Petersburg, secondly, the mature 
version that is part of the Fonds Vandeul in the Bibliothèque nationale 
in Paris, and thirdly, the copy recorded by Hippolyte Walferdin in 1837, 
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along with its dedicatory letter to the Comité d’instruction publique 
dated 24 March 1794, and whose whereabouts are now unknown. We 
do not know whether Naigeon was using the early incomplete draft, the 
mature text, an intermediary or simply a different one. We could make 
arguments for all these to be the case, as there is evidence to support 
each supposition.40 Without getting involved in the nitty-gritty of this 
particular issue at this stage, let us simply say that the most plausible 
solution is to suppose he had access to both the St Petersburg and the 
Vandeul versions, and maybe to the third (or another) one too, and 
that this would account for the presence of passages from each that 
are not in the other, and for some passages which follow the order of 
one manuscript, and others which follow the order of the other. This 
solution would also accommodate the fact that Naigeon draws on the 
‘Avertissement’ which we find only in the mature Vandeul version.
To list the areas that Naigeon covers in the order that he covers 
them allows us to describe or characterise what he does while also 
serving to reveal the aspects he emphasises or repeats. I will not at 
this point look systematically at what comes from which text or 
version thereof, but will nonetheless signal some of the major switches 
between them. So, Naigeon’s quotation from Diderot starts with a text 
from the Éléments de physiologie planted in a footnote on the brain (p. 
213n), then gives a very condensed indication of the contents of the 
introduction and first two chapters (‘Végéto-animal’ and ‘Animal’, pp. 
217–18), appends a note from the third chapter, ‘Homme’ (p. 218n), 
and then gives further quotation from this chapter, from the sub-
section on the soul (p. 221). He then has a couple of pages on organs 
and sensibility (pp. 222–23). On the following page comes the explicit 
heading of Le Rêve de d’Alembert, although in fact he continues with the 
meshed quotation from the Éléments de physiologie (there has been none 
from the ‘Rêve de d’Alembert’ to this point),41 pursuing aspects dealt 
40  We will look at this later, and also at that point discuss Terada’s view.
41  We use the italicised Rêve de d’Alembert to indicate the title of the work as a whole 
(with its three dialogues) and ‘Le Rêve de d’Alembert’ when we are talking about 
the second of these three dialogues. Naigeon only draws from this middle dialogue 
in these pages (Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, pp. 213–90), the ‘Suite d’un 
entretien philosophique supposé, entre d’Alembert et Diderot’ (the first part), 
having been dealt with earlier (pp. 207–10), and the third part, the ‘Suite de 
l’entretien précédent’ not even being mentioned.
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with in the first section of the Éléments, and looking at the question 
of the sensitive molecule (p. 224). He moves from here to the nerve 
fibre as a combination of other fibres and of the animal as a bundle of 
fibres, to the properties of life, sensitivity and irritation being common 
to all life-forms (p. 225). He then turns to movement and its laws 
(pp. 225–26), to the ceaseless change of forms, and to how the brain 
and cerebellum and nerves are the first rudiments of the animal. The 
relationship between nerves and sensation, the health of nerves and 
the effect thereof on sensation follow (p. 227), along with the well-
worn route from sensation to impression (p. 228), from impression 
to memory and thence to imagination (p. 229), to the perfecting or 
improvement of the senses (p. 230), and thereafter to the physiological 
characteristics of the nerves (p. 231). Nervous illnesses and the effects 
of compression on either the brain or the nerves are then mentioned 
(p. 232), as well as inflammation, and why pain is more intense than 
pleasure (p. 233). Muscle movement is discussed (p. 234) and then 
the different sorts of life, at the level of the molecule, the organ, and 
the animal as a whole; here we read about the increasingly unsociable 
dried-up old tendon, and learn that ‘l’homme est d’abord fluide’ [man 
is initially fluid] (p. 235). 
Discussion of the organ continues, in terms of its development, aging, 
and relationship to the rest of the body, and we come across a further 
definition of man: ‘l’homme est un assemblage d’animaux’ [man is an 
assemblage of animals] (p. 236). The next few pages are given over to 
reproduction: these are some of the relatively few passages in which 
Naigeon draws on part 2 of the Éléments de physiologie, the ‘Éléments et 
parties du corps humain’. This moves into a general theme of growth 
and transformation: ‘un œil se fait comme une anémone […], un homme 
se fait comme un œil’ [an eye grows like an anemone (…) a man grows 
like an eye] (p. 239). This theme continues (pp. 240–41), and Naigeon 
quotes from the ‘Rêve de d’Alembert’ for the first time; he then places 
passages on the relationship of part to whole, and here we meet the 
famous ‘grappe d’abeilles’ [cluster of bees] (p. 240).42 He returns to 
the Éléments de physiologie for further development of the relationship 
of part to whole; this is about the ligature of limbs and the capacity 
42  In contradistinction to the ‘Suite de l’entretien’ which he quoted from in an earlier 
named section (Naigeon, Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, pp. 208–10).
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of body parts to live separate from the whole (pp. 242–47): here we 
read that ‘chaque organe a son plaisir et sa douleur particulières’ [sic] 
[Each organ has its particular pleasure and pain] (p. 242), and that 
‘sur le champ de bataille les membres séparés s’agitent comme autant 
d’animaux’ [on the field of battle, detached limbs move about like as 
many animals] (p. 246). 
This leads to passages on the sense of self from the ‘Rêve de d’Alembert’ 
(p. 247), and we begin to see Naigeon’s technique more clearly: he 
removes the to-and-fro of the speakers’ exchange, while continuing to 
retain a certain oral quality; there is however, only one speaker, and 
that is ‘Bordeu, ou Diderot dont il est ici l’interprète’ [Bordeu, or rather 
Diderot whose mouthpiece he is] (p. 248). What is particularly striking 
about this is how Lespinasse is written out: this ‘Bordeu, ou Diderot’ is 
given one of her most famous passages, where she proposes the spider 
in its web as a way of understanding the relationship between the 
consciousness and the different body parts. Bordeu continues with her 
lines and his own, imperceptibly processed into smooth uninterrupted 
prose, as he considers the growth and development of the sensory 
organs (p. 249). 
A new paragraph returns to the Éléments de physiologie to contemplate 
(again) ‘la molécule sensible’ [the sensitive molecule] (p. 249) and the 
infinite possibilities of sensation, in an oyster or a finger (p. 250). This 
shifts into a consideration (from ‘Le Rêve’) of how each strand (‘brin’) 
of living matter can be formed or deformed; these pages bring together 
passages from ‘Le Rêve’ and the Éléments on ‘monsters’, not considered 
as monstrous, or in later terms, as abnormalities, but as perfectly 
natural, part of the endless variation and production of nature, of which 
species themselves are part (pp. 251–52). Naigeon follows this up with 
sustained quotation from the bravura passages on the endless variant 
imperfection of human beings and on the absurdity of supposing a 
master craftsman could have created them, given how imperfect they 
are (pp. 253–54); this is from the conclusion of the Éléments (in the 
mature Vandeul version, that is). 
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Fig. 12.4, Woven together extracts from the conclusion of the Éléments de 
physiologie and the Rêve de d’Alembert, Bibliothèque Carnegie de Reims, 
MS 2127, f. 142, Jacques-André Naigeon (copyist probably his brother 
Charles-Claude), 1798-1800, Pen and Paper, MS of Jacques-André 
Naigeon, Mémoires historiques et philosophiques sur la vie et les 
ouvrages de Denis Diderot, Bibliothèque Carnegie de Reims, CC-BY
This passage ends with an ellipsis of no fewer than five dots, and 
suddenly diverts into the theatricalised dialogue of Le Rêve, but with an 
extra twist: Naigeon introduces some rustling curtains. Thus Lespinasse 
and Bordeu do not just hear d’Alembert making an unspecified noise and 
fall quiet, as they do in Diderot’s version(s); they hear him rustling the 
curtains round his bed. And so commences d’Alembert’s grand dream 
monologue on shifting selfhood: ‘Pourquoi suis-je tel? c’est qu’il a fallu 
que je fusse tel…’ [Why am I this way? Because I had to be this way] (p. 
255), much but not all of which is included although lightly reordered 
and intercut with thematically-related sentences from the Éléments. This 
is where d’Alembert contemplates change and the relationship of part 
to whole, concluding that flux is perpetual, and that the notion of the 
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individual is meaningless, because not only does nothing ever stay the 
same, but also everything is an indivisible part of something bigger (p. 
256), and furthermore that the species are also in flux (pp. 257–58). 
These are the pages (pp. 256–57) that Herbert Dieckmann’s article of 
1938 examined, when he first brought to light the presence of extensive 
quotation from the Rêve de d’Alembert and the Éléments de physiologie, 
which he at that point only knew in the incomplete early draft from St 
Petersburg which Assézat and Tourneux had published in 1875.43 
Here Naigeon briefly emerges from the quotation mesh into overt 
commentary to declare that these ideas, merely ‘systématiques’ or 
abstract at this point in human knowledge, will come to be proven in 
the future, a claim which time has shown to be true, at least to some 
extent.44 More locally, Naigeon also claims that d’Alembert’s dreaming 
‘excursions’ or ‘trips’, are very carefully placed within the system as a 
whole, that they are ‘placées avec beaucoup d’art et de sobriété’ [placed 
with great skill and sobriety] (p. 259). Sobriety? This seems almost 
comical for anyone who knows exactly what d’Alembert’s trippy reveries 
involve. Not a chance, for example, that Naigeon will be mentioning 
d’Alembert’s wet dream, let alone the third part of the Rêve de d’Alembert, 
the ‘Suite de l’entretien précédent’, where Lespinasse gives Bordeu a 
glass of malaga, and then asks him to tell her about miscegenation, 
overtly associating alcohol with dangerous freedom of thought.45 The 
very mention of sobriety is like a flag signaling the opposite.
Soberly, in any case, Naigeon brings us back to theme of monsters, 
already touched on, and to the organisation of the organs (pp. 259–60); 
these sections are predominantly from the Éléments de physiologie, with 
just a few lively inserts from the ‘Rêve’, including Lespinasse’s quip 
(non-attributed) on how man is the monstrous version of the woman 
and vice versa. The presentation of monstrosity becomes a discussion 
of different needs producing different organs, of how pain and pleasure 
43  Herbert Dieckmann, ‘J.-A. Naigeon’s Analysis of Diderot’s Rêve de d’Alembert’, 
Modern Language Notes, 53.7 (1938), 479–86, https://doi.org/10.2307/2912683 
44  See for example Phoebe von Held’s experimental film, including interviews with 
scientists from the National Institute of Medical Research, London, ‘D’Alembert’s 
Dream’, https://www.phoebevonheld.com/new-index#/dalemberts-dream, 
first shown at the ‘State of Mind’ exhibition, curated by Simon Gould and Ruth 
Maclennan, London School of Economics, 2005.
45  Diderot, Le Rêve de d’Alembert, ed. by Georges Dulac, in Œuvres complètes, DPV 
(Paris: Hermann, 1987), vol. 17, pp. 23–209 (p. 195).
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drive us, and of how our vices and virtues are reliant on what our organs, 
understood as including the sensory organs and the imagination, are 
like; this then moves onto the topic of the perfectibility of organs (pp. 
260–62). This organ-related material seems thematically connected, 
despite the fact that it is brought together from six different sections 
of the Éléments (this is the case for both draft versions), but Naigeon 
then, after only a semi-colon, shifts to what seems like a new topic, that 
of not being able to think when experiencing intense feeling (p. 262). 
He then returns to the brain and to Lespinasse’s (unattributed) analogy 
of the spider (p. 263), and thence to the sense of self that arises from 
memory (p. 264); he meshes this with the notion that what characterises 
humans is their brain, returning to the previous strands on sensation 
without thought and on the potential faults in perception, on how a 
brain can misinterpret sensation (p. 265). This is developed into a 
political analogy (from the ‘Rêve’) about what happens when one or 
another part of the body becomes stronger than the rest (p. 266). He 
returns to the relationship between sensation, nerves, and thought in 
the brain, to the importance of memory particularly in connection to the 
self, to the result of imbalance and the types of character or profession 
produced by the various imbalances (again from the ‘Rêve’, pp. 267–68). 
He then looks at sleep and dreaming (pp. 270–71); this section draws its 
passages from both source texts, although the Éléments predominates. 
Then considering the sense of self during sleep, he introduces the theme 
of freedom or the will, or rather, in Diderot’s deterministic account, the 
extent and influence of involuntary actions (pp. 272–73). Naigeon then 
provides a long counter-example, showing how instinct can misdirect. 
This is Diderot’s proof (from the Éléments) that if you happen to find 
yourself in an out-of-control carriage, you should throw yourself out 
over the back wheel not the front one, because otherwise the back 
wheel will run you over. In a footnote, Naigeon explains how Diderot 
first presented this idea in a conversation with high-society people in 
St Petersburg, and how the mathematician Leonhard Euler, who was 
present, failed to back him up while knowing perfectly well that Diderot 
was right (pp. 274–76; the abundantly detailed footnote continues for a 
further couple of pages). 
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Fig. 12.5 Diderot’s proof about which side of a carriage to throw 
yourself out of, Bibliothèque Carnegie de Reims, MS 2127, f. 153, 
Jacques-André Naigeon (copyist probably his brother Charles-Claude), 
1798-1800, Pen and paper, MS of Jacques-André Naigeon, Mémoires 
historiques et philosophiques sur la vie et les ouvrages de Denis 
Diderot, Bibliothèque Carnegie de Reims, CC-BY
The main text then returns again to the question of the relative 
balance and operation of the different organs, and introduces the theme 
of genius (from the ‘Rêve’). Naigeon then, in his own voice, paraphrases 
Diderot’s views on the deleterious effect of excessive study, following 
this with a brief but intense rant about Jean-Jacques Rousseau who said 
something similar in the Discours sur l’inégalité; Naigeon calls this seminal 
text ‘une espèce de roman métaphysique’ [a sort of metaphysical novel] 
(pp. 278–79). Post-rant, he resumes his quotation mosaic to pursue the 
topic of the ill-health of the studious person, signalling the switch with 
a ‘quoi qu’il en soit, voici l’observation de Bordeu’ [in any case, this is 
the observation Bordeu makes], although what follows is in fact from 
the Éléments.46
46  On the deleterious effects of excessive study, see Anne C. Vila, Suffering Scholars: 
Pathologies of the Intellectual in Enlightenment France (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2018), https://doi.org/10.9783/9780812294804 
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He comes out of his quotation mosaic again to comment that because 
Bordeu is being harried both by the doubts or objections of d’Alembert 
and also by ‘les questions de mademoiselle Delespinasse’ [Mlle de 
Lespinasse’s questions], he is not always as thorough as he might be. 
This is an interesting mark of Naigeon’s hostility to the dialogue format 
which he systematically erases from actual quotation of the ‘Rêve’, 
while nonetheless retaining its nominal presence in the form of the 
frequently mentioned title, the ‘second dialogue’, and as part of his 
own framing—for example, ‘voici l’observation de Bordeu’ [this is the 
observation Bordeu makes]. Despite these claims about d’Alembert and 
Lespinasse, the passages that Naigeon is here introducing and excusing 
are taken from the Éléments, and what he is specifically apologising 
for or justifying is a certain rapidity: ‘c’est ainsi qu’il explique en peu 
de mots, mais avec une singulière précision, les divers phénomènes 
du jugement, du raisonnement, de la formation des langues’ [this is 
how he explains in few words but with striking precision, the diverse 
phenomena of judgement, reasoning, and the formation of languages] 
(p. 280). And this introduces pages of quotation, in more sustained and 
less re-ordered chunks than usual, from the chapter on ‘Entendement’ 
[the Understanding]: we move from sensation to idea and thence 
to language (pp. 280–82) and to the imagination: here the complex 
meshing patterns return, drawing from different parts of the Éléments 
(in either version) and also from the ‘Rêve’, although in smaller quantity 
(pp. 283–84). Naigeon then returns to the question of sensation and its 
functioning, and how sensation leads to judgement (p. 285). This makes 
way for a new topic, that of only being able to focus on one thing at a 
time, already implicit in the previous discussion of not being able to 
think when experiencing intense feeling. This also allows Naigeon to 
score a point against Condillac, who supposedly did not notice this 
aspect (p. 286); Naigeon will return to Condillac later to conduct a very 
thorough assault on his work (pp. 292–307). Meanwhile, he switches to 
the question of abstraction, using an extensive passage from the ‘Rêve’ 
that argues that ‘toute abstraction n’est qu’un signe vide d’idées’ [any 
abstraction is only ever a sign devoid of ideas] (p. 287). He has almost 
reached the end of the quotation mesh here, and he begins to conclude, 
praising ‘ce profond Dialogue’ [this profound Dialogue] for the way 
in which Diderot develops all the different parts of his system, how 
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The nineteenth-century philosopher and historian of philosophy, 
Jean-Filibert Damiron (1794–1862), in his Mémoire sur Naigeon (1857), 
asks who these ‘petits profonds’ could be, saying that ‘Je ne vois guère 
à citer que Gurat [sic], qui ne l’aimait pas, et auquel sans doute il le 
rendait’ [I cannot see who to cite other than Gurat who disliked him, 
and whom he no doubt also disliked].48 ‘Gurat’, one supposes, is a typo 
for Dominique-Joseph Garat. But I wonder whether Naigeon really is 
48  Jean-Philibert Damiron, Mémoire sur Naigeon et accessoirement sur Sylvain 
Maréchal et Delalande (Paris: Durand, 1857), reprinted in Mémoires sur les 
Encyclopédistes (Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1968), p. 67.
well it all hangs together, how enlightening it is about the operations 
of the human understanding, the perfecting of which, he says, can only 
be found in the works of those who follow the route laid out in ‘these 
dialogues’ and base their philosophy on Diderot’s principles (p. 288). 
This claim that there are people who do follow the route laid out in 
‘these dialogues’ is one we will return to in a few paragraphs.
Meanwhile, he gives one last passage from the Éléments, internally 
uncut, on the way in which an eye senses a tree and the soul gets an 
idea of it (pp. 289–90); by way of an introduction, he remarks again that 
Condillac failed to think of this issue (p. 288); he is beginning to prepare 
the way for his attack on Condillac. Placing an ‘etc’ to indicate the end 
of the quotation, Naigeon then commences his retrospective overview: 
‘Telle est, autant que la mémoire et le secours de quelques extraits très-
succincts faits autrefois sur l’original, pour ma propre utilité, peuvent 
m’en assurer, l’analyse de ce second Dialogue’ [That, insofar as my 
memory and the help of a few extremely short passages copied long 
ago from the original for my personal use confirm, is the analysis of this 
second Dialogue] (p. 290): we analysed this passage earlier.47
The attack on Condillac, running for many pages, is a crucial part 
of the presentation of the quotation mesh from the ‘Rêve’ and from the 
Éléments de physiologie. It is not merely a violent critique of Condillac but 
more importantly a comparison of Condillac’s and Diderot’s theories of 
human understanding which aims to sweep aside Condillac and give 
Diderot his place and prestige. His final swipe, not just at Condillac but 
Rousseau too, both of whom he derisively calls the ‘saints du jour’ [saints 
of the day], is also targeted at all the ‘petits profonds’ [tiny thinkers] who 
content themselves with rehearsing Condillac’s views (pp. 306–07).
47  See above.
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Fig. 12.6 Condillac and Rousseau the “saints of the day”, Bibliothèque 
Carnégie de Reims, MS 2127, f. 168, Jacques-André Naigeon (copyist 
probably his brother Charles-Claude), 1798-1800, Pen and paper, MS of 
Jacques-André Naigeon, Mémoires historiques et philosophiques sur la 
vie et les ouvrages de Denis Diderot, Bibliothèque Carnegie de Reims, 
CC-BY
targeting Garat or the Ideologues more generally here; it seems unlikely 
given their own insistent criticism of Condillac and also the presence 
we have traced within their work of the Éléments de physiologie: the 
particular aspects of their discussion of human understanding which 
I have argued came from the Éléments are also present in Naigeon’s 
Mémoires, whether we are talking about sensation-based thought, the 
importance of the imagination, or the potential for the perfecting of the 
senses. Naigeon would have recognised these aspects when he heard or 
read their work, even if he had not himself been party to communicating 
Diderot’s theories to them in the first place. Furthermore, in the 
Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, Naigeon twice mentions Diderot’s 
‘idées mères’ [mother ideas], these highly fertile ideas of his, that were 
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so influential and whose phrasing is so recognisable (pp. 168, 412). It 
seems more likely that when he says that some of these ‘idées mères’ ‘se 
retrouvent plus ou moins développées dans plusieurs ouvrages publiés 
de son temps, et dans quelques autres qui ont paru depuis, et qu’on 
a même beaucoup loués dans certains journaux’ [can be found, more 
or less developed, in many works of his time and in some that have 
been published since, and which have received much praise in certain 
newspapers] (p. 412), and when he praises ‘ceux qui suivent en général 
la route tracée de ces deux dialogues, et qui philosophient sur les 
principes de l’auteur’ [those who in general follow in the path laid out 
by these two dialogues and who philosophise according to the author’s 
principles] (p. 288), he is alluding to Garat, Cabanis, and Destutt de 
Tracy, and that therefore, when he attacks the disciples of Condillac, he 
is not targetting the Ideologues. However, this is what, via Damiron, has 
generally been supposed.
It is important, moreover, not to lose sight of what Naigeon claims 
here, that ‘la route tracée de ces deux dialogues’ [the path laid out 
by these two dialogues] is being followed by others. This is a crucial 
confirmatory claim for this study, that is, that the Éléments de physiologie 
were known, and were influencing the work of others. He does not 
say who he means, and we cannot know for sure. But it seems likely, 
given the common emphasis on human understanding that all these 
works share, that he is alluding to the work of the Ideologues. It is also 
possible, given the prominent position given to Bordeu, that Naigeon is 
thinking of vitalist doctors, such as Paul-Joseph Barthez and Paul-Victor 
de Sèze, both of whom he mentions as worthy of ‘toute l’attention des 
philosophes’ [all the attention of the philosophers].49 However, it remains 
more likely, given the common focus on the human understanding, that 
he is referring primarily to the Ideologues.
Let us also linger for a moment on the title that Naigeon consistently 
uses, Les deux dialogues. These two dialogues, according to Naigeon’s 
own internal subtitles, are the ‘Suite d’un entretien philosophique 
supposé, entre D’Alembert et Diderot’ (p. 207) and ‘Le Rêve de 
d’Alembert’ (p. 224), and as we have seen, the first is an accurate title, 
49  Naigeon, Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, p. 223n for both Barthez and de Sèze; 
see also 233n  and 245n for further extensive reference to (and quotation from) 
Barthez.
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whereas the second is accurate to some extent, in that it does indeed 
introduce considerable quotation from ‘Le Rêve’, but also, as we know, 
contains concealed quotation from another, more substantial source. In 
fact the title of Les deux dialogues is not particularly mysterious. It was the 
title that Diderot himself gave Le Rêve de d’Alembert when it was freshly 
written; there are two instances of him referring to it by that name in 
his letters to Grimm from November 1769, as Georges Dulac tells us.50 
Les deux dialogues is also the title of a version which Diderot had copied 
for Catherine II in St Petersburg in 1774, with different names given 
for the interlocutors, and which has an opening letter to her in which 
he also uses a story of broken fragments.51 This letter, however, is not 
quite the same as the one he will later use as the ‘Avertissement’ of the 
Éléments de physiologie; we have mentioned this piece, and where it fits 
in the narrative of the fragments, in an earlier chapter.52 Emphasising 
the importance of the fragment motif, at the end of this copy of Les deux 
dialogues we find the Fragments dont on n’a pu retrouver la véritable place, 
the very first draft of the Éléments de physiologie.53 Naigeon knew of the 
Rêve de d’Alembert from its very earliest versions and made a copy of it 
at that time, and it, along with a copy made much later, are now used to 
track the different draft levels of the Rêve.54 So he would have known it, 
if not exclusively, by that title. 
We have already sketched out a few suggestions for why Naigeon 
should have wished to mask the existence of this separate work on 
physiology, which are broadly that he is presenting a particular version 
of Diderot as the weighty philosopher of human understanding who 
has corrected and overtaken Locke and Condillac. Thus he minimises 
some of the more overt statements of materialism (they become implicit 
rather than explicit) and also removes anything which runs the risk of 
being labelled immoral. And yet, as we know, he did not completely 
hide this separate work. Instead, he gave it a sort of potential existence, 
50  Georges Dulac in DPV 17, p. 76. See Denis Diderot, Correspondance, ed. by Roth and 
Varloot, vol. 9, pp. 190, 207.
51  See Dulac, ‘Etablissement du texte’, Le Rêve de d’Alembert, DPV 17, p. 76 (this 
manuscript is known as ‘MD’).
52  See Chapter 2, ‘From Elements to Fragments’.
53  DPV 17, p. 225. Le manuscrit de Pétersbourg/1774/Avertissment des deux dialogues/
Fragments dont on n’a pu trouver la véritable place, ed. by George Dulac, DPV 17, pp. 
213–60.
54  See Dulac, ‘Etablissement du texte’, Le Rêve de d’Alembert, DPV 17, p. 75 (N1); 80 
(N2). 
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as a series of letters which Diderot planned to address to Naigeon and in 
which he was to give ‘à sa manière, une nouvelle théorie, ou plutôt une 
histoire naturelle et expérimentale de l’homme’ [in his manner, a new 
theory or rather a natural and experimental history of man], but which, 
sadly, he never got round to, leaving only disordered fragments (p. 291). 
This is the already-alluded-to re-evocation of the ‘Avertissement’ to the 
Éléments de physiologie. So he did not hide it completely.
It has also been our consistent view that Naigeon’s version of this 
‘Second dialogue’ is indeed his version, and not the reproduction of 
a further text by Diderot himself.55 There are a number of reasons to 
support this view, starting with the commonsensical one that there exist 
many manuscript copies of the Rêve de d’Alembert (Dulac uses twelve 
principle ones in his DPV edition), and two extant known copies of 
the Éléments de physiologie, while there is not a single manuscript from 
Diderot’s lifetime that meshes them. Secondly, we have Naigeon’s 
repeated remarks on the editorial role in general, as well as his own 
views of what needs to be done with respect to Diderot’s manuscripts 
and the Deux dialogues in particular, and indeed what he has done, 
reorganising and transposing Diderot’s ‘raisonnements’ (arguments). 
What he claims to have done is borne out exactly by our own work 
tracking these reorganised and transposed arguments.56 Furthermore, 
we have a precious trace of Naigeon’s technique in a piece of marginalia 
in his copy of the Rêve: next to Bordeu’s remark on the persistence of 
pain in a limb that is no longer there, Naigeon adds a passage from the 
Éléments, which he annotates as being from the ‘Physiologie de Diderot’; 
these two passages are then sewn together in the Mémoires (p. 265), with 
the passage from the Éléments following the Saint Petersburg manuscript 
word for word (although the Vandeul version is also very close).57
55  Terada also holds this view, calling it instead ‘une réécriture totale’ [a complete 
rewriting] (MT 64–65). I would simply add that it’s a re-ordering, not a rewriting.
56  Dulac, while dismissing the Mémoires as a useful variant text of the Rêve, clearly 
holds the same view. He writes that ‘Ce ne sont cependant que des morceaux 
combinés dans un nouvel ensemble et il nous a pas paru possible d’en tenir compte 
dans l’apparat critique’ [they are however nothing other than snippets of text 
arranged in a new order and it did not seem possible to us to include them in the 
critical apparatus] (Dulac, ‘Etablissement du texte’, Le Rêve de d’Alembert, DPV 17, p. 
84). He refers the reader to Dieckmann’s 1938 article on Naigeon: Dieckmann, ‘J.-A. 
Naigeon’s Analysis of Diderot’s Rêve de d’Alembert’.
57  This information comes from Jean Varloot and Georges Dulac’s edition. The section 
from Le Rêve is: ‘on sent du mal à un membre qu’on n’a plus’ [we feel pain in a 
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The question that remains is thus which manuscript version he was 
using, the early draft held in St Petersburg (hereafter SP), and published 
in the Assézat and Tourneux edition, or the mature draft held in the 
Fonds Vandeul (hereafter V) in the Bibliothèque nationale de France, 
as edited by Jean Mayer in DPV and subsequently by Paolo Quintili and 
Motoichi Terada. We said earlier that it seems most likely that he had 
access to both of the versions of the Éléments de physiologie we still have, 
and probably also to a third version that we no longer have access to.58 
(I am not assessing which particular manuscript or manuscripts of the 
Rêve de d’Alembert Naigeon was using.) I would now like to add some 
detail to this proposition, while avoiding cumbersome text comparison 
and commentary. The different layers and sources of the text can be 
instantaneously visualised in the digital edition, and I refer the reader 
to it for the nitty-gritty.59 Here I want to bring together a few clear 
examples to show that Naigeon was using both extant manuscripts of 
the Éléments, and sometimes prefers one, sometimes the other. Starting 
with the mundane, I will look at a few single word variants; I will then 
look at the order in which Naigeon quotes chunks from the source texts 
to see whether we can establish which one he is following, the two 
limb we no longer have] (Le Rêve de d’Alembert, DPV 17, p. 156), and in Naigeon’s 
manuscript this passage is added: ‘Lorsqu’on avait le membre, de ce membre affecté 
la sensation allait au cerveau; si par quelque cause la sensation est ressuscitée, alors 
on rapportera la sensation à son ancienne origine, et l’on aura mal au membre 
qu’on n’a plus. Souvent la douleur se fait sentir ailleurs qu’à la partie blessée; c’est 
un effet de la liaison du nerf avec un autre dont l’origine est commune à tous les 
deux. Physiologie de Diderot’ [when we had the limb, the sensation went from the 
affected limb to the brain; if for some reason the sensation is restimulated, then we 
will associate the sensation with its old origin, and we will feel pain in a limb that 
we no longer have. Often the pain is felt somewhere other than in the injured part; 
this is an effect of the nerve being connected to another one with which it shares 
a common source. Diderot’s Physiologie] (DPV 17, p. 156n; we find it the Saint 
Petersburg version, p. 312; the very close variant is Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, 
ed. by Paolo Quintili (Paris: Champion, 2004), pp. 284–85 [hereafter PQ], and DPV 
17, p. 459. These two passages run on in the Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, 
pp. 265–66).
58  Motoichi Terada, whose edition of the Éléments de physiologie includes an appendix 
with the relevant pages from Naigeon’s Mémoires historiques et philosophiques, with 
footnotes giving the source passages in the Rêve de d’Alembert and the Éléments de 
physiologie, considers that Naigeon was using SP (MT 57). He accounts for those 
elements in the Mémoires that seem closer to V by suggesting that Naigeon was 
developing his own analysis, one that seems to have coincidentally moved in the 
same direction as V (MT 66, 68). 
59  See https://naigeons-diderot.mml.ox.ac.uk/index.htm.
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manuscripts being organised completely differently, and I will also note 
the distribution of quoted passages according to the source chapters or 
sections; I will subsequently note where passages which are only in one 
of the versions of the Éléments are quoted by Naigeon in the Mémoires, 
and I will finally point to a passage that is to be found in neither of 
these extant versions, and may therefore point to a further manuscript 
variant. In each case, following chronological order of composition, I 
will take SP first and V second.
So, the words: in the Mémoires, we read about how the organs can 
be arranged in the wrong order ‘depuis l’orifice de l’œsophage jusqu’à 
l’extrémité du canal intestinal’ [from the orifice of the oesophagus to the 
very end of the intestinal canal] (p. 260): the word orifice is in SP, whereas V 
corrects this to origine.60 This suggests that SP is the source text. However, 
in a passage on dreams, Naigeon mentions the disconnected dream 
which ‘suscite une image’ [provokes an image] (p. 270); suscite is in V, 
whereas SP has surexcite [over-excites].61 Furthermore, when Naigeon 
is quoting passages about the dangers of excessive study, he writes 
that: ‘l’homme de la nature est fait pour penser peu et agir beaucoup; 
la science, au contraire, pense beaucoup et se remue peu’ [natural man 
is made to think only a little and act a lot; knowledge on the other hand 
thinks a lot and moves only a little] (p. 279): SP had had l’homme de 
la nature [natural man] matched by its equivalent l’homme de la science 
[the scholarly man, the mean of learning], whereas Naigeon and V miss 
out l’homme de, and simply say la science: this seems like a mistake, and 
it is common to both.62 Thus it looks as if the particular phrasing (and 
probably mistake) of V is replicated in Naigeon’s Mémoires.
Next, the order of texts: Naigeon reproduces a long passage on 
how violent sensation is incompatible with thought (p. 262) which 
we find in exactly the same form in SP (p. 356) but which is cut into 
two in V and placed into sections which are far apart (pp. 294, 146). 
Furthermore, two pages (pp. 372–73) from the section in SP entitled 
‘Entendement’ are quoted verbatim in Naigeon (pp. 280–83), whereas 
60  SP 420; V: Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, ed. by Jean Mayer, Œuvres complètes, DPV 
(Paris: Hermann, 1987), vol. 17, pp. 261–574 (p. 445) [hereafter DPV]/PQ 266/ MT 
261. SP refers to the early draft now held in St Petersburg; V stands for Vandeul, the 
archive holding the mature version.
61  SP 362; V: DPV 482/PQ 312/MT 297.
62  SP 273; V: DPV 511/PQ 353/MT 324.
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this passage is divided in V and placed in two chapters, ‘Entendement’ 
and ‘Imagination’ (pp. 288–89; 303–04). So this is strong evidence of 
SP’s presence. In favour of V, we have a more complex case to present, 
whereby we find the source texts for a page of quotation on sensations 
and their variety in Naigeon in two pages from the same chapter and 
sub-section in V (pp. 285–86), although they are somewhat chopped 
about and re-ordered. However, when we look at SP, we find these 
same sections drawn from six pages and four different sub-sections 
of SP (in order of quotation: p. 358 [‘Sensations: Effet Bizarre’], p. 356 
[‘Sensations’], pp. 355–56 [‘Sensations’], p. 349 [‘Sens internes: Sens en 
général’], pp. 350–51 [‘Sens internes: sensations’], and as the parentheses 
hopefully show, from two separate main headings (‘Sens internes’ 
and ‘Sensations’, which have their own subsections, one of which is, 
confusingly, ‘sensations’). This seems to show that the reworked text, V, 
is being followed here, rather than the obviously messy and repetitive 
SP. Yet the picture is not clear, and one phrase we find in SP and Naigeon 
does not make its way into V.63 This is why it seems likely Naigeon was 
consulting both draft versions, and possibly a third one as well. 
There are further examples of quotation from passages we can 
source to only one of the versions, and again this leads us to both of 
them. Naigeon quotes SP on healthy nerves and free communication 
between the nerve and the brain (N 227; SP 311), as well as a paragraph 
on seminal fluid which Diderot describes as a ‘folie conjecturale’ 
[conjectural madness] (N 238; SP 403); the first statement can be 
found reworded in V, but the ‘folie conjecturale’ is not included at all.64 
However, the story Naigeon tells about Diderot’s ‘système particulier 
de physiologie’ (p. 291) draws, as we have already shown, on the 
‘Avertissement’ to V, so again, we have evidence of the presence of both 
draft versions. Although not conclusive, it may also be worth noting 
that when we plot Naigeon’s quotation against the table of contents 
of the Vandeul version, we find that he quotes from every chapter in 
the first and third parts (‘Des Êtres’ and ‘Phénomènes du cerveau’ 
respectively), and from only seven of the twenty-five chapters from 
63  ‘L’impression naît du dedans ou du dehors, selon l’organe affecté. L’impression 
est ou goût, ou odorat, ou vision, ou son, ou toucher’ [the impression arises from 
inside or outside, depending on the affected organ]. Naigeon, Mémoires historiques 
et philosophiques, p. 228; SP 356.
64  DPV 458/PQ 284/MT 274.
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the second part (‘Éléments et parties du corps humain’). This shows 
a clear preference for the introductory first part considering life as an 
interconnected whole and for the last part focusing on sensation and 
the workings of the brain, to the partial exclusion of part two, with 
its technical physiological description, resulting, as Motoichi Terada 
points out, in a de-Hallerised version of the Éléments de physiologie.65 
We have already noted this thematic preference, and that this is also 
a feature of the works of Garat, Cabanis, and Destutt de Tracy.66 This 
profile is much clearer to see in V. In SP, any pattern in the quotation 
is much harder to discern, as SP is not organised into parts, and as we 
have already seen, some sub-headings in one area are the same as main 
headings of another; this is part of its early-draft character. Thus, there 
are forty-seven headed sections (they often have single paragraphs 
that have their own sub-headings too, but they are not being counted 
here), and of these forty-seven, Naigeon quotes twenty-eight, with 
most passages coming from ‘De l’homme’ and ‘Cerveau et cervelet’ 
(twelve each), ‘Animaux’ (ten), ‘âme’ (eight), and ‘Entendement’ 
and ‘Mouvement’ (seven each), ‘Organes’ (six), with the following 
three chapters all equal—‘Sens internes’, ‘Sommeil’ and ‘Nerfs’ (five). 
Thereafter the instances of quotation are too scattered to be helpful to 
record. 
It is difficult to pronounce clearly one way or another when surveying 
this evidence about the source passages, but the slight preponderance 
of texts from SP (both with respect to their ordering and the presence 
of passages absent from V), when considered alongside the relative 
distribution of the quotation, may suggest that Naigeon was more 
familiar with SP than V, and plundered it rather than V for preference, 
but that the re-structured mature version did nonetheless influence his 
understanding of it; the fact that he quotes from every chapter of the 
first and final parts of V tends in this direction. In favour of his also 
having access to a further manuscript version, we might point to a 
passage which is not to be found in either SP or V, and to a note which 
65  MT 59: ‘On peut ainsi constater l’absence presque totale de Haller dans le Précis du 
Rêve, malgré les nombreuses citations des EP [it can therefore be seen that Haller 
is almost completely absent from the Summary of the Dream, despite the numerous 
quotations from the Elements of Physiology]. Haller as in Albrecht von Haller, pre-
eminent physiologist, discussed in Chapter 3.
66  See Chapters 8 and 9.
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resembles passages from SP and V in different ways, and seems more 
likely to have been from a different version than a splicing of the two.67
This, then, was what Naigeon had long been referring to, 
his ‘analyse raisonnée de celui de ces ouvrages qui m’a paru le plus 
profond’.68 We can measure the distance of this piece of work from the 
‘quelques extraits très-succincts’ [a few extremely short passages] (p. 
290) which, he claims, were all he had to work from, or the ‘quelques 
matériaux épars’ [a few scattered materials] (p. 291) that Diderot 
had supposedly left; we see how this story is tailored to pick up on 
and continue Diderot’s claims in the ‘Avertissement’ from V. It is not 
impossible that Naigeon may even have taken encouragement for his 
reordering project from this very ‘Avertissement’; we saw in Chapter 10 
that he was already poised to operate in that way.69
His Mémoires historiques et philosophiques sur la vie et les ouvrages 
de Denis Diderot, however, were not published during his lifetime. 
Emmanuel Boussuge and Françoise Launay trace the fate of the 
manuscript: left to Naigeon’s brother Charles Claude, after his death 
in 1816, they passed to the third sibling, Mme Dufour de Villeneuve, 
who wrote to Diderot’s daughter Angélique to offer to sell it to her; 
Angélique appears to have declined.70 After Naigeon’s sister died, her 
things were sold, and J. L. L. Brière, the publisher, bought it, planning 
to publish it in his edition, which indeed he did.71 Out it came, as the 
twenty-second volume of that edition, in 1823, and it was banned by the 
Tribunal correctionnel de la Seine on 23 December 1823.72 Decades later, 
Maurice Tourneux talked of a new edition of it coming out, but nothing 
67  The passage which is in neither SP or V is here: ‘On peut même dire que les nerfs’ 
to ‘qu’une même substance’ (N 227); this 7-line insert sits within quotation from 
SP (276) and V (155). The note (N 284n) resembles SP in that it acknowledges a 
cut from SP with an ‘etc’ and uses the term ‘résonnances’ as SP does. However, it 
comes from two separate pages in SP (358; 355), whereas in V it runs on directly 
(283–84), with no intervening passage. V uses the term ‘ressouvenances’ instead of 
‘résonnances’, and its opening clause is slightly different.
68  Naigeon, ‘Diderot’, Philosophie ancienne et moderne, vol. 2, p. 228.
69  See above.
70  Boussuge and Launay, ‘Du nouveau sur Jacques André Naigeon’, pp. 173, 181.
71  Boussuge and Launay, ‘Du nouveau sur Jacques André Naigeon’, p. 189. Its 
whereabouts had been known, and are mentioned in Barbier’s Examen critique et 
complément des dictionnaires historiques les plus répandus; he incorrectly calls it an 
‘ouvrage inachevé’; we have already commented on this aspect, see above, note 8 in 
this chapter.
72  Boussuge and Launay, ‘Du nouveau sur Jacques André Naigeon’, p. 189.
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came of it. However, and despite the banning, the book had already 
been widely bought and read; David Adams tells us it was often bought 
separately.73 Its onward reception, and the reception of Diderot in the 
nineteenth century generally, is a new story that we do not have space 
to tell here.74
73  David Adams, Bibliographie des œuvres de Diderot, 1739–1900, vol. 2, p. 141 (see 
Adams’ ‘Commentaire’, n. 3).
74  You will be relieved to hear.

13. Conclusion
As Jean Mayer feelingly put it when describing his difficulties with 
editing the Éléments de physiologie (for the second time), ‘l’éditeur, celui 
de Diderot surtout, est condamné à inventer pour chaque problème des 
solutions spécifiques’ [the editor, particularly in the case of Diderot, is 
condemned to come up with an individualized solution for every single 
problem].1 I could not agree more, as I extend his lament about critical 
editions to apply also to this monograph. And the result is a rather 
oddly-shaped book that has developed organically from following the 
Éléments de physiologie and its fate, while simultaneously sprouting a 
digital edition of the relevant pages of Naigeon’s Mémoires sur Diderot. It 
has become a study not only of a late work of Diderot’s, but also, quite 
substantially, of Naigeon, Diderot’s disciple and literary executor, and 
furthermore of the educational and research committees and institutions 
of the French Revolution in its swiftly revolving and ever convulsive 
phases.2 It is to some extent therefore also a history of this period from 
a very particular point of view. It offers new readings of the Ideologues, 
Cabanis and Destutt de Tracy, and of their avowed influence, minister 
and educator Garat. Fresh materials have appeared in all these sections.
1  Jean Mayer, ‘La composition fragmentaire des Éléments de physiologie (problèmes 
d’édition)’, in Editer Diderot, ed. by Georges Dulac, SVEC, 254 (1988), pp. 253–305 
(p. 255).
2  2020 is a big year for Naigeon studies! Mario Cosenza has just published his 
intellectual biography of Naigeon, which unfortunately came out too late for my 
research to benefit from it. Others will be luckier! All’ombra dei Lumi: Jacques-André 
Naigeon philosophe (Naples: FedOAPress, 2020): http://www.fedoabooks.unina.it/
index.php/fedoapress/catalog/book/190.
© Caroline Warman, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0199.13
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The first part of the book contemplated the Éléments de physiologie 
itself. It offers a tour of this extraordinary work, yet bizarrely, even 
to make a claim so simple and basic as to say that it is extraordinary 
and worth taking a tour of, seems somewhat new. Our second chapter 
assesses the reasons for this strange state of affairs and emerges with a 
discussion of Pascal, having argued that the Éléments de physiologie, this 
‘Atheist’s Bible’, throws down the opening words about its fragmentary 
and incomplete state as a signal that it is accepting Pascal’s challenge 
to the atheist to be anything other than disordered and incoherent. We 
muse on the irony of Pascal’s own defence of his faith having remained 
unfinished, and also at the even greater irony implicit in Diderot’s 
counter-defence having been thought to be fragmentary and unfinished. 
We don’t know whether to laugh or cry.
Diderot, as a materialist philosopher writing about physiology, is 
directly engaging with two noisy areas—the philosophical tradition, and 
human physiology as it was understood in the late eighteenth century. 
We look at each in turn. The point we make in Chapter 3 (‘Material 
World and Embodied Mind’) is that what we find in the Éléments de 
physiologie is Diderot’s ultimate iteration of the arguments to establish 
that man was devoid of divine parts and needed to be understood and 
investigated in merely material terms. Iteration is an important term 
in this context, as Diderot is repeating arguments that had been being 
made for more than a century prior to his composing the Éléments de 
physiologie. What is specific or original to this work is not necessarily the 
arguments themselves, but that he brings them all together in one place. 
What makes them explosive is that he frames them unapologetically 
and overtly within a materialist context and also demonstrates them 
with reference to the physiology of the human body. This makes the 
Éléments de physiologie into a book of unrivalled audacity for the period. 
As an introduction to physiology, we argue that it is better than 
equivalent or rival introductory works for its succinct clarity, its ability 
to ask questions of its material, and its consistent indication of lived 
experience across natural forms so various—like the girl with only 
a stump for a tongue who still had a sense of taste, or the man who 
fell pregnant—that ‘natural’ can no longer be defined by contrast to 
a supposed ‘unnatural’. The spare directness of its descriptions are 
the result of Diderot’s experience as a writer of many articles for the 
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Encyclopédie (and editor of all of them) in combination with the often 
virtuoso ekphrastic writing of his Salons, and to put it bluntly, they make 
a whole lot more sense than the often incomprehensible and always long 
descriptions generated by ‘real’ physiologists. Diderot’s physiological 
descriptions are set within a clear presentation of the functions of the 
human body as a whole, following an introduction considering natural 
beings and life forms more generally, and leading into an enquiry of the 
human mind. As the ‘real’ physiologist, Théophile de Bordeu, put it, 
and as we quoted earlier, ‘Il faudroit enfin un Descartes ou un Leibniz, 
pour débrouiller ce qui concerne les causes, l’ordre, le rapport, les 
variations, l’harmonie, et les lois des fonctions de l’économie animale’ 
[ultimately what is needed is a Descartes or a Leibniz to disentangle that 
which concerns the causes, the order, the relationship, the variations, 
the harmony, and the laws governing the functions of the animal 
economy].3 We argue that Diderot’s response to this plea was the 
Éléments de physiologie.
Part 2 looks at what happened next. Each chapter looks at an episode 
of publication in which Diderot’s work on physiology was being 
mentioned, quoted, or drawn on (each case is different), and we chart 
these episodes in strictly chronological order. This was the only possible 
approach, given that each publication event was not just attentively 
engaging with its immediate Revolutionary and political context, 
but seemingly adjusting its techniques in the light of reactions to the 
previous episodes. Whether we are talking about Naigeon’s strident 
statements and structured approach to the exercise of his duties as 
Diderot’s literary executor, about the fate of the floating manuscript of 
the Éléments de physiologie, gifted to the Comité d’instruction publique 
[Committee of Public Education] on 24 March 1794, or what seem to be 
the numerous allusions to the Éléments on the part of Garat, Cabanis, 
and Destutt de Tracy, this is an unfurling and multi-referential story in 
which all players are working in close proximity, unavoidably aware of 
what the others are doing, and of needing to take every intervention into 
account. During this period, what is not said and who is not mentioned 
are as defining as their positive opposites.
3  Théophile de Bordeu, Recherches sur les glandes (1759), in Œuvres complètes de Bordeu: 
précédées d’une notice sur sa vie et sur ses ouvrages, ed. by Anthelme Richerand, 2 vols 
(Paris: Caille et Ravier, 1818), vol. 1, p. 208.
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Nonetheless, and despite the fact that the chronology is the only 
thing that helps bring clarity and readability to this complex history, it 
needs to be said that there are really two separate stories taking place. 
The first is the story of Naigeon’s repeated allusions to his Mémoires sur 
Diderot, to the importance of the work he was going to discuss in it, 
and to the imminence of its in fact always-deferred publication. This 
story has involved tracking Naigeon’s drum-rolling mentions of the 
Mémoires and quotations from the Éléments de physiologie all the way 
from the furore-inducing Adresse à l’Assemblée nationale of 1790 and the 
1792 article on ‘Diderot’, the fifteen-volume edition of Diderot’s Œuvres 
in 1798 with its selections, omissions, and statements, to the claims 
he makes in the Mémoires themselves. Here we analyse what it is that 
Naigeon has done with the Éléments de physiologie and, to a lesser extent, 
with the Rêve de d’Alembert. We look at his text in the light of his previous 
assertions about Diderot and about editing, not least in the censored 
preface to his 1802 edition of the Bordeaux copy of Montaigne’s 
Essais. The immense and busy collage of interwoven snippets that he 
produces has to be credited for being the first publication of either of 
these two texts of Diderot’s, given that quotation from them is exact 
and incessant, as the connected digital edition of these hundred pages 
shows immediately and comprehensively, and despite the fact that his 
reweaving techniques produce something completely different from 
either source text. Perhaps the questions of whether or not we recognise 
the original, and connectedly, whether or not we like what he has done, 
distract us from seeing something else, which is that this particular 
case may be providing us with invaluable details about his composition 
practices in earlier collaborations such as that other infamous atheist 
text, d’Holbach’s Système de la nature, a collaboration, moreover, that 
he undertook with Diderot. Paying attention to this may indicate the 
route to further research on the text factory of the Encyclopédistes and 
in d’Holbach’s circle.
Our own approach is somewhat in the style of a textual detective. 
We have used a metaphorical magnifying glass to compare texts and 
watch out for hints and traces. This is even more the case for the second 
of the two stories mentioned, which follows the third manuscript copy 
of the Éléments de physiologie, now lost, and the work of Garat at the 
École normale in 1795 and of the Ideologues at the Institut National in 
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the late 1790s. Here we conclude on the basis of extensive comparison 
that they did have access to the Éléments de physiologie in some version, 
whether it was specifically by means of this third manuscript, via 
Naigeon, or in some other way, and that they were channelling its 
insights directly into their own very successful lectures. This story is 
a separate one from Naigeon’s for one principal reason: that whereas 
we have incontrovertible proof of Naigeon’s knowledge of the Éléments 
de physiologie in the form of his quotation of about fifty pages from it, 
there is nothing explicit in the cases of Garat, Cabanis, and Destutt. 
With them, the argument gathers force (hopefully) from the sheer 
weight of cumulative resonances and parallels, and although there are 
some striking textual resemblances, these are infrequent. The story of 
Garat, Cabanis, and Destutt is marked by much greater circumspection 
on their part. Garat indeed was famous for his circumspect style, and 
much mocked for it. His odd two-volume Mémoires historiques sur la vie 
de M. Suard, sur ses écrits, et sur le XVIIIe siècle of 1820 provides a perfect 
example of volubility and circumspection, one in which, I argue, he 
repeatedly alludes to Diderot’s Éléments de physiologie.
Interwoven, these two broad strands tell a vastly different story about 
Diderot’s influence from the one that we are used to. This new story says 
that there was a concerted programme on the part of those philosophers 
who had been close to Diderot or to his circles to disseminate his thinking 
on materialism, physiology, and the mind, and that the pressures 
operating on the public sphere during the French Revolution and in the 
subsequent years of reaction, first Napoleonic and then monarchical, 
dictated absolutely the forms that dissemination was able to take. It also 
tells us something about how Naigeon, Garat, Cabanis, and Destutt de 
Tracy related to materialist thought, something which itself resonates 
with what we saw in Chapter 3. This is that these people seem all to 
have been more committed to transmitting materialist arguments and 
insights than to acknowledging those who generated those arguments 
and insights or to preserving the characteristics or form of one particular 
text. Or, to put it another way, they show their commitment to Diderot, 
whose works they have to present very carefully (if at all), by finding 
new ways and forms for his thought to continue to circulate that tend to 
remove him from the story. This, it seems, is how unorthodox thought 
survived at this time and under these circumstances. As Nicholas Cronk 
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has remarked, the re-use of texts is so extensive during this period that it 
could be called a defining feature of Enlightenment discourse.4
Ursula Le Guin wrote that ‘The unread story is not a story; it is 
little black marks on wood pulp. The reader, reading it, makes it live: 
a live thing, a story.’5 And although the Éléments de physiologie is not a 
story, this unreadness, this zombie existence as an unpublished, unread 
manuscript without a future, a present, or very much past, was not in 
fact its fate. It was a live thing. And I would argue that its reception is a 
story worth telling in itself.
This study is a deeply historicist one. Even the point in the previous 
paragraph has a historicist anchoring to it: scholars can henceforth 
take the Éléments de physiologie seriously because it was read during 
the period of study and therefore has historical value. But my final point 
will be a different one, an invitation not just to historians and scholars, 
but to those thinkers engaged with the perspectives and questions 
of new materialism, gender theory, and ecology, those looking with 
anxious urgency at the climactic and social effects of global capitalism. 
Might not Diderot’s attention to reciprocity, equality, assemblages, his 
understanding of connections and relations, his up-tipping of normal 
hierarchies, and his view of people as vegetable, animal, and human all 
at once, offer ways of thinking we need to revisit? 
4  Nicholas Cronk, ‘Digitizing Enlightenment’, paper delivered at the inaugural 
conference of The Berlin-Oxford Enlightenment Hub, St John’s College, Oxford, 2 
October 2019.
5  Ursula Le Guin, ‘Where Do You Get Your Ideas from?’, in Dancing at the Edge of 
the World: Thoughts on Words, Women, Places (London: Paladin, 1992 [1987]), pp. 
192–200 (p. 198), cited by Ika Willis, Reception (London and New York: Routledge, 
2018) p. 2.
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between man, ma� er and mind. In this late work, Diderot delves playfully into the rela� onship 
between bodily sensa� on, emo� on and percep� on, and asks his readers what it means to be 
human in the absence of a soul. 
The Atheist’s Bible challenges prevailing scholarly views on Diderot’s Éléments, asser� ng its 
contemporary philosophical importance and promp� ng its readers to inspect more closely 
this li� le-known and li� le-studied work. This book is accompanied by a digital edi� on of 
Jacques-André Naigeon’s Mémoires historiques et philosophiques sur la vie et les ouvrages 
de Denis Diderot (1823), a work which, Warman argues, represents the fi rst publica� on of 
Diderot’s Éléments, long before its offi  cial publica� on date of 1875.
The Atheist’s Bible cons� tutes a major contribu� on to the fi eld of Diderot studies, and is 
of further interest to scholars and students of materialist natural philosophy in the Age of 
Enlightenment and beyond. 
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